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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
To my 
Father and Mother 
Foreword 
T HERE has been in recent years a marked develop-ment of interest in the diversities of laws and their attendant conflicts. While modern facilities of com-
munication accelerate the spread of culture and thus augment 
the need of uniformity in the laws affecting commerce, they 
also reveal the significance of local needs, customs, and legal 
institutions. Indeed, it would seem that multiplication of 
jurisdictions and progressive diversification of laws in both 
space and subject matter is an unavoidable concomitant of 
increasing specialization in the international, interstate, or 
local economy. If these circumstances serve to justify the 
perennial effort to simplify the law, they also argue that the 
effort is Sisyphean. Meanwhile, determination of the com-
petent court and the appropriate law in the juridical conflicts 
arising in the course of commerce is requisite. 
It is sometimes objected that the resolution of conflicts of 
laws through rules guiding the selection of the applicable 
law is, as contrasted with the method of unification, a pis aller. 
But it would seem that, for the substantial group of problems 
engendered by the necessary division of judicial business and 
the variation of law according to the peculiar needs of par-
ticular communities, there is no feasible alternative. In-
deed, it may be said that, while a substantial measure of legal 
unity may be attainable in homogeneous culture areas, par-
ticularly when united under a common government, and 
unification of law is particularly desirable in the field of in-
ternational commerce, the notion of eradicating the sources 
of diversity through universal standardization of local customs 
and enactments, is under existing conditions palpably vain 
and, in certain respects, even vicious. A common law is suit-
vii 
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able only for common conditions and in any event does not 
obviate the inevitable issues of jurisdiction. It can scarcely 
be doubted that clearer perception of this situation has stimu-
lated the current interest in conflicts of laws. For, in the de-
gree that uniformity appears unattainable, the bases determin-
ing the applicable law in cases of conflict assume consequence. 
Of this increased interest, the literature respecting con-
flicts of laws that has appeared in the United States during 
the past two decades is ample testimony. On the one hand, 
there has been a major endeavor to systematize the field 
through the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, 
which has been supplemented by a monumental treatise and 
two valuable, if less extensive, manuals. On the other hand, 
there has been prolific consideration of specific problems in 
the law reviews, and the courts have concurrently provided 
an unusually rich casuistry of judicial opinion. In addition, 
the general theoretical issues have attracted attention, and 
more recently a degree of emphasis has been given to the 
value of comparative study in this field. There have, however, 
appeared relatively few exhaustive monographic studies of 
topics adequate in scope to afford a testing-ground for the 
more general or theoretical developments and at the same 
time carrying sufficient detailed consideration of specific 
problems to serve the needs of the practitioner. 
From this point of view and on several counts> the present 
study deserves attention. It comprizes a comprehensive sur-
vey of the reported Anglo-American cases in an area of great 
practical interest, which at the same time throws into relief 
the principal fundamental issues respecting the selection of 
the applicable law in cases of conflicts. A distinctive, if not 
indeed unique, feature of this survey is that it compares in 
detail the historical and doctrinal developments not merely 
in England and the United States but in the chief British 
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Dominions as well; it thus provides an illuminating per-
spective of the evolution of legal theory and practice in these 
related areas of legal culture. The technique followed is in 
refreshing contrast to the prevailing predilection for logistics 
in dealing with conflicts of laws; its significant premise is to 
relate and criticize the recorded cases in terms of the funda-
mental policies involved in preference to more formal con-
sideration. On this basis, the author develops a mode of 
approach to the central theoretical problems concerning char-
acterization (otherwise known as qualification or classification) 
and the primary distinction between substance and procedure, 
which, while of course indebted to prior critical studies, is 
nevertheless both original and practical. In this connection, 
emphasis is given to an aspect of the matter too little developed 
in the current literature, namely, that of alternative or 
multiple reference, involving the potential applicability of 
laws emanating from several jurisdictions in what the author 
appropriately designates as "multiple contact situations." 
Moreover, the treatment is in a style lucid and exact, which, 
the substance considered, is something of an achievement and 
a deceptively modest advertisement of incisive analysis. 
It is not for a foreword to forestall too much what is to 
follow. Nevertheless, the central feature of the present study 
from the theoretical point of view-the proposed emphasis 
upon standards of policy in the resolution of conflicts of laws-
invites brief comment. As specifically formulated in Chapter 
III, the policy criteria proposed are (a) uniformity and 
(b) the degree of interest of the State concerned in the par-
ticular situation. As intimated in the previous paragraph, 
this mode of approach is a commendable advance upon tech-
niques that seek to secure certainty in formal casuistry. And 
the corollarial proposal to obviate the intricacies of current 
theories of characterization by reference to such standards 
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has not merely the virtue of simplicity but, as the treatment of 
specific questions substantiates, also recommends itself from 
a practical point of view. Not the least of its merits is to 
suggest the futility of the question-begging and mechanical 
distinction by some proposed between primary and secondary 
classification. While the present study does not purport to 
explore the wider theoretical implications of this approach, 
it is worth noting that the thesis advanced may find comfort 
in the increasingly significant tendency to resolve or even to 
dissolve the problems of characterization in comparative law. 
This tendency (which of course assumes that conflict of laws 
rules are rules of positive and not of international law and, 
therefore, are technically a part of the lex fori in the broader 
sense of that ambiguous term) stresses the need of intelligent 
and forward-looking interpretation of these rules, for which 
purpose, and more particularly as a means to uniformity, 
comparison of the analogous doctrines in the various legal 
systems is essential. 
In this connection, a further consideration deserves notice, 
namely, the desirability of reaching the proper solution from 
the viewpoint of the substantive subject matter. It would not 
need to be emphasized, were it not so frequently overlooked 
in the theory of the subject, that conflict of laws cases (as 
diffe:·entiated from conflicts of jurisdiction) involve as a rule 
not only the selection of the proper law but also the basic 
issues of such law, whether lying in the field of torts, contracts, 
commercial instruments, or whatever other branch of sub-
stantive law may be concerned. By the very nature of such 
cases, there is typically presented an underlying divergence 
of views or policies respecting the proper substantive solu-
tion, not infrequently representing a conflict between an 
obsolescent doctrine and a more liberal trend. Even in the 
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latter type of situation, uniformity is admittedly a prime 
desideratum. But what of the instances, more frequent than 
is commonly supposed, where the law to be applied is unde-
cided or obscure or, as in situations involving the possibility of 
alternative or multiple reference, where the arguments for 
the application of one law in preference to another are far 
from compelling? In the resolution of such situations, the 
contributions of critical comparative scholarship have illumi-
nating pertinence and, absent countervailing considerations, 
will serve to indicate and justify determinations in accord 
with modern views of justice. In short, in the sphere of con-
flict of laws, the function of comparative law is not only to 
establish bases for the unification of the conflict rules as 
such but also, if only within the limits suggested, to promote 
and explore the possibilities of uniformity in the treatment 
of the basic substantive issues. 
In a related aspect, the implications of the point of view 
developed in this study are significant. Recently, in consider-
ing the possibility of unification of the subject matter in the 
Americas, a distinguished student of Anglo-American law 
from the comparative point of view, Professor Edouard 
Lambert, has directed attention to the excessive emphasis 
upon particularistic autarchy in the Restatement of the Law 
of Conflict of Laws, as evidenced notably by the comment to 
§ s, construing the accepted principle that conflict of laws 
rules are part of the internal law of each State in the sense 
that the courts in each State must apply, respectively, their 
own conceptions of conflict of laws. In this connection, he 
also remarks the corresponding doctrine enunciated in Kryger 
v. Wilson1 and other federal decisions to the effect that mis-
conceived applications of these rules by the State courts are 
1 242 U.S. 17r, 37 Sup. Ct. 34 (r9r6). 
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not usually reviewable on constitutional grounds, since they 
concern solely the locallaw.2 The same conception, it may 
be added, underlies the recent decision of the Supreme Court 
in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., in which it is de-
clared, applying the doctrine of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins,S 
that it is not for the federal courts to enforce "an independent 
'general law' of conflict of laws," since, subject to review on 
any federal question, each State is "free to determine whether 
a given matter is to be governed by the law of the forum or 
some other law."4 In the face of this insistence on the su-
premacy of local law in the interpretation of conflict of laws 
rules and the narrow construction correspondingly given to 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and other applicable con-
stitutional provisions by the Supreme Court, consideration 
of this problem is peculiarly pertinent. As the historical 
survey of the decisions involving foreign torts in the initial 
chapters of this study indicates, the courts in the United 
States in the course of the past hundred years have developed 
a progressively liberal attitude with respect to the sphere of 
application of foreign law in such cases, with a converse re-
striction upon recourse to the internal lex fori on grounds of 
so-called local policy or the "procedural" nature of the issue. 
It is a real service to have traced this important trend and 
to have substantiated its direction by logical exposition of 
the fundamental policies thus evolved to deal with conflict 
of laws. 
The fact is that, on the crucial issue of the significance of 
the lex fori for the solution of conflicts of laws, the official 
• Bulletin de l'Institut de Droit Compare de Lyon, March, I94o, at pp. II :ff., 
referring to Professor Lorenzen's magistral discussion, "The Federal Constitu-
tion as a Source of Private International Law," 3 Recueil d'etudes sur les 
sources du droit en l'honneur de Franc;ois Geny, I934, 437, at p. 452. 
8 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 8I7 (I938). 
• 6I Sup. Ct. Io2o (I94I). 
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theories are both anachronistic and confused. The doctrine 
of the Restatement, noted above, respecting the nature of 
conflict of laws rules (which are also characterized in the com-
ment to § 4 as "part of the general system of the common 
law") is not merely apparently self-contradictory and in-
consistent with the supposed purpose of the Restatement; it is 
hostile to the historic function of the law of conflict of laws. 
And the corresponding failure of the federal courts to define 
the ambit of local policy in conflict cases involving the laws 
of sister States, including even the so-called uniform laws, 
is out of line with the delimitation of State police power in 
other respects by the same federal tribunals and the recent 
adoption of uniform federal rules of civil procedure, anti-
pathetic even to the premises of the unprecedented decision 
in Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins5 by which the doctrine has 
been most recently supported, and in effect incompatible with 
the intent of the federal system. It countenances an in-
congruous, if not also otiose, atomization of the administra-
tion of justice in the United States in an area where uniform-
ity is primarily desirable and its indicated instrument is the 
federal judiciary. Indeed, for the purposes of a union such 
as the United States, and only less so for the purposes of 
international commerce, doctrines asserting the unconditional 
claims of the lex fori, which consequently preclude considera-
tion of the legitimate interests of other States than that of 
suit in cases of conflict, obviously carry positivism to the 
point of absurdity. 
The time is ripe to recognize that, for the solution of con-
flicts of laws and indeed for legal science generally, neither 
idealistic internationalism nor nationalistic positivism is an 
adequate basis of theory. The doctrines of the former type, 
once prevalent, have been superseded some time since, it hav-
• 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938). 
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ing been perceived that substantially no effective interna-
tional rules correspond to the inconsistent universal systems 
they projected and that they did not account for the munic-
ipal origin of conflict of laws rules and their administration 
by national courts. Nevertheless, it may be remarked that 
these theories, even in the attenuated form of the comity 
doctrine, represent an effort to define the objectives of the 
law respecting conflict of laws. On the other hand, current 
positivism, properly emphasizing the existent conditions and 
procedure for the determination of conflicts of laws, has been 
led into a cul de sac; it assumes the ultimate substantial 
finality of the lex fori. As this assumption affords no rational 
basis to determine in case of doubt what the lex fori should 
be and is essentially inconsistent with the very purpose of this 
branch of law (which is in stated measure to derogate from 
the lex fori), positivism ends in autarchy eventuating in a 
desperate struggle to escape the consequences of its primary 
premise. If, in the field of conflict of laws, internationalism 
has been characterized by unrealistic star-gazing, positivism is 
in an inverted posture like that of the students of astronomy in 
Aristophanes' comedy, engaged, their noses to the earth, in 
observing the movements of the celestial bodies. 
In addition, both types of theories commonly err in two 
further respects. In the first place, they exaggerate the sig-
nificance of sovereignty in the solution of conflicts of laws, 
whether by conceiving the problems as distinctively inter-
national or as emphatically national, whereas, at least in 
private disputes, it would seem that the primary desideratum 
is to do justice to the private interests concerned. It does not 
advance the issues much in such cases to envisage them in 
terms of local policy or national honor, nor even, we might 
add by way of parenthesis, to do so in cases of disputes 
between States. In the second place, both types of theories 
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excellently illustrate the dangers· of confusing ideal law 
with existent conditions of justice. Internationalism, taking 
a distant hope for significant actuality, is prejudiced by its 
indifference to existing conditions; positivism, confusing the 
traditional with the ideal, does not face the vital problems 
of legal change, which have to do with the present and the 
future, not the past alone. 
It would seem, therefore, that, as Dean Falconbridge and 
others have suggested, a via media is indicated, a synthesis 
that will recognize the respective merits and compensate 
for the faults, of the two extremes. An acceptable theory 
for the solution of conflicts of laws must accordingly accept, 
on the one hand, the local formulation and administration of 
the rules determining the applicable law and, on the other 
hand, the necessity to ascertain and apply the rules on rational 
grounds consistent with their purpose. It must take account 
of current conditions and under the limitations they impose 
define the criteria that express most accurately and adequately 
the substantial factors involved in the solution of conflicts 
of laws. It must suppose the rules embodying these criteria, 
national in their locale, to have an interstate or international 
orientation and objective. These conditions, as above inti-
mated, require a comparative or, in other words, a scientific 
approach. In short, in this as in other branches of law, it 
behoves legal science to have its feet on the ground and its 
head in the air, so that it may both walk and see ahead. 
With this and two companion volumes, the series of Mich-
igan Legal Studies is inaugurated, the purpose of the series 
being to facilitate and provide a suitable vehicle for the 
publication of products of legal research, particularly at 
the University of Michigan Law School, such as may be of 
interest and value in the development of legal science. We 
bespeak for the series the benison of the bar and others con-
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cerned with legal research and for the individual issues such 
generous consideration as their respective merits deserve. 
The present monograph is committed to the public with the 
further hope that the objective treatment in the following 
pages of the underlying purposes and scope of application 
of conflict of laws rules as illustrated by the Anglo-American 
cases involving torts may serve, among other things, to 
stimulate reconsideration of this fundamental matter, not 
only from the viewpoint of Anglo-Dominion law, the basic 
theory of which seems to have been prematurely crystallized 
by a very few leading precedents, but equally in the United 
States where the historical background leaves less excuse for 
illiberal theory. 
HESSEL E. y NTEMA 
Preface 
THE central theme of this study is the general choice-of-law principle that the law of the place where an alleged wrong has occurred ought to determine ques-
tions of legal liability for that wrong.1 We shall endeavour 
to examine and discuss the general social problems and the 
specific variations of those problems whose solution has 
brought this choice-of-law principle into play. Our con-
sideration of the solutions which courts and legislatures have. 
adopted for these problems will embrace the materials of 
both Anglo-American and Anglo-Dominion common law. 
As a rule, common-law courts are primarily concerned with 
cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdictions 
which they decide according to the rules of their respective 
internal or territorial laws. 2 But over a period of time 
they have developed a number of theories concerning the ap-
plication of foreign laws to cases which have a foreign setting. 
The development of such theories within the field of our 
study by English courts is briefly reviewed in the first chap-
ter. The analogous development in the United States is 
outlined in the second chapter. 
In the United States, the association of the various states 
in a federal system has further complicated the choice-of-law 
problem. The Supreme Court of the United States has held 
1 The expression "law of the place of wrong" or "lex loci delicti" is some-
what misleading because it suggests that a legal wrong has been committed. 
But in a conflicts case the defendant may rely upon the so-called law of 
the place of wrong to exonerate him of all legal liability. The expression 
must be taken to mean "law of the place of alleged wrong" or "law of 
the place where the facts of which plaintiff complains have occurred." 
• In this study the expressions "internal law," "domestic law," "law of the 
forum," "local law," all mean the body of legal rules normally applied by 




that certain clauses of the federal Constitution impose limita-
tions upon the power of individual states to apply their own 
laws to transactions connected with other states. The federal 
judiciary itself occupies a somewhat dubious position in re-
lation to choice-of-law principles. These peculiarly American 
problems are also considered in the second chapter. 
It is trite learning that every rule of law has, or ought 
to have, a purpose. What are the underlying social purposes 
of the choice-of-law principle that the law of the place of 
an alleged wrong determines questions of liability for that 
wrong? Why should this principle be followed? An attempt 
is made to answer these questions in chapter three. The opera-
tion of this principle is limited by a number of exceptional 
rules. Foreign laws contrary to the public policy of the forum 
are not enforced. Matters of procedure are governed by the 
law of the forum alone. And there are various minor rules 
which have a similar effect. Now it seems probable that a 
large number of cases would raise the border-line issue: to 
what extent should the application of the general choice-of-
law principle be modified by the application of one or more 
of these rules which operate as exceptions to it? It is sub-
mitted that this question can only be properly answered by 
taking into consideration the reasons for following the gen-
eral choice-of-law principle and the reasons for following 
the. exceptional rule or rules in question. The social policies 
of the choice-of-law principle and the social policies under-
lying the exceptional rules ought to be weighed against one 
another. Chapters four and five are therefore devoted to a dis-
cussion of the various exceptional rules with a view to ascer-
taining their social functions. 
Having examined the social functions of the choice-of-law 
principle and of its exceptions, we are now in a position to 
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consider its relation to specific types of rules of internal law. 
This is done in chapter six. 
In a simple conflict of laws case all the legally significant 
facts are connected with a single jurisdiction which is not 
the forum. There is a more complex type of case in which 
the facts are spread over two or more jurisdictions. Because 
the operative facts are so connected with these jurisdictions 
it is necessary to take their laws into consideration. Cases of 
this type, called multiple contact cases, provide the theme 
for chapter seven. Some specific problems of this type are 
discussed in chapter eight. 
Maritime torts require separate consideration. They raise 
a number of multiple contact problems which are considered 
in chapter nine. 
The earliest steps in the preparation of this study were 
taken in 1937 while I was a graduate fellow in the University 
of Michigan Law School. It is a great satisfaction to me to be 
able to record my deep gratitude to Mr. Henry M. Bates, 
then Dean of the Law School, and his colleagues for their 
inspiring instruction and their very great kindness. 
School of Law 
University of Toronto 
September, 1941 
MoFFATT HANcocK 
Table of Contents 
PAGE 
FOREWORD BY HESSEL E. YNTEMA .................... Vll 
PREFACE ...................................... XVll 
TABLE OF CASES ................................ XXVll 
CHAPTER I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW RESPECTING 
FoREIGN ToRTs IN ENGLAND. . . . . . . . . . I 
Sec. I. Assertion of judicial jurisdiction over for-
eign torts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
Sec. 2. The situation in which the law of the forum 
would allow recovery but the law of the 
place of wrong would not: the justification 
theory; the obligation theory . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Sec. 3· The situation in which the law of the place 
of wrong would allow recovery but the law 
of the forum would not: the first rule in 
Phillips v. Eyre. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 
Sec. 4· Recent English and Canadian cases . . . . . . . . . I 5 
CHAPTER II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW RESPECTING 
FoREIGN ToRTs IN THE UNITED STATEs: 
SPECIAL CoNSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. . . . . 2 I 
Sec. 5. The situation in which the law of the forum 
would allow recovery but the law of the 
place of wrong would not. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 I 
Sec. 6. The situation in which the law of the place 
of wrong would allow recovery but the law 
of the forum would not. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 
Sec. 7. Recent tendency to extend the application of 
foreign law.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
xxi 
xxii TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
Sec. 8. The comity theory; the obligation theory; 
the vested rights theory.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
Sec. 9· The Constitution of the United States and 
choice-of-law principles.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
Sec. IO. The federal courts of the United States and 
the conflict of laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
CHAPTER III. CHOICE-OF-LAW PoLICY........... 54 
Sec. I I. Uniformity as a choice-of-law policy.. . . . . . 54 
Sec. I 2. The interest of the state where the wrong 
occurred; the need for a significant con-
nection with the conduct of the parties.. . . 6I 
CHAPTER IV. ExcLUsiON oF FoREIGN PROCEDURAL 
RuLES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
Sec. I3. Reasons for exclusion of foreign procedural 
rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
Sec. I4. The problem of classification.. . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
Sec. I 5. Possible bases of classification considered. . . 70 
Sec. I6. Effect of exclusion of foreign law: burden on 
plaintiff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
Sec. J7. Effect of exclusion of foreign law: burden 
on defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
CHAPTER v. ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE AP-
PLICATION OF THE LAW OF PLACE OF 
WRONG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
Sec. I 8. Public policy of the forum.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
Sec. I9. The first rule in Phillips v. Eyre and the 
concept of public policy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
Sec. 20. Penal laws.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
Sec. 21. Injuries to foreign land.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
Sec. 22. Limitations created by the law of the place 
of wrong ............................ IOO 
TABLE OF CONTENTS XXlll 
PAGE 
CHAPTER VI. SoME SPECIFIC PRoBLEMs •......... I04 
Sec. 23. Determination of the nature of defendant's 
conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I04 
Sec. 24. Causation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I08 
Sec. 25. Contributory negligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rro 
Sec. 26. Measure of damages: American jurispru-
dence ............................. I I3 
Sec. 27. Measure of damages: Anglo-Dominion 
jurisprudence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 I 
Sec. 28. Proper plaintiffs to the action.. . . . . . . . . . . I 24 
Sec. 29. Proper defendants to the action. . . . . . . . . . . I 3 I 
Sec. 30. Limitations upon the time for bringing an 
action. . .......................... 133 
Sec. 3 r. Notice before action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 4 r 
Sec. 32. The maritime lien.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I42 
Sec. 33· Determination of facts by court or jury.. . . . 148 
Sec. 34· Nature and function of rules relative to bur-
den of proof ........................ I 53 
Sec. 3 5. Argument for the application of the law of 
place of wrong respecting burden of 
proof ............................. I59 
Sec. 3 6. The burden of proof upon the issue of con-
tributory negligence in the federal courts 
of the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 68 
CHAPTER VII. MuLTIPLE CoNTACT CAsEs: INTRO-
DUCTORY DISCUSSION •................. I7I 
Sec. 37· Application of one or of several choice-of-
law principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 7 I 
Sec. 38. Choice-of-law policies in multiple contact 
cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 7 5 
xxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
Sec. 39· The theory of causation applied in multiple 
contact cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 8 I 
Sec. 40. The problem of classification in multiple con-
tact cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 8 3 
Sec. 41. The thesis of a primary classification.. . . . . . I 89 
CHAPTER VIII. SPECIFIC PRoBLEMs IN MuLTIPLE 
CoNTACT CAsEs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I92 
Sec. 42. Liabilities of carriers and telegraph com-
panies: limitation of liability. . . . . . . . . . . I 92 
Sec. 43· Assignment or release of a tort cause of ac-
tion .............................. 202 
Sec. 44· Employers' common-law liability for injuries 
to employees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5 
Sec. 45· Workmen's compensation acts: coverage of 
the statute of the forum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 
Sec. 46. Workmen's compensation acts: a claim au-
thorized by the law of one state can rarely 
be enforced in the courts of another state. . 2 I 3 
Sec. 4 7. Workmen's compensation acts: statutory pro-
visions barring alternative claims or reme-
dies .............................. 2I7 
Sec. 48. Workmen's compensation acts: contracts 
limiting the employer's liability, releases, 
and prior judgments ................. 226 
Sec. 49· Workmen's compensation acts: a statutory as-
signment of the employee's rights against· 
a third party tortfeasor to the employer.. . 232 
Sec. so. Actions between spouses.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 
Sec. 5 I. Vicarious liability of automobile owners. . . . 2 3 7 
Sec. 52. Liability of tortfeasor's insurer to injured 
party ............................. 239 
TABLE OF CONTENTS XXV 
PAGE 
Sec. 53· Legal effect of a party's death.. . . . . . . . . . . 244 
Sec. 54· Miscellaneous multiple contact problems. . . 2 5 I 
CHAPTER IX. MARITIME ToRTS •................ 257 
Sec. 55. Introduction: the general maritime law con-
cept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 
Sec. 56. Maritime torts in territorial waters involving 
a single ship.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26I 
Sec. 57· Collision in territorial waters.. . . . . . . . . . . 266 
Sec. 58. Maritime torts on the high seas involving a 
single ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 I 
Sec. 59· Collision on the high seas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 73 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 I 
INDEX ....................................... 287 
Table of Cases 
PAGE 
Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, (I 892) 97 Ala. 126, I I So. 
803 ....................................... I94, 254 
Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Hill, (I9I2) I39 Ga. 224, 76 S. E. 
IOOI .......................................... I30 
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, (I 934) 
I Cal. (2d) 250,34 P. (2d) 7I6 .................... 2I5 
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of Cali-
fornia, (I935) 294 U.S. 532,55 Sup. Ct. 5I8 .... 39, 220, 225 
Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co., (I89I) 48 Ohio St. 623, 30 
N. E. 69 .................................... 3I, 2o6 
Allen v. Pitts. & Conn. R. Co., (I876) 45 Md. 4I........ 23 
AlphaS. S. Corp. v. Cain, (I930) 28I U.S. 642, 50 Sup. Ct. 
443 ........................................... 265 
Amalia, The, (I863) I Moo. N. S. 47I, I5 Eng. Rep. 778 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I9, I 23 
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. McCaffrey, (C. C. A. 5th, 
I93o) 37 F. (2d) 870 .................... 2Io, 2I6, 229 
Anderson v. Jarrett Chambers Co., ( I924) 2IO App. Div. 543, 
206 N.Y. Supp. 458 .............................. 227 
Anderson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (I9I4) I27 C. C. A. (6th) 
277, 2IO Fed. 689 ............................... I30 
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (I 9 I 9) I 69 Wis. 106, I 70 
N. W. 275, I7I N. W. 935 ......................... 22I 
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (I922) I76 Wis. 52 I, I82 
N. W. 852, I87 N. w. 746 .................... 234, 248 
Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co., ( I875) 37 Wis. 32I.. 28 
Apurimac, The, (D. C. Va., I925) 7 F. (2d) 74I ........ 264 
Aquitania, The, (I924) Am. Mar. Cas. I440 ............ 277 
Arkansas, etc., R. Co. v. Lee, ( I906) 79 Ark. 448, 96 S. W. 
I48 ........................................... I98 
Armbruster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I 9 I 4) I 66 Iowa 15 5, 
147 N. w. 337· ............................. II7, II8 
Armendiaz v. Stillman, (I88r) 54 Tex. 623 .............. IOO 
Arp v. Allis Chalmers Co., (I907) I30 Wis. 454, IIO N. W. 
386 ........................................... 142 
XXV!l 
XXVlll TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Arum, The, [I92I] P. I2 ............................ 268 
Ash v. B. & 0. R. Co., (I 890) 72 Md. IH, I9 Atl. 643. . . . 26 
Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Mills, (I909) 53 Tex. Civ. App. 359, 
I I 6 S. W. 8 52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 0 I 
Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Nichols, (I 924) 264 U. S. 34S, 44 
Sup. Ct. 353. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I9 
Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers, (I 907 Tex.) 99 S. W. I 90 .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IOI, I02 
Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer, (C. C. A. 9th, I 92 7) 20 
F. (2d) 714 .................................... I5I 
Austin's Adm'r v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., (I906) I22 Ky. 
304, 9I s. w. ]42 ............................ 250, 25I 
Avon, The, (I S73) I Brown's Adm. I 70, 2 Fed. Cas. 255. . . I44 
Bagdalik v. Flexlume Corp., (I939) 257 App. Div. 5S3, I4 
N.Y. Supp. (2d) 35 .............................. 2I2 
Bailey v. Western Union Tel. Co., (19I6) 97 Kan. 6I9, IS6 
Pac. 7I6 ....................................... I95 
Baise v. Warren, (I932) ISS Va. 505, 164 S. E. 655 ........ IOS 
Balderston v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I9oS) 79 S.C. 160, 
6oS. E. 435 ................................. 196, I97 
Baldwin v. Byrne, (I939) 53 Wyo. 519, S6 P. (2d) I095 .... 2I2 
Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Evans, (I9II) IIO C. C. A. (3d) 
ISS, ISS Fed. 6 .................................. 205 
Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Joy, (IS99) I73 U.S. 226, I9 Sup. 
Ct. 3S7 ........................................ 250 
Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan, (I903) 3I Ind. App. 597, 
6S N. E. 923. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I66 
Bannister v. Shepherd, (I939) I9I S.C. I65, 4 S. E. (2d) 7 .. 210 
Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., (I92o) 227 N.Y. 
531, 125 N. E. 675 ............................... 221 
Batthyany v. Walford, (I SS7) 36 Ch. D. 269 .......... 92, I 87 
Baymead, The, (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) Am. Mar. Cas. 207 ... 145 
Beach v. Bay State Steamboat Co., (1S59) 30 Barb. (N.Y.) 
433 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Belgenland, The, (1SS5) II4 U.S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. S6o .... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274, 275, 279 
Bennett v. Connelly, (1923) 122 Misc. 149, 202 N.Y. Supp. 
s68 ........................................... 265 
TABLE OF CASES XXIX 
PAGE 
Betts v. Southern R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, I934) 7I F. (2d) 
787 ....................................... 233· 234 
Bettys v. Mt1waukee, etc., R. Co., (I875) 37 Wis. 323 ...... II8 
Blad v. Barnfield, (I674) 3 Swan. 604, Cas. Temp. Finch I86, 
36 Eng. Rep. 992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Blad's Case, (I673) 3 Swan. 603, 36 Eng. Rep. 99I....... 6 
Blount v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., (D. C. La., I925) 
5 F. (2d) 967 ................................... 2I6 
Bolinger v. Beacham, (I 9 I o) 8 I Kan. 7 46, I o6 Pac. I 094. . . I 2 5 
Bonacina,InRe, [I9I2] 2Ch.D.394 ................ 91, I87 
Boneau v. Swift, (I934 Mo.) 66 S. W. (2d) I72 .......... IOS 
Bonsalem v. Byron S. S. Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931) 50 F. (2d) 
Il4 .......................................... 265 
Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber, etc., Co., (1925) 34 Brit. Col. 
485 ........................................... IOO 
Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Hurd, (I90I) 47 C. C. A. (Ist) 6IS, 
Io8 Fed. II6 .................................... II8 
Boston, etc., R. Co. v. McDu:ffey, (I897) 25 C. C. A. (2d) 
24 7, 79 Fed. 934. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 
Boulden v. Pennsylvania R. Co., ( I903) 205 Pa. 264, 54 Atl. 
906 ........................................... I29 
Bourg~gne, La, (I9o8) 2IO U.S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664 .. 272, 275 
Boyce v. Wabash R. Co., (I884) 63 Iowa 70, I8 N. W. 673 .. II8 
Boyd v. Clark, (C. C. Mich., I88I) 8 Fed. 848 ........... I37 
Boyle v. Southern R. Co., ( I90I) 36 Misc. 289, 73 N. Y. 
Supp. 465 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I20 
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (I932) 286 U.S. I45, 
52 Sup. Ct. 57I ....................... 4o, 57, 22I, 222 
Brady v. Brady, (I9I3) I6I N.C. 324, 77 S. E. 235...... 99 
Brereton v. Canadian Pacific R. Co., (I 898) 29 Ont. 57 . . . . 96 
British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moc;;ambique, [I893] 
A. C. 6o2, 63 L. J. Q. B. 70, 6 R. I, 69 L. T. 604 ..... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 96, 97· 98, 99 
Brooks v. Southern Pac. Co., (C. C. Ky., I906) I48 Fed. 986. I28 
Brown v. Hedges, (I7o8) I Salk. 290, 9I Eng. Rep. 257.... 99 
Brown v. Sunday Creek Co., (C. C. Ohio, I908) I6S Fed. 
504 ........................................... 127 
Brown v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I9IO) 85 S.C. 495, 67 
S. E. 146 ................................... I95, 198 
XXX TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Buckeye v. Buckeye, (I93I) 203 Wis. 248,234 N. W. 342 .. 235 
Buckles v. Ellers, (I88o) 72 Ind. 220 ............ 26, I24, 255 
Burg v. Knox, (I933) 334 Mo. 329,67 S. W. (2d) 96 ...... 246 
Burgess v. Gates, (I 848) 20 Vt. 326. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 
Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (I938) I82 Miss. 423, I8I 
So. 3I6 ....................... I74, 239, 24I, 242, 254 
Bussey v. Charleston, etc., R. Co., (I9o6) 73 S.C. 2IS, 53 
s. E. I65 ...................................... I27 
Byrn v. Paterson Steamships Ltd., (I 9 36) Ont. 3 I I, 3 Dom. 
L. R. III ...................................... I29 
Byron v. Great American Indemnity Co., (I934) 54 R.I. 405, 
I73At1.546 .................................... I37 
Cain v. AlphaS. S. Corp., (C. C. A. 2nd, I929) 35 F. (2d) 
7 I 7 .......................................... 265 
Caine v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I923) 209 Ala. I8I, 95 So. 
876 ·························· ........ II3, 120, I52 
Caldwell v. Seaboard, etc., R., (I9o6) 73 S.C. 443, 53 S. E. 
746 ........................................... 207 
Cameron v. Vandegriff, (I89o) 53 Ark. 38I, I3 S. W. I092 .. 252 
Campbell v. Rogers, ( I855) 2 Handy (Ohio) I I I. . . . . . . . . . 23 
Canadian Nat. Steamships Co. v. Watson, [I939] Can. L. R. 
I, I Dom. L. R. 273 ............................ 89, 273 
Canadian Pacific R. Co. v. Johnston, (I894) 26 U. S. App. 
85, 6I Fed. 738 .................................. I38 
Canadian Pacific R. Co. v. Parent, (1914) 24 Queb. K. B. 193, 
(1915 Sup. Ct.) 51 Can. L. R. 234, [1917] A. C. 195 ... zoi 
Carl Hagen beck, etc., Show Co. v. Ball, (I 920) 7 5 Ind. App. 
454, 126 N. E. 504. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 
Carr v. Fracis, Times & Co., [1902] A. C. I76, 7I L. J. K. B. 
361, 85 L. T. I44, soW. R. 257, I7 T. L. R. 657 .... zo, 270 
Carrington v. Panama Mail Co., (I929) 136 Misc. 8so, 241 
N. Y. Supp. 347 ................................. 265 
Casey v. Hoover, (1906) 197 Mo. 62, 94 S. W. 982 ........ I27 
Cavanagh v. Ocean Steam Nav. Co., (Sup. Ct., Ist Dept., I890) 
I3 N.Y. Supp. 540, I9 Civ. Proc. R. 39I .......... I37, 139 · 
Centofanti v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (I9I4) 244 Pa. 255, 90 
Atl. 558 ....................................... z55 
TABLE OF CASES xxxi 
PAGE 
Central R. Co. v. Swint, (I884) 73 Ga. 65I .............. 128 
Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, (I9I4) 238 U.S. 507, 35 
Sup. Ct. 865. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I68 
Chambersv. District Court, (I9I8) I39 Minn. 205, I66 N. W. 
I85 ........................................... 2I2 
Chapman v. Terminal R. Ass'n, (Mo. I940) I37 S. W. (2d) 
6I2 .......................................... 138 
Charlton v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., (I 906) 200 Mo. 4 I 3, 98 
s. w. 529 ...................................... I25 
Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands, etc. Co., 
(I883) IO Q. B. D. 521 ....................... 26I, 276 
Cherwien v. Geiter, (I935) 244 App. Div. 8I4, 279 N.Y. 
Supp. 553 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 239 
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle, (I883) 6o Miss. 977 .... I94, 254 
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mills, (I897) 57 Kan. 687, 47 Pac. 
834 ........................................... I29 
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schendel, (I926) 270 U.S. 6II, 46 
Sup.Ct.420 ................................. 130, 23I 
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Tuite, (I892) 44 Ill. App. 535 ...... I52 
Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co. v. Vandenberg, (I905) I64 
Ind. 470, 73 N. E. 990 ............................ I64 
Christensen v. Floriston Pulp & Paper Co., (I 907) 29 Nev. 
552,92Pac.2IO ................................. II5 
Chubbuck v. Holloway, (I93I) I82 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 
3I4, 868 .................................... 33> 246 
Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McMullen, (1889) I 17 Ind. 439, 
20 N. E. 287 ................................ 194, 254 
City of Atlanta, The, (D. C. Ga., 1924) Am. Mar. Cas. 1305. I45 
Clark v. Bowring and Co., (1908) Scottish Sess. Cas. 1168 .. 147 
Clark v. Harnischfeger Sales Corp., ( 1933) 238 App. Div. 493, 
264 N.Y. Supp. 873 .......................... 159, 166 
Clark v. Montezuma Transp. Co., (1926) 217 App. Div. 172, 
216 N.Y. Supp. 295 .............................. 264 
Clark v. Southern R. Co., ( I918) 69 Ind. App. 697 ......... 201 
Clodfelter v. Wells, (I938) 2I2 N.C. 823, I95 S. E. II .... I67 
Clough v. Gardiner, (I920) III Misc. 244, I82 N.Y. Supp. 
8o3 ........................................... 25I 
Coderre v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (I927) 48 R.I. I52, I36 Atl. 
305 .......................................... 2.f.I 
xxxii TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Coe's Estate, Re, ( 1906) 130 Iowa 307, 106 N. W. 743. . . . 125 
Coffman v. Wood, (D. C. Ill., 1934) 5 F. Supp. 906 ...... 134 
Cole v. Industrial Commission, (1933) 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. E. 
520 ........................................... 223 
Collins v. McClure, ( 1939) 63 Ohio App. 312, 26 N. E. (2d) 
780 .......................................... 166 
Colorado, The, [1923] P. 102, 92 L. J.P. 100 ............ 146 
Colucci v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1923) 121 Misc. 758, 202 
N.Y. Supp. 717 .................................. i52 
Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, (1925) 103 Conn. 390, 
130 Atl. 794 .................................. · . 33 
Compton's Adm'rs v. Borderland Coal Co., (I 91 8) I 79 Ky. 
695.201 s. w. 20 ................................ 205 
Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., (1918) 
78 N.H. 553, 103 Atl. 263 ..................... 137, 252 
Connole v. East St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I 93 7) 340 Mo. 690, 
102 S. W. (2d) 581. ......................... 108, II I 
Connor v. New York, etc., R. Co., (19o8) 28 R.I. 56o, 68 
Atl. 481 ....................................... 129 
Consolidated Coppermines Corp. v. Nevada Consolidated Copper 
Co., (1926) 127 Misc. 71, 215 N.Y. Supp. 265 ...... 8o, u8 
Constantinople, The, (D. C. N.Y., 1926) 15 F. (2d) 97.145, 193 
Continental Auto Insurance Underwriters v. Menuskin, (I 93 I) 
222 Ala. 370, 132 So. 883 ......................... 243 
Cope v. Doherty, (1858) 2 De G. & J. 614, 44 Eng. Rep. 
1127 .......................................... 123 
Cormier v. Hudson, (1933) 284 Mass. 231, 187 N. E. 625 .. 240 
Cornell Co. v. Ward, (1909) 93 C. C. A. 473, 168 Fed. 51 .. 128 
Coryell v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1918) 273 Mo. 361, 201 
S. W. 77 ....................................... 118 
Couture v. Dominion Fish Co., (I 909) I 9 Man. L. R. 6 5. . . . I 28 
Cowen v. Ray, (1901) 47 C. C. A. 352, 108 Fed. 320 ...... 204 
Cox v. Terminal R. Ass'n, (1931 Mo.) 43 S. W. (2d) 571 .. 
· · · · · · · · · .. · · ......... · .................... 107, III 
Coyne v. Southern Pacific R. Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) 155 
Fed. 683 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 
Crane v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1908) 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 
222 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 
Crowley v. Panama R. Co., ( 1859) 30 Barb. (N.Y.) 99 .. 24, 206 
TABLE OF CASES XXXlll 
PAGE 
Curtiss v. New York Cent. R. Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, I93S) 79 
F. (2d) 91 ..................................... III 
Cuzco, The, (D. C. Wash., I9IS) 22S Fed. I69 .......... 264 
Daggett v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., (I 933) 334 Mo. 
2o7, 6s s. w. (2d) Io36 .......................... 220 
Dallas v. Whitney, (I936) IIS W.Va. 106, ISS S. E. 766 .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Io6, 2S2 
Dalton v. McLean, (I940 Maine) 14 Atl. (2d) I3........ 29 
Daury v. Ferraro, ( I92S) IOS Conn. 3S6, I43 Atl. 630. . . . I IS 
Davidsson v. Hill, [I90I] 2 K. B. 6o6 .............. 27I, 279 
Davis v. Gant, ( 1922 Tex. Civ. App.) 247 S. W. S76 ...... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 20, 24S, 249 
Davis v. MI1ls, ( I904) 194 U.S. 4S I, 24 Sup. Ct. 692. . . . . . I37 
Davis v. New York, etc., R. Co., (1SS7) 143 Mass. 30I, 9 
N. E. SIS ...................................... 247 
Davis v. Ruzicka, (I936) qo Md. II2, IS3 Atl. s69...... 29 
Davis Cabs v. Evans, ( 1932) 42 Ohio App. 493, IS2 N.E. 327. 166 
Dawson v. Dawson, ( 1931) 224 Ala. I3, 13S So. 4I4 ...... 236 
Degaramo's Estate, Re, (IS9s) S6 Hun 390, 33 N.Y. Supp. 
so2, 67 N. Y. St. Rep. 21s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 
DeGray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., (1934) 106 Vt. 2S9, I73 
Atl. ss6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22S 
DeHam v. Mexican National R. Co., ( 1S93) S6 Tex. 6S, 23 
s. w. 3S1 ...................................... 2SS 
Delaware, etc., R. Co., v. Peck, (19IS) 166 C. C. A. (2d) 
431, 2SS Fed. 26I ................................ 2I5 
De Nicols v. Curlier, [I 900] A. C. 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 I 
Dennick v. Central R. Co., (I SSo) I 03 U. S. I I ......... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, so, S7, 12S 
Derr v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., ( IS93) ISS Pa. 36s, 27 Atl. 
I002 ......................................... 2S5 
DeShetlerv.Kordt, (I93I) 430hioApp.236, 1S3N.E. Ss .. IOS 
Diana, The, [IS94] A. C. 62s ........................ 270 
DiCarvallo v. DiNapoli, (193S N.J. Dept. of Labor) ISO Atl. 
4SS ........................................... 228 
Dobree v. Napier, (1S36) 2 Bing. N.C. 7SI, 132 Eng. Rep. 
301 ........................................... 270 
Dodge v. Colby, (1SSS) IOS N.Y. 44S, IS N. E. 703....... 96 
xxxiv TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Dodge v. North Hudson, (C. C. N.Y., I9IO) I77 Fed. 986 .. 128 
Domres v. Storms, ( I932) 236 App. Div. 630, 260 N.Y. Supp. 
33S ........................................... 246 
Don v. Lippmann, (I837) S Cl. & Fin. I, 7 Eng. Rep. 303 ... IS2 
Dormidy v. Sharon Boiler Works, (C. C. Pa., I904) I27 Fed. 
48s ........................................... 207 
Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines National Bank, (I 904) I 2 7 
Iowa IS3, 98 N. W. 9I8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 17 
Doulson v. Matthews, (I792) 4 Term. Rep. so3, IOO Eng. 
Rep. I I43 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Douthwright v. Champlin, (I 9 I 7) 9 I Conn. 5 24, I oo Atl. 97. 2 IS 
Dronenburg v. Harris, (I 908) 108 Md. S97, 7 I Atl. 8 I . . . . I 2 S 
Ducktown Sulphur, etc., Co. v. Barnes, (I900 Tenn.) 6oS. W. 
S93 ........................................... IOO 
Dunn Const. Co. v. Bourne, (I9JS) I72 Miss, 620, IS9 So. 
84I ........................................... 2I6 
Dupont v. Quebec Steamship Co., (I 896) I I Que b. S.C. 188 .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207, 26S 
Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lumber Co., (I932) I9 La. App. 
494, I36 So. II2, I40 So. 867 ...................... 2I2 
Dutton v. Howell, ( I693) I Show. P. C. 24, I Eng. Rep. I 7 .. 2, 6 
Dyke v. Erie R. Co., (I87I) 4S N.Y. II3 .............. I93 
Eachus v. Trustees of Illinois & Michigan Canal, (I 8 s6) I 7 Ill. 
S34 .......................................... IOO 
Eagle, The, (I868) 8 Wall. (7S U.S.) IS ............... I44 
Eagle Point, The, (I9o6) 73 C. C. A. (3d) s69, I42 Fed. 
4S3 ................................... I I6, 267, 276 
East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis, (I89o) 89 Tenn. 23s, 
I4 s. w. 603 ................................... II3 
Eggen v. Canadian Northern R. Co., ( I9I8) 167 C. C. A. 
(8th) 229, 2SS Fed. 937 ........................... I37 
Egyptian Monarch, The, (D. C. N. ]., I888) 36 Fed. 773. . . I4S 
Ekins v. East India Co., (I 7 I 7) I P. W ms. 39 s, 24 Eng. Rep. 
44I ........................................... I23 
Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., (I89S) ISS U. S. IOS, IS 
Sup. Ct. 77I.................................... 96 
El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, ( I923 Tex.) 2SS 
s. w. IS9 .................................... 29, 83 
TABLE OF CASES XXXV 
PAGE 
El Paso & S. W. Co. v. LaLonde, (1916) 108 Texas 67, 184 
s. w. 498 ..................................... II8 
El Paso, etc., R. Co. v. McComas, (1903 Tex. Civ. App.) 72 
s. w. 629 .................................. I94, 254 
Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co., (D. C. Mo., 1930) 38 F. 
(2d) 303 ...................................... 215 
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Warren, (1938) 172 
Tenn. 403, I 12 S. W. (2d) 837 ..................... 216 
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, (I938) 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 
817 ..................................... 45, 50, I68 
Esau v. Smith Bros., (I933) 124 Neb. 217,246 N. W. 230 .. 223 
Eskovitz v. Berger, ( 1936) 276 Mich. 536,268 N. W. 883.85, I05 
Esteves v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) 74 F. 
(2d) 364 ...................................... 216 
Evans & Sons v. Stein & Co., (I904) 42 Scottish L. R. 103, 
7 Fraser (Ct. of Sess.) 65 ....................... 17, 252 
Evey v. Mexican Cent. R. Co., (1897) 26 C. C. A. (5th) 
407, 81 Fed. 294 .............................. 83, I I 7 
Fail v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1908) So S.C. 207, 6oS. E. 
697· 6I s. E. 258 ............................. 195, 198 
Farr v. Babcock Lumber & Land Co., (1921) 182 N.C. 725, 
109 S. E. 833 ................................... 209 
Farrell v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., ( 1933) 54 R.I. 
18, 168 Atl. 91 I ................................. 240 
Finnell v. Southern Kan. R. Co., (C. C. Mo., 1888) 33 Fed. 
427 ....................................... 137· 138 
Fischl v. Chubb, (1937) 30 Pa. D. & C. 40 .............. 253 
Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co., (1929) 252 N.Y. 127, 
I69 N. E. I 12 ........................... II3, 120, 158 
Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., (1930) 156 Miss. 567, 126 
So. 395 ........................................ 216 
Foot v. Edwards, (C. C. 2d, 1855) 3 Blatchf. 310 ......... roo 
Ford, Bacon & Davis v. Volentine, (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 64 
F. (2d) 8oo ................................. 137, 216 
Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., (1913) 36 Nev. 247, 134 
Pac. 753 ................................... 130, 193 
Foster v. Denny Motor Transfer Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) 
roo F. (2d) 6s8 ................................. 234 
xxxvi TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Fox v. Postal-Telegraph Cable Co., ( 1909) I 38 Wis. 64-8, 120 
N. W. 399 ................................... 86, 200 
Francis v. Humphrey, (D. C. Ill., I938) 25 F. Supp. I. . . . . 169 
Freas v. Sullivan, ( 1936) 130 Ohio St. 4-86, 200 N. E. 639. . . . 105 
Friedman v. Greenberg, (I933) IIO N.J. L. 4-62, I66 Atl. 
I I 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-6 
Frounfelker v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., (I 902) 7 3 App. Div. 
350, 76 N.Y. Supp. 74-5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 
Fryklund v. Great Northern R. Co., (I907) IOI Minn. 37, 
III N. w. 727 .............................. 132, 193 
Gale£ v. United States, (D. C. S.C., 1928) 25 F. (2d) 134- .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86, I I5 
Gannett v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (I92I) I68 N.C. 382, 84-
S. E. 519 .............. : ...................... Io8 
Gardner v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I892) I7 R.I. 790, 24-
Atl. 831 ....................................... 107 
Gardner v. Thomas, (I8I7) I4- Johns. (N.Y.) 134-, 7 Am. 
Dec. 4-4-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
General Accident, etc., Co. v. Zerbe Const. Co., (1935) 269 
N.Y. 227, 199 N. E. 89 ........................... 233 
General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou, (I84-3) II Mees. 
& W. 877, I 52 Eng. Rep. 1061 ...................... 131 
Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., (I893) 3 Misc. 224-, 22 N.Y. 
Supp. 74-9 .......................... 159, I66, 264-, 265 
Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., (D. C. N. Y., 193I) 51 F. 
(2d) 4-17 ...................................... 265 
Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932) 6o F. (2d) 
927, (1932) 287 U.S. 64-2,53 Sup. Ct. 92 ............ 261 
Ghilain v. Couture, (1929) 84- N.H. 4-8, 14-6 Atl. 395 .. 129, I30 
Gilbert v. Des Lauriers Column Mold Co., ( 191 7) I 8o App. 
Div. 59, 167 N.Y. Supp. 274- ...................... 229 
Gillis Supply Co. Ltd. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., ( I 9 I 1) 1 6 
Brit. Col. 254-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
Glasgow, etc., Ins. Co. v. Canadian Pacific R. Co., ( 1 888) 34-
Lower Canada Jurist 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
Godard v. Gray, (187o) L. R. 6 Q. B. 139, 4-0 L. J. Q. B. 
62, 24- L. T. 89, 19 W. R. 34-8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
TABLE OF CASES XXXVII 
PAGE 
Goodman v. London, etc., R. Co., (I 877) 14· Scottish L. R. 
449 ........................................... 137 
Gordon v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1912) 154 Iowa 449, 134 
N. W. 1057 .................................... 250 
Gould v. Boston & M. R. Co., (1931) 276 Mass. 114, 176 
N. E. 8o7 ................................... 161, 164 
Gould's Case, ( 1913) 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693. . . . . . . . 2 I I 
Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wright, (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) 21 F. 
(zd) 814 .............................. 206, 261, 264 
Gray v. Blight, (C. C. A. 1oth, I94o) 112 F. (zd) 696 .... 246 
Gray v. Gray, (I934) 87 N.H. 82, I74 Atl. so8 ...... 33, 236 
Gray v. Telegraph Co., ( I90I) 108 Tenn. 39,64 S. W. 1063 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195, I97 
Great Western R. Co. v. Miller, (I869) 19 Mich. 305...... 23 
Grinestaff v. N.Y. Central R. Co., ( I929) 253 Ill. App. 589. . II 8 
Haefer v. Herndon, (D. C. Ill., 1938) 22 F. Supp. 523 ...... I34 
Hall v. Industrial Commission, (I925) 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. 
1073 ......................................... 2IO 
Hall v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I905) I39 N.C. 369, 52 
S. E. so ........................................ 194 
Halley, The, (I867) 2 Adm. & Ecc. 3· .... IO, I3, 3I, 87, 146 
Halley, The, (I868) L. R. 2 P. C. I93, 5 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 
262, I6 Eng. Rep. 5I4 ....... II, I2, 3I, 86, 89, 269, 270 
Hall's Adm'r v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (I 897) I 02 Ky. 480, 
43 S. W. 698 .................................... 129 
Hamilton, The, (1907) 207 U.S. 398, 28 Sup. Ct. I33. 272, 275 
Hanna v. Grand Trunk R. Co., ( 189 I) 4 I Ill. App. I I 6 . I I 9, I 26 
Hanna Nielsen, The, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1921) 273 Fed. 171. I45, 265 
Hanna Nielsen, The, (D. C. Wash., 1928) 25 F. (2d) 984 .. 264 
Harbis v. Cudahy Packing Co., (I 92 I) 2 I I Mo. App. 188, 
24I s. w. 960 .................................. 2I5 
Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, I931) 50 F. 
(zd) 866 ...................................... 273 
Harrisburg, The, (I886) II9 U.S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. I40 ... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137, 263, 275 
Harrison v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., (I9IS) I68 N.C. 382, 84 
s. E. 519 ................................... I08, I67 
xxxviii TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Chartrand, (I924) 239 
N.Y. 36, 145 N. E. 274 ........................... 233 
Hartley v. Hartley, (I905) 7I Kan. 691, 81 Pac. 505 ...... 249 
Hartman v. Duke, (I929) I6o Tenn. I34, 22 S. W. (2d) 
22I ........................................... I25 
Hartness v. Pharr, ( I903) I33 N.C. 566, 45 S. E. 90I. . . . . . I25 
Hasbrouck v. New York Cent. & H. R. Co., ( I9I I) 202 N.Y. 
363, 95 N. E. 8o8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 19 
Haskell v. Bailey, (I894) 25 U.S. App. 99,63 Fed. 873 .... 252 
Helton v. Alabama, etc., R. Co., (I893) 97 Ala. 275, I2 So. 
276 ....................................... I55, I66 
Heredia v. Davies, (C. C. A. 4-th, I926) I2 F. (2d) 500 .... 264 
Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., (I883) 3I Minn. II, 
I6 N. w. 4I3 .................................. 28, 84 
Hertell's Estate, Re, (I929) I35 Misc. 36, 237 N. Y. Supp. 
655 .................................. 125, 233, 234 
Herzog v. Stern, (I934) 264 N.Y. 379, I91 N. E. 23 ..... 246 
Hiatt v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I925) 308 Mo. 77, 27I S. W. 
8o6 ................................... 107, I6I, I66 
Higgins v. Central, etc., R. Co., (I892) I55 Mass. 176, 29 
N. E. 534 ...................................... 152 
Hinesv. Rice, (1920) I42 Ark. 159,218 S. W. 85I ........ 192 
Hockmuth v. Perkins, (I937) 55 Ga. App. 649, 19I S. E. I 56. 22I 
Hodges v. Hunter Co., (I911) 6I Fla. 280, 54 So. 811.... 99 
Hogan v. Hamburg American Line, (I934) I52 Misc. 405, 
272 N.Y. Supp. 690 .............................. 273 
Holland v. Boston & M. R. Co., (1932) 279 Mass. 342, I8I 
N. E. 2I7 ..................................... 164 
Holland v. Pack, (1823) 7 Tenn. I 50...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
Hollenbach v. Elmore & H. Contracting Co., (C. C. N. Y., 
I909) 174 Fed. 845 .............................. 126 
Holmes v. Barclay, ( I849) 4 La. Ann. 63. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, (I930) 28I U.S. 397, 50 Sup. 
Ct. 338 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
Hoodmacher v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1907) 218 Pa. 21, 66 
Atl. 975 · ...... · .... · .................. 194, 254, 255 
Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co., (I923) 99 Conn. 457, 
I21 Atl. 828 .................................... 210 
TABLE OF CASES XXXIX 
PAGE 
Horan v. New Home, etc., Co., (I937) 289 Ill. App. 340, 7 
N. E. (2d) 401 .................................. 134 
Hornthal v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I9I4) I66 N.C. 602, 
82 S. E. 85I ................................ I96, I98 
Hough v. Railway Co., ( 1879) IOO U.S. 2I3 ............. 168 
Howard v. Howard, (193I) 200 N.C. 574, 158 S. E. IOI .. 236 
Howard v. Ingersoll, (I 8 5o) I 7 Ala. 7 So. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I oo 
Howell v. Coupland, (unreported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 6 
Huber v. Steiner, (I835) 2 Bing. (N.C.) 202, 132 Eng. Rep. 
So ............................................ I36 
Hughey v. Ware, ( I929) 34 N. M. 29, 276 Pac. 27 ........ 228 
Hulburt v. Topeka, (C. C. Kan., I888) 34 Fed. 5IO ...... I29 
Hunter v. Derby Foods, (C. C. A. 2d, I940) IIO F. (2d) 970. 254 
Huntington v. Attrill, (I 892) 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224 .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 50, 94, 95 
Huntington v. Attrill, [I893] A. C. I50................ 94 
Husted v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (I9IO) 143 Mo. App. 623, 
128 s. w .. 282. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I4I 
Hyde v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., (1883) 6I Iowa 44I, 16 N. W. 
35I ........................................... 247 
Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Masterson, (I 896) I 6 Ind. App. 32 3, 
44 N. E. I004 .................................. I92 
Inter State Motor Freight Co. v. Johnson, (I 929) 32 Ohio 
App. 363, I68 N. E. I43 .......................... I II 
Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 
(I93I) 203 Wis. 466,234 N. W. 889 ............ 229, 230 
Isaacs & Sons v. Cook, [I925] 2 K. B. 39I ............... 252 
Jackson v. Anthony, (1933) 282 Mass. 540, I85 N. E. 389. II5 
Jackson v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., (I930) 224 Mo. 
App. 6o1, 3I S. W. (2d) 250 ...................... I 52 
James McGee, The, (D. C. N.Y., I924) 300 Fed. 93 ...... 277 
James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, (I927) 273 
U. S. I 19, 47 Sup. Ct. 308. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 18 
Jarrett v. Wabash R. Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, I932) 57 F. (2d) 
669 ........... · · . · · · · · ........... I 13, 120, 158, I67 
Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Swayne's Adm'r, (I866) 26 Ind. 477. I29 
Jenkins v. Hogan & Sons, (I9I7) I77 App. Div. 36, I63 N.Y. 
Supp. 707 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7 
xl TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Jenkins v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., (1914) 124 Minn. 36S, 
145 N. w. 40 ................................... I64 
Johann Friederich, The, (IS39) I W. Rob. 35, 166 Eng. Rep. 
4S7 ........................................... 276 
Johansdotter v. Canadian Pacific R. Co., (1914) 47 Queb. 
S. Ct. 76 ...................................... 21S 
Johns-Manville v. Thrane, (1923) So Ind. App. 432, 141 
N. E. 229 ....................................... 210 
Johnson v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (I927 Mo.) 290 S. W. 462. III 
Johnson v. Canadian Northern Ry., (1909) 19 Man. L. R. 
I 7 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 S, I 3 7 
Johnson v. Carolina, etc., R. Co., (I926) I9I N.C. 75, I3I 
S. E. 390 ................................... S6, 2IS 
Johnson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (IS94) 9I Iowa 24S, 59 
N. w. 66 ...................................... I66 
Johnson v. Employers' Liability Co., (I936 Tex. Civ. App.) 
99 s. w. (2d) 979 ............................... 2I6 
Johnson v. Nelson, (I9I5) 12S Minn. I5S, 150 N. W. 620 .. 219 
Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge Co., (I910) 197 N.Y. 3I6, 90 
N. E. 953 ...................................... 127 
Johnson v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1907) 144 N.C. 4IO, 
57 S. E. I22 .................................... I96 
Jonathan Goodhue, The, (IS59) Swab. 524, I66 Eng. Rep. 
1246 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 
Jones v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., ( I900) So Minn. 4SS, S3 N. W. 
446 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 
Jones v. Louisiana, etc., R. Co., (I922 Tex. Com. App.) 243 
s. w. 976 .................................. 152, 164 
Jones v. Mexican Central R. Co., ( 1902 Tex.) 6S S. W. IS6. . S3 
KaiserWilhelmii, The, (D.C. N.J., I9I6) 230Fed. 717 .. 145 
Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Becker, (IS99) 67 Ark. I, 53 S. W. 
406 .............................. I94, 20I, 207, 254 
Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Maynor, (19I3) 126 C. C. A. 
(5th) 433, 209 Fed. 6Io. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13S 
Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Cutter, (IS76) 16 Kan. 56S ........ 129 
Keane Wonder Mining Co. v. Cunningham, (C. C. A. 9th, 
I915) 222 Fed. S21 .......................... 1I3, 120 
TABLE OF CASES xli 
PAGE 
Keep v. National Tube Co., (C. C. N. J., I907) I54 Fed. 
121 ....................................... II5, 134 
Kemp v. Stephenson, (I93I) I39 Misc. 38, 247 N.Y. Supp. 
65o .......................................... Io7 
Kernan v. Webb, (I929) 50 R.I. 394, 148 Atl. I86 ........ 237 
Kerr v. Basham, (1934) 62 S.D. 301, 252 N. W. 853 ..... I29 
Kertson v. Johnson, (I932) 185 Minn. 59I, 242 N. W. 329 .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24I, 246 
Kiefer v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (I 896) I 2 App. Div. 2 8, 42 
N.Y. Supp. 17I .................................. 115 
Killough, Re, (I933) 148 Misc. 73, 265 N.Y. Supp. 30I ... 246 
Kingery v. Donnell, (I936) 222 Iowa 24I, 268 N. W. 6I7 .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I66, I67 
Kircher v. Kircher, (I939) 288 Mich. 669,286 N. W. I20 .. 236 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., (I 94 I) 6 I Sup. Ct. 
I020 .................................... so, 52, I69 
Knight v. Moline, etc., R. Co., (I9I3) I6o Iowa I6o, I40 
N. W. 839 ................................. I29, I39 
LaBar v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I907) 2I8 Pa. 26I, 67 
Atl. 4 I 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 7 
Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Teeters, (I 906) I 66 Ind. 335, 77 
N. E. 599 ................................. I92, 2oi 
Lamington, The, (D. C. N.Y., I898) 87 Fed. 752 ....... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, I45, 206, 27I 
Langdon v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I89o) 58 Hun I22, II 
N.Y. Supp. 5I4, 33 N.Y. St. Rep. 907 .............. 118 
Lansdowne, The, (D. C. Mich., I900) I05 Fed. 436 ...... 270 
Larue v. Kershaw Contracting Co., (19I2) I77 Ala. HI, 59 
So. I55 .................................... I34, 248 
Lassiter v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (I940) I36 N. C. 89, 48 
S. E. 642 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I39 
Lauria v. E. I. DuPont, etc., Co., (D. C. N.Y., I9I7) 24I 
Fed. 687 ................................... 118, 126 
Leach v. Mason Valley Mines Co., (I9I6) 40 Nev. I43, 16I 
Pac. 5I3 .................................... 35, 204 
LeForestv. Tolman, (I875) 117 Mass. I09 .............. 253 
Lemieux v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (I9I4) 219 Mass. 399, 106 
N. E. 992 ...................................... I 58 
xlii TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Leon, The, (I88I) 6 P. D. I48 ....................... 279 
Leonard v. Columbia Steam Navigation Co., (I88I) 84 N.Y. 
48 ......................................... 26, I28 
LeRoy v. Crowninshield, (I82o) 2 Mason I5I, IS Fed. Cas. 
362 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I36 
Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., (I928) I08 Conn. 
333, I43 Atl. I63. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 
Levy v. Steiger, (I9I9) 233 Mass. 6oo, I24 N. E. 477 .. I6I, I64 
Lewis v. Jones, (I928) 27 F. (2d) 72 .................. I47 
Limekiller v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., (I 88 5) 33 Kan. 83, 5 
Pac. 40I ................................... I27, I29 
Lindberg v. Southern Casualty Co., (D. C. Texas, I 926) I 5 
F. (2d) 54 ..................................... 2I6 
Lindstrom v. International Nav. Co. (C. C. N.Y., I902) I I7 
Fed. I70 ................................... 271, 272 
Little v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I896) 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 
846 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Livesley v. Horst, [I924] Can. L. R. 6os, [I925] 1 Dom. 
L. R. I59· .................................. 20, I23 
Livingston v. Jefferson, (C. C. 4th, I8II) I Brock. 203, 4 
Hughes 6o6, IS Fed. Cas. 66o........... . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
Lloyd v. Guibert, ( I865) I Q. B. I IS .................. 259 
Logan v. Lee, (I 906) 3 I Que b. S. C. 469, (I 907) 39 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 3I I .................................... 207 
Logan v. Missouri Valley, etc., Co., (I923) I57 Ark. 528, 
249 s. w. 21 ................................ 206, 215 
London Guar. & Ace. Co. v. Balgowan S. S. Co., (1931) I6I 
Md. I45, 155 Atl. 334·........................... 29 
Long v. Long, (1917) 44 New Bruns. 599, 36 Dom L. R. 
722 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 
Loranger v. Nadeau, (I932) 2I5 Cal. 362, IO Pac. (2d) 63 .. I05 
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, I20 N. E. 
I98 ....................... 27, 29, 33, 84, 8s, 89, II8 
Louisiana Western R. Co. v. Jones, (I921 Tex.) 233 S. W. 
363 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I I 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Brantley's Adm'r, (I 894) 96 Ky. 
297, 28 s. w. 477 ................................ 128 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Burkhart, (I9I3) 154 Ky. 92, 157 
s. w. IS ...................................... I37 
TABLE OF CASES xliii 
PAGE 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Dixon, (I933) I68 Miss. I4, ISO So. 
8II ................................... I3], I39> 216 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Graham's Adm'r, (I 896) 98 Ky. 688, 
34 s. w. 229 ................................... 115 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Herb, (I9II) 125 Tenn. 408, I43 
s. w. II38 ..................................... I29 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Jones' Adm'r, (I926) 2IS Ky. 774, 
286S.W.IO]I .................................. I30 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Keiffer, (I908) I32 Ky. 4I9, II3 
s. w. 433. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lynch, (I9IO) I37 Ky. 696, 126 
S. W. 362 ...................................... II8 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. McCaskell, (I9IO) 98 Miss. 20, 53 
So. 348. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I IS 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Whitlow's Adm'r, (I897) IOS Ky. 
I, 43 S. W. ]II ............................. II3, I20 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, (I897) II3 Ala. 402, 21 
So. 938 ........................................ 255 
Lovell v. DeBardelaben Coal & Iron Co., (I 890) 90 Ala. I 3, 
7 So. 756 ...................................... I27 
Lower v. Segal, (I896) 59 N.J. L. 66,34 Atl. 945 ........ I27 
Lowery v. Zorn, (C. A. La. 2d., I934) I 57 So. 826 ........ 241 
Lucas v. Coupal, (I930) 66 Ont. L. R. I4I .............. 124 
Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves, (C. C. A. ~th, I937) 89 F. 
(2d) 528 ...................................... I66 
Lyons v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (C. C. Vt., I90l) I07 Fed. 386. 248 
Machado v. Fontes, [I897] 2 Q. B. 23I, 66 L. J. Q. B. 542, 
76 L. T. 588, 45 W. R. 565, I3 T. L. R. 407, 4I Sol. J. 
507 .............................. I$, I6, I], 8], I2I 
Mackay v. Central R. Co., (C. C. N.Y., I876) I4 Blatchf. 65 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, I27 
Madrazo v. Willes, (I82o) 3 Barn. & Ald. 353, 106 Eng. 
Rep. 692 ...................................... 273 
Magdapur, The, (D. C. N.Y., I933) 3 F. Supp. 97 I ...... 264 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner, (I933) I88 Ark. I77, 65 
S. W. (2d) I .................................... 218 
Malloy v. American Hide & Leather Co., (C. C. Mass., 1906) 
I48 Fed. 482. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I IS 
xliv TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Mandu, The, (D. C. N.Y., I936) I5 F. Supp. 627 .... II6, 267 
Markley v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I 9 I I) I 5 I Iowa 612, 
I32 N. W. 37 ................................... I95 
Marra v. Hamburg-Amerikanische, etc., (I 9 I 7) I So App. Div. 
75, 167 N.Y. Supp. 74 ............................ 206 
Martin v. Kennecott Copper Corp., (D. C. Wash., I918) 252 
Fed. 207 ....................................... 101 
Martin v. Wabash R. Co., (1905) 73 C. C. A. (7th) 646, I42 
Fed. 6so ....................................... 250 
Martin v. Zurich General Accident, etc., Co., (C. C. A. Ist, 
I936) 84 F. (2d) 6 ............................... 241 
Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1894) I5I U.S. 
673, I4 Sup. Ct. 533 .............................. 249 
Massachusetts Benefit Life Ass'n v. Robinson, (I898) I04 Ga. 
256, 30 S. E. 9I8 ................................ 152 
Matheson v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., (I900) 6I Kan. 667, 
6o Pac. 747 ..................................... I I8 
Maud Carter, The, (D. C. Mass., I886) 29 Fed. I56 ...... I47 
Maysville, etc., Co. v. Wilson's Adm'r, (1893) I6 U.S. App. 
236, 59 Fed. 9I .................................. 128 
McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., (1939) I84 Miss. 663, 
I86 So. 305 ..................................... 242 
McCarron v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I92I) 239 Mass. 
64, I3I N. E. 478 ............................... 205 
McCarthy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I 87 7) I 8 Kan. 46 .... 26, I 2 7 
McCarty v. New York, etc., R. Co., (C. C. N.Y., 1894) 62 
Fed. 437 ...................................... I29 
McCluny v. SI1liman, (I83o) 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 ....... I34 
McConnell v. Caribbean Petroleum Co., (1938) 278 N. Y. 
I89, IS N. E. (2d) 573 ........................... I34 
McDonald v. McDonald's Adm'r, (I894) 96 Ky. 209, 28 
s. w. 482 ...................................... I25 
McGonigle v. Atchison, (1885) 33 Kan. 726, 7 Pac. 550.... 99 
McKenna v. Fisk, (1843) I How. (42 U.S.) 240........ 21 
McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
(I933) 212 Wis. 507,250 N. W. 396 ................ 2I3 
McLaren v. Ryan, (I875) 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 307.......... 99 
McLaughlin's Case, (I93I) 274 Mass. 2IJ, I74 N. E. 338 .. 227 
McLay v. Slade, ( I92 7) 48 R.I. 357, I38 Atl. 2 I 2. . . . . . . . II8 
TABLE OF CASES xlv 
PAGE 
McMillan v. C. N. R. Co., [I92I] I W. W. R. 5I ........ 2I7 
McMillan v. C. N. R. Co., [I923] A. C. I2o, 92 L. J.P. C. 
44, 128 L. T. 293, 39 T. L. R. I4 ................ I9, 2I6 
Meisenhelder v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I 92 7) I 70 Minn. 3 I 7, 
2I3 N. W. 32 .................................... I25 
Melton's Adm'r v. Southern R. Co., (I930) 236 Ky. 629, 33 
s. w. (2d) 690 .................................. 255 
Menard v. Goltra, (I93I) 328 Mo. 368,40 S. W. (2d) I053. 164 
Metcalf v. Reynolds, (I935) 267 N.Y. 52,· I95 N. E. 68I .. 105 
Metrakos v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., (I9I4) 9I Kan. 342, 
I37 Pac. 953 .................................... I29 
Metzler v. Metzler, (I930) 8 N.J. Misc. 82I, I5I Atl. 847 .. 236 
Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Goodman, (I898) 20 Tex. Civ. App. 
I09, 48 s. w. 778 ................................ 247 
Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Jones, (I90I) 48 C. C. A. (5th) 
227, I07 Fed. 64.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Marshall, (I899), 34 C. C. A. (5th) 
I33, 9I Fed. 933................................ 83 
Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Mitten, (I 896) I 3 Tex. Civ. App. 
653· 36 s. w. 282. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
Mexican National R. Co. v. Jackson, (I896) 89 Tex. IO], 33 
s. w. 857...................................... 83 
Middlesex, The, (D. C. Mass., I9I6) 253 Fed. I42 ........ 277 
Midland Trail Bus Lines v. Martin, ( I935) IOO Ind. App. 
206, I94 N. E. 862. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I64 
Migues' Case, (I933) 28I Mass. 373, I83 N. E. 847 ...... 227 
Mike v. Lian, (I936) 322 Pa. 353, I85 Atl. 775 .......... 254 
Miles v. McGrath, (D. C. Md., I933) 4 F. Supp. 6o3. . . . . . I34 
Milford, The, (I858) Swab. 362, I66 Eng. Rep. II67. 146, 259 
Minto v. Hitchings & Co., (I923) 204 App. Div. 66I, I98 
N.Y. Supp. 6Io .................................. 228 
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., (I922) I54 Ark. 4I3, 
242 S. W. 8I3 .................................. III 
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Miller, ( I93I) I84 Ark. 6I, 4I S. W. 
(2d) 97I ...................................... 152 
M'Larty v. Steele, ( 188 I) I 8 Scottish L. R. 266, 8 Rettie (Ct. 
of Sess.) 435. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Mohr v. Sands, (I9I3) 44 Okla. 330, I33 Pac. 238 ........ II8 
Moores v. Winter, ( I899) 67 Ark. I89, 53 S. W. I057 .... I3S 
xlvi TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Morgan v. Camden, etc., R. Co., (I 88 5) 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 
97 ............................................ 137 
Morrisv. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1885) 65 Iowa 727,23 N. W. 
143 .......................................... 130 
Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I 92 3 Mo.) 2 5 I S. W. 763. I I I 
Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., (C. C. A. 8th, I93I) 52 F. (2d) 
364 ................................... 109, I20, 132 
Mosley v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., (1926) 3I3 Mo. 225, 
281 s. w. 762 .................................. 214 
Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (I774) I Cowp. I6I, 98 Eng. Rep. 
I 02 I .................................... 2, 3, 7, 2 I 
Moxham, TheM., (I875) I P. D. 43; (I876) I P. D. I07 .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266, 269 
Munos v. Southern Pac. Co., ( I892) 2 U.S. App. 222, 51 Fed. 
I88 ........................................... 134 
Murray v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I 934) 242 App. Div. 37 4, 
275 N. Y. Supp. Io .............................. I38 
Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., (C. C. A. 4th, 
I938) 99 F. (2d) 485 ............................ 240 
Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Eakin, ( I869) 46 Tenn. 582. . . . . . 23 
Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Foster, (I882) 78 Tenn. 35I .. I94, 254 
Navarino, The, (D. C. N.Y., I925) 7 F. (2d) 743 ........ 264 
Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., ( I865) 38 Vt. 294 .... 23, 247 
Negaubauer v. Great Northern R. Co., (I904) 92 Minn. I84, 
99 N. W. 62o. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I34 
Nelson's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., (I892) 88 Va. 
97I, 14 S. E. 838 ................................ I30 
New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, (I874) 50 Miss. 244 .. I93 
New York, The, (I899) I75 U.S. I87, 20 Sup. Ct. 67 .... 270 
Newlin v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I909) 222 Mo. 375, I2I 
s. w. I25 ...................................... I08 
Nonce v. Richmond & D. R. Co., (C. C. N.C., I887) 33 Fed. 
429 ........................................... I37 
Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Norton Iron Works, (C. C. A. 6th, 
I922) 279 Fed. 32 ............................... 107 
Norman v. Hartman Furniture, etc., Co., (I926) 84 Ind. App. 
173, 150 N. E. 416 .............................. 210 
TABLE OF CASES xlvii 
PAGE 
North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, (I9I6) I74 Cal. I, I62 
Pac. 93 ........................................ 2II 
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Babcock, (I894) I54 U.S. I90, I4 
Sup. Ct. 978 .................................... I I9 
Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Wilson, (I929 Tex. Civ. 
App.) I7 S. W. (2d) 68 ........................... 227 
Oates v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., (189I) I04 Mo. 5I4, I6 S. W. 
487 ........................................... I27 
Ocean, etc., Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, (I927) 
32 Ariz. 275, 257 Pac. 644 ......................... 209 
O'Connor v. Wray, [I930] Can. L. R. 231, 2 Dom. L. R. 
899 ........................................ 89, 237 
Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., (I 933) 289 U. S. 
. 439, 53 Sup. Ct. 663. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 
Olson v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., (I 936) I 3 I Neb. 94, 267 N. W. 
246 ....................................... I6I, I64 
O'Reilly v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I889) I6 R.I. 388, 17 
Atl. I7I, I7 Atl. 906,19 Atl. 244 .................... 247 
Orleans Dredging Co. v. Frazie, (1935) 173 Miss. 882, I6I 
So. 399, (1937) I79 Miss. 188, I73 So. 43I ............ 2I6 
Ormsby v. Chase, (I933) 290 U.S. 387, 54 Sup. Ct. 2II .. 245 
Orr v. Ahern, (I928) 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 69I ... 246, 25 I 
Osborne v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (I913) 87 Vt. 104, 88 Atl. 
5I2 .......................................... 137 
O'Shields v. Georgia Pac. R. Co., (I889) 83 Ga. 62I, IO S. E. 
268 ........................................... 137 
Otey v. Midland Valley R. Co., (I92I) 108 Kan. 755, I97 
Pac. 203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 
Ott v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., (I899) I8 Ohio C. C. 395 .. 206 
Owners of S. S. Reresby v. Owners of S. S. Co betas, (I 92 3) 
Scottish L. T. 719 ............................ II6, 268 
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission 
of California, (I938) xoCal. (2d) 567,75 Pac. (2d) 1058, 
aff'd ( I939) 306 U.S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629 ............ 223 
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission 
of California, (1939) 306 U.S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, aff'g 
(1938) 10 Cal. (2d) 567, 75 Pac. (2d) 1058 .. 222, 223, 225 
xlviii TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Page v. United Fruit Co., (C. C. A. Ist, I925) 3 F. (2d) 
747 ....................................... 204, 250 
Papageorgiouv v. Turner, (I9o6) 37 New Bruns. 449· ... 89, 90 
Patton v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co., (I88o) 96 Pa. I69 ...... I27 
Pearson v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (D. C. Va., I923) 286 Fed. 
429 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I29 
Pendar v. H. & B. American Mach. Co., (I9I3) 35 R.I. 32I, 
87 Atl. I ....................................... 2I8 
Pennsylvania Co. v. McCann, (I 896) 54 Ohio St. I o, 42 N. E. 
768 ........................................... I63 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Levine, (C. C. A. 2nd, I 920) 263 Fed. 
557 ........................................... I25 
Penwell v. Anderson, ( I933) I25 Neb. 449, 250 N. W. 665. 2I2 
Perry v. St. Joseph, etc., R. Co., (I883) 29 Kan. 420 ...... I29 
Personius v. Asbury Transp. Co., (I936) I52 Ore. 286, 53 
Pac. (2d) 1065 ................................. 233 
Petrusha v. Korinek, (I927) 237 Mich. 583, 2I3 N. W. I88. 248 
Phillips v. Eyre, (I 870) L. R. 6 Q. B. I, I o B. & S. I 004, 40 
L. J. Q. B. 28, 22 L. T. 869 ..................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 8, I2, I4, 27, 32, 86, 89, 9I, I2I, I22, 269 
Pinar Del Rio, The, (C. C. A. 6th, I927) I6 F. (2d) 984 ... 264 
Pisano v. B. M. & J. F. Shanley Co., (I90I) 66 N.J. L. I, 48 
Atl. 6I8 ..................................... 205 
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Austin's Adm'r, (I9II) I4I Ky. 
722,133 S. W. 780 ............................... III 
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Bishop, (I896) I3 Ohio C. C. 380. I93 
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Grom, (I9II) I42 Ky. SI, I33 
s. w. 977 ..................................... I92 
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Hine, (I874) 25 Ohio St. 629 ..... I37 
Platt v. Reynolds, (I929) 86 Colo. 397, 282 Pac. 264 ...... 2I2 
Poling v. Poling, (I935) II6 W.Va. I87, I79 S. E. 604 .... 236 
Postv. Burger, (I9I6) 2I6 N.Y. 544, III N. E. 35I ...... 2II 
Potter v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co., Ltd., [1905] Viet. L. R. 
6I2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
Potter v. First National Bank, (I930) I07 N.J. Eq. 72, ISI 
Atl. 546 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 
Powell v. Great Northern R. Co., (I 907) I 02 Minn. 448, I I3 
N. w. IOI7 ................................. I I9, !26 
TABLE OF CASES xlix 
PAGE 
Powers v. Cunard S. S. Co., (D. C. N.Y., I925) 32 F. (2d) 
720 ........................................... 277 
Precourt v. Driscoll, (1931) 85 N.H. 280, I57 Atl. 525 ... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I6I, 162, 164 
Princess Sophia, The, (D. C. Wash., 1929) 35 F. (2d) 736 ... 128 
Quantock v. England, (I 770) 5 Burr. 2628, 98 Eng. Rep. 
382 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
Rainey v. New York, etc., Co., (1914) 132 C. C. A. (9th) 
509,216 Fed. 449· ............................... 265 
Raisor v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1905) 215 Ill. 47, 74 N. E. 
69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r r8 
Ramey v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., ( 1929) 323 Mo. 662, 21 S. W. 
(2d) 873 ...................................... r66 
Rankin v. Central R. Co., (1908) 77 N.J. L. 175, 71 Atl. 55. 127 
Rapers v. Holmes, (1937) 292 Ill. App. II6, 10 N. E. (2d) 
707 ........................................... I67 
Raphael v. Verelst, (I776) 2 Wm. Bl. 1055,96 Eng. Rep. 621 5 
Rastede v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I 92 7) 203 Iowa 4 30, 2 I 2 
N. w. 751 ..................................... 163 
Rathgeber v. Sommerhalder, (1934) 112 N.J. L. 546, 171 
Atl. 835 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 
Redfern v. Redfern, (1931) 212 Iowa 454,236 N. W. 399·. 105 
Reed v. Maas, (C. C. A. 1st, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 359 ........ 254 
Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I896) 135 Mo. 661, 37 
S. W. 904 ...................................... 195 
Reilly v. Pepe, ( 1928) 108 Conn. 436, 143 Atl. 568. . . . . . . . 166 
Resigno v. Jarka Co., (I927) 221 App. Div. 2I4, 223 N.Y. 
Supp. 5 ........................................ 215 
Resigno v. Jarka Co., (1928) 248 N.Y. 225, 162 N. E. 13 .. 262 
Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., (1924) 132 Wash. 108, 231 
Pac. 773 ....................................... 233 
Reynolds v. Day, (1914) 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 681 ...... 2I8 
Richardsonv.NewYorkCent.R.Co., (1867) 98Mass.85.26, 127 
Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell, (I893) 92 Ga. 77, 18 
s. E. 290. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 
Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (1927) 48 R.I. 433, 138 Atl. 
r86 ........................................... 241 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Robertson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I904) I22 Wis. 66, 99 
N. W. 433· .................................... I29 
Robinson v. Detroit & C. Steam Nav. Co., (I896) 43 U.S. 
App. I9o, 20 C. C. A. (6th) 86, 73 Fed. 883 ....... I45, 267 
Rochester v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, (I9I2) 87 Kan. I64, 
I23 Pac. 729 .................................... II8 
Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Co., (I933) 205 N.C. 292, I7I 
s. E. I 00. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I 8 
Rorvik v. North Pacific Lumber Co., (1920) 99 Ore. 58, I9o 
Pac. 33I, 195 Pac. I63 ............................ 233 
Rosenzweig v. Heller, (I93I) 302 Pa. 279, I 53 Ad. 346 .... I35 
Ross v. Sinhjee, (I89I) 29 Scottish L. R. 63 .............. I24 
Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegacao 
Lloyd Brasileiro, (D. C. N.Y., I928) 27 F. (2d) I002. . . I I6 
Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegaco Lloyd 
Brasileiro, (D. C. N.Y., I928) 3I F. (2d) 757 ......... 267 
Rundell v. La Compagnie Generale Transadantique, (I 900) 
4oC.C.A. (7th) 625, IooFed.655· ............. 27I, 275 
Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal, (C. C. N.J., 1849) I 
Wall. Jr. 275, aff'd I4 How. (55 U.S.) So ............ IOO 
Sagamore, The, (I9I7) I59 C. C. A. (Ist) 6oi, 247 Fed. 
743 ........................................... 278 
St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Craigo, (I895) IO Tex. Civ. App. 
238, 3I S. W. 207 ............................... IOO 
St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rogers, (I927) I72 Ark. 508, 290 
S. W. 74· ...................................... III 
Salkind v. Pennsylvania, etc., Ins. Co., (I 939) 335 Pa. 326, 
6 Ad. (2d) 30I ................................. 2I2 
Salla v. Hellman, (D. C. Calif., I925) 7 F. (2d) 953 ...... 272 
Saloshin v. Houle, (I93I) 85 N.H. 126, I55 Ad. 47 .... 233, 234 
Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission, (I 935) 2 I 9 Wis. 
343, 263 N. W. 349. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 
Sampson v. Channell, (C. C. A. Ist, I940) IIO F. (2d) 754 
........................................ 52, I69, I70 
Sanbo v. Union Pac. Coal Co., (C. C. Colo., I904) I30 Fed. 
52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I28 
Sanders' Adm'x v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (I90I) 49 C. C. A. 
(6th) 565, I II Fed. 708 ....................... 203, 247 
TABLE OF CASES li 
PAGE 
Sapone v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I927) I30 Misc. 755, 225 
N.Y.Supp.2II ................................. I64 
Sawyer v. El Paso, etc., R. Co., (I 90S) 49 Tex. Civ. App. 106, 
108 S. W. ]IS ............................... I4I, I93 
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., (C. C. A. 2nd, I934) 68 F. 
(2d) 942 ...................................... 237 
Schendel v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I 926) I 68 Minn. I 52, 2 I o 
N. W. 70 ...................................... I3o 
Schibsby v. Westenholz, (I87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. ISS, 40 L. J. 
Q. B. 73, 24 L. T. 93, I9 w. R. ss7................. Io 
Schmitt v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., (I 9 I 4) I 64 Iowa 6 54, 
I46 N. w. 467 .................................. I96 
Schopp v. Muller Dairies, (D. C. N. Y., I938) 25 F. Supp. 
50 ............................................ I69 
Schrader v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I930) 254 N.Y. I48, 
172 N. E. 272 .................................. I64 
Schueren v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I 9 I 7 Mo.) I 92 S. W. 
965 ....................................... I27, I29 
Schweitzer v. Hamburg-Amerikanische, etc., (I 9 I 2) 7 8 Misc. 
448, I38 N. Y. Supp. 944 ...................... 2o6, 22I 
Scotia, The, ( I 8 7 I ) I 4 Wall. ( 8 I U. S.) I 7 o . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 4 
Scotland, The (I88I) IOS U.S. 24 ................. 275, 279 
Scott v. Missouri P.R. Co., (I933) 333 Mo. 374, 62 S. W. 
(2d) 834 ....................................... 233 
Scott v. Seymour (Lord), (I862) I Hurl. & Colt. 2I9, ISS 
Eng. Rep. 865 .............................. 8, II, IS 
Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Refining Co., (D. C. Kan., I930) 
47 F. (2d) 6IS ................................. 22I 
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Kenney, (I9I6) 240 U.S. 489, 36 
Sup. Ct. 458. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I25 
Security Cement & Lime Co. v. Bowers, (I9I4) I24 Md. I I, 
9I Atl. 834. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I07 
Seirstad, The, (D. C. N.Y., I928) 27 F. (2d) 982 ........ 264 
Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Lacey, (1873) 49 Ga. 106 ....... I27, 137 
Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Lacy, (1871) 43 Ga. 461........... 23 
Severson v. Hanford Tri-state Airlines, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 
IOS F. (2d) 622 ................................ 225 
Shaver v. White, ( 1818) 6 Munf. (20 Va.) I 10, 8 Am. Dec. 
730 ...................................... 2I, 22, 23 
Iii TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Shaw v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., (I90I) 79 Miss. 670, 
3I So. 222..................................... 6o 
Shorter v. Bermuda, etc., Co., (D. C. N.Y., I932) 57 F. (2d) 
3I3 ........................................... 264 
Siegmann v. Meyer, (C. C. A. 2nd, I938) IOO F. (2d) 367 .. 255 
Simonson v. Canada Northern R. Co., (I9I4) 24 Man. 267, 
28 West. L. R. 3Io ............................. 89, 9I 
Sims v. Truscon Steel Co., (I939) 343 Mo. I2I6, 126 S. W. 
(2d) 204 ...................................... 220 
Sing v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I930 Mo.) 30 S. W. (2d) 37. III 
Singer v. Messina, (I933) 3I2 Pa. I29, I67 Atl. 583 .... II I, I 52 
Skinner v. East India Co., (I66s) 6 How. St. Tr. 7IO ... 2, 7, 97 
Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., (I904) I94 U. S. I2o, 24 
Sup. Ct. sSI ............... 3I, so, s6, sS, So, I02, I I4 
Sloan v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., (D. C. W. Va., 
I939) 27 F. Supp. 108 ............................ 233 
Smith v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., (I935) I9I Ark. 389, 
86 S. W. (2d) 4I I ....................... · ....... 233 
Smith v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (I 9 I 2) I I 4 C. C. A. (8th) 
I57, I94Fed. 79· ............................. I92, 20I 
Smith v. Condry, (I843) I How. (42 U.S.) 28 ......... 22, 267 
Smith v. Heine Safety Bm1er Co., (I9I8) 224 N.Y. 9, II9 
N. E. 878 ...................................... 2II 
Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., (I921) II9 Me. 552, I12 
Atl. 516 ................................... 209, 2 Io 
Smith v. Southern R. Co., (I909) 136 Ky. I62, I23 S. W. 
678 ........................................... IOO 
Smith v. Southern R. Co., (I9IO) 87 S.C. I36, 69 S. E. 18 .. 207 
Smith v. Wabash R. Co., (I895) 141 Ind. 92, 40 N. E. 
270 ....................................... 164, I66 
Smith v. Webb, (1916 Tex. Civ. App.) I8I S. W. 8I4 ... I37, 138 
Snashall v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., ( 18 90) 8 Mackey ( 19 
D. C.) 309 ..................................... 204 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, (1934) 291 U. S. 97, 54 Sup. Ct. 
330 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
Solomon v. Call, (I932) 159 Va. 625, I66 S. E. 467 ....... 233 
Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Dusablon, (I907) 48 Tex. Civ. App. 
203, 106 s. w. 766 ............................ 83, 101 
Southern R. Co. v. Robertson, (I 909) 7 Ga. App. I 54, 66 S. 
E. 535 ................................ 155, 161, 166 
TABLE OF CASES liii 
PAGE 
South-Western R. Co. v. Paulk, (I8S8) 24 Ga. 3s6 ........ I28 
Spokane, etc., R. Co. v. Whitley, (I9I3) 23 Idaho 642, I32 
Pac. I2I, aff'd (I914) 237 U.S. 487, 3S Sup Ct. 6ss .... I30 
Standard Oil Co. v. Tampico Nav. Co., (D. C. N.Y., 192I) 
21 F. (2d) 79S .................................. 267 
State of Virginia, The, (D. C. N.Y., 1894) 6o Fed. IOI8 ... I I9 
Stewart v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (I897) I68 U.S. 44S, I8 
Sup. Ct. IOS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 
Stipetich v. Security Stove & Manufacturing Co., (I 920 Mo.) 
2I8 s. w. 964 .................................. I2S 
Stockwell v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (C. C. Vt., I904) I3I Fed. 
IS3 ........................................... 248 
Stoeckman v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., (I 884) IS Mo. App. 
S03 ........................................... I2S 
Stone v. Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co., (I894) 84 N.Y. S. Ct. 
(77 Hun) 99, 28 N.Y. Supp. 446 ................... I26 
Stone v. United States, ( 1897) I67 U.S. I 78, I 7 Sup. Ct. 778. 99 
Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co., (I 9 I 3) 30 Ont. L. R. 
27I, 24 0. w. R. SS2, 4 0. w. N. 1212, II D. L. R. 
49 .................................. 17, 89, 9I, I22 
Stout v. Wood, (I 820) I Black£. (Ind.) 7 I ............. 22, 3 I 
Strandhill, The, (I926) Can. L. R. 68o ................. 147 
Strangeland v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., (1908) IOS Minn. 
224, I I7 N. w. 386 .............................. I2S 
Stratton's Independence v. Dines, (C. C. Colo., 1904) 126 Fed. 
968 ........................................... 246 
Stuart v. Baldwin, (I877) 4I Up. Can. Q. B. 446.......... 99 
Sumner v. Brown, (I933) 3I2 Pa. 124, 167 Atl. 3IS ...... 246 
Swift v. Tyson, (I842) I6 Pet. (4I U.S.) I ........... SI, 168 
Tagus, The, [I903] P. 44, 72 L. J.P. 4 ................. I46 
Talabot, The, (I89o) IS P. D . .194· ................... 270 
Tarbell v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (I 922) 96 Vt. I 70, II 8 Atl. 
484 ........................................... 137 
Taylor v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I89S) 9S Iowa 740, 64 
N. W. 66o ..................................... II8 
Taylor's Adm'r v. Pennsylvania Co., (I88o) 78 Ky. 348.127, I30 
Teitsort v. Illinois Central R. Co., (I929) 322 Mo. 640, IS 
s. w. (2d) 779· ................................ I08 
liv TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co, v. George, (1914) 233 
U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587 ...................... 101, 102 
Teti v. Consolidated Coal Co., (D. C. N.Y., 19I4) 2I7 Fed. 
443 ........................................... 127 
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. James, (I938) I3I Tex. 605, 
II8 S. W. (2d) 293 .............................. 2I2 
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Price, (I927 Tex. Civ. App.) 
300 s. w. 667. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 
Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Cox, (I89I) I45 U.S. 593 1 I2 Sup. Ct. 
905 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Gross, (I9IO) 6o Tex. Civ. App. 62I, 
128 S. W. I I73 ................................. I20 
Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Humble, (I90I) I8I U.S. 57, 21 Sup. 
Ct. 526 ........................................ 256 
Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Richards, (I887) 68 Tex. 375, 4 S. W. 
627 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, (C. C. A. 8th, I926) I5 F. 
(2d) I7I ...................................... 215 
Thacker v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (I9I5) I62 Ky. 337, I72 
s. w. 658 ...................................... 108 
Thayer v. Brooks, (I849) I7 Ohio 489 ................. IOO 
Theroux's Adm'r v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (I894) 27 U.S. 
App. 508, 64 Fed. 84. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 
Thoene v. Lockwood, ( I9II) Times, April I I ............ 252 
Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I90I) 25 Tex. Civ. 
App. 398, 6I s. w. 50 I ........................ I 15, I98 
Thompson Towing & Wrecking Ass'n v. McGregor, (I9I3) 
I24 C. C. A. (6th) 479, 207 Fed. 209 ................ 265 
Thorpe v. Union Pac. Coal Co., (I902) 24 Utah 475, 68 
Pac. I45 ....................................... I27 
Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., (I93I) 163 Tenn. 
420, 43 S. W. (2d) 22I ........................... 228 
Tie:ffenbrun v. Flannery, (I930) I98 N.C. 397, I5I S. E. 
857 ........................................... 135 
Titanic, The, (I9I4) 233 U.S. 7I8, 34 Sup. Ct. 754- .. II9, 27I 
Torgersen v. Hutton, ( I934) 243 App. Div. 3I, 276 N. Y. 
Supp. 348, a:ff'd ( I935) 267 N.Y. 535, 196 N. E. 566 ... 261 
Traders, etc., Ins. Co. v. Stake~, (I939 Tex. Civ. App.) I3I 
S. W. (2d) 270 ................................. 2I2 
TABLE OF CASES lv 
PAGE 
Traglio v. Harris, (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 439 .... 256 
Union Bridge, etc., Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1919) 287 
Ill. 396, 122 N. E. 609 ............................ 21 I 
United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) 18 
F. (2d) 453 .................................... 216 
United States Casualty Co. v. Hoage, (1935) 64 App. D. C. 
284, 77 F. (2d) 542 .......................... 223, 224 
Uravic v. Jarka, (1931) 282 U.S. 234,51 Sup. Ct. II I .. 262, 264 
Usher v. West Jersey R. Co., (1889) 126 Pa. 206, 17 Atl. 
597 ....................................... 127, 130 
Vandeventer v. New York & N.H. R. Co., (1857) 27 Barb. 
(N.Y.) 244.................................... 24 
Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (I 899) 35 C. C. A. (3d) 
282, 93 Fed. 260. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 
Varawa v. Howard Smith Co., ( 1910) Viet. L. R. 509, 13 Can. 
L. R. 35....................................... 16 
Vaughn v. Bunker Hill, etc., Co., (C. C. Ore., 1903) 126 Fed. 
895 ........................................... 127 
Vestris, The, (D. C. N.Y., 1931) 53 F. (2d) 847 ....... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119, 137, 18o, 272 
Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, (1912) 102 Miss. 735, 
59 So. 883 ...................................... 127 
Vimont v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I 886) 69 Iowa 296, 22 N. 
W. 906, 28 N. W. 612 ............................ 203 
Wagganam v. General Finance Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) II6 
F. (zd) 254. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Walker v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1906) 75 S.C. 512, 56 
S. E. 38 ....................................... 195 
Walpole v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., (1921) 15 Sask. L. 
R. 75, I w. w. R. 1232 ........................ I6, 217 
Walpolev.CanadianNorthernR.Co., [1923] A. C. 113 ... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 216, 221 
Wandersee v. Moskewitz, (1929) 198 Wis. 345, 223 N. W. 
837 ........................................... 212 
Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., (1914) 87 Misc. 
156, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1035 ..................... 218, 221 
lvi TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Watts v. Thomas, (I8II) 2 Bibb. (5 Ky.) 458........... 21 
Weaver v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, 
(I936) 339 Mo. ISO, 95 S. W. (2d) 64I ............. 223 
Weiderho:ff v. Neal, (D. C. Mo., I934) 6 F. Supp. 798 ..... 223 
Weidman v. Weidman, (I93I) 274 Mass. II8, I74 N. E. 
206 ........................................... 236 
Weir v. Rountree, (I909) 97 C. C. A. (8th) soo, I73 Fed. 
776 ........................................... 201 
Wellman v. Mead, (I9I9) 93 Vt. 322, I07 Atl. 396 ....... II8 
Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co., (D. C. Wash., I 92 I) 2 77 
Fed. 812 ...................................... 265 
Western, etc., Ry. v. Strong, (I874) 52 Ga. 461 .......... I27 
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, (I92I) 257 U.S. 233, 42 Sup. 
Ct. 89 ..................................... 262, 263 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Armstrong, (I918 Tex. Civ. App.) 
207 s. w. 592. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, (I9I4) 234 U. S. 542, 
34 Sup. Ct. 955 ............................. II5, I94 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, (I 904) 35 Tex. Civ. 
App. 437, So S. W. 561 ........................... 196 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Burris, (1910) 102 C. C. A. (8th) 
386, I79 Fed. 92 ............................. I96, I98 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chilton, (I9II) 100 Ark. 296, 
I40 s. w. 26.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, (I902) 29 Tex. Civ. App. 
59 I, 69 s. w. 427. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I95 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crenshaw, (I9IO) 93 Ark. 4IS, 
I 2 5 S. W. 420. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 98 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Favish, ( I916) I96 Ark. 4, 71 
So. I83 .................................... I96, I97 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ford, (I9o6) 77 Ark. 53I, 92 
s. w. 528 .................................. 196, I98 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fuel, (I9IO) I65 Ala. 39I, 51 
So. 57 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. James, (I896) I62 U.S. 6so, 16 
Sup. Ct. 934. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I94 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Jennings, (I 9 I 6) I I o Miss. 673, 
70So.830 ...................................... Il5 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lacer, (I906) I22 Ky. 839, 93 
s. w. 34· ...................... ' ............... 195 
TABLE OF CASES I vii 
PAGE 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, (ISS7) I22 U.S. 34-7, 
7 Sup. Ct. I I26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I94-
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pratt, (I907) IS Okla. 274-, S9 
Pac. 237 ....................................... I94-
Western Union Tel. Co. v. See, ( I9IO) 94- Ark. S6, I26 S. W. 
7S ............................................ I98 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Smith, (I9I6 Tex. Civ. App.) ISS 
s. w. 702. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I94-
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Waller, (I903) 96 Tex. 5S9, 74-
S. W. 75I. ..................................... I95 
Wheeler v. Southern R. Co., (I 9 I 6) I II Miss. 52 S, 7 I So. 
SI2 ....................................... I07, I25 
Whitford v. Panama R. Co., (IS5S) 3 Bos. (N.Y.) 67...... 24-
Whitford v. Panama R. Co., (IS6I) 23 N.Y. 4-65......... 24 
Williams v. Jones, (ISII) I3 East 4-39, I04- Eng. Rep. 4-4-I 
........................................... ·70, I36 
Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., (I900) 52 La. Ann. I4-I7, 27 
So. S5I ........................................ 256 
Williams v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I S94-) I 2 3 Mo. 57 3, 2 7 
s. w. 3S7 ...................................... I3S 
Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., (I 92 I) 54 Cal. App. 57 I, 202 
Pac. 356 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 I 
Williams v. Southern R. Co., ( I90I) 12S N.C. 2S6, 3S S. E. 
S93 ........................................... 206 
Willis v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (ISS4-) 6I Tex. 4-32 ...... 23, 26 
Wilson v. Rich, (IS3I) 5 N.H. 4-55.................... 22 
Wilson v. Tootle, (C. C. Mo., IS93) 55 Fed. 2II .......... I29 
Windrush, The, (D. C. N.Y., I922) 2S6 Fed. 25I, (C. C. A. 
2nd, I924-) 5 F. (2d) 4-25 ...................... 278, 279 
Wingert v. Carpenter, (I S94-) IOI Mich. 395, 59 N. W. 662. 264-
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., (ISSS) I27 U.S. 265, S Sup. 
Ct. I370 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, (C. 
C. A. 2nd, I930) 4-3 F. (2d) 94-I ................ I36, I3S 
Woodard v. Bush, (I920) 2S2 Mo. I63, 220 S. W. S39.... III 
Woodard v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., (IS 59) I o 0 hio St. 
I2I ........................................ 26, I30 
Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co., (I89I) 126 N.Y. IO, 26 
N. E. I050 ..................................... II7 
lviii TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Woolen v. Lorenz, (1938) 68 App. D. C. 389, 98 F. (2d) 
261 ........................................... 246 
Woudrichem, The, (D. C. N.Y., 1921) 278 Fed. 568 ...... 145 
Wright v. Palmison, (1932) 237 App. Div. 22, 260 N. Y. 
Supp. 812 .................................. 159, 166 
Wrightv.Pettus, (1936) 209N.C. 732, 184S.E.494 ..... 105 
Yarbrough's Estate, (1923) 126 Wash. 85,216 Pac. 889 .... 129 
Young v. Masci, (1933) 289 U.S. 253, 53 Sup. Ct. 599, aff'g 
Masciv. Young, (1932) 109N.J.L.453, 162Ad.623 ... 237 
Yourri, The RussianS. S., (1885) L. R. 10 App. Cas. 276 ... 270 
Zurich, etc., Ins. Co. v. Brunson, (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) I 5 F . 
. (2d) 906 ...................................... 216 
CHAPTER I 
Development of the Law Respecting 
Foreign Torts in England 
SECTION I 
ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN TORTS 
THE first step taken by the courts toward the develop-ment of a choice-of-law theory was the assumption of jurisdiction to try actions for torts committed outside 
England. The old rules relating to the venue of actions raised 
an obstacle because they required the plaintiff to state carefully 
the place or places in which the facts of the case occurred. These 
rules had come into existence at a time when juries were sup-
posed to decide issues of fact by their own personal knowledge. 
It was therefore necessary to summon a jury from the very 
place where the facts transpired. As the jury slowly became 
a judicial body which elicited the facts from the evidence at 
the trial, these rules ceased to have any purpose or value. 
Their strict application was relaxed in what were known as 
transitory actions. Distinguished from transitory actions were 
local actions. Local actions have been defined as those in which 
the facts have a necessary connection with a particular locality, 
e. g., an action to recover possession of a house in Trumping-
ton. In local actions, the plaintiff had to state the venue ac-
curately. But in transitory, i. e., non-local actions, this rule was 
not strictly enforced. Even in transitory actions the plaintiff 
was required to state some venue for the facts. But although 
the venue stated in a transitory action was not the true venue, 
the court might refuse to permit the defendant to object. 
This was the state of English internal law in the sixteenth 
century. When the common-law courts decided to entertain 
I 
2 TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
actions arising out of contracts made outside England or 
wrongs committed outside England, they faced the problem: 
how should the venue be laid in such a case? The ancient law 
of venue really forbade the trial of such an action. If the 
facts occurred outside the realm, it would be impossible to 
summon a jury to try the case. But the sixteenth century com-
mon lawyers hurdled the obstacle, as was their wont, with a 
fiction. In cases where the operative facts occurred in a for-
eign place, the plaintiff was permitted to state their true local-
ity, e. g., "in the city of Paris in France" and then to add, "to 
wit in the parish of St. Mary le Bow in the Ward of Cheap." 
Needless to say, the defendant was forbidden to question the 
truth of this statement. 
This extraordinary fiction was, however, only permitted in 
transitory actions. The recital of a venue in such actions had 
already come to be regarded as little more than a point of 
form. An additional fiction was no great matter. But in local 
actions, the fiction was forbidden. A true venue had to be 
stated and if it was impossible to state a true venue within the 
jurisdiction the action could not be brought.1 For instance, an 
action for trespass to land was considered to be a local action 
because it involved a particular piece of land located in a par-
ticular place. Consequently it was impossible to sue a man in 
England for trespass to land outside England. 
The law was summed up to this effect in Skinner v. East 
India Co.2 (1665). Mr. Skinner, an independent trader in 
'See HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Ed. 3 (I924) vol. 5, p. I40; 
Sack, "Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law," (I937) 3 LAW. 
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) I Cowp. I6r, 9& 
Eng. Rep. ro2I; British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mo~ambique, 
[1&93] A. C. 6o2, 63 L. J. Q. B. 7o, 6 R. I, 69 L. T. 6o4; and section 21 
below. 
• Skinner v. East India Co., (1665) 6' How. St. Tr. 710. 
A rather faint objection to the trial of foreign torts in England may be also 
found in Dutton v. Howell, (1693) I Show. P. C. 24, 1 Eng. Rep. 17. An 
action was brought for false imprisonment in the Barbados. For the defendant it 
was argued that "this Action cannot lie because the Fact is not triable here; 
the laws there may be different from ours." To which plaintiff's counsel re-
torted "that the Action lies, for that 'tis a transitory Action and follows the 
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the Indies, complained at the bar of the House of Lords that 
the East India Company had seized his trading post and con-
fiscated his goods. The House asked the judges whether or 
not the plaintiff would have a remedy in the common-law 
courts. They gave the House a unanimous opinion: 
"That the matters touching the taking away of the peti-
tioner's ship and goods and the assaulting of his person, not-
withstanding the same were done beyond the seas, might be 
determined upon by his majesty's ordinary courts at West-
minster; And as to the dispossessing him of his house and 
island, that he was not relievable in any ordinary court of law." 
A final and emphatic assertion of the jurisdiction to try 
transitory actions for foreign torts was made by Lord Mans-
field in the famous case of Mostyn v. Fabrigas 3 upon the 
authority of which many American courts based their deci-
sions to exercise a similar jurisdiction. The action was one 
brought against an ex-governor of Minorca for false im-
prisonment and other injuries committed in the island; coun-
sel for the defendant suggested at one point that "the cases 
where the courts of Westminster have taken cognizance of 
transactions arising abroad seem to be wholly on contracts 
where the laws of the foreign country have agreed with the 
laws of England, and between English subjects." This sug-
gestion Lord Mansfield repudiated in his judgment, saying: 
"But can it be doubted that actions may be maintained here, 
not only upon contracts, which follow the persons but for in-
juries done by subject to subject; especially for injuries where 
the whole that is prayed is a reparation in damages, or satis-
Person wheresoever he comes under the Power of the Common Law Process: 
And that a Man may as well be sued in England for a Trespass done beyond 
Sea, as in Barbadoes or the like Place, as for a Debt arising there by Specialty 
or other Contract: that no body but Prynne ever denied it and he did so only in 
case of Bonds dated there: That many Actions have been maintained and tried 
here for Facts done in the Indies notwithstanding special Justifications to them 
and the Trials have been where the Actions were laid." 
3 Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) I Cowp. r6r, 98 Eng. Rep. rozr. 
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faction to be made by process against the person or his effects 
within the jurisdiction of the court? We know it is within 
every day's experience. I was embarrassed a great while to 
find out whether the counsel for the plaintiff really meant to 
make a question of it." 
Lord Mansfield explained the fictitious venue with his 
characteristic common sense: 
((The law," he said, ((has in that case invented a fiction and 
has said that the party shall first set out the description truly, 
and then give a venue only for form and for the sake of trial, 
by a videlicet in the county of Middlesex or any other county. 
But no judge ever thought that when the declaration said in 
Fort St. George, viz., in Cheapside, that the plaintiff meant 
it was in Cheapside. It is a fiction of form; every country has 
its forms which are invented for the furtherance of justice; 
and it is a certain rule that a fiction of law shall never be con-
tradicted so as to defeat the end for which it was invented 
but for every other purpose it may be contradicted. Now the 
fiction invented in these cases is barely for the mode of trial, 
to every other purpose therefore it shall be contradicted, but 
not for the purpose of saying the case shall not be tried." 
At this time the declaration in an action of trespass usually 
recited that the defendant had done the acts complained of 
"contra pacem domini regis." Lord Mansfield was a little 
concerned over the propriety of these words in cases where the 
trespass was committed outside His Majesty's Dominions: 
((With regard to matters that arise out of the realm there 
is a substantial distinction of locality too, for there are some 
cases that arise out of the realm which ought not to be tried 
anywhere but in the country where they arise; as in the case 
alluded to by Serjeant Walker: if two persons fight in France 
and both happening casually to be here one should bring an 
action of assault against the other it might be a doubt whether 
such an action could be maintained here; because, though it 
is not a criminal prosecution, it must be laid to be against the 
peace of the king; but the breach of the peace is merely local 
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though the trespass against the person is transitory. There-
fore, without giving any opinion, it might perhaps be triable 
only where both parties at the time were subjects." 
But in Raphael v. V erelst 4 ( r 776) the Court of Common 
Pleas awarded damages for a trespass alleged to have been 
committed in the dominions of an Indian prince. The court 
said that "although in all Declarations of Trespass it is laid 
contra pacem regis yet that is only Matter of Form and not 
traversable." 
Thus, on the eve of the American revolution, there was 
substantial authority in the English cases for the view that, 
for injuries inflicted outside England or even outside the 
realm, an action might be maintained in an English court. 
This idea had been reconciled with the strongly territorial 
flavour of English procedure upon all points save one: the 
strict rule requiring a proper venue for local actions. 
SECTION 2 
THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE LAW OF THE FORUM WOULD 
ALLOW RECOVERY BUT THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF 
WRONG WOULD NOT: THE JUSTIFICATION THEORY; 
THE OBLIGATION THEORY 
Having asserted their power to entertain these suits, the 
courts were faced with the more difficult problem of deter-
mining in what measure the law of the place of wrong ought 
to control their decision. There are two possible permutations 
involving differences of local and foreign law which may 
occur in an action upon a foreign tort. First, the law of the 
forum 1 may allow a recovery although the law of the place 
'Raphael v. Verelst, (r776) 2 Wm. Bl. ross, 96 Eng. Rep. 62r. 
1 In this study the expression "law of the forum" means the internal law of 
the forum, the body of rules applied by the courts of the forum in cases having 
no contact with any other jurisdiction. The expression "law of the place of 
wrong" means the internal law of the place of wrong. 
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of wrong would not do so. Second, the law of the place of 
wrong may allow a recovery although the law of the forum 
would not do so. The former of these two situations was the 
first one brought to the notice of English courts. In Blad's 
case 2 ( 1 6 73) some English traders took proceedings against 
Peter Blad, a Dane, who had seized their stock of goods in 
Iceland. Blad petitioned the Privy Council for protection on 
the plea that the seizures were authorized by the King of 
Denmark. He apparently believed that this would be no de-
fence in the ordinary English courts. Lord Nottingham (by his 
own account) stood up and said "that it was an injury to the 
subject to stay his proceedings at law and no injury to the 
Dane to let the suit go on, for whatever was law in Denmark 
would be law in England in this case and would be allowed 
as a very good justification in the action." 
This doctrine, that the defendant may "justify" his actions 
under the law of the place of wrong, stands out very prom-
inently in the subsequent case of Dutton v. Howell. 3 There 
the House of Lords had occasion to pass upon a claim by 
his deputy against an ex-governor of the Barbados, arising 
out of an attempt on the part of the governor and council 
to punish the deputy for his maladministration by imprison-
ing him. The arguments of counsel, reported at length, show 
clearly that both parties admitted Governor Dutton might 
rely upon the law of the islands to defend himself. The 
plaintiff merely directed his argument to proving that Eng-
lish common law had been imported by the first settlers as 
the law of the Barbados and ought therefore, to govern the 
case in hand. If the Governor asserted that the Barbadian law 
was different from the common law, let him prove it. 
2 Blad's case, (I673) 3 Swan. 6o3, 36 Eng. Rep. 99I. Subsequent chancery 
proceedings showed that the plaintiff relied upon certain treaties with the King 
of Denmark. Lord Nottingham decided that a matter of state was involved 
and enjoined the defendants from further proceedings at law. Blad v. Bam-
field, (I674) 3 Swan. 6o4, Cas. Temp. Finch I86, 36 Eng. Rep. 992. 
"Dutton v. Howell, (I693) I Show. P. C .. z4, I Eng, Rep. I7· 
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"It was further said, That the justification of such a Tort 
or Wrong ought to be according to the Common Law of 
England for that Barbadoes is under the same Law as Eng-
land; For tho' the Matter may justify him for 
an Act done there which would not justify him for the same 
Act done here, yet he must shew that he hath pursued the 
Rules of Law in that Place: or in case of no positive Laws, 
the Rules of Natural Equity: For either the Common Law, 
or new Instituted Laws, or Natural Equity must be the 
Rule in those Places." 
The House gave judgment in the Governor's favour, 
without reasons. 
In Mostyn v. Fabrigas 4 the questions of jurisdiction and 
choice-of-law were both thoroughly discussed. To dispose 
of the first question Lord Mansfield merely reaffirmed the 
hundred-year-old doctrine of the Skinner case. 5 Similarly 
his choice-of-law theory was couched in terms taken from the 
seventeenth century cases. "For whatever is a justification in 
the place where the thing is done, ought to be a justification 
where the case is tried." 
None of these early decisions make it clear just why the 
English courts were ready to recognize foreign laws as a de-
fence. But the fact that that recognition was directed to 
assisting the defendant suggests that it was his interest 
which claimed the court's attention. Perhaps it was felt that, 
if he had complied with the laws and customs of the land 
in which he found himself, it would be unfair to judge his 
conduct by English rules and standards simply because he 
happened to come "under the power of the common law 
process."6 Perhaps, too, the courts were concerned, in some 
'Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (I774) I Cowp. I6I, 98 Eng. Rep. I02I, 
• Skinner v. East India Co., (I66s) 6 How. St. Tr. 7IO, 
• This idea appears in the argument of counsel in Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (I 774) 
r Cowp. I6I, 98 Eng. Rep. I02I. They sought to have the plaintiff's action 
dismissed because of the great inconvenience and difficulty which, they claimed, 
would be encountered in appraising the defendant's conduct according to the 
foreign law. 
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degree, to respect the authority of the government ruling the 
territory where the wrong was committed. 7 
In I 8 70 Mr. Justice Willes attempted to restate the 
English choice-of-law theory for torts in terms somewhat 
more comprehensive than those of the seventeenth-century 
formula. The case of Phillips v. Eyre,S which prompted 
this attempt, itself presented a nice question for legal dia-
lectics. The defendant, an ex-governor of Jamaica charged 
"The inconveniences of entertaining such an action in this country are many, 
but none can attend the rejecting it. For it must be determined by the law 
of this country or by the law of the place where the act was done. If by our 
law, it would be the highest injustice, by making a man who has regulated! his 
conduct by one law amenable to another totally opposite. If by the law of 
Minorca how is it to be proved?" 
And in Phillips v. Eyre, (I869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 225, 239, 38 L. J. Q. B. IIJ, 
Cockburn, C. J., explained the English choice-of-law rule as follows: "It ap-
pears to us clear that where by the law of another country an act complained 
of is lawful, such act, though it would have been wrongful by our law if 
committed here, cannot be made the ground of an action in an English court. 
The rule, which obtains in respect of property and civil contracts-namely, 
that an act, unless intended to take effect elsewhere, shall as regards its effects 
and incidents, if a conflict of law arises between the lex loci and the lex fori, 
be governed by the former,-appears to us to be applicable to the case of an 
act occasioning personal injury. To hold the contrary would be attended with 
the most inconvenient and startling consequences, and would be altogether con-
trary to the comity of nations in matters of law to which effect should, if 
possible, be given. An act might not only be lawful but might even be enjoined 
by the law of another country, which would be wrongful, and give a right of 
action by our law, and it certainly would be in the highest degree unjust 
that an individual who has intended to obey the law binding upon him should 
be held liable in damages in another country where a different law may prevail. 
Thus, an arrest and imprisonment might be perfectly justified by the law of a 
foreign country under circumstances in which it would be actionable heFe. 
It would be impossible to hold that in such a case an action could be maintained 
in an English court." 
7 The notion that foreign law should be recognized upon the ground of 
comity or respect for the legal policy of the foreign state was made explicit 
in the case of Scott v. Seymour (Lord), (I86z) I Hurl. & Colt. 2I9, 158 
Eng. Rep. 865. At p. 232 counsel argued: "By the comity of nations the 
Courts of this country respect the policy of the foreign law and if that pro-
vides that no civil action shall be maintained for an assault, none is maintainable 
here." And at p. 236, Blackburn, J., said: "As at present advised, I think that 
when two British subjects go into a foreign country they owe local allegiance 
to the laws of that country and are as much governed by that law as foreigners." 
See also WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. I (I858) 222. -
8 Phillips v. Eyre, (I87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. r, IO B. & S. Ioo4, 40 L. J. Q. B. 28, 
zz L. T. 869. 
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with assaulting and imprisoning the plaintiff in the course of 
a rebellion in that island, pleaded for his justification a ret-
roactive act of indemnity passed by the Jamaican legislature. 
To this the plaintiff replied that, since the acts complained 
of were not justified at the time they were committed, there 
then accrued to him a vested right of action in the English 
courts, of which the legislature of Jamaica could not deprive 
him. It was, of course, a commonplace of English law in 
r 8 70 that colonial legislation could have no direct extra-
territorial effect. Mr. Justice Willes met the plaintiff's argu-
ment with these words: 
"This objection is founded upon a misconception of 
the true character of a civil or legal obligation and the 
corresponding right of action. The obligation is the prin-
cipal to which a right of action in whatever court is only 
an accessory, and such accessory according to the maxim of 
law follows the principal and must stand or fall therewith. 
'Quae accessorium locum obtinent extinguuntur cum prin-
cipales res peremptae sunt.' A right of action, whether it arise 
from contract governed by the law of the place or wrong, 
is equally the creature of the law of the place and sub-
ordinate thereto. The terms of the contract or the char-
acter of the subject matter may shew that the parties in-
tended their bargain to be governed by some other law but 
prima facie it falls under the law of the place where made. 
And in like manner the civil liability arising out of a wrong 
derives its birth from the law of the place and its character 
is determined by that law. Therefore, an act committed 
abroad, if valid and unquestionable by the law of the place, 
cannot, so far as civil liability is concerned, be drawn in 
question elsewhere, unless by force of some distinct excep-
tional legislation, superadding a liability other than and 
besides that incident to the act itself. In this respect no sound 
distinction can be suggested between the civil liability in 
respect of a contract governed by the law of the place and 
a wrong." 
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His lordship discussed more particularly some of the 
older decisions on foreign torts and crimes. He then alluded 
to the well established rule in bankruptcy cases that "what 
is a discharge of a debt in the country where it is contracted 
is a discharge of it everywhere" and continued: 
"So that where an, obligation by contract to pay a debt or 
damages is discharged and avoided by the law of the place 
where it was made, the accessory right of action in every 
court open to the creditor unquestionably falls to the ground. 
And by strict parity of reasoning, where an obligation, ex 
delicto, to pay damages is discharged and avoided by the law 
of the country where it was made, the accessory right of 
action is in like manner discharged and avoided." 
To this conception of tort liability as an obligation created 
by the law of the place of wrong, a startling novelty in the 
English line of cases, his lordship ascribed no specific source. 
The analogy to a similar theory regarding contracts 9 is ex-
plicit in the excerpt quoted and in other parts of the judgment 
as well. And the very same volume of reports contains the 
cases of Godard v. Gray 10 and Schibsby v. Westenholz 11 in 
which Mr. Justice Blackburn, following earlier decisions of 
Baron Parke, explained at some length that foreign judg-
ments were enforced in England because they constituted 
binding obligations imposed by a court of competent juris-
diction. A similar approach to foreign tort liability had been 
adopted by Sir Robert Phillimore throughout his exhaustive 
and erudite opinion in The Halley .12 Another possible source 
of the doctrine is the first edition of Westlake, published 
in 1858, and cited before Mr. Justice Willes and his brothers 
9 See also WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. I (r858) §§ 171, 
I 84. 
10 Godard v. Gray, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. 139, 40 L. J. Q, B. 6z, 24 L. T. 
89, 19 w. R. 348. 
"'Schibsby v. Westenholz, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. rss, 40 L. J. Q. B. 73, 
24 L. T. 93, 19 W. R. 587. 
19 The Halley, (r867) 2 Adm. &Ecc. 3· 
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in the Exchequer Chamber in I 862 13 for the proposition that 
"every authority which traces the force of a contract, or of 
an obligation quasi ex contractu, to the local law under 
which the agreement or the act is made or done, must of 
course be of equal avail to trace the obligation arising from 
a delict to the local law under which it is committed." 14 
But whatever its origin, this obligation theory now re-
ceived the unanimous approval of the Court of Exchequer 
Chamber. Nor was it incorporated in its judgment as a mere 
ornamental display of academic learning; it stood as an in-
tegral part of the ratio decidendi. To succeed in a suit 
based upon a foreign tort, the plaintiff must show an obliga-
tion to pay damages created by the law of the place of wrong. 
·Here the obligation, if any, had been dissolved by the J a-
maican act of indemnity. Hence the plaintiff failed. The 
court did not reach this result by an interpretation or ap-
plication of the justification principle. Nevertheless it was 
duly rehearsed in an oft-quoted passage intermediate be-
tween the excerpts quoted above: 
"As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England, 
for a wrong alleged to have been committed abroad, two 
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of 
such a character that it would have been actionable if com-
mitted in England. Secondly, the act must not 
have been justifiable by the law of the place where it 
was done." 
Of these two conditions, the first summarizes the doctrine 
of public policy announced in The Halley, 15 the second is 
our traditional formula for the application of foreign law. 
To reconcile that formula with the newer theory of enforc-
"'In Scott v. Seymour (Lord), (I862) I Hurl. & Colt. 2I9, I58 Eng. Rep. 
S6s. 
14 WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. I (I 858) 222. 
15 The Halley, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193,5 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 262, 16 Eng. 
Rep. 514. 
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ing an obligation no attempt was made by Mr. Justice Willes. 
He let them stand side by side in his judgment where they 
have ever since offered a doctrinal choice for court and jurist. 
SECTION 3 
THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF 
WRONG WOULD ALLOW RECOVERY BUT THE LAW 
OF THE FORUM WOULD NOT: THE FIRST RULE 
IN PHILLIPS V. EYRE 
Hitherto in our survey we have considered only cases in 
which the law of the place of wrong exonerated the defend-
ant although the law of the forum would have imposed 
liability upon him. In such situations the justification theory 
permits the defendant to make use of the law of the place 
of wrong as a defence. If it "justifies" him, he goes scot-free. 
The obligation theory indicates the same result. If the law 
of the place of wrong imposes no obligation upon the defend-
ant there can be no liability. 
There is, however, a second possible permutation of local 
and foreign law; the law of the place of wrong may give 
the plaintiff a cause of action although, under the law of the 
forum, he would have none. How should the court of the 
forum deal with this situation? The justification theory 
does not offer any very definite answer to this question. But 
the obligation theory clearly suggests that since the law of 
the place of wrong has imposed an obligation upon the de-
fendant, the court of the forum ought to enforce it. 
In the case of The Halley 1 (decided two years before 
Phillips v. Eyre2 ) the Privy Council laid down a sweeping 
proposition which very seriously curtails the power of Eng-
lish courts to enforce affirmative obligations in the tort field 
1 The Halley, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 16 Eng. Rep. 514. 
• Phillips v. Eyre, (1 870) L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, 10 B. & S. 1004, 40 L. J. Q. B. 28, 
22 L. T. 869. 
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created by foreign law. The court had before it an admi-
ralty action arising out of a collision on the river Scheidt 
in Belgium. Belgian law had obliged the defendant to put 
his vessel in charge of a special river pilot whose careless 
navigation had caused the accident. English common-law 
rules of master and servant would have exculpated the de-
fendant, but under Belgian law he was none the less respon-
sible. The trial judge, Sir Robert Phillimore, in a lengthy 
and scholarly judgment, observed that the Belgian rule, 
far from being contrary to natural justice, seemed to him 
rather more reasonable than the English one and that the 
latter was "founded upon special considerations of public 
policy applicable only to British territory." He accordingly 
gave judgment for the plaintiff.3 
The members of the Privy Council who heard the case on 
appeal did not share Sir Robert Phillimore's views regarding 
the Belgian law: 
"It appears," said Lord Justice Selwyn, who spoke for the 
board, "that the tort for which damages are sought to be 
recovered in this cause was a tort occasioned solely by the 
negligence or unskilfulness of a person who was in no sense 
a servant of the Appellants, a person whom they were com-
pelled to receive on board their ship, in whose selection they 
had no voice, whom they had no power to remove or displace, 
and who, so far from being bound to receive or obey their 
orders, was entitled to supersede and had, in effect, at the 
time of the collision superseded the authority of the Master 
appointed by them." 
Were they under these circumstances to be held liable in an 
English court upon a principle unknown to English law? 
Lord Justice Selwyn's answer was a quotation from Story: 
"it is difficult to conceive upon what ground a claim can be 
rested to give to any Municipal laws an extraterritorial effect 
"The Halley, (1867) z Adm. & Ecc. 3· 
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when those laws are prejudicial to the rights of other Nations 
or to those of their subjects." And he added that the courts 
of England would even disregard a foreign judgment inter 
partes "if it appears on the record to be manifestly contrary 
to public justice." 
When a court renders a decision upon a particular set of 
facts, it is always an interesting and difficult question to 
determine the ambit of its effect as a juristic precedent. 
In The Halley the Privy Council would appear to have de-
cided that it was contrary to the policy of English law (as it 
stood in the year I 8 6 8) to enforce a particular right of action 
created by Belgian law. But the principle upon which this 
decision was reached was stated in very broad terms: 
"It is, in their Lordships' opinion, alike contrary to principle 
and to authority to hold that an English Court of Justice will 
enforce a Foreign Municipal Law and will give a remedy in 
the shape of damages in respect of an act which, according 
to its own principles, imposes no liability on the person from 
whom the damages are claimed." 
In the case of Phillips v. Eyre 4 Mr. Justice Willes laid 
down two conditions governing actions for foreign torts, 
which have since acquired an almost oracular prestige in 
Anglo-Dominion jurisprudence. The second of these has al-
ready been discussed in the preceding section. The first epit-
omizes the doctrine of The Halley: 
"The wrong," said Mr. Justice Willes, "must be of such 
a character that it would have been actionable if committed 
in England; therefore in The Halley the Judicial Com-
mittee pronounced against a suit in the Admiralty founded 
upon a liability by the law of Belgium for collision caused by 
the act of a pilot whom the shipowner was compelled by that 
law to employ, and for whom, therefore, as not being his 
agent, he was not responsible by English law." 
• Phillips v. Eyre, (t 87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. t, 28. 
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Criticism of this first rule in Phillips v. Eyre, and detailed 
exploration of its boundaries must be reserved for a later 
section. It may be of interest to note, however, that so far 
as reported cases show, the rule has never been actually ap-
plied by any English court to deprive a plaintiff of rights 
acquired under a foreign law. It has been frequently dis-
cussed in the courts of British Dominions. 
SECTION 4 
RECENT ENGLISH AND CANADIAN CASES 
Although the English courts have, since 1870, enjoyed 
the luxury of two distinct, general choice-of-law theories, 
the specific problems to which these have been applied are 
comparatively few in number. One of the most interesting 
of these problems was presented by the case of Machado v. 
Fontes.1 This was an action for libel, alleged to have been 
published in Brazil. The defendant sought to amend his 
pleadings by stating that under the law of Brazil, no civil 
proceedings for damages could have been maintained in 
respect of such publication. The Court of Appeal rejected 
this amendment as demurrable, on the ground that if the 
libel were punishable as a crime in Brazil, it would still be 
"unjustifiable" in the light of Brazilian law. Consequently 
an action could be maintained for it in England. 
The court professed to reach this result by a careful con-
sideration of the significance of the words "not justifiable" 
as used by Mr. Justice Willes in Phillips v. Eyre. Great em-
phasis was placed upon the two conditions which he laid 
down in that case. Lord Justice Rigby said he could not doubt 
but that the change from "actionable," in the first, to "not 
1 Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231, 66 L. J. Q. B. 542, 76 L. T. 588, 
45 W. R. 565, 13 T. L. R. 407, 41 Sol. J. 507. For dicta on the problem of 
this case, see Scott v. Seymour (Lord), (1862) 1 Hurl. & Colt. 219, 15 Eng. 
Rep. 865. 
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justifiable," in the second, was deliberate. From this he 
inferred that the latter must have been intended to be more 
comprehensive, covering acts which were criminal by the 
law of the place of wrong as well as those which would give 
rise to civil action. It seems rather improbable, however, that 
Mr. Justice Willes could have had the problem of Machado 
v. Fontes in mind when he formulated his famous sentences. 
His use of the words "not justifiable" might be explained 
more simply by the circumstance that they had been used by 
British judges in similar cases for almost two hundred years. 
Whatever may be its relation to the justification formula, 
the decision in Machado v. Fontes can scarcely be reconciled 
with the obligation doctrine expounded in Phillips v. Eyre. 
What obligation did the court enforce in l'viachado v. Fontes? 
Brazilian law would have imposed no civil liability whatever 
upon the defendant. It might be argued that by attaching 
criminal law sanctions to the defendant's conduct, Brazilian 
law had set up an obligation on his part to abstain from 
libelling the plaintiff. Such an argument strains the accepted 
meaning of the concept obligation which, as used by Mr. 
Justice Willes, connotes the duty to pay damages, not the 
duty to abstain from harmful conduct. None o£ the judges in 
the Court of Appeal made any attempt to .reconcile their 
decision with the obligation theory, which, indeed, they 
completely ignored. 
Machado v. Fontes has been criticized in many quarters 
chiefly because it is not consistent with the obligation theory. 2 
But however useful that theory may be, as succinctly sum-
• See CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2 (I 9 3 8) 30 5; DICEY, 
CoNFLICT OF LAws, Ed. 3 (I922) 38; Keith, "The American Law Institute's 
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws," (I936) I UNIV. OF ToRONTO L. J. 233, 
257; Pollock, Note, (I 897) I3 LAW QUARTERLY REv. 233; MINOR, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS (I90I) 479· 
See Walpole v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., (I92I) I5 Sask. L. R. 75, 79, 
I W. W. R. 1232; Varawa v. Howard Smith Co., (I9Io) Viet. L. R. 509, 
I3 Can. L. R. 35· Machado v. Fontes was followed by a Quebec court in 
Howell v. Coupland (unreported) where the facts were identical. See JoHNSON, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS (I937) vol. 3, p. 357• 
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marizing the operation of choice-of-law rules in simple cases, 
it does not contain within itself the satisfactory solution of 
every problem in the field. Judicial experience shows that 
the obligation doctrine must be taken with qualifications and 
exceptions. 3 We should not say a decision is wrong, merely 
because it cannot be subsumed under some sweeping prin-
ciple. From a functional point of view, it might be objected 
that the result reached in Machado v. Fontes was unfair to 
the defendant. Although the law of the place of wrong 
would not have required him to pay damages, he was forced 
to do so because he happened to have assets in England. 
On the other hand, the court had a good reason for not 
letting him go free. He had (so the court assumed) broken 
the criminal law of the place of wrong. Perhaps, in view of 
this circumstance, Machado v. Fontes ought to be regarded 
as a rather peculiar case which called for exceptional treat-
ment. 4 
In Machado v. Fontes the Court of Appeal indicated that 
the plaintiff would recover damages measured by the ordi-
nary rules of English law. The case has been regarded in 
some quarters • as proving that in all actions based on for-
eign torts the law of the forum governs the measure of dam-
ages. But there is no need to draw this sweeping conclusion. 
It must be remembered that in Machado v. Fontes· the law of 
the place of wrong did not provide any rule at all for estimat-
In M'Larty v. Steele (I 8 8 I) I 8 Scottish L. R. z66, 8 Rettie (Ct. of Sess.) 
435, a case which was almost on all fours with Machado v. Fontes except 
that the acts complained of were not shown to be criminal by the law of the 
place of wrong, the second division of the Court of Sessions reached the same 
result. But M'Larty v. Steele would appear to have been overruled by the 
subsequent decision of the same court in Evans & Sons v. Stein & Co., (I904) 
42 Scottish L. R. Io3, 7 Fraser (Ct. of Sess.) 65. 
3 See below, section 8. 
4 See Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (I931) 47 LAW 
QuARTERLY REV. 483. See also Gutteridge, Review of Cheshire, Private Inter-
national Law, (I939) 55 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 131. 
5 See Falconbridge, Note, (I939) 17 CAN. BAR REv. 546; Willis, "Two 
Approaches to the Conflict of Laws," (I936) I4 CAN. BAR REv. r, 20. 
See Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co. (I9I3) 30 Ont. L. R. 27I, 24 
.-.. ._....,..,. ... T ,...... T 'T'!. 
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ing damages. Having decided, in the special circumstances of 
that case, to give a remedy notwithstanding, the court had 
no alternative but to resort to the law of the forum for guid-
ance in estimating its award. It does not follow that this course 
would be adopted in a case where the law of the place of wrong 
provided its own rule for estimating damages. Machado v. 
Fontes, it is submitted, was an unusual case in which unusual 
steps were taken. 
In two recent Canadian appeals, the Privy Council has 
found the brief justification formula equal to the complexities 
of such a modern problem as that created by workmen's com-
pensation legislation at the place of injury.6 Walpole v. 
Canadian Northern R. Co. 7 was an action arising out of the 
death of a locomotive engineer. He was killed in British 
Columbia while working for the defendant company. Under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act of that province, his de-
pendents were entitled to compensation to be paid by the ad-
ministering board out of an accident fund. This indemnity was 
granted in lieu of all their rights of action against the defend-
ant. Here, however, the widow brought a common-law action 
in Saskatchewan. Her claim was rejected by the Court of Ap-
peal there upon the ground that British Columbia law did not 
give her any rights capable of enforcement in another juris-
diction. The law of the place of wrong had provided her with 
a special remedy which could only be satisfactorily imple-
mented by a particular tribunal. But Lord Cave, in formulat-
ing the advice of the Privy Council, preferred to take as his 
starting point the ancient precept: "the act must not have 
been justifiable by the law of the country where it was done." 
He proceeded to interpret it as follows: 
"It is unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal to con-
sider the precise meaning of the term justifiable, as used by 
6 This problem is discussed at p. 2 I 3 below. 
'Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co., [1923] A. C. 113. 
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Willes J.; but, at all events, it must have reference to legal 
justification, and an act or neglect which is neither actionable 
nor punishable cannot be said to be otherwise than justifiable 
within the meaning of the rule." 
Since the widow had failed to show the defendants liable 
to either a civil action or a criminal prosecution in British Co-
lumbia, he confirmed the Saskatchewan court in dismissing her 
claim. While the result seems fair and practical, there is, as 
Cheshire has pointed out,8 an unfortunate use of language 
in saying that a railway company may be justified (even 
technically) in causing the death of one of its employees. 
Moreover, at no point does the reasoning of the Privy Council 
make it clear why an act which gives rise to a claim for com-
. pensation out of a fund is "justified," whilst one giving rise 
to a civil action for damages is not. 
Even that distinction was removed in McMillan v. Cana-
dian Northern R. Co} where, the facts being in other respects 
similar, the compensation act of the place of wrong (Ontario) 
substituted for the civil action, not a claim against the board, 
but a special form of proceeding to be taken before it against the 
individual employer. Yet the Privy Council again gave judg-
ment for the defendant railway company. They pointed out 
that, before the passing of the compensation act, the doctrine . 
of common employment would have been a good defence to 
an ordinary civil suit in Ontario. Hence, they argued, thelia-
bility now enforceable by proceedings before the board, 
"is not to pay damages for a wrongful act but compensation 
for an accident. The right to compensation is founded on ac-
cident simply, not on negligence or any other actionable 
wrong. The act complained of in this case was the act of a 
fellow servant which, by the law of Ontario, is neither wrong-
ful nor unjustifiable so far as the employer is concerned and 
8 
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2 (1938) 301, 
"McMillan v. C. N. R. Co., [1923] A. C. 12o, 92 L. J.P. C. 44, 128 L. T. 
293, 39 T. L. R. 14· 
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in regard to which the employer may be justly said to be in-
nocent or excusable." 
The presence or absence of an antecedent common-law 
liability seems a rather flimsy criterion for determining the 
plaintiff's rights. Would the result really have been different 
if the facts had not made the defence of common employment 
available, or if that defence had been abolished in Ontario 
prior to the passing of the compensation act? Would there-
sult in either of these cases have been different if the plaintiffs 
had been able to show the defendant's negligence to be of a 
criminal character? Strong reasons of policy and convenience 
obviously demand a negative answer to these questions, but 
in the light of the peculiar type of conceptualistic reasoning 
employed by the Privy Council, such an answer is by no means 
assured. 
In these recent cases which we have just discussed, the 
English courts seem to have taken great pains to make their 
decisions appear as irresistible conclusions reached by a some-
what intensive interpretation of the justification formula. 
One can scarcely read these cases without wondering just 
why the judges were so anxious to produce this illusion of 
automatic deduction, like a conjuror pulling a rabbit out of a 
seventeenth century hat. One is also tempted to wish that 
they had given a little more prominence to the practical 
reasons of social policy which might be advanced in support 
of their decisions.10 
10 See the remarks of Beckett in his "The Question of Classification ( 'Qualifi-
cation') in Private International Law," (1934) 15 BRITISH YEAR BooK INT. 
LAW 46, 6 3 (footnote). 
For further discussion of the effect of the English choice-of-law theories, 
see Carr v. Fracis, Times & Co., [19oz] A. C. q6, 71 L. J. K. B. 361, 85 
L. T. 144, 50 W. R. z57, 17 T. L. R. 657; Livesley v. Horst, [19z4] Can. 
L. R. 6os, 6II, [1925] I Dom. L. R. 159 (dictum). 
See also Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (1931) 47 
LAW QUARTERLY REV. 483; Heighington, "Conflict of Laws in Automobile 
Negligence Cases," (1936) 14 CAN. BAR REV. 389; Richardson, "Problems 
in Conflict of Laws Relating to Automobiles," (1935) 13 CAN. BAR REV. 
201; JoHNSON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) vol. 3, p. 340. 
CHAPTER II 
Development of the Law Respecting 
Foreign Torts in the United States: 
Special Constitutional Problems 
SECTION 5 
THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE LAW OF THE FORUM WOULD 
ALLOW RECOVERY BUT THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF 
WRONG WOULD NOT 
W:EN we turn to consider the development of oice-of-law doctrine in the United States, we are nfronted by a much more extensive collection of 
decided cases. Yet up to a certain point, judicial experience 
seems to have followed the same lines as that of the English 
courts. The jurisdictional question is the first to be raised: 
should the courts take cognizance of wrongs which have oc-
curred in far-away foreign places? The American courts turned 
for an answer to Lord Mansfield's vigorous discussion of the 
question in Mostyn v. Fabrigas. 1 From that source they re-
ceived the assurance that such actions were commonly enter-
tained by English common-law courts. Hence they proceeded 
to do likewise. 2 
Many of these early American opinions upon the question 
of jurisdiction say nothing at all about the application of 
foreign law. Perhaps it was thought that the court would have 
to apply the law of the forum to all cases coming before it. 
1 Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) r Cowp. r6r, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021. 
"Watts v. Thomas, (r8rr) 2 Bibb. (5 Ky.) 458; Gardner v. Thomas, 
(r8r7) 14 Johns. (N.Y.) 134, 7 Am. Dec. 445; McKenna v. Fisk, (r843) 
r How. (42 U. S.) 240; Shaver v. White, (r8r8) 6 Munf. (zo Va.) uo, 
8 Am. Dec. 730. 
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More probably the point was not considered at all. Where 
the incidents of which the plaintiff complained had occurred 
in another common-law jurisdiction, the possibility of a dif-
ference between the law of the forum and the law of the place 
of wrong would not· be very likely to occur to a lawyer of 
that day. The common law was generally assumed to be the 
same everywhere. None of the states had developed a 
very extensive local jurisprudence. And statute law, which, at 
a later date, produced many differences, still covered a com-
paratively small field. 
But when the choice-of-law question was raised, it appears 
to have been raised under the same circumstances as in the 
early English cases. It is the defendant who claims the pro-
tection of the proper law. The court is asked to depart from 
its usual course of decision because the defendant, though per-
haps guilty according to local standards, is innocent in the 
eyes of the law in force at the place of the alleged wrong. This 
is a very interesting coincidence to whose significance we shall 
recur at a later point. The problem was considered in a great 
many American cases; almost unanimously the courts reached 
the same conclusion as the English courts. The plaintiff who 
could not make out a good cause of action under the law of the 
place of wrong was not permitted to succeed elsewhere.3 
One might expect to find that the American courts, having 
adopted Lord Mansfield's views in the matter of jurisdiction, 
would take up the justification formula as a guide to the 
solution of the choice-of-law problem. That formula had 
been especially invented to deal with the situation where the 
foreign law was pleaded as a defence. But there was no 
general reception of the justification formula in the United 
States. Most courts seem to have simply worked out their 
8 Smith v. Condry, (I843) I How. (42 U.S.) 28; Wilson v. Rich, (I83I) 
5 N.H. 455; Stout v. Wood, (I82o) I Black£. (Ind.) 7I; Holland v. Pack, 
(I823) 7 Tenn. ISO; Shaver v. White, (I8I8) 6 Munf. (zo Va.) IIO. And 
see the death cases cited below, note 5· 
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own solution to this problem without any acknowledged as-
sistance from the English line of cases. The ipsissima verba 
of those cases made only a few fleeting appearances. In Shaver 
v. White 4 (Virginia, I 8 I 3) for instance, the court said: 
"In the case before us it was not improper for the defend-
ant to plead that the trespass was committed in the State of 
Tennessee, as he also pleaded that he was acting under the 
authority of the laws of that State, in the instance in question. 
These facts, however, do not go to the jurisdiction of the 
court but only to the justification of the defendant; the prin-
ciple being, as aforesaid, that if a party is justified, as to a 
transaction, in the Country or placein which it was committed, 
he is justifiable everywhere." 
But, generally speaking, the justification formula made 
slight impression on American jurisprudence. Nor was any 
other set of symbols contrived to fill its place. Each court ex-
pressed itself as it pleased. A variety of language was used to 
convey the general idea that the legal effect of acts and events 
must be determined by the law in force where they took place. 
Most of the cases in which a defendant sought to escape a 
liability imposed by local law were based upon statutes which 
gave a deceased person's dependents an enforceable claim to 
damages for his death. When statutes of this type were first 
enacted, strenuous attempts were made to have the courts ap-
ply them in cases where the deceased had been killed outside 
the territory of the enacting state. These attempts were uni-
formly unsuccessful. Court after court held that its local statute 
was not intended to have extraterritorial operation. 5 Some 
courts expressly held that the law of the place of wrong gave 
the plaintiff no cause of action. Others non-suited the plaintiff 
•shaver v. White, (I8I8) 6 Munf. (2o Va.) IIO, II2. 
"Campbell v. Rogers, (I855) 2 Handy (Ohio) III; Needham v. Grand 
Trunk R. Co., (I86s) 38 Vt. 294; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Eakin, (I869) 
46 Tenn. 582; Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Lacy, (I87I) 43 Ga. 46I; Allen v. 
Pitts. & Conn. R. Co., (I876) 45 Md. 4I; Willis v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
(I884) 61 Tex. 432; Great Western R. Co. v. Miller, (I869) I9 Mich. 305. 
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because he had failed to prove that the law of the place of 
wrong gave him a cause of action. 
Whitford v. Panama etc. R. Co.6 (New York, I 861) is a 
good sample decision. The action was brought in New York 
by an administrator to recover damages for the death of his 
decedent, who had been killed while riding on one of the 
company's trains in New Grenada. The Court of Appeals 
held that the action must be governed by the law of New 
Grenada and emphatically refused to allow a recovery under 
the New York death statute. The question had been much 
discussed in the lower New York courts.7 In writing the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice Denio emphasized 
the importance of "comity," respect for the laws of New 
Grenada in cases which had arisen there: 
"It would be easy to illustrate the correctness of these 
positions by referring to the preposterous results which would 
follow from a different rule. Suppose the government of New 
Grenada to have enacted that the proprietors of a railroad 
company should not be responsible for the negligence of its 
servants, provided there was no want of due care in selecting 
them; it could not be pretended that its will could be set at 
naught by prosecuting the corporation in the courts of an-
other State where the law was different. Or suppose that gov-
ernment had passed a statute like ours, except that the amount 
which might be received was unlimited, no one, I presume, 
would deny that the full amount of damages which could be 
proved might be recovered, though it might exceed the limit 
in our statute, in whatever court the suit might be brought. 
The true theory is, that no suit whatever respecting this in-
jury could be sustained in the courts of this State, except 
pursuant to the law of international comity. By that law for-
eign contracts and foreign transactions, out of which liabilities 
"Whitford v. Panama R. Co., (r86r) 23 N.Y. 465. 
'Whitford v. Panama R. Co., (1858) 3 Bos. (N.Y.) 67; Vandeventer v. 
New York & N.H. R. Co., (1857) 27 Barb. (N.Y.) 244; Crowley v. Panama 
R. Co., (1859) 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 99; Beach v. Bay State Steamboat Co., 
(1859) 30 Barb. (N.Y.) 433· 
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have arisen, may be prosecuted in our tribunals by the implied 
assent of the government of this State; but in all such cases 
we administer the foreign law as from the proofs we find it 
to be, or as without proofs we presume it to be." 
The learned judge then referred to the English juris-
prudence, saying: 
"The cases of Rafael v. V erelst and Mostyn v. F abrigas were 
decided upon the presumption respecting the foreign law to 
which I have referred. Both cases were actions in the English 
courts for the imprisonment of the respective plaintiffs in 
foreign countries. The principle applicable to the present 
question was not much discussed but Lord Mansfield said, in 
the last case, that whatever would be a justification in the place 
where the thing was done, ought to be a justification where the 
case was tried; thus putting the liability of the defendant 
upon the provisions of the foreign law." 
SECTION 6 
THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF 
WRONG WOULD ALLOW RECOVERY BUT THE LAW OF 
THE FORUM WOULD NOT 
Having applied the choice-of-law principle for the benefit 
of defendants, American courts had then to decide how far 
they were prepared to go in applying it for the benefit of 
plaintiffs. That is to say, if the law of the place of wrong gave 
a plaintiff a cause of action, could that cause of action be en-
forced in a forum where the local law would not have given 
him any cause of action? The issue was raised in numerous 
suits based upon the death statutes, which varied considerably 
from state to state. For example, A causes B's death in state X. 
Can B's dependents bring an action under the death statute 
of state X, in state Y where a different death statute is in 
force or where, perhaps, there is no death statute at all? For 
a time the answer to this question was very uncertain. Both 
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the courts and the textwriters hesitated to adopt the position 
that a plaintiff could recover upon a cause of action created 
entirely by foreign law and not in any way dependent upon 
the law of the forum. 
The first attempts to enforce foreign death statutes were 
met by a bristling array of technical objections. Some courts 
objected to the collection of a foreign claim by a local ad-
ministrator.1 Some courts suggested, rather feebly, that per-
haps foreign death statutes were penal or criminal laws and 
so they ought not to be recognized outside their state of 
Qrigin.2 
The textwriters took various views. 3 Wharton, whose first 
edition appeared in I 8 72, appears to have thought that the 
cause of action conferred by a death statute could not be en-
forced outside the state where the fatal injury occurred. 
Rorer, in his "Interstate Law," laid down a rule to the same 
effect in the baldest terms. In I 8 8o both the Supreme Court 
of the United States (in Dennick v. Railroad Co.) 4 and the 
Court of Appeals of New York (in Leonard v. Columbia 
Steam Navigation Co.) 5 took an opposite view and allowed 
actions based upon foreign death statutes to proceed to judg-
ment. After these decisions, claims based upon foreign death 
statutes became common in the courts. But this did not mean 
that such claims were always and everywhere enforced. The 
New York Court of Appeals, in the case mentioned, invented 
1 See Richardson v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I 867) 98 Mass. 85; Mackay 
v. Central R. Co., (C. C. N.Y., I 876) I4 Blatchf. 65; Woodard v. Michigan, 
etc., R. Co., (I 8 59) I o Ohio St. I 2 I. 
2 Richardson v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I867) 98 Mass. 85; McCarthy 
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I 877) I 8 Kan. 46. 
3 See WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Ed. I (I8p) 383; RoRER, INTER-
STATE LAW, Ed. I (I879) I45> I55· 
Rorer had a theory that the statute law of a state could not be enforced in 
any other state. See Buckles v. Ellers, (I88o) 72 Ind. 220; Willis v. Mo. Pac. 
R. Co. (I884) 6I Tex. 432; Ash v. B. & 0. R. Co., (I89o) 72 Md. I44, I9 
Atl. 643. 
4 Dennick v. Central R. Co., (I88o) I03 U.S. II. 
"Leonard v. Columbia Steam Navigation Co., (I88I) 84 N.Y. 48. 
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a flexible restrictive theory which became very popular. This 
was the rule that the law of the place of wrong must be 
"similar" to that of the forum: 
"The rule here laid down," said the court, "is just and 
reasonable and it is not essential that the statute should be 
precisely the same as that of the State where the action is 
given by law, or where it is brought, but merely requires that 
it should be of a similar import and character. The statute in 
this State is certainly of the same nature, and the similarity 
is such as to authorize the conclusion that it is founded upon 
the same principles and possesses the same attributes as the 
statutes of Connecticut which have been cited. The same rem-
edy was to be accomplished, and an examination of the dif-
ferent provisions evinces an agreement in both of the statutes 
as to their main features, and that they are substantially alike 
and to the same effect as to the survivorship of the action. In 
fact, when there are similar statutes, instead of the common 
law, the right to recover damages stands precisely the same 
as if the common law in both States relating to the subject 
prevailed." 
As Mr. Justice Cardozo later pointed out,6 this doctrine 
had no more stable foundation than a misapprehended dictum 
in an earlier case. Despite its spurious origin it spread rapidly 
from state to state. In I 8 9 I it was applied with approval by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.7 No doubt its popularity 
was due to the fact that it provided the courts with a flexible 
tool for rejecting unfamiliar doctrines without unduly fet-
tering their power to adopt foreign law. 
The similarity doctrine is not unlike the first rule in Phillips 
v. Eyre 8 that, "the wrong must be of such a character that it 
would have been actionable if committed in England." The 
similarity doctrine does not, perhaps, draw the line quite so 
clearly between foreign law which should be rejected and 
6 In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (I9I8) 224 N.Y. 99, I20 N. E. I98. 
7 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Cox, (I 89I) I45 U.S. 593, I 2 Sup. Ct. 905. 
8 Phillips v. Eyre, (I87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. I, z8. 
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that which should be accepted. Wharton, in his second edition 
of I 8 8 I, attempted to introduce the English theory into 
the United States but with small success. A few courts spon-
sored it but without enthusiasm.9 In Huntington v. Attrill10 
the Supreme Court went out of its way to repudiate the Eng-
lish theory. 
The similarity doctrine remained in vogue for a time. But 
as the courts became accustomed to enforcing the laws of 
other states, the similarity doctrine came to appear selfish 
and provincial and its authority crumbled. As early as I 8 8 3 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota watered it down in the fol-
lowing words: 11 
"A few cases appear to lay some stress upon the fact that 
the statutes of both states were similar, but rather as evidence 
of the fact that the statute of the state giving the right of 
action is not contrary to the policy of the laws of the state 
where the action is brought. But it by no means 
follows that because the statute of one state differs from the 
law of another state, therefore it would be held contrary to 
the policy of the laws of the latter state. Every day our courts 
are enforcing rights under foreign contracts where the lex 
loci contractus and the lex fori are altogether different, and 
yet we construe these contracts and enforce rights under them 
according to their force and effect under the laws of the state 
where made. To justify a court in refusing to enforce a right 
of action which accrued under the law of another state, be-
cause against the policy of our laws, it must appear that it is 
against good morals or natural justice, or that, for some other 
such reason, the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to the 
general interests of our own citizens." 
"See WHARTON, CoNFLICT OF LAws, Ed. 2 (r88r) 523· 
See The Lamington, (D. C. N.Y., 1898) 87 Fed. 752; Anderson v. Mil-
waukee & St. P.R. Co., (1875) 37 Wis. 321; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Richards, 
(r887) 68 Tex. 375,4 S. W. 627. 
10 Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U.S. 657, 67o, 13 S. Ct. 224. 
11 Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., (1883) 31 Minn. u, 14, r6 
N. w. 4IJ. 
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This view of the similarity rule was adopted by court after 
court. In Loucks v. Standard Oif12 (r9r8) that doctrine was 
discarded by the New York Court of Appeals, the very court 
which was the first to put it forward. At the present day it is 
probably retained only in Texas and Maryland.13 For most 
American courts, the grounds upon which they may dispense 
with the ordinary application of choice-of-law rules are the 
same in tort cases as in others and are represented by the 
same brief symbol,-"public policy," which is generally sup-; 
posed to have the meaning attributed to it by the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota in the passage quoted. To sum up the 
story, American courts, in the I 8 70's, adopted a restriction 
upon the affirmative enforcement of foreign tort obligations 
almost as confining as the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre. But 
in the following decades they rebelled at this confinement, 
discarded the restrictive theory and replaced it with one which 
gave more scope to the operation of choice-of-law principles 
and the foreign rules thereby imported.14 
SECTION 7 
RECENT TENDENCY TO EXTEND THE APPLICATION OF 
FOREIGN LAW 
Another important trend in American jurisprudence de-
serves consideration in our historical outline. It is a well-
recognized doctrine in all branches of conflict of laws that 
12 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198. 
"'See London Guar. & Ace. Co. v. Balgowan S. S. Co., (1931) r6r Md. 
I4S, ISS Atl. 334; Davis v. Ruzicka, (1936) 170 Md. 112, 183 Atl. s69; 
El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, (Tex. 1923) 2SS S. W. IS9· See 
Stumberg, "Conflict of Laws-Torts-Texas Decisions," (r93o) 9 Tex. L. 
Rev. 21. 
14 Dalton v. McLean, (Maine, 1940) 14 Atl. (2d) 13, is .an interesting case. 
A New Brunswick statute was, by its express terms, given retroactive effect. 
A Maine court refused to enforce it retroactively on the ground that retroactive 
laws are contrary to Maine's public policy. 
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courts, in applying doctrines of foreign law, follow the pro-
cedural or remedial rules of the forum. This theory operates 
as an exception to all choice-of-law theories, as a limitation 
upon their effectual application. It may prevent the foreign 
law from taking effect as a defence. Or it may prevent the 
foreign law from assisting the plaintiff to a recovery. There 
are many aspects to the operation of this restrictive doctrine 
which we shall examine later. For present purposes it is of in-
terest to note a tendency toward a fuller and less restricted 
application of foreign law. This tendency is not an obvious 
one, but there are a number of decisions, most of them handed 
down in the last two decades, which, taken together, would 
seem to indicate that the courts are gradually limiting their 
resort to local procedural rules. In cases involving the ap-
plication of foreign law even local rules governing the bur-
den of proof and trial by jury have been temporarily dis-
carded.1 This general tendency has been approved by anum-
ber of present-day writers.2 
SECTION 8 
THE COMITY THEORY; THE OBLIGATION THEORY; THE 
VESTED RIGHTS THEORY 
Generally speaking, American courts have not shown the 
tendency to cling to particular verbal symbols which char-
acterizes English decisions in this field. English courts, in 
rationalizing their results, have laid great stress upon the 
term "justification." This term has been scarcely used at all 
by American courts. But the American courts have had their 
own favorite symbols. Let us consider some of them. 
We have quoted an excerpt above in which comity, the 
1 See sections 3 3, 3 5 below. 
2 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 148; Cook, "'Substance' and 
'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333, 343· 
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respect of one state for another's sovereignty, is put forward 
as a reason for enforcing other states' laws.1 The word "com-
ity" appears frequently in American opinions.2 It has the 
sparkle of a partial truth. Respect for the authority of a 
friendly state with regard to acts and events which have oc-
curred there is clearly a matter to be taken into account in 
conflicts cases. "Comity" does represent one of the reasons 
for recognizing foreign law. But to regard it as the alpha and 
omega of the conflict of laws would lead to unfortunate re-
sults. There are other very important choice-of-law policies 
to be considered too. A court which can see nothing behind a 
choice-of-law principle except interstate courtesy seriously 
underrates the significance of the principle. The due applica-
tion of the principle may suffer thereby. In a word, the term 
"comity" is incomplete and so misleading. But is this not true 
of all the catch words and maxims used by lawyers? The word 
"comity" expresses a measure of truth; surely that is all we 
can reasonably demand of a juridical symbol. 
In The Halley 3 Mr. Justice Phillimore described the ap-
plication of the law of the place of wrong to a foreign tort 
as the enforcement of an obligation. The same idea has been 
expressed in numerous American decisions. 4 There is nothing 
very original about it. But the obligation conception received 
its most authoritative and emphatic recognition in the United 
States when Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Slater v. Mexican National R. Co.5 The 
action had been brought to recover damages for a wrongful 
death which had occurred in Mexico. Under Mexican law the 
1 Above at p. 24. 
2 The popularity of the word comity was probably due to its use by Story. 
See his CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1 834) §§ 29-38. 
"The Halley, (1867) 2 Adm. & Ecc. 3, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 16 Eng. 
Rep. 514. 
•see, e.g., Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co., (1891) 48 Ohio St. 623, 30 N. E. 
69. An interesting early example is Stout v. Wood, (1 820) 1 Black£. (Ind.) 71. 
6 Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. s&x. 
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deceased's dependents would have been entitled to a long 
series of periodical payments. If certain specified events oc-
curred the defendant would be relieved from the duty to 
make further payments. The American court could not very 
well give a judgment in accordance with the Mexican law. 
The plaintiff requested an unconditional judgment for a lump 
sum. The Supreme Court refused this relief on the ground 
that it might impose a burden upon the defendant which 
would be greater than that contemplated by Mexican law. 
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Holmes said: 
"The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act 
complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, 
it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like othelr 
obligations, follows the person and may be enforced wherever 
the person may be found. But as the only source of this obli-
gation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that that 
law determines, not merely the existence of the obligation but 
equally determines its extent. It seems to us unjust to allow 
a plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the foreign 
law for the foundation of his case, and yet to deny the de-
fendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his liability 
that law would impose." 
The reasoning of the Slater case is analogous to that of 
Phillips v. Eyre.6 Both opinions start with the premise that 
the defendant's liability rests upon an obligation created by 
the law of the state of wrong. In Phillips v. Eyre the legis-
lature of that state had, by an act of indemnity, abolished the 
obligation. So the action was dismissed. In the Slater case the 
foreign obligation had not been abolished but it had been 
qualified in such a way as to make its transitory enfor~ement 
impracticable. Hence the action was dismissed there also. 
Very similar to the obligation theory in its implications, 
affirmative and negative, is the doctrine of vested rights. It 
6 Phillips v. Eyre, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. r. 
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appears to have made its American debut in Beale's "Cases on 
the Conflict of Laws" (I 902) where it was advanced as an ex-
planation of the operation of choice-of-law principles. The 
author's language is not specifically directed to the field of 
torts but its application to tort cases is obvious. 
"The topic called 'Conflict of Laws' deals with the recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign created rights. In the legal 
sense all rights must be created by some law. A right is arti-
ficial, not a mere natural fact; no legal right exists by nature. 
A right is a political, not a social thing; no legal right can be 
created by the mere will of the parties. Law being a general 
rule to govern future transactions, its method of creating 
rights is to provide that upon the happening of a certain event 
a right shall accrue. The law annexes to the event a certain 
consequence, namely, the creation of a legal right. 
"A right having been created by some appropriate law, the 
recognition of its existence should follow everywhere. Thus 
an act, valid where done, cannot be called in question any-
where." 7 
This terse and forceful terminology for explaining the 
operation of choice-of-law rules has found its way into judicial 
opinions.8 For example, in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co} an 
action brought in New York for a tort committed in Massa-
chusetts, Mr. Justice Cardozo said: 
"A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise to 
an obligation which, if transitory, 'follows the person and 
may be enforced wherever the person may be found.' [ Cita-
tions] 'No law can exist as such except the law of the land; 
but it is a principle of every civilized law that 
vested rights shall be protected.' Beale, Conflict of Laws, 5 I. 
The plaintiff owns something and we help him to get it." 
7 Quoted from BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. 3, p. 1968. 
"See Chubbuck v. Holloway, (1931) 182 Minn. 225,234 N. W. 314, 868; 
Gray v. Gray, (1934) 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 5o8; Commonwealth Fuel Co. 
v. McNeil, (1925) 103 Conn. 390, 130 Atl. 794· 
9 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, IIo, 120 N. E. 198. 
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Undoubtedly the theory of vested rights has exercised a 
considerable influence upon the thinking of American lawyers 
and judges. 
Both the obligation theory and the vested rights theory 
emphasize the notion that an injured person's claim to repan-
tion depends upon the law of the territory where he was 
injured. From this it follows that if the law of the place of 
wrong would not allow him any compensation at all, courts 
in other jurisdictions should do likewise. Courts in other juris-
dictions ought to give him exactly what the law of the place 
of wrong allows him-no more and no less. That is his vested 
right. Attention has already been directed toward the marked 
inclination of American doctrine and jurisprudence to accord 
the fullest possible recognition to the law of the place of 
wrong.10 The category of procedure within which the rules 
of the forum hold sway is being gradually limited. Rules of 
the law of the place of wrong which might affect the relative 
positions of the parties are sedulously observed by outside 
courts. Perhaps this tendency, which seems to be very de-
sirable, may be attributed to the obligation and vested rights 
theories. By stressing the significance of the law of the place 
of wrong they may have induced the courts to make a greater 
effort to really enforce that law. 
But like many other legal conceptions, the vested rights 
and obligation doctrines are ambiguous and incomplete. They 
reveal to us only a part of the conflict of laws picture. Foreign 
obligations are not always and everywhere recognized. Their 
recognition is frequently qualified by the operation of local 
rules of procedure. Sometimes it is denied entirely for rea-
sons of local policy. Sometimes it is denied for obscure and 
insufficient reasons, as where the injury affects foreign land. 
In short, there are a number of important conflict of laws prin-
10 Above, section 7. 
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ciples which in practice modify and limit the enforcement of 
vested rights. Although courts may say that they are enforcing 
foreign vested rights, they are continually impeded and frus-
trated by the necessity of adhering, in some degree, to the 
moral traditions and habitual technique of their own juris-
diction.11 
Moreover, the vested rights and obligations theories can 
scarcely be reconciled with one of the important phenomena 
of the conflict of laws, the application to a single set of facts 
of legal rules drawn from two or more foreign jurisdictions.12 
To illustrate: an action is brought for a tort alleged to have 
been committed in state X. The defendant pleads a release of 
all claims executed by the plaintiff in state Y. The court will 
look to the law of state X to decide whether or not the plaintiff 
ever had any cause of action. But the law of state Y will 
probably have to be consulted also, in order to determine the 
validity and effect of the contract of release which was exe-
cuted there. Each body of law governs a particular aspect of 
the case. It cannot be said that either legal system determines 
whether or not the plaintiff has a vested right. Both must be 
considered. Suppose the contract of release is void accord-
ing to the law of state X, the place of wrong, but valid by the 
law of state Y where it was executed. The court allows the 
law of state Y to prevail and dismisses the suit.13 Here the 
law of the place of wrong has created an obligation but the 
substantive law of some other system has been permitted to 
11 See Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," (1928) 
37 YALE L. J. 468. For further and more detailed exposition of certain in-
adequacies in the vested rights and obligation theories, see: Cook, "The Logical 
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; Lorenzen, 
"Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 
736; Heilman, "Judicial Method and Economic. Objectives in Conflict of 
Laws," (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1082. 
12 For further discussion of this phenomenon see below, section 3 7. 
13 This result was reached by a court in Leach v. Mason Valley Mines Co., 
(1916) 40 Nev. 143, 161 Pac. 513· 
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destroy it. Considerable interpretation and qualification of 
the obligation theory would be required to make it consistent 
with such a result. 
Our final observation upon the vested rights and obligation 
theories is that they fail to indicate why the law of the place of 
wrong should be applied to cases which have arisen there. 
They give us a guiding principle but without any raison d'etre. 
When an action is brought based upon extraterritorial acts and 
events, it would be much simpler to apply the ordinary law 
of the forum than to learn and apply the law of the place of 
wrong. Yet courts habitually take the latter course. There 
must be some very good reason or reasons for doing so. Doubt-
less some important social policy lies behind the principle 
that tort claims should be governed by the law of the place 
of wrong. But neither the obligation theory nor the vested 
rights theory throws any light on this aspect of the matter. 
In the foregoing paragraphs an attempt has been made to 
reveal certain inadequacies in the comity theory, the vested 
rights theory, and the obligation theory. To recognize these 
inadequacies is not to deprecate all reference to these theories 
but only to warn against exaggeration of their significance. 
Each of them contains a measure of truthful statement. Each 
of them indicates some important conflict of laws policy or 
practice. They are useful symbols, but it would be a mistake 
to regard any one of them as an infallible guide to the solu-
tion of all conflicts cases. Indeed the suggestion is ventured 
that the problems of the conflict of laws and the jurisprudence 
which American courts have built up in dealing with them 
are much too complex for comprehensive summary in any 
single phrase or maxim. Much less is it possible to construct 
a brief formula containing within itself the germs of a just 
and satisfying decision for every case which might conceiv-
ably arise in this field. 
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SECTION 9 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHOICE-OF-
LAW PRINCIPLES 
We generally assume that the courts and the legislature 
of an independent state are free to follow or to disregard 
choice-of-law theories. There is no higher law which would 
prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom from abolish-
ing the choice-of-law rule for torts, if it chose to do so. The 
House of Lords might (within the limits set by the doctrine of 
stare decisis) interpret English statutes, and mould the Eng-
lish common law in such a manner as to curtail the application 
of the law of the place of wrong in cases where one person 
has injured another in a foreign country, but there is no higher 
court which could reverse the House of Lords' decisions be-
cause they had this effect. 
The legislatures and courts of the states of the United States 
occupy a somewhat different position. The states of the United 
States are not autonomous units in the conflict of laws. Cer-
tain clauses of the federal constitution have been interpreted 
as imposing limitations upon the power of the state govern-
ments to make their local law govern transactions which have 
occurred in other states or in foreign countries. If a state court, 
in determining the ambit of its local laws, oversteps these lim-
itations, its decision may be reversed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. This means that the Federal Constitution, 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, sets the bounds within 
which the state courts are free to depart from choice-of-law 
principles. To a certain extent, choice-of-law principles are 
compulsory for state courts.1 
1 See generally on the subject of this section: Dodd, "The Power of the 
Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws," 
(1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 533; Ross, "Has Conflict of Laws Become a Branch 
of Constitutional Law?" (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 161. 
See Annotations, (1931) 74 A. L. R. 710; (1936) 100 A. L. R. 1143. 
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The principal clauses upon which the Supreme Court re-
lies in exercising this corrective jurisdiction are the due process 
clause and the full faith and credit clause. 2 The significance 
of the full faith and credit clause is obvious. Suppose an ac-
tion arising out of an alleged tort in one state is brought in 
the courts of another state. The court, for one reason or an-
other, refuses to enforce a statute of the state of wrong. Such 
a refusal might, in some circumstances, constitute a refusal 
to obey the command of the full faith and credit clause. The 
court might be said to have denied full faith and credit to 
the statute of the state of wrong. It should be noted, however, 
that there is some ambiguity about the words "public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings." They have been held to 
include the judgments and statutes of a sister-state. It seems 
very doubtful whether they would be construed as including 
rules of common law embodied in judicial decisions. Another 
noteworthy point about the full faith and credit clause is 
that it only requires full faith and credit to the law of a sister-
state. It does not affect the power of state courts to disregard 
the law of a foreign nation. 
Most of the cases related to the subject of this treatise which 
involved the effect of the full faith and credit clause have been 
somewhat complicated in their nature. They can be more ad-
vantageously analyzed after certain other preliminary ques-
tions have been discussed. For present purposes it will be 
sufficient to notice the general principle upon which the Su-
preme Court professes to apply the full faith and credit 
2 United States Constitution, Art. 4, § I: "Full Faith and Credit shall be 
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner 
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof." 
Art. I4, § I: "· .. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." 
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clause. In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Commis-
sion of California3 the Court said: 
"In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which Con-
gress has not prescribed, where the policy of one state statute 
comes into conflict with that of another, the necessity of some 
accommodation of the conflicting interests of the two states is 
still more apparent. A rigid and literal enforcement of the 
full faith and credit clause, without regard to the statute of 
the forum, would lead to the absurd result that wherever 
the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced 
in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own. Unless 
by force of that clause a greater effect is thus to be given to 
a state statute abroad than the clause permits it to have at 
home, it is unavoidable that this Court determine for itself 
the extent to which the statute of one state may qualify or 
deny rights asserted under the statute of another. 
"Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own 
courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges 
that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute 
of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the 
burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the con-
flicting interests involved those of the foreign state are su-
perior to those of the forum. It follows that not every statute 
of another state will override a conflicting statute of the forum 
by virtue of the full faith and credit clause; that the statute 
of a state may sometimes override the conflicting statute of 
another, both at home and abroad; and again, that the two 
conflicting statutes may each prevail over the other at home, 
although given no extraterritorial effect in the state of the 
other." 
In a subsequent section of this book it is argued that a de-
parture from choice-of-law principles is likely to press harder 
upon a defendant than upon a plaintiff.4 A plaintiff, whose 
claim based upon the law of the place of wrong has been re-
fused recognition at the forum, can generally sue elsewhere. 
8 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 
(1935) 294 U.S. 532, 547, 55 Sup. Ct. 518. 
• Section II, below. 
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A defendant whose foreign defence has been denied must 
pay the judgment and forever hold his peace. It might be 
thought that the Supreme Court would be more ready to use 
the full faith and credit clause as a shield for a defendant than 
as a means to compel the enforcement of a plaintiff's rights. 
And this idea is supported by a passage from the opinion in 
Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper.5 But a some-
what different view is expressed in Ala.s·ka Packers Associa-
tion v. Industrial Commission of California: 
"The necessity is not any the less whether the statute and 
policy of the forum is set up as a defence to a suit brought 
under the foreign statute or the foreign statute is set up as 
a defence to a suit or proceeding under the local statute. In 
either case, the conflict is the same. In each, rights claimed 
under one statute prevail only by denying effect to the other. 
In both the conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic 
effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts 
of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the 
other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each 
jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to 
their weight." 
The bearing of the due process clause upon the solution of 
choice-of-law problems is not quite so obvious as that of the 
full faith and credit clause. It may be illustrated by a simple 
case drawn from the field of contracts. In Home Insurance 
Co. v. Dick 6 a fire insurance contract was made in Mexico. 
It provided that all legal proceedings to enforce the policy 
should be taken within a year from the date of loss. This 
clause was valid under Mexican law. The policy covered only 
losses in Mexican waters and was payable in Mexico. A loss 
having occurred, a suit to enforce the policy was brought in 
Texas, after the time limit of one year had elapsed. Certain 
• See Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 16o, 
sz Sup. Ct. 571. 
• Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, (1930) 281 U.S. 397, 407, so Sup. Ct. 338. 
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companies who had reinsured part of the risk were brought 
into the action by garnishment proceedings. These garnishees 
pleaded that, by the very terms of the contract, the action was 
brought too late. But the Texas court followed a Texas statute 
which purported to avoid such contractual limitations when 
they required a shorter period than two years. Judgment was 
given in favour of Dick, the insured. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of the United States reversed this judgment: 
"The Texas statute as here construed and applied deprives 
the garnishees of property without due process of law. A 
state may, of course, prohibit and declare invalid the making 
of certain contracts within its borders. Ordinarily, it may pro-
hibit performance within its borders, even of contracts validly 
made elsewhere, if they are required to be performed within 
the state and their performance would violate its laws. But, in 
the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued 
on, or to the contracts of re-insurance, was ever done or re-
quired to be done in Texas. All acts relating to the making 
of the policy were done in Mexico. All in relation to the 
making of the contract of reinsurance were done there or in 
New York. And likewise, all things in regard to performance 
were to be done outside of Texas. Neither the Texas laws 
nor the Texas courts were involved for any purpose, except 
by Dick in the bringing of this suit. The fact that Dick's per-
manent residence was in Texas is without significance. At all 
times here material, he was physically present and acting in 
Mexico. Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the 
terms of contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater 
obligation than that agreed upon and to seize property in 
payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty 
against deprivation of property without due process of law." 
The due process clause was implemented in this case to 
protect a defendant from an improper resort to the law of 
the forum. It seems unlikely that it would ever be invoked 
to assist a plaintiff whose foreign cause of action had been 
denied recognition. The court would have to go the length 
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of holding that the court of the forum, in refusing to enforce 
a foreign cause of action, had deprived the plaintiff of prop-
erty without due process of law. In this respect, the scope of 
the due process clause is more limited than that of the full 
faith and credit clause. 
But the full faith and credit clause has, as we have seen, 
certain limitations which are not found in the due process 
clause. If, in a given case, a state court's refusal to apply the 
proper law of the case is a denial of due process, it is immate-
rial whether the appropriate rule of the proper law which 
has been rejected is a rule of common law or a statute. It 
may be doubted, however, whether a state court's refusal to 
apply the common law of a sister state (as distinct from its 
statute law) could ever amount to a denial of full faith and 
credit. Again, the full faith and credit clause only compels 
American courts to recognize the laws of other American 
states. But the application, by a state court, of its own local 
law to a set of facts arising in a foreign country might consti-
tute a denial of due process. This is what happened in the 
Home Insurance Company case. 
Attempts have been made to invoke the due process clause 
in some of the more complex tort cases. They can be more 
conveniently considered at a later point. 
In subsequent sections of this book it is proposed to discuss 
various principles which operate as exceptions to the general 
choice-of-law principle. The effect of these exceptional prin-
ciples in practice is to exclude the application of the law of 
the place of wrong. When a court follows one of these prin-
ciples it disregards the law of the place of wrong and either 
applies its own law instead or else washes its hands of the 
case. The law of the place of wrong may be excluded on the 
ground that it concerns procedure, that it is contrary to public 
policy, that it is penal in character, etc. In discussing the opera-
tion of these exceptional principles, the reader should bear in 
mind the fact that each one of them is overshadowed by the 
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possibility of a constitutional limitation. In the Home Insur-
ance Company case the Texas court, in trying to deprive the 
insurers of the benefit of a term in their contract, valid under 
the proper law, said that it was applying Texas law to a 
matter of procedure. It said the proper law of the contract 
was contrary to Texas public policy. But the Supreme Court 
said the Constitution prohibited this particular application 
of established conflict of laws theories. No one can tell how 
far the Supreme Court may go in using the full faith and 
credit clause or the due process clause to check state courts 
which refuse to follow choice-of-law principles directing them 
to respect and apply the laws of other states. 
SECTION IO 
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 
The relation between the federal courts and state law is a 
large and difficult question which goes far beyond the scope 
of this study. We shall not attempt to discuss it exhaustively 
but a few comments upon its conflict of laws aspects may not 
be out of place. Since these courts exercise a large and im-
portant jurisdiction, notably in cases where the parties are 
citizens of different states, it is important to know where they 
stand in relation to the conflict of laws. 
Judicial administration by federal courts in the United 
States is governed by section 34 of the Judiciary Ace (1789) 
which provides: 
"The laws of the several States, except where the Con-
stitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall other-
wise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision 
in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in 
cases where they apply." 
1 1 Stat. L. 73, 92, (1789), 28 U.S. C. (1934) § 725. 
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Without considering the precise meaning of this section 
we pass on to another federal statute controlling the adminis-
tration of the courts which provides: 
"The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the 
power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts 
of the United States and for the court of the District of Colum-
bia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the 
practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall 
neither abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive right of 
any litigant. They shall take effect six months after their 
promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith 
shall be of no further force or effect." 2 
Pursuant to this statute the Supreme Court drafted and 
promulgated a code of rules which took effect in 1938. This 
code governs the procedure in all the lower federal courts 
throughout the United States. It establishes a uniform pro-
cedure in these courts which is independent of the rules fol-
lowed in the courts of the various states. 3 But by the very 
terms of their constituent statute, these rules may not "abridge, 
enlarge or modify the substantive right of any litigant." 
Where a matter of "substantive right" is involved, the fed-
eral courts must observe the mandate of the Judiciary Act 
(section 34). 
If we examine section 34 of the Judiciary Act from a con-
flict of laws point of view we discern an ambiguity. The sec-
tion says that "the laws of the several States shall 
be regarded as rules of decision in cases where 
they apply." This section might be interpreted in at least 
2 48 Stat. L. 1064, § 1 (1934), 28 U.S. C. (1934) § 723 b. 
3 Before the introduction of these rules the lower federal courts followed 
the procedure of the state courts for the state in which they were located, as 
directed by the Conformity Act, 17 Stat. L. 197, § 5 (1872), 28 U. S. C. 
(1934) § 724. 
The formulation and application of the uniform federal code will doubtless 
raise many border-line issues as to whether particular rules or problems are 
matters of "procedure," i.e., whether they ought to be governed by uniform 
federal rules. See Note, (1938) 38 CoL. L. REV. 1472. 
Such an issue has been raised regarding the burden of proof in relation to 
contributory negligence. See section 36, below. 
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two different ways. The direction to the federal courts to 
apply the laws of the several states might be interpreted as a 
direction to apply those laws in conformity with established 
choice-of-law principles. Since the direction to apply state 
law proceeds from the federal Judiciary Act4 and the choice-
of-law principles to be followed are implicit in the direction 
itself, the scope and application of these principles would 
naturally be determined by the federal courts themselves 
with the final word lying in the mouth of the Supreme Court. 
A second interpretation might be placed upon the section: 
that a federal court shall apply to each case coming before it 
the laws of the state in which the federal court is located, 
including the conflict of laws rules normally applied by the 
courts of that state. If we adopt the second interpretation, it 
follows that a federal court ought, in conflicts cases, to follow 
automatically the conflict of laws rules of the state in which it 
sits, as expounded by the courts of that state. 
Before we turn to the judicial treatment of this problem 
let us pause to consider it from the standpoint of a student of 
the conflict of laws. There are, in the United States, a number 
of different jurisdictions with different internal laws. Within 
the limits set by the Constitution, each state is free to develop 
its own body of legal rules, different from those of the other 
states. Yet it is frequently possible for one of two parties en-
gaged in a legal controversy to choose any one of several 
• The Supreme Court's opinion in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, (1938) 304 
U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, contains statements which appear to indicate that 
the relation between the federal courts and state laws is determined by the 
Constitution and that Congress is without power to alter that relation. 
But, carefully considered, the majority opinion does not seem to go beyond 
a statement that, in the absence of Congressional direction, the federal courts' 
assumption of power to disregard state decisions was unconstitutional. The 
opinion does not say explicitly that Congress could not prescribe special rules 
of decision to be followed by the federal courts in all cases coming before them. 
See Note, (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 1002. 
For general discussion of the relation between the federal judiciary and state 
law under the Constitution, see McCormick and Hewins, "The Collapse of 
'General Law' in the Federal Courts," (1938) 33 ILL. L. REv. 126; Note, 
(1938) 36 MICH. L~ REV. 1312. 
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states as the forum in which to litigate the controversy. If 
the court of each of these states were to apply its own internal 
law in settling the controversy the fortunes of the parties to it 
would depend entirely upon their choice of a forum. Such a 
situation would produce grave injustice, not to mention the 
possibility of unseemly bickering between the courts of dif-
ferent states. The solution to this difficult problem has been 
found in the application of choice-of-law principles. In deal-
ing with a controversy which has arisen in another state, a 
state court will normally decline to apply its own local law 
and will try, so far as possible, to apply the law of the state 
in which the controversy arose. For the sake of uniformity and 
other choice-of-law policies5 which we shall discuss later, the 
state courts of the United States are all engaged in a coopera-
tive enterprise to solve the problem of the conflict of laws. 
Viewed in this light, the conflict of laws appears to be a · 
problem of national consequence. Although one of its prime 
objectives is justice for the individual, this objective cannot 
be secured without the cooperation of all the states and state 
courts. Moreover, the application of choice-of-law principles 
in certain types of cases involves a certain weighing and ad-
justment of the interests of different states which is, in some 
sense, an interstate problem. The Supreme Court has already 
recognized this national aspect of the conflict of laws. It has 
intervened on constitutional grounds to check the activity of 
state courts which were extending the application of their 
local laws in utter disregard of choice-of-law principles.6 In 
this way the Court limits and supervises, in the interests of 
the nation, the administration of the conflict of laws by state 
tribunals. 
But the Supreme Court, although it has set limits to the 
powers of state tribunals, has left them considerable freedom 
6 For a more detailed discussion of choice-of-law policies, see sections 1 x, 
12, 38. 
6 See generally section 9· 
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to follow or to abandon choice-of-law principles as they please. 
And it must be admitted that the state courts do not always 
give the fullest possible measure of cooperation to the work 
of solving the conflict of laws problem. Although paying lip-
service to choice-of-law principles, they sometimes refuse to 
enforce particular rules of the law of a sister-state on the 
ground that these rules run counter to their own "public 
policy" or "procedure." Occasionally there is good reason 
for such a refusal but often there is none. In some cases it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that a state court's failure to 
co-operate in the application of choice-of-law principles has 
resulted from a narrow, provincial point of view or a failure 
to completely understand the conflict of laws problem and its 
solution. But although we may deplore such decisions, the 
Supreme Court, on its present view of the matter, is powerless 
to prevent them. 
Let us now consider the role of the federal courts with the 
aid of a specific example. A injures Bin state X. The law of 
state X does not allow any interest on damages for an injury 
of this character. If B brings suit in state X the court there 
will very properly apply its own law to the case and B will 
recover no interest. Now let us suppose that B brings suit, not 
in state X, but in state Y. Under the local law of state Y 
interest would be recoverable upon damages for an injury 
of the character sustained by B. But A should not have to pay 
greater damages because he happens to be subject to the 
jurisdiction of state Y. For the sake of uniformity and other 
choice-of-law ideals the court in state Y ought to adopt a co-
operative attitude. It should disregard its local rule regard-
ing interest in this case and adopt the rule of state X, the state 
of wrong.7 We shall suppose, however, that the court of state 
Y refuses to follow the law of state X and applies its own rule 
instead. This decision is unfair to Band evinces an unwilling-
7 For a more detailed discussion of rules relating to damages, see section 26, 
especially note 2. 
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ness to co-operate with other state courts in solving the con-
flict of laws problem. 
Now we reach the final stage of our analysis. Suppose B 
brings suit in a federal court sitting in state Y. If we adopt 
the second of the two interpretations of the Judiciary Act 
which we have outlined above, the federal court will have 
to give the same undesirable decision which the state court of 
state Y would give. If the federal court were disposed to ac-
cord more complete support to the choice-of-law principle 
by allowing the law of state X to govern the measure of dam-
ages it would not be permitted to do so. Surely this is a most 
unfortunate result. A federal court, representing the judicial 
power of the United States, ought not to be forced to take 
an unjust and uncooperative attitude toward a problem of 
national significance. The federal courts should, it is sug-
gested, be left free to decide conflicts cases according to their 
own best judgment subject, of course, to the guidance of the 
Supreme Court. 
It is quite true that this suggested view of the federal 
courts' powers would permit such a court to render decisions 
which would not conform to the rulings given in similar cases 
by the local state court. Thus, in our example above, we have 
suggested that the federal court in state Y should decide the 
A-B controversy in a manner inconsistent with the views of the 
state Y state court. This lack of uniformity is no doubt regret-
table. But if the federal court in state Y was bound to do as 
the local state court would do, its decision would not conform 
to that which would be given by the court of state X, or by the 
court of any other state which adhered thoroughly to the 
choice-of-law principle. Hence there is bound to be some lack 
of uniformity in any event. 
Perhaps the strongest argument which can be advanced 
against the view here suggested is that it would permit a 
federal court to disregard the policy of its home state as 
enunciated by the state courts. No doubt the policy of its home 
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state is a matter to which a federal court should always give 
serious consideration. But in a conflict of laws case the policies 
of other states besides the forum may also be involved. 8 And, 
more important still, the national policy of uniformity in the 
solution of conflicts cases will always be affected in some de-
gree. In view of these facts it is difficult to understand why the 
federal court should be expected to give an automatic pre-
eminence to the policy of the state in which it sits and to 
slavishly follow the decisions of that state's courts. 
There is a further point to be made in favour of federal 
independence in the conflicts field. The primary objective of 
choice-of-law principles is to secure uniformity in the treat-
ment of conflicts cases consistent with a fair adjustment of the 
interests of the states involved. To attain this objective the 
various state courts must act in concert. Such concerted action 
in the treatment of conflicts problems would be greatly facili-
tated if some single pre-eminent tribunal could take the lead 
in laying down a pattern of sound decisions to which the 
various state courts might conform. This function might very 
well be performed by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
If the Supreme Court were free to follow its own bent in con-
flicts cases coming up from the federal courts, it would be 
able to offer persuasive guidance, not only to the lower federal 
courts, but to the state tribunals as well. If, on the other hand, 
the federal courts were in all cases bound to follow their local 
state decisions, the Supreme Court would have much less oc-
casion to pronounce upon conflicts problems. It could only do 
so when some state or federal court had exceeded the limits 
set by the Constitution. 
This suggestion that the Supreme Court should sound the 
key-note of conflicts doctrine for the state tribunals is by no 
means a theoretical novelty. In the past the Court has (as we 
shall see) made a practice of writing independent opinions 
upon important conflicts problems for the special guidance of 
8 See section 12. 
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federal courts. Some of these opinions had a widespread in-
fluence not only upon federal but also upon state tribunals 
and made important contributions to the erection of a uni-
form American conflict of laws jurisprudence. Without going 
outside the field of torts we can name such great cases as Den-
nick v. Railroad Co} Huntington v. Attrill,10 Slater v. Mexi-
can National R. Co.11 
Having speculatively considered our problem let us turn 
to its history in the courts. As we have said, the Judiciary Act 
is patient of two constructions. One construction would per-
mit the federal courts to apply state laws according to estab-
lished choice-of-law principles as understood by them, the 
other construction would bind the federal courts to apply 
state laws upon the automatic principle of locality. This 
doubt was not resolved by the Supreme Court until the 
decision of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.12 ( 1941 ). 
The seeming tardiness of this clarification was due to the fact 
that until the epochal decision of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kini3 (I 9 3 8) the problem was almost totally obscured by the 
doctrine of a general federal common law. For many years, the 
Supreme Court and other federal courts assumed that they 
were entitled, notwithstanding section 34 of the Judiciary 
Act, to disregard the decisions of the state courts when dealing 
with matters of "general law." In certain fields of law, never 
clearly defined, they administered a general federal common 
law which governed the decision of all cases coming before 
federal courts. They did not, of course, disregard state statutes 
which the states had constitutional power to enact. But if a 
case in a federal court involved a point of common law within 
• Dennick v. Central Railroad Co., (188o) 103 U.S. II. 
10 Huntington v. Attrill, (1 892) 146 U.S. 657, r 3 Sup. Ct. 224. 
11 Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 58r. 
,. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., (1941) 6r Sup. Ct. 1020. 
"'Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, (1938) 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817. 
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the general law field, the federal court made no attempt to 
follow state law. The case was simply decided according to 
the rules of the federal common law, a jurisprudence built up 
by the accretion of federal decisions. The final authority upon 
matters of general law was, of course, the Supreme Court. 
The classic justification for this practice was Mr. Justice 
Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson 14 (I 842) in which he said: 
" the true interpretation of the thirty-fourth sec-
tion limited its application to state laws, strictly local, that is 
to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the construction 
thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles 
to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and 
titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intra-
territorial in their nature and character. It never has been sup-
posed by us that the section did apply, or was designed to ap-
ply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent 
upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent 
operation, as, for example, to the construction of ordinary 
contracts or other written instruments, and especially to 
questions of general commercial law, where the state tri-
bunals are called upon to perform the like functions as our-
selves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal 
analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or in-
strument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles 
of commercial law to govern the case." 
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that all this was error. The doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson was described as "an unconstitutional assumption of 
powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time 
or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to 
correct." The court declared that "in applying this doctrine 
this Court and the lower federal courts have invaded rights 
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the 
several States." For the future, federal courts were directed to 
14 Swiftv.Tyson, (1842) 16Pet. (41 U.S.) r, 18. 
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apply and enforce the non-statutory as well as the statutory 
law of the states. 
During the heyday of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine the prob-
lem of choosing between the two interpretations of the Judi-
ciary Act outlined above did not arise because at that time 
the Supreme Court regarded the application of choice-of-law 
principles as a branch of law which came within the scope of 
that doctrine. Conflict of laws was a part of the general fed-
eral common law. Lower federal courts took their conflict of 
laws doctrine from the Supreme Court. In various cases com-
ing up from the lower federal courts the Supreme Court an-
nounced its own independent solutions of conflict of laws 
problems without any particular regard for the views enter-
tained by the courts of the states in which these cases were 
tried. 
After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins the propriety of 
this practice was at least questionable. The general law theory 
upon which it was based had been destroyed, root and branch. 
The power of the federal courts to work out their own conflict 
of laws principles could not be supported any longer upon the 
general law theory. It might still have been justified, how-
ever, as a necessary implication of the relation between the 
federal courts and the laws of the several states, as that rela-
tion was determined by the Judiciary Act of 1789.15 
But in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.16 (1941) 
the Supreme Court appears to have definitely decided that the 
federal courts must adhere implicitly to the conflict of laws 
decisions of their local state courts. The action was brought in 
a Delaware federal court for breach of a contract made in New 
15 See Cheatham, "Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws," (r 9.}i )89u. PA. L. 
REV. 430, 437; Note (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. rooz, 1007. 
16 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., (1941) 61 Sup. Ct. xozo. 
Lower federal courts held themselves bound to follow the conflicts rules of 
the state forum in Sampson v. Channell, (C. C. A. rst, 1940) I ro F. (zd) 754; 
Wagganam v. General Finance Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) II6 F. (zd) 254. 
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York. Having won a judgment, the plaintiff claimed that, 
under New York law, he was entitled to interest from the 
date of suit to that of the judgment. The defendant opposed 
the application of New York law. The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit ruled that the rights of the parties 
ought to be governed by New York law and that the plaintiff 
was entitled to the interest claimed. The Circuit Court of 
Appeals apparently reached this conclusion independently 
without consulting the Delaware cases or statutes. The Su-
preme Court remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for decision in conformity with the law of Delaware. 
Speaking for the Court, in a rather short opinion, Mr. Jus-
tice Reed said: 
"We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins against such independent deter-
minations by the federal courts extends to the field of con-
flict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the 
federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing 
in Delaware's state courts. Otherwise the accident of diversity 
of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration 
of justice in co-ordinate state and federal courts sitting side by 
side. . . . Any other ruling would do violence to the prin-
ciple of uniformity within a state upon which the Tompkins 
decision is based. Whatever lack of uniformity this may pro-
duce between federal courts in different states is attributable 
to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits 
permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies 
diverging from those of its neighbours. It is not for the fed-
eral courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an inde-
pendent 'general law' of conflict of laws. Subject only to 
review by this Court on any federal question that may arise, 
Delaware is free to determine whether a given matter is to be 
governed by the law of the forum or some other law." 
In view of our extended speculative discussion above, any 




UNIFORMITY AS A CHOICE-OF-LAW POLICY 
I
T IS frequently said that choice-of-law principles are 
designed to secure uniformity. Perhaps the precise sig-
nificance of this objective and its relation to choice-of-
law principles can best be visualized in the light of a specific 
problem. A takes his friend B for an automobile ride. Due to 
A's careless driving the car runs into a ditch and B is injured. 
Having decided to bring an action against A, B will proceed to 
choose a suitable forum. He must be sure that the forum 
selected will undertake to exercise jurisdiction over A. And 
he will probably want to bring his action in a place where A 
has sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment. Let us suppose that 
he elects to sue in state X. It would be easy for the court 
there to decide the case according to the rules of its own in-
ternal law without considering how the courts of any other 
state might have decided it. But if every court took this atti-
tude, B's power to recover damages would depend entirely 
upon his choice of a forum. A might be a man of means with 
property in a number of states. B could then select the state 
whose law was most favorable to him. Such a possibility would 
strike many persons as unfair. "Fairness to the parties," says 
Goodrich, "requires that the obligations created between them 
remain unchanged by fortuitous changes in the geographical 
locations of either until such obligations are settled or other-
wise discharged." 1 It seems desirable, therefore, that the court 
1 Goodrich, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," (1930) 36 WEST VA. 
L. Q. 156, 164. See also Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested 
Rights," (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 656; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) 
699· 
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of state X should attempt to cooperate with those of other 
states in arriving at a uniform solution of the A-B controversy. 
The court can do this by invoking some choice-of-law prin-
ciple indicating a single legal system to whose rules all courts 
might resort in dealing with that controversy. The principle 
that tort claims are regulated by the law of the place of wrong 
would obviously be appropriate. Following out this principle, 
the court ought not to decide the case according to its own 
internal law unless the accident occurred within the bounds of 
state X. If it occurred in any other state, the law in force there 
should govern the decision. 
Let us assume, however, that the accident occurred out-
side state X. Yet the court disregards the established choice-
of-law principle, settles the case according to the law of the 
forum, and so reaches a result different to that which a ref-
erence to the law of the place of wrong would have prompted. 
If we accept the premise that justice requires uniformity, 
that result will be, to some extent, unfair to either the plain-
tiff or the defendant. It should be observed that the possibility 
of hardship to the defendant is greater than that of hardship 
to the plaintiff. A judicial decision in favour of a defendant 
which contravenes an established choice-of-law principle 
works a certain hardship upon the plaintiff. But a judicial 
decision in favour of a plaintiff which contravenes an estab-
lished choice-of-law principle works a much greater hardship 
upon the defendant. This proposition, although perhaps not 
readily apparent, is one of fundamental importance in the 
conflict of laws. It deserves further elucidation. 
We have supposed that the accident occurred outside state 
X but that the court of state X, disregarding the choice-of-
law rule, has applied the law of the forum. Let us suppose 
further that whilst the law of the place of wrong would have 
permitted the plaintiff to recover, the law of the forum directs 
a contrary result. Thus the plaintiff is deprived of the oppor-
tunity to litigate his claim in this particular jurisdiction. But 
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he may have other strings to his bow. Perhaps he can bring a 
successful suit in some other jurisdiction, e.g., the place of 
wrong. His power to bring a second suit in some other juris-
diction would, of course, depend upon the attitude of the 
court there. The court of the jurisdiction in which the second 
suit was brought might take the view that the adverse judg-
ment given in the first suit by the court of state X had settled 
the merits of the A-B controversy once for all. It might say 
that that judgment was res judicata against the plaintiff. But 
the court of state X can render this result a highly unlikely 
one. It can, if it wishes, make it perfectly clear that its judg-
ment is based solely upon the rules of the internal law of state 
X. The court of state X has decided that, under the internal 
law of state X, the plaintiff has no cause of action. Nothing is 
said regarding his rights under the laws of other states. If 
he can convince some other court that his claim should be 
governed by the laws of state Y, the judgment rendered by 
the court of state X ought not to impede him. That judgment 
does not purport to determine in any way what the plaintiff's 
rights under the law of state Y may be. Thus the court of 
state X can refuse to enforce the plaintiff's claim accor~ing 
to the law of the place of wrong and, by making explicit the 
theory of their decision, leave him free to pursue his remedy 
in other jurisdictions.2 
Suppose now, on the other hand, that the court of state X, 
in disregard of the choice-of-law rule, gives judgment against 
the defendant. He will be forced to pay plaintiff according 
to the terms of the judgment and he has no further means of 
redress. His liability is irrevocably fixed. Hence it would 
2 This attitude was taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. rzo, 24 Sup. Ct. 581. 
In the United States the effect of a judgment as a conclusive determination 
of facts and legal rights between the parties is usually referred to the law of 
the state where the judgment was rendered. See FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (1925) 
vol. 3> §§ 1394-1397; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) 533· 
For further discussion of this problem, see section r6, below. 
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seem to be particularly important that a court should not set 
aside a choice-of-law principle, the proper application of 
which would have the effect of protecting a defendant. 3 
This distinction between a foreign law which favours the 
plaintiff and one which favours the defendant is believed to 
have considerable significance in the conflict of laws although 
it has been frequently over looked. We shall recur to it at 
various points in the subsequent pages of this treatise. At this 
point a few illustrations may not be inappropriate. Let us turn 
first to our historical review. We saw that in England, as early 
as the seventeenth century, the courts adopted the justification 
theory, which protects the defendant. In an English court 
the defendant may with certain exceptions employ any de-
fence available under the law of the place of wrong. A plain-
tiff, on the other hand, can apparently get no advantage at all 
from the application of foreign law. 4 He must in all cases 
show that "the wrong was of such a character that it would 
have been actionable if committed in England." In brief, al-
though English courts have long seen the importance of al-
lowing a defendant to rely upon defences not recognized by 
English internal law, they have been notoriously slow to let 
a plaintiff collect a claim in England which English internal 
law would not give him. Does not this history suggest that 
the recognition of foreign defences is more pressing and im-
portant than the recognition of foreign claims? 
When we considered the history of extraterritorial 
torts in America we found evidence of a development analo-
8 In Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 
16o, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, Mr. Justice Brandeis said: 
"A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. In 
so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substan-
tive right, so that he is free to enforce it elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect 
to a substantive defence under the applicable law of another State, as under 
the circumstances here presented, subjects the defendant to irremediable liability. 
This may not be done." 
• See above, section 3. 
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gous to that in England. Almost all the earlier cases involved 
the problem of a defendant who seeks to justify himself 
according to the law of the place of wrong. Dozens of de-
cisions upon the death statutes established the proposition 
that the death statute of the forum imposed no liability upon 
a defendant who had caused the decedent's death in an outside 
jurisdiction. Yet when suits were brought to enforce foreign 
death statutes, to establish claims by foreign law, they met 
numerous objections. For many years a plaintiff claiming 
under a foreign death statute had to surmount that judicial 
hurdle of uncertain dimensions, the similarity doctrine. 5 And 
although that obstacle has vanished in most jurisdictions, its 
function is filled by an even more nebulous theory-"public 
policy." The decisions which have clustered about this con-
cept lend further support to our suggested distinction. "Pub-
lic policy" often frustrates a plaintiff but it rarely hurts a de-
fendant. There are many cases in which an action based upon 
foreign law has been dismissed on the ground that it is con-
trary to the public policy of the forum. But instances in which 
a court has struck down a defence based on foreign law for 
this reason are extremely rare.6 
A similar pattern is found in the cases on damages. 7 Not 
infrequently a plaintiff's compensation, estimated according 
to the law of the place of wrong, has been cut down to the 
amount which he would have recovered if his claim had been 
governed by the internal law of the forum. But the cases 
are few in which a defendant has been forced to pay damages 
greater than those which the law of the place of wrong would 
have authorized. In Slater v. Mexican National R. Co.8 it 
• See above, section 6. 
• See below, section 18. 
7 See below, section z6. 
8 Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., (1904) 194 U. S. uo, 2.4 Sup. Ct. 581. 
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appeared that the limitations of common-law procedure made 
it impossible for an American court to award the same damages 
to the plaintiffs which they could have recovered in the courts 
of Mexico, the place of wrong. In a Mexican court they 
would have received a long series of periodical payments. A 
Mexican court would have had power to stop these payments 
in the event of certain specified contingencies. The Supreme 
Court decided that it would be preferable to dismiss the 
plaintiff's action rather than to give him some substitute 
award which might be more burdensome to the defendant than 
the Mexican procedure. 
To sum up the argument: ordinary notions of justice and 
equity suggest the desirability of uniformity in the settle-
ment of legal controversies, wherever they may be litigated. 
Since each jurisdiction has different laws, courts have devised 
a number of choice-of-law rules which attempt to allocate the 
decision of each individual case to a particular legal system. 
One of these rules is that matters of tort liability ought to be 
referred to the law of the state where the alleged tort occurred. 
For the sake of uniformity this rule ought to be followed. If 
a court, in a given case, refuses to follow it and applies the 
internal law of the forum, the resulting decision will be in-
consistent with the general choice-of-law practice and there-
fore, unfair to the party who would have succeeded had the 
choice-of-law rule been adopted.9 If that party is the plaintiff 
he may still be able to succeed elsewhere. If he is the defend-
ant, however, he will be forced to pay damages according to 
the unjust judgment and will be unable to do anything more 
about it. Hence a court should be especially careful not to 
give an affirmative judgment awarding damages in violation 
9 When a decision is given which is inconsistent with choice-of-law principles 
the responsibility usually lies with the court of the forum. It may, however, lie 
with the legislature of the forum. 
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of a general choice-of-law principle. That English and Amer-
ican courts have generally been careful to avoid such a re-
sult is shown by our historical survey of the subject and by 
various groups of cases. 
Even in cases with an obviously foreign setting, courts 
often follow the law of the forum unless one of the parties 
requests a reference to some foreign law.10 This practice would 
seem to indicate that such references are primarily made in 
the interest of the parties to the suit. Adherence to a choice-of-
law theory may also be said to benefit the court slightly in 
the following way. If a court always applied its local rule in 
a particular class of cases and that rule favoured the plaintiff, 
the world would make a beaten path to its door.11 It might 
be embarrassed by the great volume of business thus thrust 
upon it. 
Two observations may be made regarding uniformity as 
an objective in the conflict of laws. In the first place, it will 
not guide us to a complete solution of the choice-of-law prob-
lem because it does not indicate any particular legal system. 
Where a well established practice of selection exists we may, 
presumably, approach uniformity by following it. But where 
the question presented is without precedent, we must go 
further afield for an answer. Secondly, the ideal of consist-
ency in the treatment of conflicts cases is very incompletely 
realized. Sometimes different states apply different choice-
of-law principles to the same fact problem. And even the 
most complete unanimity in choice-of-law theory is apt to be 
frustrated by a divergence in rules of procedure affecting 
the ultimate result. It would seem, therefore, that the obstacles 
to securing the identical decision of conflicts cases in all juris-
dictions are formidable enough to warrant a willingness to 
10 See BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. 3, p. 1679. 
11 See Shaw v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., (1901) 79 Miss. 67o, 684, 
3 I So. zzz. 
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sacrifice it in some instances for other and less difficult ob-
jectives. 12 
SECTION !2 
THE INTEREST OF THE STATE WHERE THE WRONG OCCURRED; 
THE NEED FOR A SIGNIFICANT CONNECTION WITH THE 
CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES 
With particular reference to the field of torts, the theory 
has been advanced that a controlling rule should be imported 
from the place of wrong because that jurisdiction appears to 
have the greatest social interest in securing conformity to it.1 
To a great extent tort liability, like criminalliabilty, is im-
posed by a state to secure compliance with prescribed rules 
and standards of conduct on the part of those who enter its 
borders. Whether or not those rules are there obeyed is a 
matter of greater importance to it than to any other state. 
Hence its laws ought to determine the legality of conduct 
within its boundaries wherever that issue may be raised. Of 
course, a state's interest in regulating behaviour there will 
not always find expression in the imposition of duties and 
liabilities. The community there may also deem it expedient 
to create privileges in favour of certain types of conduct, as 
where police officers are authorized to use force in prevent-
ing an escape, or injury necessary to save human life is 
permitted. In either event, other states, recognizing the para-
mount concern of that community in penalizing or exonerat-
ing a defendant, should attempt as far as possible to give 
effect to its policies. 
This theory is reminiscent of the old doctrine that states 
12 See Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," (192.8) 
3 7 YALE L. J. 4-68; Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem," ( 193 3) 
4-7 HARV. L. REV. 173> 197· 
1 See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 182.; Note, (1935) 4-4 YALE 
L. J. 12.33; CHEATHAM, DoWLING and GooDRICH, CASES oN THE CoNFLICT 
OF LAWS (1936) 4-11, 
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referred to one another's laws for the sake of international 
courtesy or comity. But the modern theory is more specific. 
The law of the place of wrong is not merely rehearsed by the 
court in a spirit of friendly deference. It is actually enforced 
by the court because the matter in hand is felt to be of more 
acute concern to the foreign community than to the com-
munity of the forum. 
The reasonable expectations of the parties are not the least 
of the various factors to be considered in choosing a proper 
law. It would be inequitable to determine their rights and 
duties upon a principle whose application to their affairs they 
had no reason to anticipate. From this point of view the law 
of the place of wrong would seem to be a satisfactory choice. 
Most persons realize when they enter a jurisdiction that 
they are bound to comply with the laws in force there. A man 
who failed in this duty might well expect to be mulcted in 
damages. On the other hand, a man who succeeded in it 
might justly complain if he were compelled to answer for 
his conduct in a jurisdiction where different laws prevailed. 
CHAPTER IV 
Exclusion of Foreign Procedural Rules 
SECTION I3 
REASONS FOR EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN PROCEDURAL RULES 
I T IS axiomatic in the conflict of laws that courts only apply foreign substantive law, eschewing that which is procedural or remedial/ that the law of the forum must 
govern all matters of procedure or remedy. The application 
of foreign law in compliance with choice-of-law principles is 
always limited by this general theory. In effect, it directs the 
courts to disregard certain classes of foreign rules, and to 
adhere instead to the ordinary principles and practices of their 
own internal law. An actual issue upon the point will, of 
course, only arise when, at some stage in a lawsuit, one party 
attempts to rely upon a rule of foreign law which conflicts 
with a rule of the local law. The question may then be raised 
whether or not the foreign rule ought to be excluded from 
the court's deliberations. This question might be phrased in 
any one of three ways, viz., is the local rule procedural? is the 
foreign rule procedural? does the subject matter of these rules 
relate to the remedy? But the practical issue is always the 
same; the court must decide whether the local or the foreign 
rule shall prevail. 
What are the reasons for this exclusionary principle? Most 
authorities are agreed that it would be practicably impossible 
for the court of the forum to duplicate in every detail the per-
formance which would be given by a foreign tribunal with 
the same suit before it. Until the court has decided that some 
1 For conflict of laws purposes the words "procedure" and "remedy" are 
usually assumed to have the same significance. In this study they are used inter-
changeably. 
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reference to foreign law should be permitted it has, of course, 
no rules for guidance save those of its own internal law and 
must conduct its adjudication accordingly. But even after the 
proper external law has been selected, there may be certain 
rules of that system which the court of the forum and its of-
ficers could not obey without expending a great deal of time 
and effort. Thus it might be very difficult for the judges and 
officials to adhere strictly to the rules of a foreign jurisdiction 
in executing and enforcing judgments. If the court did not 
confine its reference to foreign rules to those which it could 
conveniently and expeditiously apply, the administration of 
justice at the forum might be seriously hampered. 
During the first three quarters of the nineteenth century 
common-law courts were inclined to look askance at laws of 
other jurisdictions which differed from their own. It seems 
very probable that such laws were sometimes labelled "pro-
cedure" and excluded merely because they did not conform to 
the law of the forum which from habit and experience the 
court had come to regard as ideal.2 Foreign doctrines are not 
likely to be viewed with such naive hostility at the present 
day. But when foreign doctrines are believed to be very harsh 
or unjust, there is no need to reject them in a back door fashion 
by calling them rules of procedure. They can be rejected upon 
the more appropriate ground that they are contrary to the 
public policy of the forum. Calling them rules of procedure 
obscures the real reason for the decision to disregard them, 
their repugnance to local ideals of justice. 
However necessary this substitution of local principles for 
foreign ones may be, it constitutes a serious impediment to 
the attainment of certain objectives which choice-of-law rules 
are supposed to seek. It plainly jeopardizes the ideal of 
uniformity. The very fact that one of the parties to a suit has 
2 See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 147; Lorenzen, "The Statute 
of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 311, 327· 
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sought to introduce a particular rule of the law of the place 
of wrong may be taken to show that he expects to derive some 
advantage from its application. The importance of this ad-
vantage will depend upon the nature of the rule and the facts 
of the particular case. Had the suit been brought at the place 
of wrong, he would have obtained the advantage. The exclu-
sion of a particular rule of the law of the place of wrong in 
this way may confer an abnormal benefit upon either the 
plaintiff or the defendant. 
Sometimes a particular rule of the law of the place of wrong 
has been laid down by the courts or legislature of that state 
in order to protect an important social interest. The forum's 
choice-of-law principle aims, in a measure, to recognize such 
interests. If a rule of this kind is excluded as procedural, the 
recognition of these interests will be prevented. 
For these reasons certain writers have urged that the courts 
should try, so far as convenience in the dispatch of judicial 
business will permit, to apply as few local, as many foreign, 
rules as possible.3 Moreover, as we have observed, a number 
of recent decisions indicate that American courts are moving 
in this direction. 4 
SECTION 14 
THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION 
The substance-procedure problem arises because the law 
of the forum differs from the law of the place of wrong. The 
problem becomes crucial with regard to particular conflicting 
rules of these two systems. Whenever the problem comes be-
fore a court, there is a foreign rule and a local rule which con-
tradict one another. A lawyer, stating the question in formal 
language, might put it in any one of three ways, viz., Is the 
8 See STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (I 93 7) 148; Cook, "'Substance' and 
'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333, 343· 
'Above, section 7· 
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foreign rule one of procedure or substance? Is the local rule 
one of procedure or substance? Is the subject matter of these 
rules one of procedure or substance? For instance, an action 
is brought upon a foreign tort. The local period of limitation 
for such a suit would be three years, the period laid down by 
the law of the place of wrong is five years. The defendant 
relies upon the local statute. It, in effect, conflicts with the 
affirmative rule of the foreign law that such a suit may be 
brought at any time within five years after the cause of action 
arose. The defendant might be said to have raised the ques-
tion: is the local limitation of three years a rule of substance 
or procedure? Or, in a different form: Is the foreign rule al-
lowing suit in five years a rule of substance or procedure? Or, 
in a third form: Does the subject matter of these rules (which 
we find to be in conflict), namely, limitation of actions, fall 
within the category of substance or the category of procedure? 
All these forms of statement are used by the courts. 
Put in any of these three ways, the problem becomes what 
certain writers call a problem of classification (qualification, 
characterization). The court's task is to classify the local rule, 
or the foreign rule, or the subject matter as belonging to the 
class "substance" or the class "procedure." There may appear 
to be a certain discrepancy between the statements of the 
problem offered by various writers because they appear to be 
classifying different things.1 But no matter which formula we 
employ, the underlying problem is always the same. The 
court must decide whether the rule of the forum or the rule 
of the place of wrong shall prevail, and, as a consequence, 
whether one party or the other shall obtain the advantage. 
It should be observed that all three of these formulae, 
although frequently used by courts and writers, are to a cer-
1 See, e.g., Beckett, "The Question of Classification ('Qualificati~n') in Private 
International Law," ( 1934) 15 BRITISH YEAR BooK INT. LAW 46. At p. 64 
he speaks of "classification of the internal law of the forum"; at p. 72, of 
"classification of rules of foreign law." 
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tain extent incomplete and misleading. They are incomplete 
because they fail to make explicit the important social factors 
which must be considered in the solution of a substance-
procedure problem. These factors we have already con-
sidered. 2 A rule of the forum and a rule of the place of wrong 
conflict. To give effect to the rule of the forum will serve the 
court's administrative convenience. But choice-of-law policies 
demand the application of the place-of-wrong rule. None of 
these factors finds its way into any of the three classification 
formulae. These formulae suggest that the problem is merely 
one of logic. A rule or its subject matter is either substance 
or procedure. We must ascertain its true nature and classify 
it accordingly. To talk of the "problem of classification" is to 
accentuate this unfortunate notion that the problem is simply 
an exercise in deduction. An analysis of the problem which 
adopts this terminology is apt to focus the judge's attention 
upon the mental process of assigning legal rules to abstract 
categories. He may forget all about the social factors involved; 
in any event, the tendency of this terminology is to minimize 
their importance. 
This is merely another particular instance of that recurrent 
phenomenon of legal thought which has been called "me-
chanical jurisprudence," "the tyranny of labels," 3 "the 
squirrel cage of conceptualism." In discussing, in thinking 
about legal problems of all kinds, we are liable to become too 
much engrossed with the meaning of verbal symbols or for-
mulae and the process of deducing logical consequences there-
from. Our concern with such matters may lead us to forget the 
social interests which are involved in our problems. The sug-
gestion is ventured that, in conflict of laws, the dangers of me-
2 In section I 3, above. 
3 See Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," (1908) 8 ·CoL. L. REv. 6os; Mr. 
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Snyder v. Massachusetts, (1934) 291 U.S. 97, II4, 
54 Sup. Ct. 330; Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," 
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 468, 481. 
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chanicallogical thinking are greater than in other fields. The 
basic social functions of that collection of legal theories which 
we call the conflict of laws do not seem to be very generally 
understood by the legal profession. One does not expect a 
judge to give all the reasons for his decision in his opinion. 
But it is not an infrequent experience to feel, after reading an 
opinion in a conflicts case, that the judge who wrote it did not 
have a very clear conception of the policies and purposes which 
choice-of-law principles have been created to achieve. Perhaps 
the social interests underlying the conflict of laws are unusu-
ally obscure or subtle. However this may be, a court which 
does not fully appreciate the social implications of the case 
before it is very likely to fall into the rut of automatic de-
duction. It is accordingly submitted that if we must, in con-
formity to established usage, speak of the classification of legal 
rules or their subject matter, we should, at the same time, keep 
clearly in view the various conflicting aims and policies which 
ought to govern that classification. 
The dangers inherent in the established terminology and 
the type of thinking which it engenders have been fully dem-
onstrated by Cook. 4 As he points out, the words "substance" 
and "procedure" are used by lawyers in a number of different 
connections. For example, we may say a certain rule is a rule 
of procedure because it is usually taught in a law-school course 
on procedure. Or we may say that a constitutional prohibition 
of retrospective laws does not apply to statutes which merely 
affect matters of procedure. But we must not assume that the 
word procedure, when used in connection with these internal 
law problems, has the same meaning as it has when used in the 
conflict of laws. The symbol is the same, but the problems are 
different. For example, statutes shifting the burden of proving 
contributory negligence have generally been classified as pro-
• Cook," 'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 42 
YALE L. J. 333· See also Cheatham, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict 
of Laws," (1936) 21 CoRN. L. Q. 570. 
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cedural in the sense that suGh statutes may be given a retro-
spective effect without infringing a constitutional prohibition 
of retrospective laws. But it does not follow that a statute of 
the forum disposing of the burden of proof ought to be classi-
fied as procedural in the conflict of laws. The problem which 
occasions the classification is different. If the law of the place 
of wrong has a rule governing the burden of proof different 
from that of the forum, choice-of-law policies, especially the 
ideal of uniformity, require the application of the rule of the 
place of wrong in preference to that of the forum. The court 
of the forum should do this, if it can. Thus the statute of the 
forum ought to be classified as "substantive" for conflict of 
laws purposes. 
"In view of the fact that today it is generally no more diffi-
cult to know the foreign rule as to burden of proof than it is 
to know the foreign (substantive law', much can be said for 
holding the question, at least in the negligence cases, to be 
(substantive' in the conflict of laws cases, for often the loca-
tion of the burden in these cases is really decisive as to which 
side will emerge victorious." 5 
Let us take another example. Common-law courts have 
held for over two centuries that a contract debt, barred by a 
statute of limitations, revives if the debtor promises to pay 
it. In rationalizing this result, they often say that the statute 
abolishes the remedy but does not affect the right.6 If we 
assume that the word "remedy" has at all times and in all 
places the same significance, we might argue that such a 
statute ought to be classified as a rule "pertaining to the 
remedy" in conflict of laws. But is this not the sheerest casu-
istry? A rule does not become a remedial rule for conflict of 
laws purposes simply because someone has applied the word 
"remedy" to it in a totally different context. The considera-
" Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 42 
YALE L. J. 333, 346. 
"See, e.g., Quantock v. England, (rno) 5 Burr. z6z8, 98 Eng. Rep. 382. 
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tions of expediency which lead the courts to permit the revival 
of statute-barred debts are totally different from those bear-
ing upon the question whether or not a given rule of foreign 
law should be adopted. The word remedy should not be 
juggled about in such a way as to make the judicial solution 
of the first problem affect that of the second. Yet this dismally 
mechanical type of reasoning appears to have influenced an 
English court in one of the early cases 7 and has probably af-
fected the decisions of other courts too. 
The suggestion is therefore offered that a court, in resolving 
a substance-procedure problem, ought not to be influenced 
by the fact that the word "procedure" or "remedy" has been 
applied to a particular rule of law in the process of determin-
ing some question which is purely a question of internal law. 
In other words, classification ought not to be governed by the 
internal law of the forum nor by the internal law of the place 
of wrong. It ought to be governed by conflict of laws policies. 
SECTION I5 
POSSIBLE BASES OF CLASSIFICATION CONSIDERED 
In dealing with the so-called problem of classification, cer-
tain writers discuss extensively the question whether the classi-
fication ought to be determined by the internal law of the 
forum or by the proper law of the case, i.e., for the purposes of 
this treatise, the law of the place of wrong. As we have seen, 
there are three alternative modes of stating the classification 
problem. The elements of the problem are a rule of the 
forum's internal law and a rule of the internal law of the 
state of wrong which conflict with one another. We may pur-
port to classify the local rule, the foreign rule, or the subject 
matter of these rules. Our problem is to make a classification 
in order properly to apply the forum's choice-of-law principle. 
7 Williams v. Jones, (18II) 13 East 439, 104 Eng. Rep. 441. 
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We must assign the conflicting rules or their subject-matter 
to the category of substance or the category of procedure, for 
the purposes of the forum's conflict of laws rules. If we view 
this classification as a purely logical operation, there are three 
ways in which it might be carried out. 
( r) We might adopt as the basis of our classification some 
classification of the local rule which has been made for some 
internal law purpose at the forum. 
( 2) We might adopt some classification of the foreign rule 
which has been made for some internal law purpose in the 
law of the place of wrong. 
(3) We might adopt the classification of the foreign rule 
(if any) which the court of the state of wrong has made in 
dealing with a conflict of laws problem analogous to that 
which is now before the court of the forum. 
In reading the works of writers on this subject it is not 
always easy to be sure which of these last two alternatives they 
have in mind when they speak of classification by the proper 
law. Let us consider, in order, each of the three methods 
which have been suggested. 
The first method is classification according to the internal 
law of the forum.1 It is not very favourably regarded by most 
writers but Cheshire suggests that it must be adopted under 
some circumstances: 
"It is clear that with one important exception secondary 
classification must be effected according to the lex causae. The 
exception is this, that if the result of classifying some English 
or foreign rule in the manner adopted by the foreign lex 
causae is to infringe a rule of English internal law which is 
1 In speaking of classification according to the internal law of the forum we 
do not mean to imply that the rule of the law whose classification is in question 
will have been classified as substance or procedure for all internal law purposes. 
Within the internal law of the forum a particular rule may be regarded as 
"procedure" for some purposes and "substance" for others. 
The same is true of the conflicting rule of the law of the place of wrong so 
far as its classification in the internal law of the place of wrong is concerned. 
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regarded in this country as a rule of procedure, then the Eng-
lish classification must be followed. 
"That this exception is justifiable cannot be doubted. It is 
inevitable that in the sphere of substance and procedure an 
English Court which encounters an English rule of procedure 
should adhere rigidly to its own principles of classification. No 
Court can be expected to disregard one of its well-established 
procedural rules merely because the particular action happens 
to contain a foreign element. . . . 
"· .. Normally the lex causae should be omnipotent, 
but this cannot be so if the result is to contravene an English 
rule of procedure. A Court which has consistently acted on the 
assumption that one of its own rules is procedural in nature 
can scarcely allow its view to be disturbed in a limited class of 
cases merely because a foreign court would have acted on a 
different assumption." 2 
No doubt Dr. Cheshire's statement gives us a fairly accu-
rate description of the usual practice of English courts. It is 
impossible to agree with him that this practice is justifiable or 
necessary. In the light of Professor Cook's arguments it ap-
pears to be not only unnecessary, but undesirable because (as 
Dr. Cheshire admits) it often frustrates choice-of-law policies. 
What is necessary is that English courts (and perhaps Dr. 
Cheshire himself) should recognize the fact that "procedure" 
may have one meaning in English internal law and another in 
English conflict of laws. It is not, of course, suggested that the 
court of the forum should not take into account the policy and 
the practical effect of a rule of its own internal law. If, for ex-
ample, a tort action were brought which would be barred by 
the forum's statute of limitations (though not barred by the 
law of the place of wrong) the court might feel that the policy 
of the forum forbade the trial of such a stale claim. But the 
court should not rigidly adhere to its own statute of limita-
tions merely because the statute had been said to "pertain to 
the remedy." 
° CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2 (1938) 38. 
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The second method which has been proposed is classification 
according to the internal law of the place of wrong. 3 This 
method is also within the gravamen of Professor Cook's argu-
ment. Suppose the court of the state of wrong has, in the course 
of solving some problem of internal law, called its statute of 
limitations a rule of "procedure." Why should that fact 
determine the classification of the rule for conflict of laws pur-
poses? The court of the forum is not concerned with the nature 
of the rule in the abstract. Its problem is to decide whether or 
not the rule can conveniently be applied so as to further choice-
of-law policies. Choice-of-law policies require the maximum 
possible application of the law of the place of wrong. The court 
of the forum could easily follow the foreign statute of limi-
tations. Why should it decline to do so because, under very 
different circumstances, the foreign statute has been called 
a rule of "procedure?" 
In addition to the criticisms which Professor Cook has 
levelled at all schemes for classification which are based upon 
internal law, this method is open to a further objection. It does 
not take any account of a very important practical matter, the 
administrative convenience of the forum. Suppose a particular 
rule of the law of the place of wrong has been classified, for 
some internal law purpose, as "substantive." Notwithstanding 
such classification, the court of the forum would have to re-
ject the rule if its enforcement by the courts and officials there 
could not practicably be carried out. 
An individual and special method of classification according 
3 When a writer speaks of classification by the foreign law or by the proper law 
of the transaction it is not always clear whether he means classification by the 
internal proper law or classification according to the conflict of laws principles 
of the proper law. For a suggestion of classification according to the proper 
law, see McClintock, "Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict 
of Laws," (1930) 78 UNrv. OF PA. L. REV. 933; HARPER and TAINTOR, CASES 
ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 655; ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE 
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1940) 246. This method of classification appears also 
to be advocated by Cheshire with certain limitations. See CHESHIRE, PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2 (1938) 38. 
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to the law of the place of wrong has been suggested by Harper. 
He appears to argue that the court of the forum ought to 
classify a particular rule of the law of the state of wrong as 
"substance" and so adopt it, if it embodies an important social 
policy of that jurisdiction. He puts the matter thus: 
"If the policy of a state in regulating social intercourse 
within its borders and affording legal protection to certain in-
terests of persons within the state represents such deep-seated 
convictions of fairness and justice as to require the same legal 
consequences by way of judicial action wherever recovery is 
sought, whether in the local courts or those of other states, this 
policy is expressed by characterizing a particular rule of law 
as a rule of 'substance' rather than 'procedure'. In such a case, 
the state having legislative jurisdiction over the acts or events 
and the parties involved, attempts to extend the application 
of the rules of its law to actions brought in the courts of other 
states. 
"Accordingly, it would seem that the law of each state 
should determine what part of its own law is procedure and 
what part is substance. The policy of each state is expressed in 
its laws. Therefore, whether the policy of the state is of such a 
character that any given rule of its law should be regarded as 
substance or procedure is properly determined by the law of 
that state. Whether a particular rule of any state is by it char-
acterized as substance or procedure very often presents an ex-
tremely difficult question. Several factors may indicate the 
policy which a state expresses in its legal rules." 4 
It is impossible to quarrel with Harper's premise that the 
purpose and ideals underlying a particular rule of the state of 
wrong should serve as an inducement to the court of the forum 
to assist in its enforcement. But the substance-procedure prob-
lem cannot be solved upon this basis alone. There are other 
and more important factors to be considered also. In the first 
place, we must always take into account the administrative 
convenience of the court of the forum. No matter how preg-
• HARPER and TAINTOR, CASES ON CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 655. 
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nant with social policy a rule of foreign law may be, it must 
be classified as "procedure" and rejected if the technique of 
its application is beyond the competence of the forum's of-
ficials. In the second place, the important choice-of-law policy, 
uniformity, has its bearing upon the problem also. Suppose a 
certain rule of the state of wrong is brought forward by one of 
the parties. Nothing in the law or policy of the state of wrong 
indicates that this rule is there regarded as representing "deep-
seated convictions of fairness and justice." If the sole purpose 
of the forum's resort to the law of the state of wrong was to 
respect and enforce the basic policies of that law, the court 
might safely classify this rule as "procedure" and ignore it. 
But there is still the ideal of uniformity to be considered. 
Neither party should be permitted to gain any advantage 
which the law of the state of wrong does not confer upon him. 
Hence the rule in question, notwithstanding its insignificance 
in relation to the policy of its home state, ought to be classified 
as "substance" and adopted at the forum. 
Let us now consider the third possible method of classifi-
cation: classification according to the conflict of laws prin-
ciples of the law of the place of wrong. This would mean that 
any given rule of a state's internal law would always be placed, 
for conflict of laws purposes, in the same category. At first 
sight it might be thought that this method of classification 
would produce a desirable uniformity in the conflict of laws. 
Uniformity in the definition and application of choice-of-law 
principles is a very important conflict of laws ideal. But the 
rule that the law of the forum governs procedure is not a 
choice-of-law principle, it is the negation of choice-of-law 
principles. What is wanted is not its uniform application 
everywhere but its contraction to the minimum practicable 
limits. Classification by the conflict of laws principles of 
the state of wrong is just as objectionable as classification 
by the internal law of the place of wrong. Let us assume 
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that the court of the state of wrong treats its statute of 
limitations as a rule of procedure in conflicts cases. 
This means that the court will dismiss all suits barred by 
the statute regardless of their place of origin. If the court of 
the forum adopts this classification, it will disregard the state 
of wrong's statute of limitations in cases arising there. Such 
a course of action would directly contravene all choice-of-law 
policies. It would deprive the defendant of a clear ground of 
defence which would have been available to him if the case 
had been litigated in the courts of the place of wrong. Classi-
fication by the conflict of laws rules of the law of the place of 
wrong is also subject to the criticism that it is unworkable 
where the foreign rule is unsuitable for expeditious applica-
tion at the forum. Under such circumstances the foreign rule 
would have to be rejected no matter how it had been classified 
in conflicts cases at home. 
In the light of what has been said, we venture to conclude 
that a court, confronted by a substance-procedure problem, 
need not concern itself with any of these three proposed 
schemes for classification, nor with the question which one 
should be adopted. All of these schemes are deficient and un-
satisfactory because they fail to take account of the social 
purposes of choice-of-law principles and the practical purpose 
of the doctrine that foreign rules of procedure cannot be 
adopted. They are also undesirable because they tend to ob-
scure these important purposes and to draw the court's atten-
tion·away from them. We venture to agree with Cook and 
Stumberg that the answer to the so-called problem of classi-
fication is, in reality, a very simple one. The court of the forum 
ought to restrict the category of procedure as much as possible 
and to give the law of the place of wrong the maximum pos-
sible application consistent with the due and effective admin-
istration of justice. American courts seem to be working slowly 
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toward this result. It is to be hoped that they continue to do 
so, and do not allow themselves to be led astray by any of the 
three theories whose defects we have attempted to demon-
strate. 
Another criterion, suggested by certain writers, for deter-
mining whether a foreign or local rule of law ought to be 
placed in the category of procedure should be noted. 5 These 
writers divide the work of courts of law into two parts: (a) 
the process of ascertaining physical facts; (b) the ascription 
of legal meanings to those facts, the predication of legal rela-
tions. Only those rules and practices which relate to the fact-
finding process ought to be regarded as procedural. U nques-
tionably this definition places emphasis upon a very striking 
distinction which it is possible to make between the various 
legal precepts coming into play in the course of litigation. In 
everyday argument and exposition lawyers almost invariably 
state their problems in terms of facts which are supposed to 
exist in the physical world. It can, therefore, be plausibly 
urged that the application of foreign law might most con-
veniently begin at the point where the court has before it a 
clear picture of acts and events. Before this point could be 
reached, however, the court might have to investigate a mass 
of evidence and decide disputed issues of fact. If this part of 
the proceedings were governed exclusively by the rules of 
the forum, and not by those of the proper law, one of the 
parties might gain a very decided advantage thereby, or some 
important rule of the proper law, pregnant with social policy, 
might be disregarded. In view of these undesirable possibil-
ities, some courts have taken the trouble to follow certain 
rules of foreign law although they appeared to regulate the 
process of proving facts. 6 
5 See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (I 9 3 7) I 2 8; Lorenzen, "The Statute 
of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," (I 923) 32 YALE L. J. 3 I r, 325. 
6 See sections 33, 35, below. 
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SECTION 16 
EFFECT OF EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN LAW: BURDEN ON 
PLAINTIFF 
If we adopt complete uniformity as our theoretical norm 
we may say that whenever a rule of the law of the place of 
wrong is excluded as procedure an abnormal burden is placed 
upon either the plaintiff or the defendant. When the burden 
is placed upon the plaintiff, one of two things may happen. 
Notwithstanding his loss of whatever advantage the applica-
tion of the foreign rule might have brought him, the plaintiff 
may succeed and recover a judgment. With this situation we 
are not presently concerned. The other possibility is that the 
plaintiff may lose his case. For example, the court may de-
cline to follow the law of the place of wrong relating to 
limitation of actions and dismiss the plaintiff's suit because it 
is proscribed by the forum's statute of limitations. 
Under these circumstances the plaintiff may desire to in-
stitute a second suit in some more favourable jurisdiction. 
It will then become necessary for the court there to decide 
whether the adverse judgment given in the former proceed-
ings should be regarded as having settled the merits of the con-
troversy. In order to ascertain exactly what matters were de-
cided in the first suit the court will probably turn to the 
formal judgment and to the law of the first forum. In the 
example we have taken, the first judgment really decides 
very little except that the plaintiff cannot bring an action in 
that particular forum. It is important that the second court 
should know this. The suggestion is therefore offered that a 
court which, in dismissing an action, follows some local rule 
of procedure ought to make the basis of its decision perfectly 
clear. In this way it will facilitate the work of other tribunals 
which are called upon to determine the effect of its judgment. 
This does not mean, of course, that in cases of this type the 
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court before whom the second action is brought will always 
allow it to proceed. Other factors would have to be taken 
into consideration besides the conclusiveness of the first judg-
ment. In the statute-of-limitations illustration which we have 
used most lawyers would probably agree that the plaintiff 
ought to be given a second try.1 But there are good argu-
ments to the contrary. He chose the forum for the first suit; 
ought he not to be content with the "procedure" there? Pro-
tracted litigation is undesirable for both parties. The plain-
tiff should not be allowed to whip the defendant from state 
to state, looking for a favourable forum. A court's view re-
garding the propriety of a second suit would probably also 
be influenced, to some extent, by the nature of the procedural 
rule involved in the first one. Suppose the first court sub-
stituted its own rule relating to the burden of proving some 
particular issue for that of the state of wrong. It is most un-
likely that another court would, under these circumstances, 
allow the plaintiff to retry the entire case. Such problems, 
although interesting, have been little explored as yet by 
courts or writers. We take note of them because they relate, 
indirectly, to the problems of this treatise. 
SECTION 17 
EFFECT OF EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN LAW: BURDEN ON 
DEFENDANT 
The operation of the doctrine that foreign rules of pro-
cedure must be excluded will in some instances subject the de-
fendant to an abnormal burden. The plaintiff, in such cases, 
is permitted to profit by his selection of a particular forum 
whose procedural rules help him to a recovery. Since the de-
fendant will have no redress against an adverse judgment, 
1 For discussion of this problem and citation of authorities, see FREEMAN, 
JUDGMENTS (1925) vol. 31 § 1397; PIGOTT, FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND JURIS-
DICTION (1908) part 11 p. 78. 
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this result is highly undesirable. Nevertheless, it has occurred 
in a good many cases. Perhaps the most notorious are those 
in which courts have disregarded the state of wrong's statute 
of limitations and allowed actions which would there be 
barred to proceed to judgment at the forum.1 
On the other hand, there is authority of a very high order 
for the view that when the operation of local procedure would 
press too hard upon a defendant, the attempt to enforce prin-
ciples of the law of the place of wrong through the medium 
of that procedure should be completely abandoned. Without 
giving any final pronouncement upon the rights of the parties, 
the court ought to dismiss the action. It is not very easy 
to say just when this alternative course should be pursued be-
cause there are so few cases on the subject.2 
The authority referred to is Slater v. Mexican National 
Railroad Co.3 Suit was brought in a Texas federal court to 
recover damages for a death occurring in Mexico. It appeared 
that in a Mexican court, the deceased's dependent relatives 
would have been awarded a series of periodical payments 
during the probable period of his life, terminable upon any 
one of several contingencies such as the marriage, majority, or 
attainment of economic independence of the beneficiaries. In 
the Supreme Court of the United States Mr. Justice Holmes 
wrote for the majority: 
"The present action is a suit at common law and the court 
has no power to make a decree of this kind contemplated by 
the Mexican statutes. What the Circuit Court did was to disre-
gard the principles of the Mexican statute altogether and to 
follow the Texas statute. This clearly was wrong and was ex-
1 See below, section 30. 
2 For further discussion of the problem of this chapter, see Consolidated 
Coppermines Corp. v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Co., (1926) 127 Misc. 71, 
215 N.Y. Supp. 265. 
See also the workmen's compensation cases discussed below, section 46. 
3 Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., (1904) 194 U. S. uo, 24 Sup. 
Ct. 581. 
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cepted to specifically. But we are of opinion further that 
justice to the defendant would not permit the substitution of 
a lump sum, however estimated, for the periodical payments 
which the Mexican statutes required. The marriage of bene-
ficiaries, the cessation of the absolute necessity for the pay-
ments, the arising of other circumstances in which, according 
to law, the deceased would not have been required to con-
tinue the support, all are contingencies the chance of which 
cannot be estimated by any table of probabilities. It would 
be going far to give a lump sum in place of an annuity for 
life, the probable value of which could be fixed by averages 
based on statistics. But to reduce a liability conditioned as 
this was to a lump sum would be to leave the whole matter to a 
mere guess. We may add that by article 225 concerning ali-
mony, the right cannot be renounced, nor can it be subject to 
compromise between the parties. There seems to be no possi-
bility in Mexico of capitalizing the liability." 
Three members of the bench dissented. They inclined 
toward the view that the Mexican law of damages should be 
characterized as procedural and disregarded. "The extent of 
damages," they argued, "does not enter into any definition 
of the right enforced or the cause of action sought to be prose-
cuted." Mr. Justice Holmes rejected this fissiparous notion: 
"The theory of the foreign suit," he wrote, "is that al-
though the act complained of was subject to no law having 
force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, 
which like other obligations, follows the person and may be 
enforced wherever the person may be found. But as the only 
source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it 
follows that that law determines not merely the existence of 
the obligation but equally determines its extent. It seems to us 
unjust to allow a plaintiff to come here absolutely depending 
on the foreign law for the foundation of his case, and yet to 
deny the defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his 
liability that law would impose. Therefore we may 
lay on one side as quite inadmissible the notion that the law 
of the place of the act may be resorted to so far as to show 
that the act. was a tort, and then may be abandoned, leaving 
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the consequences to be determined according to the accident 
of the place where the defendant may happen to be caught." 
The plaintiff's action was accordingly dismissed. 
This decision promulgates an important principle of con-
flict of laws and raises several interesting questions. Why did 
the court not carry on the adjudication in the customary fash-
ion, substituting, where necessary, the rules of the forum for 
those of the place of wrong? Mr. Justice Holmes makes the 
answer quite plain; such a course would be unfair to the de-
fendant. He would, in all probability, have been forced to 
pay higher damages than a Mexican court would have exacted. 
The case rests upon the basic ideal that the defendant's fate 
should not be determined according to the accident of the place 
where he "may happen to be caught." This reasoning sug-
gests a further query. If the defendant can have the plaintiff's 
suit dismissed because the use of the forum's procedure might 
increase the bill of damages, may there not be other situations 
in which the defendant could claim to be protected against a 
very unfavourable procedural rule of the forum? Whenever 
the substitution of a local for a foreign doctrine deprives him 
of an unanswerable defence or renders his position especially 
precarious, the theory of the Slater case would appear to at 
least provide a basis for arguing that the court should decline 
jurisdiction. 
Following the same theory in the opposite direction, we 
may be permitted to conclude that, if the element of hardship 
to the defendant had been removed from the constituent 
circumstances of the Slater case, the final result would have 
been different. Had the court been of the opinion that a 
common-law recovery could not possibly place a greater bur-
den upon the defendant than would a Mexican decree, they 
would very likely have allowed the action to proceed. Such 
a result would be fair enough to both parties. 4 
• See CoNFLICT oF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 609. 
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Although the Slater case upholds one major conflict of laws 
policy, it does so at the expense of another. The defendant is 
secured against a liability more onerous than that imposed by 
the law of the place of wrong. But the plaintiff has been denied 
a remedy in at least one forum. The Supreme Court laid some 
stress upon the accessibility of the Mexican courts as a con-
venient place for him to wage his claim. Suppose he had shown 
that the Mexican courts would not exercise jurisdiction over 
the defendant or that the latter had no property there to 
satisfy their decree. Perhaps, under those circumstances, the 
court would have been willing to weigh the injustice to the 
plaintiff of leaving him without any effective remedy against 
the injustice to the defendant of subjecting him to a possibly 
heavier penalty. On such a basis a different decision might 
have been pronounced. 
In Mexican National R. Co. v. Jackson 5 the plaintiff suf-
fered personal injuries in Mexico for which he sought to fix 
liability upon the plaintiff in a Texas court. The case differed 
from Slater v. Mexican National R. Co. in that the injuries 
to the plaintiff did not result in death. The Supreme Court 
of Texas dismissed his suit upon grounds similar to those 
adopted in the Slater case. The court also decided that the 
enforcement of the Mexican law would be contrary to Texas 
public policy. These two theories seem to have become merged 
in subsequent Texas decisions. 
5 Mexican National R. Co. v. Jackson, (I896) 89 Tex. 107, 33 S. W. 857. 
The Jackson case was followed in Jones v. Mexican Central R. Co., (I902 Tex.) 
68 S. W. 186; El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, (I923 Tex.) 255 
s. w. I59· 
The Jackson case was distinguished and criticized in Mexican Central R. Co. 
v.Mitten, (I896) 13 Tex.Civ.App. 653,36 S. W. 282; SouthernPaci:ficR. Co. 
v. Dusablon, (I 907) 48 Tex. Civ. App. 203, I o6 S. W. 766. 
Federal courts in Texas refused to follow the Jackson case in Evey v. Mexi-
can Cent. R. Co., (I897), 26 C. C. A. (sth) 407, 8I Fed. 294; Mexican Cent. 
R. Co. v. Marshall, (I899), 34 C. C. A. (sth) I33, 9I Fed. 933; Mexican Cent. 
R. Co. v. Jones, (I9oi) 48 C. C. A. (sth) 227, I07 Fed. 64. 
CHAPTER v 
Additional Limitations on the Application 
of the Law of Place of Wrong 
SECTION !8 
PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM 
I
N SECTIONS r r and 12 we have tried to set out some 
of the objectives which courts seek to attain by applying 
the law of the place of wrong in tort litigation. Nat-
withstanding the compelling significance of these objectives, 
few courts would care to undertake the blindfold adoption of 
every foreign rule which this choice-of-law principle might 
lay upon their doorstep. Suppose the law of the place of 
wrong appeared to be extremely harsh or unfair. The court of 
the forum would naturally be loath to lend the force of its 
authority to a decision which was entirely contrary to local 
ideals of justice. To meet such situations, the vague but gen-
erally accepted theory of "public policy" has been developed.1 
Foreign laws which conflict with the public policy of the forum 
will not be accepted. This doctrine obviously leaves a good 
deal of discretion to reject foreign law in the hands of the 
judges. It is difficult to see how it could be more explicitly 
framed unless all foreign rules differing from those of the 
forum were excluded. This would completely wipe out choice-
of-law principles. 
In practice the public policy theory may have one of two 
effects, depending upon the tenour of the foreign law which 
the court refuses to follow. Let us consider first the situation 
1 See Lorenzen, "Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736, 748. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 
N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198; Herrick v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., (r883) 31 Minn. 
II, r6 N. W. 413· 
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where the foreign law favours the plaintiff. The court, be-
lieving that law to be unjust, dismisses the plaintiff's suit.2 
Such a decision is opposed to the purposes of choice-of-law 
principles. But the plaintiff, although deprived of one forum, 
may be able to enforce his claim elsewhere. The court merely 
washes its hands of the case and leaves the parties as they 
were. 
In section 6 we endeavoured to trace historically the 
progress of American legal opinion regarding this problem. 
It apparently passed through three cycles. The problem be-
came acute in the I 8 6o's with the advent of death statutes, 
which varied a good deal from state to state. At first the courts 
and text writers harboured grave doubts as to whether foreign 
death statutes ought to be enforced at all. Then the courts 
began to enforce them in some cases, with the cautious quali-
fication that the foreign death act must be "similar" to that 
of the forum. Finally they dropped the similarity requirement 
but continued to insist, as they do today, that a cause of action 
created by the law of another state must not conflict with the 
"public policy" of the forum. Today the verbal formula is the 
same for death cases, for other tort cases, for all departments 
of conflict of laws. In both judicial opinions and extra-judicial 
writings the view has been often and emphatically expressed 
that as between sister states, only the strongest grounds should 
induce one state to refuse its aid in enforcing the civil laws 
of another.3 
• This is the most common result. By disregarding a single rule of the foreign 
law for reasons of policy a court might also (a) make it more difficult for the 
plaintiff to succeed or (b) reduce the amount of his recovery. 
• See Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights," (1918) 27 
YALE L. J. 656, 663; Goodrich, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," 
(I930) 36 w. VA. L. Q. I 56, I7o; BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (I935) vol. 3, 
p. I 6 5 I ; Nutting, "Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," 
(I935) 19 MINN. L. REV. 196; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (193 4) 
§ 612. 
See Eskovitz v. Berger, (1936) 276 Mich. 536, 268 N. W. 883; Loucks v. 
Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198. 
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Let us turn now to a discussion of the second effect which 
the public policy theory may produce. Here the foreign law 
favours the defendant. The court feels that it cannot recon-
cile that law with its own ideas of justice. So it gives an af-
firmative judgment for the plaintiff. This application of the 
public policy theory is much more drastic than the first one 
which we have considered. The defendant is forced to pay 
damages in a situation where the proper law would not have 
exacted them, merely because he is vulnerable at a particular 
forum. Such a result is especially undesirable in the conflict 
of laws. It is quite unusual for a court to deny a defendant the 
protection of the proper law upon the express ground that 
that law runs counter to the public policy of the forum. But in 
a few instances this has been done. 4 
SECTION I9 
THE FIRST RULE IN PHILLIPS V. EYRE AND THE CONCEPT 
OF PUBLIC POLICY 
In section 3 above we discussed the peculiar doctrine, laid 
down by the Privy Council in The Halley 1 and epitomized 
by Willes J., as the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre/ which pre-
vents English courts from allowing a recovery under foreign 
law unless "the wrong is of such a character that it would have 
been actionable if committed in England." While the mean-
ing of this sentence is not transparently clear, it seems to 
require every plaintiff in an English court to show that the 
• Johnson v. Carolina, etc., R. Co., (1926) 191 N.C. 75, 131 S. E. 390; 
Galef v. United States, (D. C. S.C. 1928) 25 F. (zd) 134; Fox v. Postal-
Telegraph Cable Co., (1909) 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399· 
See also the cases discussed at p. zoo, below. 
'The Halley, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193. 
"Phillips v. Eyre, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. r, 28. On the subject of this section, 
see Hancock, "Torts in the Conflict of Laws: The First Rule in Phillips v. 
Eyre," (1940) 3 UNIV. OF ToRONTO L. J. 400; Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and 
the Conflict of Laws," (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 483, 497; F<lkonbridge, Com-
ment, (1940) 18 CAN. BAR REV. 308. 
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acts of which he complains, though committed abroad, would 
give rise to a liability under English internal law. 
If we consider this rule historically, in relation to the time 
and place of its enunciation, it does not appear so very absurd. 
In the r 8 6o's, the idea of enforcing foreign law was still a 
novelty. Many judges, both in England and in America, seem 
to have thought that to give a judgment awarding damages, 
which was not based upon statutes or decisions of the juris-
diction in which they sat, would be a daring innovation. Text 
writers such as Wharton and Rorer had the same idea. 8 Some 
judges like Sir Robert Phillimore and Mr. Justice Miller did 
not share this attitude. 4 But they seem to have been excep-
tional. When the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre was enunciated, 
American courts were toying with similar theories which they 
did not entirely abandon for another forty years. 
But in the cooperative atmosphere of modern conflict of 
laws, the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre is like a breath from a 
bygone age. As a restriction upon the normal application of 
choice-of-law principles and the realization of choice-of-law 
policies it is objectionable in its generality. Conceivably there 
might be cases in which an English court would not want to 
enforce a liability in tort created by some foreign state because 
that liability was utterly repugnant to English ideas of justice. 
But it could scarcely be contended that every tort liability un-
known to English law is, from the standpoint of English law, 
something so immoral that it ought not to be recognized. The 
first rule in Phillips v. Eyre compels the court of the forum to 
disregard foreign laws and fundamental choice-of-law policies 
whether there is any special reason for doing so or not. 
Cheshire, who emphatically deplores the English Court of 
Appeal decision in Machado v. Fontes 5 and seeks to prove 
8 See above, p. 26. 
'For Sir Robert Phillimore's views see The Halley, (I867) 2 Adm. & Ecc. 3· 
For Mr. Justice Miller's views, see Dennick v. Cent. R. R. Co., (I88o) I03 
U, S. II, 
"Machado v. Fontes, [I897] 2 Q. B. 23I. 
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that it has been overruled, accepts the first rule in Phillips v. 
Eyre with something approaching equanimity.6 He argues 
that the rule, though severe in its generality, has the merit of 
simplicity. It can easily be applied and it enables the parties 
to know where they stand so far as English courts are con-
cerned. Now there are undoubtedly some legal problems ior 
which a simple, workable criterion is very desirable. In a situa-
tion where two social interests, each deserving serious con-
sideration, conflict with one another in almost every case 
which comes before the courts, we may save time and trouble 
in the long run by adopting a rigid formula and sticking to 
it, instead of deciding each case upon its own merits by a nice 
balancing of the conflicting interests. But the instant problem 
is surely not one of this category. Here is no frequent conflict 
of delicately balanced interests. In every case where an Eng-
lish court is asked to enforce the law of the place of wrong, 
choice-of-law policies require that it should do so. On the 
other hand, the cases in which the foreign law is so unfair or 
oppressive that choice-of-law policies are opposed to English 
ideas of justice will probably be very few and far between. 
And when a case of this type does occur, the courts could 
easily deal with it under their general discretionary power to 
reject any foreign law which clashes with the "public policy" 
of the forum. 
The first rule in Phillips v. Eyre was formulated at a time 
when the need for a rational system of conflict of laws was 
very dimly perceived in common-law jurisdictions and when 
many judges felt that there was something rather strange and 
perhaps a little dangerous about enforcing the law of another 
jurisdiction. Today that notion is obsolete. Every jurisdiction 
has different laws and these laws are continually changing. 
6 
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. Z (1938) 302, 
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What difference if a court in one jurisdiction enforces the laws 
of another? "We are not so provincial," said Judge Cardozo, 
"as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because 
we deal with it otherwise at home." 7 It is rather amusing to 
note that the liability of a shipowner for the negligence of a 
compulsory pilot which Lord Justice Selwyn refused to en-
force in The Halley 8 and upon which he expended so many 
high-sounding phrases, was later introduced by an act of 
Parliament into English internallaw.9 
In keeping with the centripetal tendency of Anglo-
Dominion jurisprudence, the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre has 
been transplanted to some of the federal Dominions where 
it is indeed an exotic plant. Between the territorial units of a 
federal state there should be friendship and cooperation. It 
seems incredible that because in I 868 the Privy Council re-
fused to enforce a particular rule of Belgian law, the courts 
of Canadian provinces should refuse to enforce any law of a 
sister province which happens to differ slightly from their 
own. Yet this appears to be the prevailing doctrine in Canada 
today.10 One would look far to find a more striking example 
of "mechanical jurisprudence," blind adherence to a verbal 
formula without any regard for policies or consequences. 
Notwithstanding Cheshire's suggestion, the application of 
the first rule of Phillips v. Eyre in practice has raised some 
difficult questions. In Potter v. Broken Hill Proprietary 
7 In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (I9I8) 224 N.Y. 99, III, 120 N. E. I98. 
8 The Halley, (I868) L. R. 2 P. C. I93· 
"By the Pilotage Act, I9I3 (2 & 3 Geo. s, c. 3I). 
10 Simonson v. Canada Northern R. Co., (I9I4) 24 Man. 267, 28 West. 
L. R. 3Io. 
For dicta, see O'Connor v. Wray, [I93o] Can. L. R. 23I, 2 Dom. L. R. 
899; Canadian Nat. Steamships Co. v. Watson, [I939] Can. L. R. I, I Dom. 
L. R. 273; Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co., (I9I3) 30 Ont. L. R. 27I. 
Canadian courts applied the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre to exclude claims 
based on the law of states of the United States in Papageorgiouv v. Turner, 
(I 906) 3 7 New Bruns. 449; Gillis Supply Co. Ltd. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
(I9II) I6 Brit. Col. 254· 
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Co., Ltd.11 the action was brought in Victoria by the owner 
of a New South Wales patent for the unlawful use of his 
invention in New South Wales. The invention was not pat-
ented in Victoria. How should the first rule in Phillips v. 
Eyre be applied in a case like this? The defendant argued 
that if he had used the invention in Victoria where it was not 
patented he would have incurred no liability. Therefore "the 
wrong" was not actionable in Victoria so the plaintiff could not 
succeed. To this the plaintiff retorted that if the defendant 
had used an invention in Victoria which was patented in Vic-
toria he would have been liable. This, he claimed, showed that 
Victoria law recognized "the wrong" of patent infringement 
and so "the wrong" was actionable in Victoria. "What," asked 
Mr. Justice A'Beckett, "are we to take to be the meaning of 
the words-<the wrong must be of such a character'? Do they 
mean that we are to regard merely the act of the defendant 
and consider whether, if that act were done in the state of the 
forum, it would give any right of action to the plaintiff or are 
we to import into the state of the forum the circumstances 
which surrounded the act in the foreign state, including the 
existence of a privilege conferred under the statute law of 
that state?" Taking the latter, more liberal view of the matter, 
his lordship concluded: "In the case before us the defendant 
was bound to observe the obligation imposed by the New 
South Wales patent in New South Wales. It was under no 
similar obligation in Victoria, but that would not prevent the 
Victorian court from affording redress for the wrong com-
mitted in New South Wales if our court would afford, as it 
undoubtedly would, redress for a wrong of the same char-
acter committed in Victoria." But the Supreme Court of Vic-
toria was divided in opinion and the case went off upon 
another point. 
nPotter v. Broken Hill Proprietory Co., Ltd., [1905] Viet. L. R. 6u. 
A somewhat similar problem was presented by Papageorgiouv v. Turner, 
(1906) 37 New Bruns. 449· 
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If the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre is applied in a purely 
mechanical fashion, without regard to its underlying pur-
pose, a little scholastic puzzle may be produced. Suppose B 
injures A in state X whose law gives A a cause of action. A 
brings suit in state Y, which subscribes to the first rule in 
Phillips v. Eyre. A must show that "the wrong was of such a 
character that it would have been actionable if committed in 
state Y." Assuming the injury to have occurred in state X, 
we find that the common law of state Y would have given A no 
right of action. But a statute has been enacted in state Y (prior 
to A's injury) which would permit him to recover. A argues 
that this statute enables him to comply with the first rule in 
Phillips v. Eyre. But B argues that since the statute was not 
meant to have extraterritorial effect, A's rights cannot be any 
greater than they were before it was passed. The simple answer 
to B's argument would seem to be that there is no question of 
giving the statute extraterritorial operation. The statute is 
referred to only for the purpose of determining whether or not 
a recovery by A would be contrary to the policy of state X. 
But Canadian courts have reached divergent results.12 
By its own terms the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre only af-
fects foreign "wrongs," foreign causes of action which belong 
to the category of "torts." Other departments of the conflict 
of laws are exempt from its severity. An action for breach of 
a contractual obligation imposed by foreign law may be 
brought in an English court even though English internal 
law would not impose liability in the same circumstances.13 
Borderline questions may thus arise as to whether a particular 
obligation created by foreign law falls within the tort category. 
If it does, it must be strained through the more finely meshed 
12 Compare Simonson v. Canada Northern R. Co., (1914) 24 Man. 267, 28 
West. L. R. 310, with Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co., (1913) 30 Ont. 
L. R. 271. 
For an ingeniously mechanical explanation of the first rule in Phillips v. 
Eyre, see Note, (1937) 6 FoRTNIGHTLY L. J. 297. 
10 In Re Bonacina, [1912] 2 Ch. D. 394· 
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sieve appropriate to such obligations, instead of the general 
sieve of "public policy." This state of affairs produces a prob-
lem of classification. The foreign law must be classified as tort 
or non-tort for the purpose of this rule of English conflict 
of laws. 
Batthyany v. W alford 14 presented one of these borderline 
problems. The plaintiff was the tenant in possession of cer-
tain large estates in Austria under a fidei commiss. He brought 
action in England against the personal representative of a 
previous tenant claiming that the personal representative was 
liable, under Austrian law, for the deterioration and dilapida-
tion of the Austrian estates during the lifetime of the previous 
tenant. The defendant argued that this claim based upon 
Austrian law was a claim sounding in tort; that therefore it 
must be tested by the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre; that upon 
that test it must be rejected since, under English internal law, 
a tenant's liability for waste could not be enforced against 
his estate after death. The court experienced difficulty, as one 
might expect, in classifying the Austrian fidei commiss as tort 
or non-tort, even for conflict of laws purposes. At one point an 
Austrian lawyer was asked point-blank whether the action by 
the possessor against the heirs of the preceding possessor was 
an action founded on contract or tort. He replied: "It is not an 
action founded upon contract. There is no contract existing 
upon which it could be founded. It is an action founded upon 
tort, if you understand by tort what the Romans understood by 
the word delictum." But after an intensive study of the Aus-
trian law the court decided that the liability thereby estab-
lished was not a liability in tort and so it need not be tested 
by the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre. "As I understand the 
evidence," said Lord Justice Cotton, "the claim according to 
the law of Austria is not in the nature of damages for default, 
14 Batthyany v. Walford, (r887) 36 Ch. D. 269. 
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but a claim under an obligation to keep the property in as good 
condition as the late possessor found it, with liberty to excuse 
himself from making good the deficiency if he can shew that 
it was not caused by any default of his own. That, in my opin-
ion, is not a claim simply depending on tort and does not come 
within the rule of actio pm·sonalis moritur cum persona." 
The opinion in this case does not contain any suggestion of 
a functional basis for the classification ultimately adopted. 
This is not surprising in view of the difficulty which we have 
experienced in finding a functional basis for the first rule in 
Phillips v. Eyre itself. 
SECTION 20 
PENAL LAWS 
In most states the courts and officials do not attempt to 
punish anyone for crimes committed against the laws of other 
states. A number of cases have raised the question whether 
or not the courts should also refuse to entertain civil actions 
based upon foreign laws which appear to have a punitive pur-
pose. As examples of such foreign laws, we might cite statutes 
authorizing the recovery of exemplary damages or double 
damages. 
It is difficult to see why a general rule excluding civil suits 
of a punitive character should be either necessary or desirable. 
A foreign law of this type which was regarded as harsh or un-
fair at the forum could always be excluded on grounds of pub-
lic policy. A general rule excluding all such laws might de-
prive a deserving injured person of any remedy at the forum 
although there was no reason for doing so. The sweeping rule 
which forbids criminal prosecution under foreign laws is well-
established in practice. But the reasons for it are mainly his-
torical. The failure of the courts to make some desirable ex-
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ceptions to it has not gone scathless.1 Its extension to include 
civil suits would be unfortunate. 2 
In Huntington v. Attrill both the Supreme Court of the 
United States3 and the English Privy Council 4 took the 
view that a civil action, brought by an injured party to enforce 
a foreign law, should not be dismissed on the ground that it 
was penal in its nature. Both courts were called upon to decide 
whether a certain New York judgment ought to be enforced 
in outside jurisdictions. This judgment made an officer of a 
corporation liable to pay certain of its debts because he had 
signed a false certificate regarding its affairs. It was argued 
that the judgment ought not to be enforced outside New York 
because it imposed a penalty. Both courts held that the judg-
ment was not a penal judgment. In the Supreme Court, the 
majority discussed the meaning of the words "penal" and 
"penalty" as follows: 
"Strictly and primarily they denote punishment, whether 
corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for 
a crime or offence against its laws. But they are also commonly 
used as including any extraordinary liability to which the law 
subjects a wrongdoer in favour of the person wronged, not 
limited to the damages suffered. . . . Penal laws, strictly 
and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offence 
committed against the State and which, by the English and 
American constitutions, the executive of the State has the 
power to pardon. Statutes giving a private action against the 
wrongdoer are sometimes spoken of as penal in their nature, 
but in such cases it has been pointed out that neither the lia-
bility imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal." 
Both courts admitted that a qui tam action by a common 
informer would fall within the penal category, but this was 
1 See STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL LAWS (1936) 25. 
• See Lefl.ar, "Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims," 
(1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 193. 
8 Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224. 
• Huntington v. Attrill, [1 893] A. C. I so. 
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explained by the Privy Council to be unexceptional since such 
actions are brought on behalf of the community. So far as 
suits by private individuals are concerned, the punitive pur-
pose of the recovery would seem to be immaterial. They are 
not penal actions in the conflict of laws. As between actions 
brought by a state, the distinction apparently turns upon the 
nature and purpose of the recovery sought. A claim for money 
exacted because of an offence against the laws of the plaintiff 
state would no doubt be rejected as quintessentially penaP 
But there is nothing in the reasoning of either court to pre-
clude one state from collecting compensation for an injury 
or breach of contract in the courts of another. 
Although the decisions in Huntington 'V. Attrill were based 
upon a factual situation involving a foreign cause of action 
already crystallized in a judgment, their rationale plainly 
extends, and was meant to extend to the treatment of foreign 
legal doctrines in original actions.6 The Supreme Court's defi-
nition of an action penal for conflict of laws purposes has been 
adopted in a number of cases where foreign doctrines, not 
judgments, were involved. In other cases courts have unfor-
tunately taken a broader view of the penal concept. These 
cases are discussed in section 26, below.7 
SECTION 21 
INJURIES TO FOREIGN LAND 
In many common-law jurisdictions the courts will not 
entertain an action to recover damages for an injury to land 
5 See Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., (1888) 127 U.S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 
1370. 
6 See Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U.S. 657, 671, 683, 13 Sup. Ct. 224. 
7 See generally, Lefiar, "Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental 
Claims," (1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 193; STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL 
LAWS (1936) 33; Note, (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 387. 
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situated in another jurisdiction.1 These courts say that such a 
suit is beyond their competence. Without even considering the 
terms of the foreign law they turn the plaintiff away. Every 
court which takes this view deprives the plaintiff of an avail-
able forum. The enquiring student of the law will naturally 
ask what is the reason for this restrictive doctrine. 
It is submitted that there is no adequate reason. The point is 
sometimes taken in support of the doctrine that it may be 
necessary for the court of the forum to decide a question of 
title to the foreign land. That is true. But is such a question 
any more difficult for the court of the forum than any other 
question of foreign law? The application of any choice-of-law 
principle may require the court of the forum to investigate 
questions of foreign law. Why cavil at a question of title 
to land? There are other species of actions, regularly enter-
tained by the courts, which sometimes involve the determina-
tion of title to land outside the jurisdiction. An action for 
breach of contract relating to foreign land may raise such a 
question. An action for conversion of timber or minerals on 
foreign land may turn upon the issue of ownership of the 
land itself. On the other hand, the question of title may never 
be raised. In an action brought in state X for damage to land 
in state Y the defendant may not dispute the plaintiff's title 
to the land at all. But, by virtue of the doctrine under discus-
sion, such a suit cannot proceed. 
A second point sometimes made in favour of this doctrine 
is based upon the court's lack of control over the subject mat-
1 British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moc;ambique, [1893] A. C. 6oz; 
Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., (1895) 158 U.S. ro5, 15 Sup. Ct. 771; 
Dodge v. Colby, (r888) ro8 N.Y. 445, 15 N. E. 703; Brereton v. Canadian 
Pacific R. Co., (rS98) 29 Ont. 57· 
The rule forbidding suits for trespass to foreign land does not seem to be 
part of the law of Louisiana or Quebec. 
See Holmes v. Barclay, ( 1 849) 4 La. Ann. 6 3; Glasgow, etc., Ins. Co. v. 
Canadian Pacific R. Co., (r888) 34 Lower Canada Jurist r. 
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ter. It is, of course, generally recognized that, while a court 
might decide that one person had a valid title, a legal right 
to the enjoyment of a piece of foreign land, it could not 
effectively put that person in possession of such land or pro-
tect his possession. If A dispossesses B of his land in state X, 
the court of state Y cannot send its officers into state X to put 
B back into possession. The government of state X would not 
tolerate such action. Suppose, however, the court of state X 
were to award damages to B equal to the value of the land. 
It is argued that this would be a mere substitution of remedies 
and most unfair to A, because B might then return to state X, 
recover possession of the land, and keep both the land and the 
damages.2 Given its fullest possible significance, this argument 
merely proves that the court in state X ought not to award 
damages equal to the value of the land but should only at-
tempt to compensate B for the actual injury to the land re-
sulting from A's acts. B could then recover his land without 
injustice to A. However, even if the court in state Y did award 
full damages, the court in state X could easily avoid any in'"' 
justice by requiring B to repay part of these damages to A 
before allowing him to resume possession. 
The doctrine that no action will lie for an injury to foreign 
land is a very old one. In Skinner v. East India C o.3 (I 66 5) 
it was laid down by all the judges, reporting to the House of 
Lords. It is a lingering vestige of the ancient rule that the 
venue of every fact must be truly stated in the plaintiff's 
pleading so that a jury can be summoned from that place. 
In the sixteenth century the courts relaxed this rule so far as 
to allow a plaintiff whose cause of action arose outside Eng-
land to say in some cases, that it arose in Cheapside. But this in-
• See British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mo~ambique, [r 893] A. C. 
6o2, per Lord Herschell at p. 625. 
• Skinner v. East India Co., (r66s) 6 How. St. Tr. 710. 
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dulgence was never extended to plaintiffs seeking recovery 
upon a local cause of action. And the category of local causes 
of action included suits for the recovery of land or damages for 
trespass to land. 4 
Lord Mansfield allowed several suits based upon injuries 
to land outside England to be tried before him, but after his 
death the old rule was re-established. 5 In Livingston v. 
Jefferson 6 the problem arose before a United States Circuit 
Court composed of Chief Justice Marshall and District Judge 
Tucker. Chief Justice Marshall said he could see no good 
reason for the rule but he adopted it for the sake of consistency 
and continuity. His half-hearted decision to uphold the doc-
trine became a leading case which has been followed by many 
American courts. 
In Little v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.7 the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota refused to follow Livingston v. Jefferson. The 
plaintiff alleged that one of the defendant railway company's 
engines had started a fire which injured his land in Wisconsin. 
The court allowed the suit to proceed, saying: 
"We recognize the respect due to judicial precedents and 
the authority of the doctrine of stare decisis; but, inasmuch as 
this rule is in no sense a rule of property, and as it is purely 
technical, wrong in principle, and in practice often results 
in a total denial of justice, and has been so generally criticized 
by eminent jurists, we do not feel bound to adhere to it not-
withstanding the great array of judicial decisions in its favour. 
If the courts of England, generations ago, were at liberty to 
invent a fiction in order to change the ancient rule that all ac-
tions were local and then fix their own limitations to the ap-
plication of the fiction, we cannot see why the courts of the 
present day should deem themselves slavishly bound by those 
limitations." 
• See p. 21 above. 
British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mot,;ambique, [I893] A. C. 602. 
"In Doulson v. Matthews, (I792) 4 Term. Rep. 503, IOO Eng. Rep. II4J. 
6 Livingston v. Jefferson, (C. C. 4th, I 81 I) I Brock 203, 4 Hughes 6o6, 15 
Fed. Cas. 66o. 
• Little v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846. 
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In Brithh South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mofambique 8 
the House of Lords gave exhaustive consideration to the prob-
lem of suits for trespass to foreign lands and decided that they 
should not be entertained in England. Unlike American 
courts, their lordships did not disparage the doctrine but ap-
pear to have approved it. Lord Chancellor Herschell, who 
delivered the lengthiest opinion (there were no dissents), put 
forward in support of the doctrine the various arguments 
which we have considered. He also took the position that the 
doctrine depended, in some measure, upon general principles 
of international law. This argument appears to have been 
based solely upon a quotation from Story. His lordship con-
cluded that the grounds for the doctrine were "substantial and 
not technical." 
The refusal of the courts to try actions for trespass to for-
eign land has naturally raised a number of border-line issues 
regarding objects which are sometimes treated as part of the 
land, such as fences, timber, growing crops, minerals, etc. The 
general trend of decision here appears to limit the scope of the 
term "land" as much as possible. Considering the unsatis-
factory nature of the general rule, this is only to be expected. 
In Brown v. Hedges (qo8),9 the court of King's Bench up-
held the transitory character of a suit in trover for cutting 
timber in Ireland. No significance was attached to the objec-
tion that it might be necessary to pass upon the plaintiff's title 
to the land. Subsequent decisions fully support this view.10 
Suits to recover the value of minerals taken from land outside 
the jurisdiction have also been assigned to the category of 
transitory actions.11 
"British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mo~ambique, [I893] A. C. 6o2. 
• Brown v. Hedges, (I7o8) I Salk. 290, 9I Eng. Rep. 257 • 
• 
10 McLaren v. Ryan (1875) 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 307; Stone v. United States, 
(I 897) I 67 U.S. I 78, I 7 Sup. Ct. 778; Hodges v. Hunter Co., (I9I I) 6I Fla. 
28o, 54 So. 81 I; Brady v. Brady, (I9IJ) I6I N.C. 324, 77 S. E. 235. 
Contra, Long v. Long, (I9I7) 44 New Bruns. 599, 36 Dom. L. R. 722. 
n McGonigle v. Atchison, (r885) 33 Kan. 726, 7 Pac. sso; Stuart v. Bald-
win, (I877) 41 Up. Can. Q. B. 446. 
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In Boslund v. Abbottsford Lumber Co.12 a fire spread from 
the defendant's land and burned over the plaintiff's land in 
the state of Washington. The action was brought in British 
Columbia. The court refused to allow compensation for in-
juries to the soil, fences or barns but awarded damages for the 
burning of timber, growing crops, and grass in the pastures. 
Another problem which we must consider is that of apply-
ing the doctrine of this section to multiple contact cases. Sup-
pose A, in state X, does some act which causes injury to B's 
land situated in state Y. It does not seem to have been doubted 
that B can bring suit in state Y where the damage was suf-
fered.13 A number of courts have also taken the view that the 
court of state X has jurisdiction because the allegedly wrong-
ful act of the defendant was done there.14 But there are some 
decisions to the contrary, holding that the action may only 
be brought in the state where the injury occurred.15 
SECTION 22 
LIMITATIONS CREATED BY THE LAW OF THE 
PLACE OF WRONG 
In some states statutes have been enacted which establish a 
tort cause of action with the proviso that suits to enforce this 
cause of action must be brought in the courts of that state and 
not elsewhere. A person who has been injured in a state where 
"'Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber Co., (I925) 34 Brit. Col. 485. 
See also Ducktown Sulphur, etc., Co. v. Barnes, (I9oo Tenn.) 6o S. W. 
·593 (claim for injuries to grass, crops, trees by noxious vapours held to be 
transitory.) 
13 See St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Craigo, ( 1 89 5) I o Tex. Civ. App. 2 3 8, 3 I 
S. W. 207; Thayer v. Brooks, (1849) I7 Ohio 489. 
14 Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal, (C. C. N.J., I 849) I Wall. Jr. 27 5, 
aff'd I4 How. (55 U.S.) 8o; Foot v. Edwards, (C. C. 2d I855) 3 Blatchf. 
3Io; Smith v. Southern R. Co., (I9o9) 136 Ky. I62, 123 S.W. 678; Armendiaz 
v. Stillman, (I88I) 54 Tex. 623. 
15 Howard v. Ingersoll, (I 8 50) I 7 Ala. 7 8o; Eachus v. Trustees of Illinois 
& Michigan Canal, (I856) I7 Ill. 534; Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber, etc., 
Co., (I925) 34 Brit. Col. 485 (semble). 
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such a statute has been passed may attempt to bring an action 
upon it in another jurisdiction. Should the court of the forum 
accept the restriction in the law of the place of wrong and 
dismiss the suit or should it attempt to give a transitory 
remedy in defiance of this particular rule of the law of the 
place of wrong? 
A rigid compliance with the obligation and vested rights 
theories would seem to require that the action at the forum 
be dismissed. The law which created the right or obligation 
has limited it so that it can only be enforced in one court. But 
there is still a way out; we can distinguish between the right or 
obligation and the mode of its enforcement. The law of the 
place of wrong creates the obligation, the law of the forum 
determines the mode of its enforcement. Thus we might allow 
a recovery at the forum and still profess our adherence to the 
obligation theory. This solution apparently did not satisfy 
Mr. Justice Holmes.1 
Let us consider the actual social interests at stake. To pre-
vent the parties from litigating their controversy outside the 
state of wrong may put them to some inconvenience. It may 
deprive the plaintiff of all recourse against the defendant if 
the latter keeps himself and his assets out of the state of wrong. 
On the other hand, by refusing to let the plaintiff collect his 
claim at the forum we show proper respect, "comity," for 
the government of the state of wrong. Actual decisions upon 
the point are in conflict. Some courts have refused to recognize 
jurisdictional restrictions in the law of the place of wrong 2 but 
others have shown a disposition to give effect to them!1 
1 See his dissenting judgments in Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers, ( r 909) 
213 U.S. 55, z9 Sup. Ct. 397; Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George, 
(1914) 233 U.S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587. 
=Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers, (1907 Tex.) 99 S. W. 190; Atchison, etc., 
R. Co. v. Mills, (1909) 53 Tex. Civ. App. 359, II6 S. W. 8sz. 
8 Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Dusablon, (1907) 48 Tex. Civ. App. zo3, 106 
S. W. 766 (plaintiff also a citizen of state of injury); Coyne v. Southern 
Pacific R. Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) 155 Fed. 683; Martin v. Kennecott 
Copper Corp., (D. C. Wash. 1918) zsz Fed. zo7. 
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In Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George 4 an 
attempt was made to use the full faith and credit clause to pre-
vent an outside court from disregarding a restriction con-
tained in the law of the place of wrong. A workman who had 
been injured in Alabama brought an action against his em-
ployer in Georgia. Alabama law purported to give the courts 
of that state exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. The 
Georgia court refused to follow this rule of Alabama law, and 
allowed the action to proceed to judgment. The Supreme 
Court of the United States held that the full faith and credit 
clause did not oblige the Georgia court to comply with the 
Alabama rule. 
So far in the discussion we have assumed that the cause of 
action created by the law of the place of wrong is one which 
could be justly administered by the court of the forum. The 
cause of action in question might, of course, be of a peculiar 
character so that it could not be administered by the court of 
the forum without subjecting the defendant to the risk of 
a recovery more onerous than that which the law of the place 
of wrong would allow. For instance, the law of the place of 
wrong might, as in Slater v. Mexican National R. Co} con-
template a judgment for a long series of contingent payments, 
which the court of the forum could not conveniently enforce. 
In such a situation there is authority for the view that the court 
of the forum should take no action at all but should dismiss 
the plaintiff's claim without prejudice to his existing rights.6 
But the reasons for adopting this course are quite independent 
of any express provision in the law of the state of wrong. 
There is another situation which must be distinguished 
from the problem which forms the theme of this section. 
4 Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company v. George, (1914) 233 U.S. 
354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587. See also Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers, (1909) 213 
U. S. 55, 29 Sup. Ct. 397· 
5 Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581. 
6 See section I 7, above. 
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Sometimes a state creates a cause of action and then purports 
to prevent other states, not only from enforcing this cause of 
action, but from allowing persons entitled to it any recovery 
whatsoever with respect to facts which might form the basis 
for the cause of action in question. W ork:men's compensation 
laws often purport to have this effect. The question may then 
arise whether or not an outside court ought to abstain from 
applying its own local law in such a case. The further question 
may also be raised: does the full faith and credit clause compel 
it to do so? This problem is discussed in detail in section 4 7. 
CHAPTER VI 
Some Specific Problems 
SECTION 23 
DETERMINATION OF THE NATURE OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT 
O
NE of the prime factors which the courts take into 
consideration in imposing tort liability is the char-
acter of the defendant's conduct which has caused 
harm to the plaintiff. For analytical purposes it is customary 
to distinguish three broad categories of conduct causing harm. 
A defendant may be held liable for harm which he has caused 
intentionally. Or he may be held liable for harm which, 
although unintended, was causedby reason of his negligence. 
Or he may be held liable for the harm which he has caused, 
irrespective of his intention or the care which he has exercised. 
Sometimes, for certain purposes, additional special categories 
are used; under certain circumstances a defendant's liability 
may be made to depend upon whether or not he has been 
guilty of "gross negligence" in causing harm. 
In various instances the rules of the state of wrong have 
been allowed to determine the species of conduct of which 
the defendant must be proven guilty in order to make him 
liable for harm which he has caused. A recent, and very clear 
example may be found in the "guest cases." In some states the 
driver of an automobile is liable to a guest passenger for any 
injury suffered by the guest passenger which is due to the 
driver's failure to use ordinary care and skill in handling the 
automobile. In other states the host driver's liability has been 
diminished, sometimes by statute, sometimes by a process of 
judicial interpretation. To succeed in an action against the host 
driver the injured guest must show, not merely the lack of 
104 
SOME SPECIFIC PROBLEMS 105 
ordinary care but something further; "gross negligence," 
"wanton recklessness," "culpable negligence." A number of 
cases have been decided in which the rule of the forum and 
the rule of the place of wrong were different. It has generally 
been held that the law of the place of wrong ought to deter-
mine the type of conduct on the part of the host driver which 
would give rise to liability. 
When the rule of the place of wrong required only ordi-
nary negligence and the rule of the forum required some fur-
ther element, the rule of the place of wrong was applied.1 
Some cases explicitly decide that the rule of the forum mini-
mizing defendants' liability is not a rule of public policy in 
the conflict of laws sense. 2 An Iowa court has held that it is 
not a rule of procedure.3 Conversely, when the law of the 
place of wrong required something more than ordinary neg-
ligence, the court of the forum upheld that requirement.4 
In Boneau v. Swift 5 an action was brought in Missouri to 
recover damages for a tort committed in Illinois. The plaintiff 
had been injured by a swinging iron door while walking across 
the defendants' premises. He was accustomed to walk there 
without any objection from the defendants but they did not in-
vite him to do so, nor could it be said that he was there in the 
defendants' interest. According to the law of the place of 
wrong (Illinois) the plaintiff's status was that of a licensee 
and the defendants owed him no duty except "to refrain from 
1 Eskovitz v. Berger, (1936) 276 Mich. 536, 268 N. W. 883; Freas v. 
Sullivan, (1936) 130 Ohio St. 486, 200 N. E. 639; Loranger v. Nadeau, (1932) 
215 Cal. 362, 10 Pac. (2d) 63; Redfern v. Redfern, (1931) 212. Iowa 454, 236 
N. W. 399; Baise v. Warren, (1932) 158 Va. 505, 164 S. E. 655. 
"Loranger v. Nadeau, (1932) 215 Cal. 362, 10 Pac. (2d) 63; Eskovitz v. 
Berger, (1936) 276 Mich. 536, 268 N. W. 883. 
3 Redfern v. Redfern, (1931) 212. Iowa 454, 236 N. W. 399· 
• De Shetler v. Kordt, (1931) 43 Ohio App. 2361 183 N. E. 85; Metcalf v. 
Reynolds, (1935) 267 N.Y. 52, 195 N. E. 681; Wright v. Pettus, (1936) 209 
N.C. 732, 184 S. E. 494· 
See Howard, Comment, (1937) 36 MICH. L. REV. 268. 
6 Boneau v .. Swift, (1934 Mo.) 66 S. W. (2d) xp .. 
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injuring him wilfully or wantonly, or by such gross negligence 
as is the equivalent of wilfulness or wantonness." The court 
of the forum (Missouri) applied this general rule to decide 
whether the defendants' conduct was of a liability-creating 
character. 
In Dallas v. Whitney 6 blasting operations carried on in 
West Virginia seriously damaged the plaintiff's property in 
Ohio. The action was brought in West Virginia. The court 
there decided that Ohio should be regarded as the state of 
wrong so that its law would control the decision. Under the 
law of Ohio a defendant who caused damage in this way was 
liable for it, whether he had been guilty of ordinary neg-
ligence or not. This rule of Ohio law, determining the effect 
of the defendant's conduct upon his liability, was applied by 
the West Virginia court. 
As we have indicated, the internal law of the place of wrong 
may describe the conduct necessary to make the defendant 
liable in very general terms such as "lack of ordinary care," 
"wanton disregard of the interests of others," etc. Under 
these circumstances the court of the forum will decide for 
itself in each particular case whether or not the facts, as 
proved, fall within the general category of liability-creating 
conduct established by the law of the place of wrong. Some-
times, however, the law of the place of wrong is more specific. 
It may say that under certain circumstances a defendant must 
do certain things. If he fails to do them, he is guilty of neg-
ligence. The general definition of negligence is supplemented 
by a specific rule for a particular situation. For example, the 
law of state X may say that a motorist who exceeds a certain 
speed limit is guilty of negligence and so liable for any injury 
caused by his excessive speed. 
6 Dallasv. Whitney, (1936) u8 W.Va. ro6, r88 S. E. 766. 
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Specific rules of this character may be imposed either by 
legislative enactment or by a series of judicial decisions deal-
ing with a specific problem. 
What is the status of rules of this character in the conflict 
of laws? The reports are full of instances in which such rules 
forming part of the law of the place of wrong have been ap-
plied, usually without question, by outside courts. On the 
positive side, this treatment has been accorded to rules which 
made the following omissions, taken with their attendant 
circumstances, negligence per se: failure of a locomotive 
driver to signal at a railway crossing/ failure of railway em-
ployees to operate gates at a crossing, 8 failure of a locomotive 
driver to look out for pedestrians on the line,9 failure of an 
automobile driver to observe a speed limit/0 failure of em-
ployer to guard dangerous machinery.11 
Specific rules defining the duty of the defendant in partic-
ular circumstances may be negative as well as positive in 
character. A court may say that a defendant who, under certain 
circumstances fails to do certain things shall not, for that rea-
son only, be deemed guilty of negligence. For example, some 
state courts have said that a locomotive driver is not guilty 
of negligence merely because he fails to keep a lookout for 
trespassers walking on the railway track. Such negative rules 
have often been imported from the law of the place of wrong. 
Following a rule of the law of the place of wrong it has been 
held that the following omissions, taken with their attendant 
circumstances, did not in themselves constitute negligence: 
7 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Norton Iron Works, (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) 279 
Fed. 32; Hiatt v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1925) 308 Mo. 77, 271 S. W. 8o6; 
Gardner v. New York, etc., R. Co., (r892) 17 R.I. 790, 24 Atl. 831. 
8 Cox v. Terminal R. Ass'n., (193 r Mo.) 43 S. W. (2d) 57 I. 
"Wheeler v. Southern R. Co., (I9I6) III Miss. sz8, 7I So. 8I2. 
1° Kemp v. Stephenson, (I93I) I39 Misc. 38, 247 N. Y. Supp. 650. 
11 Security Cement & Lime Co. v. Bowers, (I 9 J 4) r Z4 Md. II, 9 I Atl. 8 34· 
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failure of a locomotive driver to look out for trespassers on 
the track, 12 failure of a locomotive driver to slow down at a 
crossing, 13 failure of a locomotive driver to signal at a private 
crossing, 14 failure of a railroad company to block switches.15 
SECTION 24 
CAUSATION 
Section 3 8 3 of the "Conflict of Laws Restatement" tells us 
that "whether an act is the legal cause of another's injury 
is determined by the law of the place of wrong." 1 There is 
no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of this general 
principle but explicit judicial authority for it is not easily 
found. 
Connole v. East St. Louis R. Co.2 deals with the question 
of legal cause in express language. The action was brought in 
Missouri to recover damages for the death of a truck driver 
who collided with one of the defendant's trains at a crossing 
in Illinois. An Illinois statute obliged the truck driver to 
come to a stop before crossing the railroad track, and, accord-
ing to the Illinois decisions, a failure to comply with the stat-
ute would be negligence per se. However, the Illinois de-
cisions also supported the rule that a failure to stop would 
not bar the plaintiff's recovery if that failure was not the 
proximate cause of the accident. If compliance with the stat-
ute would not have obviated the accident (because, had he 
12 Teitsort v. Illinois Central R. Co., (1929) 322 Mo. 64o, 15 S. W. (2d) 
779; Harrison v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., (19I5) I68 N.C. 382, 84 S. E. 5I9· 
18 Gannett v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (I92I) 238 Mass. 125, I30 N. E. 183. 
"Thacker v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (19I5) I62 Ky. 337, I72 S. W. 658. 
16 Newlin v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I9o9) 222 Mo. 375, I2I S. W. 125. 
1 CONFLJCT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (I934). 
"Connole v. East St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I937) 340 Mo. 69o, Io2 S. W. 
(2d) 581. 
See also Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Keiffer, (I 908) I 32 Ky. 4I9, I I3 S. W. 433· 
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stopped, the driver could not have seen or heard the train ap-
proaching) then the failure to stop would not be the prox-
imate cause of the accident. The Missouri court carefully 
considered and applied these rules of Illinois law. 
In Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co.3 an action was brought in 
Missouri to recover damages for pollution of a stream in 
Kansas. Several defendants, acting separately, had dumped 
salt water and crude oil into the stream from which the plain-
tiff, a rancher, obtained his supply of water. Under Kansas law 
each defendant was, in these circumstances, legally responsible 
for the entire damage caused by the acts of all of them. Ap-
parently Kansas law treated each defendant's acts as the legal 
cause of the total damage. The Missouri court followed the 
Kansas doctrine, although, under Missouri law, the result 
would have been different. 
The problem which forms the theme of the present sec-
tion must be distinguished from another problem also in-
volving the use of the conception of causation. This second 
problem arises when a court is called upon to determine 
whether the facts of a particular case are so connected with a 
particular state that it would be fair to apply the law of that 
state in determining the rights of the parties. In some cases 
it is possible to argue that the defendant is not responsible for 
the occurrence of events in a particular state, that there is 
not a sufficient causal connection between the act of the de-
fendant and the fact that certain events have occurred in a 
particular state. If this is so, the argument proceeds, it would 
be unjust to make the defendant's liability depend upon the 
law of the state in question. This problem and the relation of 
its solution to the causation conception are discussed in section 
39, below. 
8 Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) 52 F. (zd) 364. 
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SECTION 25 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
In deciding whether or not to impose tort liability, courts 
frequently give some consideration to the character of the 
plaintiff's conduct and its relation to the harm for which he 
seeks to make the defendant liable. In some jurisdictions the 
courts follow the general principle that a plaintiff whose fail-
ure to use proper care for his own safety has been a contribu-
tory cause of his injury cannot recover any damages; what is 
known tersely as the doctrine of "contributory negligence." 
Certain well-known exceptions to this general principle are 
recognized in many states; notably, the doctrine of "dis-
covered peril" or "last clear chance" and the doctrine of the 
"inattentive plaintiff" sometimes called "the humanitarian 
rule." 1 If the facts of a case bring it within the ambit of one 
of these exceptional doctrines, the plaintiff will recover full 
damages, notwithstanding his contributory fault. In some ju-
risdictions, however, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does 
not completely bar him from recovery in any case but merely 
reduces the amount of his damages. The court or jury merely 
deducts an amount proportionate to the degree of the plain-
tiff's negligence so far as that is capable of measurement. This 
principle is often referred to as that of comparative negligence. 
In the conflict of laws the law of the place of wrong is 
usually permitted to determine whether or not the plaintiff 
has been guilty of contributory negligence. The law of the 
place of wrong may describe in general terms what conduct 
on the part of a plaintiff shall be regarded as contributory 
negligence. The court of the forum will determine in each 
case whether the plaintiff's conduct should be so classified. 
Sometimes the law of the place of wrong describes, in specific 
terms and with reference to a special fact situation, the conduct 
1 For general definitions of these exceptional doctrines, see ToRTS RESTATE-
MENT (1934) vol. z, §§ 479> 480. 
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on the part of a plaintiff which will constitute contributory 
negligence. For example, in many jurisdictions the rule has 
been laid down that a motorist approaching a railway crossing 
must "stop, look, and listen." If he fails to do so and an acci-
dent ensues, his failure will be held to constitute contributory 
negligence per se or contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. If this "stop, look, and listen" rule is found in the law of 
the place of wrong, the court of the forum will give effect to 
it. 2 Similar treatment has been accorded to other rules which 
make the following acts, taken with their attendant circum-
stances, contributory negligence per se: driving an automobile 
in the dark too fast to stop within the range of the headlights,3 
use by an employee of a patently dangerous machine/ park-
ing an unlighted vehicle on the highway at night. 5 
In jurisdictions where the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence prevents him from recovering anything, an exceptional 
principle is usually recognized, the doctrine of "discovered 
peril" or "last clear chance." A number of conflicts cases have 
come before the courts in which this doctrine formed a part of 
the law of the place of wrong. The courts have usually en-
deavoured to apply the doctrine in the sense in which it would 
have been applied by the courts of the state of wrong.6 
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.7 is a good illustrative 
decision. A truck belonging to the plaintiff was demolished by 
"Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Austin's Adm'r, (1911) 141 Ky. 722, 133 S. W. 
78o; Woodard v. Bush, (1920) 282 Mo. 163,220 S. W. 839; Louisiana Western 
R. Co. v. Jones, (1921 Tex.) 233 S. W. 363; Connole v. East St. Louis, etc., 
R. Co., (1937) 340 Mo. 69o, 102 S. W. (2d) 581; Curtiss v. New York Cent. 
R. Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 91. 
a Inter State Motor Freight Co. v. Johnson, (1929) 32 Ohio App. 363, 168 
N. E. 143. 
4 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rogers, (1927) 172 Ark. 5o8, 290 S. W. 74· 
• Singer v. Messina, (1933) 312 Pa. 129, 167 Atl. 583. 
6 Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1923 Mo.) 251 S. W. 763; Sing v. St. 
Louis, etc., R. Co., (1930 Mo.) 30 S. W. (2d) 37; Johnson v. Atchison, etc., 
R. Co., (1927 Mo.) 290 S. W. 462; Cox v. Terminal R. Ass'n, (1931 Mo.) 43 
S. W. (2d) 571. 
7 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., (1922) 154 Ark. 413, 242 S. W. 
813, 
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one of the defendant railway company's trains at a crossing 
in Oklahoma. The defendant contended that the driver of the 
truck was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to per-
ceive the approach of the train. The plaintiff contended that it 
was entitled to recover, notwithstanding the contributory neg-
ligence of its driver, basing its contention upon the doctrine 
of discovered peril. Upon this point the law of the forum 
(Arkansas) and the law of the place of wrong (Oklahoma) 
differed. According to Arkansas law, if the persons running 
the train could, by keeping a proper lookout, have discovered 
the perilous situation of the truck in time to avoid the col-
lision, the plaintiff was entitled to recover in spite of his own 
contributory fault. The Oklahoma law was not so favourable 
to the plaintiff. Under Oklahoma law the plaintiff, having 
been guilty of contributory fault, could not succeed unless 
he proved that the persons in charge of the train did discover 
his helpless peril in time to avoid the collision but failed to do 
so. The Arkansas court applied the Oklahoma law. 
As we have indicated, the law of contributory negligence 
has been amended in many jurisdictions so tha.t a plaintiff 
whose negligence has been a contributory cause of his injury 
is not completely barred from any recovery. His contributory 
negligence merely has the effect of diminishing his recovery, 
the damages being proportioned according to the degrees of 
fault of the parties. When the law of the forum and the law 
of the place of wrong are different, the law of the place of 
wrong determines the legal effect of the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence. The cases may be grouped according to the 
permutations of local and foreign law. First, the law of the 
forum allows the plaintiff a partial recovery on a comparative 
negligence basis but the law of the place of wrong gives him 
nothing. There is authority for the view that in this situation 
the law of the place of wrong controls and the plaintiff's action 
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must fail. 8 The converse of this situation is that in which the 
law of the forum makes contributory negligence an absolute 
defence but the law of the place of wrong is more lenient with 
the plaintiff and allows him to recover part of the damages 
which he has suffered. Here, too, the law of the place of wrong 
is usually applied; the court of the forum awards partial dam-
ages upon a comparative negligence basis.9 
SECTION 26 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES: AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
In this section we are concerned with rules of various types 
determining the amount of the monetary award which the 
plaintiff may obtain in an action. A rule of this character may 
generally be regarded as expressing a policy of the state creat-
ing it. If, for example, it permits a person to recover damages 
for mental anguish it indicates a desire of the government to 
give protection against this type of injury. Obviously, the 
aims of choice-of-law principles can best be served by giving 
the plaintiff exactly what the law of the place of wrong 
allows him,-no more and no less. But when the law of the 
place of wrong and the local law are different, various ob-
stacles to the enforcement of the law of the place of wrong 
may be raised. 
The law of the place of wrong and the law of the forum 
may differ in two ways. First, the law of the place of wrong 
may allow the plaintiff less damages than he would recover, 
in a similar case, at the forum. Second, the law of the place of 
8 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis, (r89o) 89 Tenn. 235, 14 S. W. 603. 
• Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co., (1929) 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112; 
Jarrett v. Wabash R. Co., (C. C. A. znd, 1932) 57 F. (2d) 669; Caine v. 
St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1923) 209 Ala. 181, 95 So. 876; Louisville, etc., R. 
Co. v. Whitlow's Adm'r, (1897) 105 Ky. 1, 43 S. W. 711; Keane Wonder 
Mining Co. v. Cunningham, (C. C. A. gth, 1915) 22.2 Fed. 821. 
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wrong may allow the plaintiff more damages, a more ample 
recovery than he would get in a similar case at the forum. 
Let us consider these problems separately. When the law of 
the place of wrong allows a less ample recovery, the situation 
is not unlike that in which the law of the place of wrong 
allows no recovery at all. If we give the plaintiff damages on 
the liberal scale of the forum and abandon the meagre measure 
of the law of the place of wrong, the plaintiff gets a very 
obvious advantage from the fact that he has been able to bring 
suit at this particular forum. Such a result is most unfair to the 
defendant. It would seem therefore that a court should "on 
principle" refuse to grant the plaintiff an award bigger than 
that which the law of the place of wrong allows him .. 
Slater v. Mexican National R. Co.1 presented this problem 
in a most striking fashion to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The action was for damages for death. The law of the 
place of wrong (Mexico) required them to be paid out over 
a long period of time. The courts there were empowered to 
relieve the defendant from making further payments upon the 
happening of various contingencies. The Texas .federal court 
in which the action was brought had no power to make and 
superintend an elaborate decree of this nature. The plaintiff 
suggested that the court should follow the ordinary rule of 
the forum and order the defendant to pay a lump sum. But 
because of the possibility that the defendant might thereby be 
forced to pay more than the law of the place of wrong would 
have required, the Supreme Court refused to make such an 
order. "To reduce liability conditioned as this was to a lump 
sum would be to leave the whole matter to a mere guess," 
said Mr. Justice Holmes. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed. 
The Slater case, therefore, stands unequivocally for the 
proposition that a court should not make an award of damages 
which exceeds, or which might exceed, that permitted by the 
1 Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. xzo, 24 Sup. Ct. 581. 
SOME SPECIFIC PROBLEMS 115 
law of the place of wrong. To do so would be contrary to one 
of the basic policies of the conflict of laws. Following this prin-
ciple, courts have frequently refused to permit the recovery of 
damages upon a theory of measurement not sanctioned by the 
law of the place of wrong. Damages for physical pain and suf-
fering, consolation money for mental anguish, interest upon 
damages have all been refused because they were not author-
ized by the law of the forum.2 
Calef v. United States 3 appears to be in conflict with the 
doctrines of the Slater case. The libelant, an American citizen, 
claimed damages for the loss of a cargo on board a German 
lighter which had been struck by a United States Shipping 
Board vessel in German waters. For the United States gov-
ernment it was argued that, under German law, they were 
only liable for part of the damages in proportion to the degree 
of their fault. The court, following the American principle, 
allowed the cargo owner full damages upon three grounds. 
(a) The German rule was contrary to public policy. (b) The 
German rule dealt with the remedy only. (c) The German 
law should not be applied to a vessel owned by the United 
States. Foreign laws allowing cargo owners part damages only 
have been applied by American admiralty courts in other 
2 Damages for mental pain allowed by law of forum but refused because 
not allowed by place of wrong. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, (1914) 234 
U.S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955; Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1901) 25 
Tex. Civ. App. 398, 61 S. W. 501; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Jennings, (1916) 
110 Miss. 673, 70 So. 830; Christensen v. Floriston Pulp & Paper Co., (1907) 
29 Nev. 552, 92 Pac. 210; Jackson v. Anthony, (1933) 282 Mass. 540, 185 
N. E. 389. 
Damages for pain and suffering allowed by law of the forum but refused 
because not allowed by law of the place of wrong. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. 
Graham's Adm'r, (1896) 98 Ky. 688, 34 S. W. 229. 
Interest allowed by law of forum but refused because not allowed by place 
of wrong. Kiefer v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (1896) 12 App. Div. 28, 42 N.Y. 
Supp. 171; Frounfelker v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., (1902) 73 App. Div. 350, 
76 N.Y. Supp. 745· 
Damages limited to maximum sum allowed by law of place of wrong. Keep 
v. National Tube Co., (C. C. N.J., 1907) 154 Fed. 121. 
8 Galef v. United States, (D. C. S. C., 1928) 25 F. (2d) 134. 
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cases.4 Unless something is made of the fact that the wrong-
doing vessel was owned by the American government, the de-
cision must be regarded as a very anomalous one. 
Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Campanhia de Navegacao 
Lloyd Brasileiro 5 also sounds a discordant note. It arose out 
of a collision in Belgian waters. Both Belgian and American 
law would have permitted the respondent to limit his liability. 
But under Belgian law he would have been liable for a smaller 
sum than that fixed by American law. The court refused to 
allow him the benefit of the Belgian limitation. Thus the 
plaintiff received a large sum of money merely because he 
brought suit in the United States. It is well-established that 
even in cases governed by foreign law, an injured party cannot 
recover any greater amount than that permitted by the Amer-
ican limited liability laws.6 It does not necessarily follow, 
however, that a foreign law of similar character should be dis-
regarded. The court overlooked the important distinction be-
tween declining to enforce a foreign liability and declining to 
recognize a foreign defence. 
Let us consider now our second problem: the law of the 
place of wrong gives the plaintiff a more liberal allowance 
of damages than the law of the forum would give him. Under 
these circumstances, choice-of-law policies would favour the 
idea that the plaintiff should recover the full amount author-
ized by the law of the place of wrong. To limit his recovery to 
the amount authorized by the law of the forum may in some 
cases be almost as hard upon him as to refuse recovery alto-
• The Eagle Point, ( 1906) 73 C. C. A. (3rd) 569, 142 Fed. 453; Royal 
Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, (D. C. 
N.Y., 1928) 31 F. (2d) 757; The Mandu, (D. C. N.Y., 1936) 15 F. Supp. 
627· 
• Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 
(D. C. N. Y., 1928) 27 F. (2d) 1002. A Scottish court rendered a similar 
decision in Owners of S. S. Reresby v. Owners of S. S. Cobetas, (1923) Scottish 
L. T. 719. 
6 See below at p. II9. 
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gether. On the other hand, the law of the place of wrong may 
sometimes conflict with the public policy of the forum. When 
this occurs the court will tell the plaintiff that he must take 
what the law of the forum gives him or else go empty handed. 
Such a decision does not, of course, violate the doctrine of 
the Slater case because it is the plaintiff, not the defendant, 
who suffers by the court's failure to apply completely the law 
of the place of wrong. 
There are a few cases in which courts refused to enforce 
a foreign law governing the measure of damages on the broad 
ground that the measure of damages "relates to the remedy." 7 
But the facts of these cases show clearly that there was no 
practical obstacle of convenience to impede the application 
of the foreign law. The courts appear to have reached their 
results by a purely mechanical deduction from an oversimpli-
fied and erroneous general theory. Perhaps they really felt 
that the enforcement of the foreign law was inconsistent with 
the forum's public policy. 
Claims for damages based upon foreign law have also been 
rejected or cut down on the ground that they were penal laws. 
We have already discussed this peculiar notion in section 20, 
above. 
Sometimes the law of the place of wrong not only attempts 
to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries but authorizes the 
court to award him an additional sum as exemplary or punitive 
damages. A judicial power of this kind indicates that the 
foreign community is anxious to prevent the conduct penal-
ized. At the same time the court of the forum might feel that 
such conduct ought not to be penalized. It is not surprising 
to find that exemplary damages, allowed by a foreign law, 
1 Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines National Bank, (1904) 127 Iowa 153, 
98 N. W. 918; Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co., (1891) 126 N.Y. 10, 26 
N. E. 1050; Armbruster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1914) 166 Iowa 155, 147 
N. W. 337; Evey v. Mexican· Cent. R. Co., (r897) 26 C. C. A. (5th) 407, 
8r Fed. 294. 
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have been refused for reasons of policy.8 And some courts 
have taken the view, advocated by Minor, that such damages 
are penalties. 9 But since they are not recovered by the state 
or its representative, they are not penalties as defined in 
Huntington v. Attrill, and the Supreme Court has so held.10 
In a good many cases foreign rules conferring a right to a 
punitive award have been enforced without objection.11 
Analogous to exemplary damages are double or treble dam-
ages and fixed monetary penalties. Some death statutes set a 
definite sum to be paid by the tortfeasor in all cases. Grant-
ing that each of these remedies inflicts liability upon the de-
fendant over and above reparation of the plaintiff's injuries, 
they all appear, like exemplary damages, to fall outside the 
Supreme Court's definition of a penalty. But they have all 
been classified as penal laws by various state tribunals.12 In 
"Rochester v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, (1912) 87 Kan. 164, 123 Pac. 
729 (obiter). 
"See Armbruster v. Chicago etc. R. Co., (r9r4) r66 Iowa 155, 147 N. W. 
337; Grinestaff v. N.Y. Central R. Co., (1929) 253 Ill. App. 589; McLay v. 
Slade, (r927) 48 R.I. 357, 138 Atl. 212. 
10 In James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, (1927) 273 U.S. 119, 
47 Sup. Ct. 3o8. 
11 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198; Daury 
v. Ferraro, (1928) 108 Conn. 386, 143 Atl. 630; Wellman v. Mead, (1919) 
93 Vt. 322, 107 Atl. 396; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Hurd, (r9or) 47 C. C. A. 
(rst) 6I5, ro8 Fed. II6; Malloy v. American Hide & Leather Co., (C. C. Mass., 
19o6) 148 Fed. 482; Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Co., (1933) 205 N.C. 292, 
171 S. E. roo; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lynch, (1910) 137 Ky. 696, 126 
S. W. 362; Lauria v. E. I. DuPont, etc., Co., (D. C. N. Y., 1917) 241 Fed. 
687; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. McCaskell, (1910) 98 Miss. 20, 53 So. 348. 
12 Double or treble damages held to be penal. Langdon v. New York, etc., 
R. Co., (I89o) 58 Hun I22, II N.Y. Supp. 5I4, 33 N.Y. St. Rep. 907; 
Mohr v. Sands, (I9I3) 44 Okla. 330, I33 Pac. 238; Bettys v. Milwaukee, 
etc., R. Co., (I 8 7 5) 3 7 Wis. 32 3; Consolidated Coppermines Corp. v. Nevada 
Consolidated Copper Co., (I926) I27 Misc. 71, 2I5 N.Y. Supp. 265. 
Contra: Boyce v. Wabash R. Co., (I884) 63 Iowa 70, 18 N. W. 673. 
Additional money penalty held to be penal. Taylor v. Western Union Tel. 
Co., (1895) 95 Iowa 740, 64 N. W. 66o. 
Contra: Coryell v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (I918) 273 Mo. 361,201 S. W. 77· 
Death statute fixing compensation for all cases held to be penal. Matheson 
v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., (I9oo) 6I Kan. 667, 6o Pac. 747; Raisor v. 
Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I905) 2I5 Ill. 47, 74 N. E. 69; El Paso & S. W. Co. v. 
La Lande, (I9I6) 108 Texas 67, I84 S. W. 498. 
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Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Nichols 13 the Supreme Court ap-
proved the extraterritorial enforcement of a death statute fix-
ing the amount of damages for all cases. The court did not 
even admit a punitive purpose behind the statute but pointed 
out that, since a precise assessment of the loss caused by death 
would be impossible, the fixed sum represented the legis-
lature's approximate estimate of reasonable compensation for 
all cases. 
Rules of the forum limiting liability in particular cases 
may also restrict the application of foreign law. A local statute 
provides that the damages awarded in certain classes of cases 
shall not exceed a fixed sum. Should the court obey this rule 
even in cases governed by foreign laws? The answer to this 
question would seem to depend upon the court's opinion re-
garding the policy of the local limitation. Some courts have 
disregarded such limitations to permit the plaintiff a full re-
covery according to the foreign laws.14 The restriction imposed 
by the law of the forum might, however, be deemed to em-
body some very important policy of that law which the court 
could not properly ignore. This appears to be the view of 
American courts regarding limitations upon the liability of 
shipowners. In The Titanic/5 a number of actions for death 
and personal injuries were brought against the owners of a 
18 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Nichols, (1924) 264 U.S. 348, 44 Sup. Ct. 353· 
14 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Babcock, (r894) 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct. 
978; Powell v. Great Northern R. Co., (r9o7) 102 Minn. 448, 113 N. W. 
1017; Hanna v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (r89r) 41 Ill. App. II6; Hasbrouck v. 
New York Cent. & H. R. Co., (r9u) 202 N.Y. 363, 95 N. E. 8oS. 
15 TheTitanic, (1914) 233 U.S. 718, 34Sup. Ct. 754· 
Section 4 of the Federal Death Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 537,46 U.S. C. [1934] 
§ 7 64) abolishes the shipowner's right to limit liability in respect of death on the 
high seas in cases governed by foreign laws. See The Vestris, (D. C. N.Y., 1931) 
53 F. (2d) 847. 
The American limited liability laws have also been applied to collisions in 
foreign territorial waters. See The State of Virginia, (D. C. N. Y., r 894) 6o 
Fed. 1018, 
An English court would probably apply the local limitation of shipowners' 
liability even in a case controlled by foreign law. See The Amalia, ( r 8 6 3) 1 
Moo. N. s. 471, T 5 Eng. Rep. ns. 
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British ship which had gone down on the high seas after 
colliding with an iceberg. The Supreme Court held that al-
though these actions were governed by British law, the owners 
of the ship were entitled to the benefit of an American statute 
fixing the maximum amount recoverable: 
"It is true," said Mr. Justice Holmes, "that the foundation 
for a recovery upon a British tort is an obligation created by 
British law. But it is also true that the laws of the forum may 
decline altogether to enforce that obligation on the ground 
that it is contrary to the domestic policy, or may decline to 
enforce it except within such limits as it may impose." 
Despite the possible obstacles of public policy and the now 
almost obsolete theories of "procedure" and "penalties," for-
eign rules for measuring damages are regularly applied in 
tort cases. Damages for mental anguish, damages for physical 
pain have been awarded because authorized by the law of the 
place of wrong.16 Many jurisdictions have adopted the rule 
that when the plaintiff and defendant have both contributed to 
the plaintiff's injury, the loss should be borne by both in pro-
portion to their respective degrees of fault. When this rule 
forms part of the law of the place of wrong it is usually en-
forced in other states.17 
16 Damages for mental anguish. Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Gross, (I9IO) 6o Tex. 
Civ. App. 6zi, 128 S. W. II73; Davis v. Gant, (I922 Tex. Civ. App.) 247 
s. w. 576. 
Death action; damages for pain and suffering of deceased. Boyle v. Southern 
R. Co., (I9oi) 36 Misc. 289, 73 N.Y. Supp. 465. 
Stream polluted by several joint tortfeasors; each one held responsible for 
full amount of damage. Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 19 3 I) 
52 F. (zd) 364. 
17 Plaintiff partly responsible for damages; damages borne by plaintiff and 
defendant according to respective degrees of fault. Fitzpatrick v. International 
R. Co., (I929) 252 N.Y. I27, I69 N. E. II2; Jarrett v. Wabash R. Co., (C. 
C. A. 2nd, I932) 57 F. (2d) 669; Caine v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I923) 
209 Ala. I8I, 95 So. 876; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Whitlow'sAdm'rs, (I897) 
I05 Ky. I, 43 S. W. 7I 1; Keane Wonder Mining Co. v. Cunningham, (C. C. 
A. 9th, I915) zz2 Fed. 821. 
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SECTION 27 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES: ANGLO-DOMINION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
121 
There is no case in the Anglo-Dominion jurisprudence 
squarely deciding that the damages allowed for a foreign 
tort should not exceed the amount authorized by the law of 
the place of wrong. The situation is complicated by the bifur-
cate nature of English choice-of-law theory examined in sec-
tion 2. The justification doctrine which originated in a group 
of early English cases can hardly be regarded as throwing any 
light on the matter at all. Focusing attention upon the juris-
tic character of the defendant's conduct, it is silent regarding 
the measurement of his penalty. On the other hand, the obli-
gation doctrine, announced by Mr. Justice Willes in Phillips 
v. Eyre 1 would seem to require that the law of the place of 
wrong should determine the extent of the plaintiff's recovery. 
The situation is further complicated by the case of Machado 
v. Fontes. 2 There an action was brought in England for a libel 
published in Brazil. The English court assumed that Brazil-
ian law made this act punishable as a crime but would not 
have compelled the defendant to pay damages. They indi-
cated that under these circumstances they would not permit 
the defendant to go scot free but would give the plaintiff 
damages measured by the rules of English internal law. This 
was avery exceptional case.3 Having decided to give the plain-
tiff relief, the court had no alternative but to follow the law of 
the forum in computing damages, since the law of the place of 
wrong gave no civil remedy at all. It does not follow that 
this course of action ought to be taken in all cases. Such a 
proposition would go directly against basic choice-of-law 
policies. 
1 Phillips v. Eyre, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. r. 
• Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2. Q. B. 2.31. 
8 See the discussion of Machado v. Fontes at p. r6. 
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In Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co.4 a workman sued 
his employer in Ontario for injuries sustained in Quebec. 
There was no question of criminal liability and the workman 
had a clear cause of action under the law of Quebec. It was 
suggested that the amount awarded by the jury should be re-
duced to the maximum permitted by Quebec law. The court 
admitted that "were the matter res integra, it might not un-
reasonably be held that the plaintiff, by suing in another 
jurisdiction, cannot put himself in a better position than if he 
had sued in the country delicti commissi." But they felt con-
strained by the decision in Machado v. Fontes to allow the 
plaintiff the larger sum permitted by Ontario law. This in-
ference seems far-fetched and unfortunate. 
An ingenious counsel in an Anglo-Dominion courtroom 
dealing with the problem of damages for a foreign tort would 
probably be able to make some use of the first of the two 
rules in Phillips v. Eyre.5 "The wrong must be of such a 
character that it would have been actionable if committed in 
England." It might be argued that the strict application of 
this principle requires that English courts should never award 
greater damages for a foreign wrong than those ·which English 
internal law would authorize in the same circumstances. We 
have already observed the unfortunate effects of the first rule 
in Phillips v. Eyre itself. Its sweeping and automatic exclusion 
of foreign law often needlessly frustrates choice-of-law 
policies. A derivative doctrine regarding damages would be 
equally objectionable. 
There are a few other decisions and dicta which an Anglo-
American court might wish to take into consideration in deal-
ing with a conflict between foreign and local rules governing 
damages. 
4 Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co., (I9I3) 30 Ont. L. R. 27I. 
• Phillips v. Eyre, (I 8 70) L. R. 6 Q. B. I. 
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In Cope v. Doherty 6 an American shipowner took proceed-
ings in Chancery to have his liability limited in accordance 
with the British Merchant Shipping Act of r854.7 His ship, 
the Tuscaroca, had become involved in a collision on the 
high seas. The long point of the case was whether or not that 
statute protected alien owners; the court decided that it did 
not. It was sought in argument to obtain a decision in favour 
of the petitioner upon the short ground that the statutory 
limitations upon damages affected only the remedy and must, 
therefore, be applied as part of the law of the forum in every 
controversy before a British court. Refusing to accede to this 
contention, both Vice-Chancellor Wood and Lord Justice 
Turner affirmed in the clearest terms that a limitation on 
damages affected the substance of the plaintiff's rights. In 
this case there was really no question of applying foreign law. 
The court purported to make its selection between the internal 
law of the forum and the so-called "general maritime law" 
governing collisions on the high seas. 
In Lives ley v. H orst 8 the Supreme Court of Canada de-
cided, in an action upon a foreign contract, that the proper law 
of that contract should determine the extent of the damages to 
be recovered. Speaking for the court, Mr. Justice Duff re-
ferred to Cope v. Doherty as "authority, both unmistakable 
in effect and of a high order, for the proposition that the 
measure of damages in an action for reparation in respect of a 
tort in a foreign country, is not matter of procedure but matter 
of the substance of liability." 
Ekins v. East India Co.9 was an action brought in Eng-
land for conversion of a ship in the East Indies. Lord Chancel-
"Cope v. Doherty, (r8s8) 2 De G. & J. 6I4, 44 Eng. Rep. II27. 
7 British Merchant Shipping Act, (I854) I7 & r8 Viet. c. Io4. The law is 
different today; any owner, British or foreign, may limit his liability in an 
English court. See The Amalia, (I863) I Moo. N. S. 471. 
"Livesleyv. Horst, [I924] Can. L. R. 6os, [I925] I Dorn. L. R. I59· 
9 Ekins v. East India Co., (I7I7) I P. Wrns. 395, 24 Eng. Rep. 441. 
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lor Cowper allowed the plaintiff to recover interest from the 
date of the conversion at the high rate then obtainable in the 
East Indies. Nothing was said, however, regarding East 
Indian law. 
SECTION 28 
PROPER PLAINTIFFS TO THE ACTION 
The law of the place of wrong may be said to decide who is 
the proper plaintiff to an action in the sense that it determines 
whether the plaintiff bringing the suit has any claim at all 
against the defendant. Thus, in Ross v. Sinhjee, 1 an action 
brought in Scotland alleging the seduction of the plaintiff by 
the defendant in London was dismissed on the ground that 
English common law gave the right of action in such circum-
stances, not to the seduced woman, but to her parents. It was 
argued that this rule was remedial only but without success. 
Assuming, however, that the law of the place of wrong does 
give the plaintiff some claim against the defendant, it may be 
necessary to decide whether other formal parties should be 
added to the record, such as next friends, guardians, assignors, 
husbands, etc. There is authority for the view that, in general, 
the law of the forum should answer this question.2 
Problems of both types are raised by suits based on death 
statutes, which often provide that a representative action shall 
be brought by the deceased's personal representative on behalf 
of a group of designated beneficiaries. Since the latter are the 
real parties in interest it has been uniformly held that the 
1 Ross v. Sinhjee, (1891) 29 Scottish L. R. 63. See also Buckles v. Ellers, 
(188o) 72 Ind. 220, 37 Am. Rep. 156. 
"CoNFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) §588; BEALE, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS (1935) vol. 3, p. 1603. 
See contra: Lucas v. Coupal, (r93o) 66 Ont. L. R. 141. 
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statute of the state of wrong shall determine their identity and 
the shares which they are to receive.3 
Sometimes the statute ordains that the damages shall be 
distributed in the same proportions as personal property of 
a deceased intestate. A question of construction is then raised; 
does the statute refer to the distribution statute of the state 
of wrong or to that of the deceased man's domicile? Both 
views have been taken in the decisions. 4 A similar question is 
raised by the use of the words "heirs," or "next-of-kin," in 
the death statute of the state of wrong. Several courts appear 
to have assumed, rather than consciously determined, that the 
denotation of these terms should be ascertained by considering 
the inheritance laws of the state of wrong. 5 
The cases dealing with these problems all accept the prin-
ciple that the law of the place of wrong should be allowed to 
say who shall divide the damages. But some courts, having re-
s An anomalous case is Re Hertell's Estate, (I929) I35 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y. 
Supp. 655, where a New York surrogate divided the damages according to the 
law of the forum. 
• Applying the scheme of distribution of the state where tort committed: 
Bolinger v. Beacham, (I 9 I o) 8 I Kan. 746, I o6 Pac. I 094; Re Coe's Estate, 
(I9o6) qo Iowa 307, Io6 N. W. 743; Mcdonald v. McDonald's Adm'r, 
(I 894) 96 Ky. 209, 28 S. W. 482; Stoeckman v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 
(I884) IS Mo. App. 503; Hartman v. Duke, (I929) I6o Tenn. I34, 22 S. 
W. (2d) 221. 
Applying the scheme of distribution in force where decedent died domiciled: 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Levine, (C. C. A. 2nd, I92o) 263 Fed. 557· 
See Note, (I92o) 29 YALE L. J. 798. 
Sometimes the death statute of the place of wrong expressly stipulates what 
law shall determine the distribution of damages. See Dronenburg v. Harris, 
(I9o8) Io8 Md. 597, 7I Atl. 8I; Hartness v. Pharr, (I9o3) 133 N.C. 566, 
45 S. E. 90I; Re Hertell's Estate, (I929) I35 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y. Supp. 655. 
5 Charlton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I9o6) 200 Mo. 4I3, 98 S. W. 529; 
Wheeler v. Southern R. Co., (I 9 I 6) I I I Miss. 52 8, 7 I So. 8 I 2; Stangeland 
v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., (I9o8) Ios Minn. 224, II7 N. W. 386; Stipetich 
v. Security Stove & Manufacturing Co., (I92o Mo.) 2I8 S. W. 964. 
The Supreme Court has held that the membership in the class of "next-of-kin," 
as that term is used in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, should be deter-
mined according to the inheritance laws of the state where the cause of action 
arose. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Kenney, (19I6) 240 U. S. 489, 36 Sup. Ct. 
458; see also Meisenhelder v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I927) I70 Minn. 3I7, 
2I3 N. W. 32. 
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ferred to that law, find themselves carried by a species of 
renvoi to a third system of law, the law of the deceased per-
son's domicile. 
In Re Degaramo's Estate 6 the wrongful death occurred in 
Ohio. A New York court had to decide whether a certain 
claimant was the husband of the deceased within the terms of 
the Ohio death act. This issue turned upon the effect of a di-
vorce obtained in Michigan. The court did not refer the va-
lidity of the divorce to Ohio law. They referred it to the law 
of the forum (New York) and decided that the judgment 
ought not to be recognized. 
In several cases the court found that the law of the place of 
wrong authorized the trial judge to apportion the damages 
among the beneficiaries. This procedure was followed at the 
forum. 7 
What law should indicate the proper formal plaintiff to 
represent the beneficiaries in an action for wrongful death? 
Conceivably the view might have been taken that this was a 
matter of procedure to be determined by the law of the forum. 
But at one time many jurisdictions had no death statute and 
consequently no procedural rule to apply in this connection. 
Hence there has grown up a general practice of insisting that 
the formal plaintiff in a death action should be the person 
prescribed by the statute of the state of wrong. There are a 
few decisions to the contrary.8 
• Re Degaramo's Estate, (I895) 86 Hun 390, 33 N.Y. Supp. 502, 67 N.Y. 
St. Rep. 2I5. 
7 Powell v. Great Northern R. Co. (I907) I02 Minn. 448, II3 N. W. 
IOI7i Hanna v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (I89I) 4I Ill. App. II6; Lauria v. E. 
I. DuPont etc. (D. C. N.Y., I9I7) 241 Fed. 687. 
8 In Stewart v. Baltimore etc. R. Co. (I 897) I 68 u. s. 445, I 8 Sup. Ct. I05, 
the Supreme Court held that an action might be brought in the District of 
Columbia by an administrator appointed there although the statute of the place 
of wrong, Maryland, prescribed suit in the name of that state. This was fol-
lowed in Hollenbach v. Elmore & H. Contracting Co. (C. C. N.Y., 1909) 174 
Fed. 845. A contrary ruling had been given in Stone v. Groton Bridge & Mfg. 
Co. (I894) 84 N.Y. S. Ct. (77 Hun) 99, 28 N.Y. Supp. 446. 
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If the statute of the state of wrong decrees that suit shall 
be brought by a relative-beneficiary, he or she and not the 
personal representative is the proper plaintiff.9 If the statute 
provides for a representative action by the personal repre-
sentative, the beneficiaries may not sue for themselves.10 
When the statute of the state of wrong provides for a repre-
sentative action a further question may arise: By what state 
must the proper administrator to maintain the suit be ap-
pointed? It seems to have always been taken for granted that 
an administrator appointed in the state of wrong would come 
within the terms of the statute in force there. But in a number 
of early cases an administrator appointed in a state other than 
the state of wrong was refused permission to sue on the ground 
that the statute of the state of wrong authorized a suit by one 
administrator only: the administrator appointed in the state 
of wrong.11 This attitude, which greatly hindered the transi-
tory enforcement of death statutes, was emphatically rejected 
in I 8 8o by both the Supreme Court of the United States and 
The question of the proper formal plaintiff was held to be a matter of pro-
cedure, governed by the law of the forum, in Teti v. Consolidated Coal Co. 
(D. C. N.Y., I9I4) 2I7 Fed. 443; Bussey v. Charleston, etc., R. Co., (I9o6) 73 
s. c. 2I5, 53 s. E. I65. 
"McCarthy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I877) 18 Kan. 46; Brown v. 
Sunday Creek Co., (C. C. Ohio, I 908) I 6 5 Fed. 504; Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. 
Williams, (I9I2) I02 Miss. 735, 59 So. 883; Lower v. Segal, (1896) 59 
N. J. L. 66, 34 Atl. 945; s. c., (I 897) 6o N. J. L. 99, 36 Atl. 777; Rankin v. 
Central R. Co., (I 9o8) 77 N.J. L. I 7 5, 7I Atl. 55; Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge 
Co., (I9Io) I97 N.Y. JI6, 90 N. E. 953; Limekiller v. Hannibal, etc., R. 
Co., (I885) 33 Kan. 83, 5 Pac. 40I. 
10 Usher v. West Jersey R. Co., (I889) 126 Pa. 206, I7 Atl. 597; Vaughn v. 
Bunker Hill, etc., Co., (C. C. Ore., I903) 126 Fed. 895; Lovell v. De Bardelaben 
Coal & Iron Co., (I89o) 90 Ala. 13, 7 So. 756; Selma, etc. R. Co. v. Lacey, 
(I873) 49 Ga. Io6; Oates v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., (r89r) I04 Mo. 5I4, 16 S. 
W. 487; La Bar v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I907) 2I8 Pa. 261, 67 Atl. 413; 
Thorpe v. Union Pac. Coal Co., (1902) 24 Utah 475, 68 Pac. 145; Casey v. 
Hoover, (I9o6) I97 Mo. 62, 94 S. W. 982; Western, etc., Ry. v. Strong, (I 874) 
52 Ga. 46I; Patton v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co., (r88o) 96 Pa. 169; Schueren 
v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I9I7 Mo.) 192 S. W. 965. 
11 Richardson v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I867) 98 Mass. 85; Mackay v. 
Central R. Co., (C. C. N.Y., 1876) I4 Blatchf. 65; Taylor's Adm'r v. Pennsyl-
vania Co., (r88o) 78 Ky. 348. 
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the New York Court of Appeals/2 after which it rapidly went 
out of fashion. These courts took the position that where the 
death act of the state of wrong provides, without special quali-
fication, that the action shall be brought by the deceased's 
personal representative, it may be brought by a duly qualified 
administrator appointed in any state. 
So far as the terms of the death statute are concerned, then, 
the defendant may be attacked in any convenient forum. But 
there are two rules of local policy with which the plaintiff may 
have to contend in certain jurisdictions. In many states the 
general rule that a foreign administrator cannot sue is ap-
plied in actions for wrongful death.13 The chief purpose of 
this rule is supposed to be the conservation of assets for local 
creditors of the deceased. Normally they have no interest 
whatever in the proceeds of actions for wrongful death, since 
such proceeds form no part of the estate and are distributed 
directly to the beneficiaries.14 Accordingly some courts have 
held that the general rule has no relation to actions of this 
kind and have allowed a foreign representative to proceed 
12 By the Supreme Court in Dennick v. Central R. Co., (1·88o) 103 U. S. 
II, and by the New York Court of Appeals in Leonard v. Columbia Steam 
Navigation Co., (1881) 84 N.Y. 48. 
But the rejected construction was adopted at a much later date in Manitoba. 
See Couture v. Dominion Fish Co., ( 1909) 19 Man. L. R. 6 5; Johnson v. 
Canadian Northern Ry., (1909) I9 Man. L. R. I79· 
12 South-Western R. Co. v. Paulk, (I858) 24 Ga. 356; Central R. Co. v. 
Swint, (I884) 73 Ga. 65I; Cornell Co. v. Ward, (I909) 93 C. C. A. 473, 
168 Fed. 51; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Brantley's Adm'r, (1894) 96 Ky. 297, 
28 S. W. 477; The Princess Sophia, (D. C. Wash., I929) 35 F. (2d) 736; 
Dodge v. North Hudson (C. C. N.Y., 1910) 177 Fed. 986; Brooks v. Southern 
Pac. Co., (C. C. Ky., I9o6) I48 Fed. 986. 
In many states the rule that a foreign administrator cannot sue has been 
abolished in whole or in part by statute. 
"See Rose, "Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death," (I935) 
33 MICH. L. REv. 545, 570, 592. Where creditors in the forum have an interest 
in the fund recovered there may be some justification for refusing to let a 
foreign representative carry it away. See Maysville, etc., Co. v. Wilson's Adm'r, 
(I893) I6 U.S. App. 236, 59 Fed. 9I; Sanbo v. Union Pac. Coal Co., (C. C. 
Colo., I 904) I 30 Fed. 52. 
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with his action.15 Where this privilege is denied, however, the 
only alternative is to secure ancillary letters of administra-
tion at the forum. Here a second obstacle may be encountered. 
If the deceased did not reside within the jurisdiction and left 
no assets there, the court may possibly refuse to appoint a 
local administrator for the sole purpose of litigating a claim 
for damages for death. 16 
The existence of several administrators for one deceased, 
each empowered to bring an action, may raise a problem re-
garding the effect of a prior judgment. Suppose a death action 
is brought by one administrator. The defendant sets up as a 
defense a prior judgment given in an earlier action brought 
by another administrator. This prior judgment might be 
pleaded either ( I ) as a merger of the cause of action or ( 2) as 
having conclusively determined some issue of law or fact 
in the defendant's favour. Would this previous judgment be a 
good defence to the present action by a different adminis-
ll> Wilson v. Tootle, (C. C. Mo., I 893) 55 Fed. 2II; McCarty v. New York, 
etc., R. Co., (C. C. N.Y., I894) 62 Fed. 437; Pearson v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 
(D. C. Va., I923) 286 Fed. 429; Knight v. Moline, etc., R. Co., (I9I3) I6o 
Iowa I6o, I40 N. W. 839; Boulden v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (I903) 205 Pa. 
264, 54 Atl. 906; Robertson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I904) I22 Wis. 66, 99 
N. W. 433; Kerr v. Basham, (I934) 62 S.D. 30I, 252 N. W. 853; Connor v. 
New York, etc., R. Co., (I9o8) 28 R.I. s6o, 68 Atl. 48I; Ghilain v. Couture, 
(I929) 84 N. H. 48, I46 Atl. 395; Byrn v. Paterson Steamship Ltd. (I936) 
Ont. 3II1 3 Dom. L. R. III. 
In Kansas a foreign administrator may sue for wrongful death, Kansas Pac. 
R. Co. v. Cutter, (I876) I6 Kan. 568, provided that he could have maintained 
the same type of suit in the state of his appointment, Limekiller v. Hannibal, etc., 
R. Co., (I88s) 33 Kan. 83,5 Pac. 40t; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mills, (I897) 
57 Kan. 687, 47 Pac. 834; Hulburt v. Topeka, (C. C. Kan., I888) 34 Fed. 
5IO. 
See also Metrakos v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., (I9I4) 9I Kan. 342, I37 
Pac. 953· 
16 Re Yarbrough's Estate, (I923) 126 Wash. 85, 2I6 Pac. 889; Louisville, 
etc., R. Co. v. Herb, (I9II) 125 Tenn. 408, I43 S. W. II38; Perry v. St. 
Joseph, etc., R. Co., (I883) 29 Kan. 420; Hall's Adm'r v. Louisville, etc., R. 
Co., (I897) Ioz Ky. 48o, 43 S. W. 698; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Swayne's 
Adm'r, (I866) 26 Ind. 477· 
See also Schueren v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (I9I7 Mo.) I92 S. W. 965; 
Connor v. New York, etc., R. Co. (I9o8) 28 R.I. 56o, 68 Atl. 48I. 
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trator? Hesitation and doubt upon the point are expressed in 
a few early opinions.17 But there is substantial modern au-
thority for the view that if the first court had proper jurisdic-
tion over the parties, its judgment would be recognized in the 
second suit though the formal plaintiffs be different.18 
In Spokane, etc., R. Co. v. W hitley/9 a death action, con-
trolled by the law of Idaho, was brought in that state by one 
of the beneficiaries. A satisfied judgment for $9,500 obtained 
in a Washington court by the deceased's administratrix was 
set up as a defence. The plaintiff beneficiary replied that since 
she had never given her consent or been made a party to the 
Washington suit she was not bound by the judgment termi-
nating it. The Idaho court allowed the plaintiff to recover and 
the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. Since the beneficiary 
was not a party to the Washington suit, the Washington court 
did not acquire judicial jurisdiction over her cause of action, 
and the Washington judgment was not entitled to full faith 
and credit in Idaho. The Supreme Court indicated that the 
beneficiary might have been bound by any judgment obtained 
by a duly appointed administrator, even without the bene-
ficiary's concurrence in the action, if the statute of the state of 
wrong (Idaho) had so provided. But the Idaho statute, as 
construed by the Idaho courts, made no such provision. The 
law of the state of wrong (Idaho) gave the administratrix no 
17 Woodard v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., (1859) 10 Ohio St. 121; Taylor's 
Adm'r v. Pennsylvania Co., (188o) 78 Ky. 348; Usher v. West Jersey R. Co., 
(1889) 126 Pa. St. 2061 17 Atl. 597· 
18 See Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schendel, (1926) 270 U.S. 611 1 46 Sup. Ct. 
420; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Jones' Adin'r, (1926) 215 Ky. 774, 286 S. W. 
1071; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Hill, (1912) 139 Ga. 2241 76 S. E. 1001; 
Schendel v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1926) 168 Minn. 1521 210 N. W. 70; see 
generally FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (1925) vol, 31 §§ 13921 1393· 
For dicta on the point, see Ghilain v. Couture, (1929) 84 N.H. 481 146 Atl. 
395; Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1885) 65 Iowa 727, 23 N. W. 143; 
Nelson's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., (1892) 88 Va. 971 1 14 S. E. 838; 
Anderson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1914) 127 C. C. A. (6th) 2771 210 Fed. 
689; Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co. (1913) 36 Nev. 247, 134 Pac. 753· 
19 Spokane, etc,, R. Co. v. Whitley, (r913) 23 Idaho 6421 132 Pac. 1211 
aff'd (1914) 237 U. S. 487, 35 Sup. Ct. 655. 
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power to bind the beneficiaries without their sanction. Hence 
the Washington judgment, obtained by the administratrix 
without the consent of the beneficiary did not effect a merger 
of the beneficiary's cause of action: 
"The question," said the Supreme Court, "is one of juris-
diction, that is, whether the mother-Mary Elizabeth Whit-
ley-was represented by the administratrix in the Washing-
ton suit. The mother was not a party to that suit, and if she 
was not represented by the administratrix, the Washington 
court was without jurisdiction as to her, and the Idaho court 
was not bound to treat the judgment as a bar to her recovery 
in the present suit. [Citations.] The matter is not one of 
mere form or procedure, and it is manifest that the authority 
of the administratrix to represent the mother without her con-
sent, if that authority existed, could be derived only from the 
Idaho statute. . . . The Supreme Court of Idaho having 
authority to construe the Idaho statute, has held that the ad-
ministratrix did not represent the mother, and, consequently 
that the mother's right was not barred." 
SECTION 29 
PROPER DEFENDANTS TO THE ACTION 
The law of the place of wrong indicates the proper defend-
ant as it does the proper plaintiff in the sense that it shows 
whether a particular defendant has incurred any liability 
whatsoever. Where that law imposes liability for an injury 
upon several persons, a question may arise as to whether they 
may or must be joined as defendants in a single action. Is the 
answer to be given by the law of the forum or the law of the 
place of wrong? 
This very problem was dealt with at an early date in the 
English case, General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou.1 The 
'General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou, (I843) II Mees. &W. sn, 1$2 
Eng. Rep. I06I, 
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action was brought against an alleged owner of a French ship 
which collided with plaintiff's ship upon the high seas. The 
defendant set up a plea which the judges considered to be 
patient of two different meanings. Some of them interpreted it 
as averring that the defendant, being a member of an associa-
tion which owned the erring ship, could only be sued in France 
in a joint action prosecuted against all members of the associa~ 
tion simultaneously. Others thought it meant that under 
French law the association bore the responsibility alone, like 
an English limited company. Assuming on demurrer that 
French law was the proper law of the case, the court ex-
pressed the unanimous opinion that, taking the second view of 
the plea, it expressed a good defence to the action but that, 
on the first interpretation, the plea was bad. "It is well 
established," said Parke, B., "that the forms of remedies and 
modes of proceeding are regulated solely by the law of the 
place where the action is instituted-the lex fori; and it is 
no objection to a suit in proper form here, that it would have 
been instituted in a different form in the Court of the country 
where the cause of action arose or to which the defendant 
belongs." 
The theory of this case would seem to be that once it is 
admitted that the proper law creates some obligation to pay 
damages, the local law will decide whether or not co-obligees 
must be joined in an action to enforce it. Although other au-
thorities support the doctrine,2 it seems at least questionable 
whether the forum's administrative convenience really re-
quires it. 
It was rejected in Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co.3 While 
carrying on drilling operations, a number of oil companies 
polluted a stream in Kansas by dumping crude oil into it~ 
• See BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS ( 193 5) vol. 3, p. 1 6o3; Fryklund v. Great 
Northern R. Co., (1907) 101 Minn. 37, III N. W. 727. 
• Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) 52 F. (2d) 364. 
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This practice injured cattle belonging to the plaintiff, a ripar-
ian rancher. Under Kansas law the companies were each liable 
to the plaintiff to the full extent of the damage. This liability 
could be enforced by joint action against all the companies. 
Under the law of the forum (Missouri) each company was 
responsible only to the extent of the damage caused by its 
activities and a separate suit would have to be brought against 
each company. 
Conceivably the court might have split the issues, and, 
while holding that each defendant was liable for the whole 
damage according to the law of the place of wrong (Kansas), 
have referred the propriety of a joint action to the law of the 
forum (Missouri). It appears, however, to have followed the 
law of the place of wrong on both points and to have decided 
that the companies were properly made co-defendants to a 
single action, as they would have been in Kansas. 
SECTION JO 
LIMITATIONS UPON THE TIME FOR BRINGING AN ACTION 
A rule of the forum limiting the period of time within which 
an action must be brought may conflict with a rule of the state 
of wrong in either one of two ways. The rule of the forum 
may prescribe a shorter period of time than that permitted 
by the rule of the state of wrong. Or the rule of the state of 
wrong may prescribe a shorter period than the rule of the 
forum allows. 
Let us consider the first of these problems. An action is 
brought at a time when it would be barred by the law of 
the forum but not by that of the place of wrong, which allows 
a longer period. If the court follows the local law, the plain-
tiff will be deprived of a remedy at the forum although he 
might have succeeded at the place of wrong or some other 
jurisdiction. Such a result is prima facie undesirable. Is there 
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any reason why the court should not depart from its usual rule 
and follow that of the foreign law? A foreign rule of this 
character should not be particularly difficult to apply. But it 
has been argued that the law of the forum ought to govern 
for another reason. Statutes of limitation are intended to pro-
tect the courts from stale claims. The investigation of facts 
which are supposed to have occurred long ago necessarily in-
volves the sifting of meagre and unsatisfactory evidence. 
Justice, long delayed, sometimes has the appearance of in-
justice. The policy of the forum requires that its courts should 
not be burdened with this kind of litigation. This interest must 
be weighed against that of making all courts available to the 
plaintiff upon the same conditions.1 
This problem was first presented in connection with actions 
for breach of contract during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Both in England and America the doctrine became 
established that such actions must be brought within the period 
prescribed by the statute of the forum. The same doctrine has 
been applied in the field of tort. 2 
In a number of cases an important exception to this general 
principle has been developed. 3 In each instance the legislature 
at the forum had created a new form of statutory liability. The 
constituent statute specified that actions to enforce it should be 
brought within a certain period of time. The courts held that 
the legislature did not intend the limitation to control actions 
1 See Lorenzen, Comment, (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 492, 497· 
• Mufios v. Southern Pac. Co., (r892) 2 U.S. App. 222, 51 Fed. r88; Larue 
v. Kershaw Contracting Co., (1912) 177 Ala. 441, 59 So. 155; Haefer v. 
Herndon, (D. C. Ill., 1938) 22 F. Supp. 523; Horan v. New Home, etc., Co., 
( r 93 7) 289 Ill. App. 340, 7 N. E. (2d) 401; McConnell v. Caribbean Petro-
leum Co., (r938) 278 N.Y. 189, 15 N. E. (2d) 573; Miles v. McGrath, (D. C. 
Md., 1933) 4 F. Supp. 6o3; McCluny v. Silliman, (r83o) 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 
270, 
See also Annotation, (1930) 68 A. L. R. 217. 
3 Negaubauer v. Great Northern R. Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 62o; 
Keep v. National Tube Co., (C. C. N.J., 1907) 154 F. 121; Theroux's Adm'r 
v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (r894) 27 U.S. App. so8, 64 Fed. 84; Coffman v. 
Wood, (D. C. Ill. 1934) 5 F. Supp. 906, 
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brought to enforce a similar statute of another jurisdiction. 
They distinguished the special statutory provision from the 
general statutes of limitations which were involved in the 
older cases. There does not seem to be any functional basis for 
this distinction. Presumably the special limitation, like all 
limitations, was established to protect the courts from stale 
claims. When this protection is afforded by a general statute 
of limitations it is deemed to be more important than choice-
of-law policies. Why should it be neglected when it is pro-
vided in a particular statute governing a single type of lia-
bility? Some courts have adopted this argument and refused 
to recognize the distinction. 4 But these courts assume that the 
general principle produces satisfactory results. The distinc-
tion, though groundless, is probably symptomatic of dissatis-
faction with the general principle and of a desire to limit its 
sphere of operation. 
Let us now consider the second problem. The law of the 
place of wrong prescribes a shorter limitation than that al-
lowed by the law of the forum. The plaintiff brings suit within 
the intermediate period. Such a suit, if brought at the place 
of wrong, would not have succeeded. If the court does not 
adopt the rule prevailing there and dismiss the instant suit, 
the defendant may be subjected to a liability which the law of 
the place of wrong does not sanction. His misfortune will be 
due to the fact that he is amenable to suit at the forum. To 
avoid this result, the court ought to adopt the foreign rule. 
This could be done without difficulty. No important policy of 
the forum would be affected. 
This problem was first raised in actions for breach of a con-
tract governed by foreign law. Common-law courts both in 
England and America took the view that the limitation of the 
foreign law should be disregarded. One cannot read the early 
'Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, (1930) 198 N.C. 397, rsr S. E. 857; Rosenzweig 
v. Heller, (1931) 3oz Pa. z79, 153 Atl. 346. 
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cases without receiving the impression that the judges failed 
to distinguish the instant problem from the situation where 
the forum demands that suit be brought in a shorter time than 
the foreign law allows. 5 There, as we have seen, the policy of 
the forum may require the observance of its rule. Even if the 
court observes the local rule and dismisses the action, the 
plaintiff may still be able to succeed in another forum. In the 
instant situation, however, the application of the local rule 
imposes an obligation upon the defendant against which he has 
no redress. The solution adopted in the early cases neglects 
this important consideration. 
To the general doctrine excluding foreign statutes of limi-
tations there is one recognized exception. It is said that a 
statute which not only bars the plaintiff's remedy but ex-
tinguishes his "right" should be enforced in other jurisdic-
tions. But when does such a statute "extinguish the right"? It 
is well established in common-law jurisdictions that a con-
tract debt barred by a statute of limitations may be revived by 
a subsequent promise to pay it. There is some authority for the 
theory that such statutes do not "extinguish the right" be-
cause they leave open this possibility of revival. 6 On this 
theory it would seem that, so far as tort claims are concerned, 
the ordinary statute of limitations of a common-law jurisdic-
tion does "extinguish the right" because, after the statutory 
period has elapsed, such claims cannot be revived. 7 They con-
tinue to exist in the juristic imagination as metaphysical es-
sences, devoid of practical consequence. But this reasoning does 
not seem to have been adopted in any of the decided cases. In 
a number of these a tort action has been allowed to continue 
"See LeRoy v. Crowninshield, (r82o) 2 Mason 151, 15 Fed. Cas. 362; 
Huber v. Steiner, (1835) 2 Bing., (N.C.) 202, 132 Eng. Rep. So. 
"See Williams v. Jones, (1811) 13 East 439, 104 Eng. Rep. 441; Wood & 
Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930) 43 F. 
(2d) 941. 
7 See WooD, LIMITATIONS, Ed. 4 (1916) vol. 1, § 66. 
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although, according to the law of the place of wrong, it was 
begun too late. 8 A good many states have passed legislation to 
prohibit their courts from entertaining suits which have been 
barred by the appropriate foreign law.9 
In one particular situation a limitation provision is usually 
regarded as "extinguishing the right" for conflict of laws pur-
poses. If the legislature of an outside jurisdiction creates a new 
form of liability and directs that actions to establish it shall be 
brought within a specified period, that direction will be en-
forced at the forum. 10 A foreign limitation of this kind is com-
monly said to be a "condition of the right of action" conferred 
by the legislature. It is not essential that it should be con-
tained in the same statute with the constituent clauses creating 
the right.11 
There is also some authority for the view that a foreign 
statute ought to be regarded as ''extinguishing the right" if, 
by its express wording, it purports to do so.12 
Story maintained that a statute which extinguished the right 
8 Eggen v. Canadian Northern R. Co., (I9I 8) I67 C. C. A. (8th) 229, 255 Fed. 
937i Morgan v. Camden, etc., R. Co., (I88s) 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 97; Tarbell 
v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (I922) 96 Vt. I7o, I I8 Atl. 484; Nonce v. Richmond 
& D. R. Co., (C. C. N. C., I 8 8 7) 3 3 Fed. 429; O'Shields v. Georgia Pac. R. Co., 
(I889) 83 Ga. 62I, ro S. E. 268; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Burkhart, (I9I3) 
I 54 Ky. 92, I57 S. W. I8. 
9 See Annotation, (I9JI) 75 A. L. R. '203. 
10 Boyd v. Clark, (C. C. Mich., I88I) 8 Fed. 848; Selma, etc., R. Co. v. 
Lacey, (I873) 49 Ga. Io6; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Hine, (I874) 25 Ohio 
St. 629; The Harrisburg, (I886) II9 U.S. I99, 7 Sup. Ct. I4o; Cavanagh v. 
Ocean Steam Nav. Co., (Sup. Ct., Ist dept., I89o) IJ N.Y. Supp. 540, I9 Civ. 
Proc. R. 39I; The Vestris, (D. C. N.Y., I9JI) 53 F. (2d) 847; Louisville, 
etc., R. Co. v. Dixon, ( I933) I68 Miss. I4, I 50 So. 8 I I; Ford, Bacon & Davis 
v. Volentine, (C. C. A. sth, I933) 64 F. (2d) 8oo; Byron v. Great American 
Indemnity Co., (I934) 54 R.I. 405, I73 Atl. 546; Connecticut Valley Lumber 
Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., (I9I8) 78 N.H. 553, Io3 Atl. 263. 
To the same effect, see Johnson v. Canadian Northern R. Co., (I909) I9 
Man. L. R. I79i Goodman v. London, etc., R. Co., (I877) I4 Scottish L. R. 
449· 
11 Davis v. Mills, (I904) I94 U.S. 45I, 24 Sup. Ct. 692. 
:tJl Osborne v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (I 913) 8 7 Vt. I 04, 8 8 Atl. 5 I 2 
(semble) ; Finnell v. Southern Kan. R. Co., (C. C. Mo., I 8 8 8) 3 3 Fed. 42 7; 
Smith v. Webb, (I9I6 Tex. Civ. App.) I8I S. W. 8I4. 
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should not be enforced unless it were shown that both the 
parties concerned had resided in the state where the statute 
was in force for the full period of time prescribed by the 
statute.13 To illustrate: A injures B in state X. More than a 
year later B brings action in state Y. A pleads a rule of the 
law of state X which is regarded by the court in state Y as 
extinguishing B's right to compensation at the end of one 
year. To get the benefit of this rule A must also show that 
both A and B resided for one year in state X.14 One can well 
understand this requirement being insisted upon at the forum 
if it were part of the law of state X. Otherwise, as Goodrich 
points out, it seems to be a needless refinement.15 Why should 
the defendant have to surmount another hurdle in order to 
secure the benefit of a rule of the place of wrong? If the resi-
dence requirement fulfilled any useful function we would 
expect to find it employed in cases of the type discussed above, 
where the courts adopt the time limit attached to a newly-
created foreign cause of action. Yet in many of these cases it is 
never mentioned. 
The application of rules restricting the time. for suit may 
give rise to incidental problems. In Murray v. New York, 
etc., R. Co./6 an action to recover damages for a wrongful 
death occurring in Pennsylvania was brought in New York 
by the father of the deceased. The Pennsylvania death statute 
13 STORY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS, Ed. 8 (1883) § 582B. 
14 This view is adopted in the following cases: Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. 
Johnston, (1894) 26 U.S. App. 85,61 Fed. 738; Moores v. Winter, (1899) 67 
Ark. 189, 53 S. W. 1057; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Maynor, (1913) 126 
C. C. A. (sth) 433, 209 Fed. 61o; Finnell v. Southern Kan. R. Co., (C. C. Mo., 
1888) 33 Fed. 427; Williams v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1894) 123 Mo. 573, 
27 S. W. 387; Smith v. Webb, (1916 Tex. Civ. App.) 181 S. W. 814. 
Some doubt is expressed regarding the theory of these decisions in Wood & 
Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930) 43 F. 
(2d) 941. 
15 GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, Ed. 2 (I938) 202. 
16 Murray v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I934) 242 App. Div. 374, 275 N.Y. 
Supp. I o. To same effect, Chapman v. Terminal R. Ass'n, (Mo. I 940) 13 7 
S. W. (2d) 612. 
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provided that such actions should be brought in the name of 
both parents and within a specified period of time. After this 
time had elapsed it was sought to join the deceased's mother 
as a party plaintiff. The court decided that the time limitation 
was a "condition of the right" which ought to be enforced. 
They were then faced with a second problem: could an addi-
tional and necessary plaintiff be joined after the time for 
bringing suit had passed? General choice-of-law policy 
would seem to require that this question be determined, if pos-
sible, by the law of Pennsylvania. This course was adopted by 
the court. Following the Pennsylvania cases, they ruled that 
a new party to the action might be added although the statu-
tory period had run out. 
The same question arose in Knight v. Moline, etc., R. Co.17 
where the plaintiff sought to amend his pleadings at a time 
when a new action would have been extinguished (not merely 
barred) by the statute of the place of wrong. It was not shown 
that the courts there would have refused such an amendment 
but the court of the forum simply decided the question ac-
cording to their own rules, saying that it was one of procedure. 
The amendment was allowed. 
A very interesting variation of this problem is found in 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Dixon.18 The action was brought 
in Mississippi by a workman to recover compensation under 
the Louisiana compensation act for an injury received there. 
A Mississippi court dismissed the action on the ground that 
the judicial machinery of the forum was not adequate for the 
proper administration of the Louisiana statute. Subsequent de-
cisions of the higher Mississippi courts departed from this 
theory and held that the Louisiana statute in question could 
17 Knight v. Moline, etc., R. Co., (I9I3) I6o Iowa I6o, I40 N. W. 839. 
See also Lassiter v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (I904) 136 N.C. 89, 48 S. E. 642. 
18 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Dixon, (I933) I68 Miss. I4, I5o So. 8II. See 
also Cavanagh v. Ocean Steam Nav. Co. (Sup. Ct., ISt Dept., I 890) I 3 N. Y. 
Supp. 540, I9 Civ. Proc. R. 391. 
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be enforced in Mississippi. The plaintiff then brought a second 
action in Mississippi. By this time the period for bringing suit 
laid down by the Louisiana statute had run out. The court de-
cided this time limit was "a condition of the cause of action." 
The plaintiff attempted to rely upon a curative principle of 
Mississippi law which would have permitted the second action 
to be maintained because the dismissal of the first did not 
settle the merits of the controversy. The court held that this 
rule could not affect the operation of the Louisiana statute and 
dismissed the second suit also. 
This result seems unsatisfactory. One cannot quarrel with 
the court for its reluctance to resort to the law of the forum. 
That shows a due and proper regard for choice-of-law policies. 
But this case was an exceptional one and required special treat-
ment. Let us examine it more closely. The problem presented 
in the second suit was based upon two facts. First, a previous 
suit at the forum had been dismissed because it was brought 
to enforce a foreign created right and the court thought that 
the administrative machinery of the forum was inadequate. 
Second, the time for bringing the action allowed by the law of 
the place of wrong had run out. What should be done in a 
case like this? Choice-of-law policies suggest that we turn to 
the law of the place of wrong for an answer. But we turn to 
the law of Louisiana in vain, because this problem could not 
have arisen in Louisiana. Had the first suit been brought in 
Louisiana it would not have been dismissed; no question 
would have been made of the competence of Louisiana courts 
to enforce their own statutes. Since Louisiana law offered no 
solution of the problem and the solution provided by the 
law of the forum was a fair and reasonable one, it is sub-
mitted that the court would have been justified in adopting 
the curative principle of the law of the forum.19 
19 On the problems discussed in this section, see generally: Ailes, "Limitation 
of Actions and the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 31 MICH. L. REV. 474; Note, 
(1931) 79 UNiv. OF PA. L. REv. rr12; Lorenzen, Comment, (r9r9) 28 YALE 
L. J. 492, 497· 
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SECTION 3I 
NOTICE BEFORE ACTION 
Several conflict of laws cases have involved the considera-
tion of statutes which had the effect of compelling an injured 
person to serve notice of his claim upon the tortfeasor within 
a limited time period on pain of losing his right of action if 
he failed to do so. In their practical operation such statutes 
are not unlike statutes of limitation. A statute requiring a notice 
of action may form a part of either the law of the forum or the 
law of the place of wrong. Let us consider the latter situation 
first. 
The law of the place of wrong forbids the bringing of an 
action unless the defendant has been notified of the plaintiff's 
claim within a stated time. The law of the forum makes no 
such restriction. The plaintiff fails to comply with the law of 
the place of wrong. If the court of the forum allows the action 
to proceed, the plaintiff will gain an improper advantage by 
his selection of a forum. Choice-of-law policies will obviously 
be best maintained by dismissing the plaintiff's suit. In deal-
ing with the analogous problem of a foreign statute of limita-
tions which bars the plaintiff's suit, the courts refused to 
enforce the foreign statute, saying it was merely a rule of pro-
cedure.1 We suggested that this was an unfortunate result. De-
cisions upon the instant problem have not been affected by 
statute-of-limitations cases. There is authority for the view 
that if the notice required by the law of the place of wrong 
has not been given, the plaintiff cannot bring an action any-
where.2 
Suppose the law of the forum requires notice of the plain-
tiff's claim and the law of the place of wrong does not. The 
plaintiff fails to give the notice. Under these circumstances 
1 See above, section 30. 
• Husted v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (r9ro) 143 Mo. App. 623, 128 S. W. 282; 
Sawyer v. El Paso, etc., R. Co., ( r 9o8) 49 Tex. Civ. App. ro6, ro8 S. W. 718. 
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the court can best assist in the realization of choice-of-law 
policies by enforcing the plaintiff's cause of action as it would 
be enforced in the state of wrong. But the court may feel that 
the policy underlying the local rule requiring a notice is so 
important that it should be applied even in cases which have 
a foreign proper law. The court will then have to weigh the 
local policy against the choice-of-law policies.3 
SECTION 32 
THE MARITIME LIEN 
Under both English and American law, many mantlme 
torts give rise to a maritime lien upon the ship concerned in 
favour of the person wronged. The lien attaches to the ship 
at the time of the injury. As a rule, it cannot be displaced by a 
sale of the ship to a bona fide purchaser for value. An admi-
ralty court will enforce the lien by seizing the ship and, if 
necessary, selling it to pay off the lienholder.1 
The position of these maritime liens in the conflict of laws 
is extremely doubtful. At the threshold of our· discussion, 
it may be well to distinguish a lien upon a vessel from the 
power to arrest the vessel at the commencement of a suit in 
admiralty. The latter is obviously a matter which could only 
be governed by the local law. At the commencement of the 
suit the court's officers would not know all the facts of the 
case. They could not tell what foreign law or laws to apply. 
They could not apply a foreign law because they would not 
know its provisions. Hence, in deciding whether or not a ship 
may be seized, an admiralty court can only be governed by its 
own local rules. After the case has been tried, the facts proved, 
8 The rule of the forum requiring notice was applied to a foreign cause of 
action in Arp v. Allis Chalmers Co., (1907) 130 Wis. 454, I xo N. W. 386. 
1 Under the Constitution of the United States a state court cannot enforce a 
maritime lien by proceedings in rem. See RoBINSoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) 359· 
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and the relevant foreign laws established, the situation is dif-
ferent. The court has before it all the materials necessary to 
decide what law should determine the rights of the person 
wronged and whether that law gives him a lien upon the ves-
sel in question which may be enforced by selling the vessel. 
In considering the conflicts aspect of the maritime lien we 
have, as usual, two problems. ( r) Will the admiralty court 
of the forum enforce a lien in a case where the law of the forum 
would create a lien but the law of the place of wrong would 
not? ( 2) Will the admiralty court of the forum enforce a lien 
in a case where the law of the forum would not create a lien 
but the law of the place of wrong would? Attacking the first 
problem from a conflict of laws point of view we must conclude 
that the forum ought not to enforce a lien which the law of 
the place of wrong does not authorize. To do so is to put an 
extra burden upon the defendant (the claimant, in admiralty 
terms) or perhaps upon some innocent bona fide purchaser of 
the ship, which burden is solely due to the fact that his ship 
has entered the waters of the forum. So far as the court's 
administrative convenience is concerned, a mere refusal to en-
force the plaintiff's (in admiralty, the libellant's) claim should 
not involve any difficulty upon that score. 
But in dealing with the conflicts aspect of the maritime 
lien we must reckon with that ancient and formidable tradi-
tion of admiralty courts, the conception of a universal mari-
time law. The conflicts argument which we have outlined 
clashes with this conception. We are apt to be told that when 
an admiralty court of the forum enforces a maritime lien for 
tort, it is not enforcing the internal law of the forum, it is 
enforcing the law of the sea which is common to all civilized 
sea-going nations. Admiralty courts do not seek the ideal of 
uniformity through choice-of-law principles; they have their 
own uniform system. The notion that admiralty law is the 
same in all countries appears today to be merely a pleasant 
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fiction. 2 But it has had considerable influence upon the treat-
ment of the instant problem by admiralty courts. 
The classic American decision is The Eagle3 (Supreme 
Court, I 8 6 8) which arose out of a collision in Canadian waters. 
For the claimant it was argued that Canadian law gave the 
libellant no lien. Dealing briefly with the point, the Supreme 
Court indicated that the question was to be decided by "the 
practice and principles of the courts of admiralty in this coun-
try, wholly irrespective of any local law." 
The same problem came before Judge Emmons in The 
A von 4 (I 8 7 3) and was discussed by him at considerable 
length. His opinion shows plainly the reluctance of admiralty 
judges at that time to follow choice-of-law principles where 
maritime liens were concerned. After wavering between the 
choice-of-law principle and the so-called universal maritime 
law as conceived by American courts he chose the latter. 
The Eagle and The A von do not seem to proceed upon the 
ground that the maritime lien is a part of American admiralty 
procedure which must be followed in all cases for the conven-
ience of the court. Such a view is expressly rejected in The 
A von. The basis of decision is that the lien is part of the gen-
eral maritime law which American courts administer in all 
cases, whether they have a foreign setting or not. 
There is a group of tort cases in which American courts have 
refused to enforce a maritime lien on the ground that to do 
so would be inconsistent with the foreign law by which the 
case ought to be governed. Most of these cases involved per-
sonal injury or death aboard single ships, in foreign waters or 
2 See below, section 55· 
3 The Eagle, (r868) 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 15. Robinson explains this decision 
as proceeding upon the ground that the vessels were merely passing through 
Canadian waters but were not entering or leaving a Canadian port. See ROBIN-
soN, ADMIRALTY (1939) 825. 
'The Avon, (1873) 1 Brown's Adm. 170, 2 Fed. Cas. 255. 
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on the high seas. 5 The courts which decided them do not make 
it clear whether or not the injured person or the deceased per-
son's dependents would have had a lien on the ship under 
the general maritime law as applied by American courts. 
Probably, in most of these cases, he would not. They are not, 
therefore, in irreconcilable conflict with The Eagle and The 
A von. The most that can be said of them, in relation to the 
general maritime law theory, is that they damn it with faint 
prarse. 
Outside the field of tort liability there are several American 
decisions dealing with the effect of foreign contractual trans-
actions to raise a lien upon a vessel. These decisions emphati-
cally announce that no lien will be enforced which is not sanc-
tioned by the proper law of the transaction in question. 6 In 
The Kaiser Wilhelm 7 the libellant sought a lien for repairs 
and supplies furnished to a German ship in England. The 
court said: 
"The laws of Great Britain and of Germany have both been 
pleaded, and, if no lien or right to proceed against the vessel 
is given under either of them, it is immaterial whether or not 
the libellant is entitled to proceed in rem, under the general 
maritime law as recognized in this country." 
It would appear, therefore, that the general tendency of 
American courts is to deny a lien in cases governed by foreign 
law unless the proper law creates one. But there are older au-
• The Egyptian Monarch, (D. C. N.J., 1 888) 36 Fed. 773; The Lamington, 
(D. C. N.Y., 1898) 87 Fed. 752; The Cuzco, (D. C. Wash., 1915) 225 Fed. 
169; The Hanna Nielsen, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1921) 273 Fed. 171; The Baymead, 
(C. C. A. 9th, 1937) Am. Mar. Cas. 207. 
See also Robinson v. Detroit & C. Steam Nav. Co., (r896) 43 U.S. App. 190, 
20 C. C. A. (6th) 86, 73 Fed. 883 (collision in foreign territorial waters; action 
for wrongful death against ship not carrying deceased). 
"The Kaiser Wilhelm II, (D. C. N.J., 1916) 230 Fed. 717; The Woud-
richem, (D. C. N.Y. 1921) 278 Fed. 568; The City of Atlanta, (D. C. Ga., 
1924) Am. Mar. Cas. 1305; The Constantinople, (D. C. N, Y., 1926) 15 F. 
(2d) 97· 
7 The Kaiser Wilhelm II, (D. C. N.J., 1916) 230 Fed, 717. 
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thorities which favour the view that American courts may dis-
regard the proper law and enforce a lien by virtue of the 
general maritime law. 
English courts incline to the simple view that "lien or no 
lien" is a question of procedure. In The Mil ford 8 (I 8 58) the 
master of an American ship, hired in the United States, claimed 
a lien for his wages. American law gave no such lien. A British 
statute provided, in very general terms, that "every master of 
a ship" should have such a lien. Dr. Lushington applied the 
British statute, saying: 
"It was very ingeniously contended that the law of the 
United States formed part of the contract; but I cannot think 
so; the proceedings originated in this country; it is a question 
of remedy, not of contract at all. Now the law as to contract 
and remedy was settled by Donn v. Lippmann to the effect 
that the remedy must be according to the law of the forum in 
which it is sought. . . . Now in this case the legality of the 
arrest of the freight is the whole matter in dispute." 
. These remarks evince a confusion of two things; the lien 
and the arrest. As we have indicated, the seizure of the res 
by the court would have to proceed according to the law of the 
forum; no other course would be practicable.9 But the right 
of the master ultimately to enforce a lien on it might well 
have been referred to the proper law of the case. The Milford 
is an old decision, as conflicts decisions go; the opinion displays 
the diffidence and distaste for foreign law which is character-
istic of the period. It was criticized by Sir Robert Phillimore, 
who did not share the hostility of other English judges toward 
foreign laws.10 But it has been followed 11 and approved 12 
in subsequent cases. 
"The Milford, (x8s8) Swab. 362, 166 Eng. Rep. u67. Followed in The 
Jonathan Goodhue, (1859) Swab. 524, x66 Eng. Rep. 1246. 
9 Above, p. 142. . 
10 In The Halley, (I 867) L. R. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 3, I 2. 
11 In The Tagus, [1903] P. 44, 72 L. J.P. 4· 
lll In The Colorado, [1923] P. 102, 92 L. J.P. 100. 
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Let us consider now the second problem of maritime liens: 
will the admiralty court of the forum enforce a lien in a case 
where the law of the forum would not create a lien but the law 
of the place of wrong would? From the conflict of laws point 
of view, an affirmative answer is desirable. If no obstacle of 
policy or inconvenience intervenes, the court should allow the 
libellant the same remedy which he would have under the law 
of place of wrong. 
There is very little direct authority in the United States. 
As we have seen, American courts favour the application of 
foreign law, as a general doctrine. But only one case has been 
found in which a foreign lien was enforced under circum-
stances in which the local law would not create a lien. In The 
Maud Carter 13 the libellant claimed liens upon a ship for in-
surance premiums and materials used in her construction. The 
lien transactions occurred while the vessel was in a British 
port. Neither transaction would have given rise to a lien under 
the general ~aritime law of the United States. The British 
law gave liens in both cases. The court held that they should 
be enforced. 
Turning to the British Empire we find a diversity of opin-
ion. In Clark v. Bowring and Co.14 certain persons claimed a 
lien in a Scottish court for moneys expended upon a ship while 
it was in the port of New York. They based their claim upon 
American law. The court refused to consider the American 
law, holding that the matter must be determined by the law 
of the forum which gave no lien. 
In The Strandhill 15 the same problem came before the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Goods were furnished to the ship 
"'The Maud Carter, (D. C. Mass., 1886) 29 Fed. 156. 
American admiralty courts will enforce a lien for wrongful death created by 
the laws of an American state in cases occurring within the territory of the 
state in question. See Lewis v. Jones, (1928) 27 F. (2d) 72. But no lien is 
enforced unless the state death act so provides. 
"Clark v. Bowring and Co., (19o8) Scottish Sess. Cas. n68. 
15 The Strandhill, (1926) Can. L. R. 68o, 687. 
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in the port of Boston. American law gave a lien; Canadian law 
gave none. After considering the matter at some length, the 
court enforced the American law, saying: 
"Indeed it is difficult to perceive any reason why an Ameri-
can citizen, the owner of a ship which is by American law 
subject to a maritime lien for the price of necessaries purchased 
by him in an American port, could avoid the enforcement of 
the lien by sending his ship to Canada, if there be a Canadian 
tribunal having jurisdiction to enforce it." 
The court distinguished the decision in Clark v. Bowring 
on the ground that it involved a question of priorities among 
competing claims against the ship. This is perfectly true but 
the Scottish court's decision proceeded upon the very broad 
ground that the court would not recognize any liens which 
were not created by the law of the forum. 
SECTION 33 
DETERMINATION OF FACTS BY COURT OR JURY 
In common-law courts an issue of fact is commonly disposed 
of in one of three ways. It may be entrusted exclusively to the 
court, whose decision is final unless reversed by a higher 
court. It may be entrusted exclusively to the jury, whose de-
cision cannot be changed or questioned by the court. Generally, 
however, an issue of fact is passed upon by both the court 
and the jury in the following manner. The judge first con-
siders all the evidence relating to the fact in question. If he 
thinks the evidence overwhelmingly favours one conclusion 
so that no reasonable jury could make a different finding, he 
will assume that conclusion to be correct and proceed to de-
cree legal consequences accordingly. But if he thinks that the 
evidence is so conflicting that a reasonable jury might come to 
either one of two conclusions, he will then permit the jury to 
give the final decision.1 
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Rules defining the respective functions of court and jury 
are in a sense ancillary to other legal principles. The problem 
of determining which of these bodies should pass upon a par-
ticular question of fact arises because the court has resolved 
to enforce some principle of law which declares that certain 
defined operative facts shall have certain legal consequences. 
In order to apply such a principle it is necessary to decide 
whether or not those operative facts are present. For example: 
a court desires in a particular case to apply the general prin-
ciple that a defendant shall only be held liable for injuries 
caused by his negligence. Two issues of fact must therefore 
be decided: (a) was the defendant's conduct negligent? 
(b) did it cause the injury complained of? The question arises: 
are these issues to be decided by the court, by the jury, or by 
both acting in concert? To answer this question we must resort 
to some ancillary rule. 
In a conflict of laws case, the primary principles requiring 
the investigation and proof of facts may be derived from either 
the law of the forum or the law of the place of wrong. In ap-
plying a principle of this kind taken from the law of the 
forum, a court would very probably decide the factual issues 
involved or submit them to the jury according to its usual prac-
tice in non-conflicts cases. But who is to decide the questions of 
fact which are raised by primary principles of the law of the 
place of wrong? A solution for this problem might be sought 
in the rules of either the law of the place of wrong or the law of 
the forum. If the law of the place of wrong emanated from a 
jurisdiction where trial by jury was part of the judicial ma-
chinery, it would no doubt be possible to derive a controlling 
rule from that legal system. 
But the court might also resort to the law of the forum 
for guidance. Often the primary principle of the law of the 
place of wrong with which the court is dealing can be 
matched with an apparently similar rule of the local law. As 
between two common-law jurisdictions, the law of the forum 
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and the law of the place of wrong frequently concur in making 
liability depend upon the defendant's "negligence," the plain-
tiff's "contributory negligence," "assumption of risk," etc. In 
such a situation the court of the forum might feel inclined to 
follow its own secondary rule governing the assignment of the 
issue to court or jury. 
For example: the primary principle that a plaintiff who 
has by his own negligence contributed to his own injury can-
not recover damages is law in both state X and state Y. In 
state X the jury decides whether or not the plaintiff has been 
guilty of such negligence, subject to the usual supervision 
by the court. In state Y the question of contributory negli-
gence is determined by the jury alone. An action is brought 
in the courts of state Y arising out of a highway accident in 
state X. Following the primary principle of the law of state 
X, the court of the forum resolves to investigate the question 
of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. But who is to de-
cide that question, the court or the jury? As we have sug-
gested, the court might turn to the law of the place of wrong 
for an answer and follow the procedure laid down by the 
law of state X. But since the jurisprudence of the forum 
contains a similar principle, raising the same general issue 
of fact (was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence?) 
the court might adopt the secondary rule of the forum making 
the question exclusively one for the jury. 
It is quite possible that a court might be called upon to 
enforce some primary principle of the law of the place of 
wrong which had no counterpart in the law of the forum. The 
opportunity to employ a secondary rule derived from the law 
of the forum would not be so clearly available in such a case. 
But the court could still obtain assistance from the law of 
the forum. It might treat the factual issue defined by the 
law of the place of wrong in the same manner that it would 
treat analogous or similar questions of fact arising in the course 
of ordinary non-conflicts litigation at the forum. This par-
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ticular variety of the general problem does not seem to have 
been canvassed in the decided cases. 
In discussing other types of legal rules and their relation 
to the substance-procedure problem, we have usually drawn 
a distinction between the situation where the application of 
the rule of the place of wrong would help the defendant and 
that in which it would help the plaintiff. In the present con-
text it may not always be possible to say whether the trial of 
an issue by the tribunal and in the manner prescribed by the 
law of the place of wrong would assist the plaintiff or the 
defendant. But one thing is clear. To dispose of the question 
in the manner prescribed by the law of the place of wrong 
will at least bring the court as near as possible to the hypo-
thetical result which the foreign court would have reached 
had the case been tried before it. Choice-of-law policies di-
rect us to go as far as we can in this direction. On the other 
hand, it must be admitted that the delimitation of the func-
tions of judge and jury is a matter of intimate concern to the 
court of the forum. One can well understand its reluctance 
to adopt the rule of another jurisdiction upon the matter. 
Some states have enacted statutes providing that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence should be entrusted exclu-
sively to the jury. These statutes usually operate to diminish 
the defendant's chances of success because they deprive him 
of the opportunity of getting a directed verdict upon this is-
sue. Even if the court believes that no reasonable jury could 
exonerate the plaintiff from contributory fault, the question 
must go before the jury. In Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer2 
a federal court refused to apply a local statute of this type be-
cause the case had a foreign setting. 
"It cuts deep," said the court, "into the right observed at 
common law by which a defendant can obtain a decision by the 
court upon a proven state of facts. What is, at common law, 
within the power of the judge to decide, is in all cases left 
2 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer; (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) 20 F. (zd) 714. 
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to the jury and their finding is conclusive on the court. Thus, 
although by the law of the place where an injury has been 
inflicted the power and duty of the judge are to pass upon a 
clearly established state of facts, a litigant may avoid the con-
sequence of the exercise of those functions by going into a 
jurisdiction where the fundamental local law strips the court 
of that power by making the jury the sole arbiter of the ques-
tion with conclusive force upon the court." 
The court refused to countenance that state of affairs. They 
therefore asserted the power, which a court sitting at the place 
of wrong would have possessed, to pass upon the evidence 
and decide whether or not it showed the plaintiff to be guilty 
of contributory negligence beyond all reasonable doubt. They 
decided that it did show such guilt and directed a verdict for 
the defendant. 
The converse situation where the statute forbidding the 
court to control the jury is in force at the place of wrong has 
arisen in several cases. Here the law of the place of wrong 
ostensibly favours the plaintiff. It enables him to escape the 
risk of a directed verdict which would be possible under the 
law of the forum. Under these conditions some courts have 
applied the statute of the place of wrong. 3 But others have re-
fused to do so on the ground that the foreign statute dealt 
with a matter of procedure. 4 
"Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Miller, (I93I) I84 Ark. 6I, 4I S. W. (2d) 97I; 
Jackson v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., (I93o) 224 Mo. App. 6oi, 31 
S. W. (2d) 25o; Caine v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I923) 209 Ala. r8I, 95 So. 
876. 
'Colucci v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (I923) I2I Misc. 758, 202 N.Y. Supp. 
71 n Singer v. Messina, (I933) 3 I 2 Pa. 129, 167 Atl. 583. 
See also Massachusetts Benefit Life Ass'n v. Robinson, (I 89 8) I 04 Ga. 2 56, 
30 S. E. 918 (the court refused to follow the rule of the law of the place of 
contracting that in actions upon insurance policies the materiality of a misrepre-
sentation should be decided by the court) ; Higgins v. Central, etc., R. Co., 
(1892) 155 Mass. I76, 29 N. E. 534 (here the court assumes rather than de-
cides that it would not follow the practice of the law of the place of wrong 
permitting the jury to assess damages when a different practice prevailed at 
the forum). 
For dicta, see Jones v. Louisiana, etc. R. Co., (1922 Tex. Com. App.) 243 
S. W. 976; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Tuite, (I892) 44 Ill. App. 535; Don v. 
Lippmann, (1837) 5 Cl. & Fin. 1, 7 Eng. Rep. 303. 
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In common-law jurisdictions most issues of fact are set-
tled by the jury working under the judge's supervision. This 
means that the power of the jury to decide the issue depends 
upon the judge's opinion of the evidence. If he considers that 
it leaves no room for difference of opinion regarding the 
facts, he will not ask the jury for their conclusion. The con-
trol exercised by the judge may also be governed by a class 
of rules, commonly known as presumptions. These rules direct 
the judge to presume the probable truth of one fact from the 
existence of another. If sufficient evidence is put in to justify 
the jury finding the basic fact, they should also be allowed 
to pass upon the presumed fact. This is not, however, the only 
consequence produced by presumptions. Their status in the 
conflict of laws is discussed in other sections. 
SECTION 34 
NATURE AND FUNCTION OF RULES RELATIVE TO BURDEN OF 
PROOF 
The term "burden of proof" has, as every lawyer knows, 
two meanings.1 It may refer to the duty resting upon the 
proponent of some factual allegation, to convince the jury, 
as triers of the facts, that the allegation is true-what 
Wigmore has called the risk of non-persuasion. It may also 
be used simply to denote the duty of adducing enough evi-
dence in support of some factual allegation that the court will 
permit the jury to decide whether or not that allegation is 
true. At the beginning of a trial, the burden of proof in the 
first sense will be placed, with respect to each of the· spe-
1 The discussion of the burden of proof and presumptions which follows is 
based upon the following works: THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVI· 
DENCE (I898) 313-390; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, Ed. 3, (I940) Vol. 9> pp. z66-
29 I; Morgan, "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions," (I 9 31) 44 
HARV. L. REV. 906; Morgan, "Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and 
Burden of Proof," (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 59; Maguire and Morgan, "Look-
ing Backward and Forward at Evidence," (1937) so HARV. L. REv. 910-9I3; 
Bohlen, "The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of 
Proof," (1920) 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307. 
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cific allegations raised and disputed in the course of pleading, 
upon either the plaintiff or the defendant. The burden of 
proof in the second sense, that of adducing sufficient evidence 
to get to the jury, is almost invariably assigned, with respect 
to each issue, to the party bearing the risk of non-persuasion. 
This allocation of the burdens of proof at the outset of the 
trial is governed by various rules of law which, according to 
writers on the law of evidence, are based upon considerations 
of convenience, fairness, and social policy. 2 
There is a second species of rules affecting the incidence 
of the burden of proof, known as presumptions. A presump-
tion, as generally understood, is a direction to the trier of 
the facts that, whenever a certain basic fact or group of facts 
has been proved, the truth of another specified fact must be 
assumed. According to Wigmore and Thayer, the normal 
operation of a presumption should be to shift the burden of 
adducing evidence from one party to the other. When once 
the required minimum of evidence upon which the jury might 
find the basic facts has been introduced, the party who was 
originally obliged to bring in enough evidence of the pre-
sumed fact to get before the jury ought to be relieved of that 
obligation. And at the same time his opponent ought to be 
required to adduce sufficient evidence to justify a finding 
against the presumption. If such evidence is not forthcoming, 
the jury should be told that in the event they find the basic 
facts they must find the presumed fact. 
No doubt every presumption has the effect of shifting the 
duty of producing evidence in this manner. But Morgan and 
Bohlen have pointed out that, in the decided cases, a number 
of further consequences have sometimes been attributed to 
them. These consequences are often much more onerous for 
the party against whom the presumption works than those 
suggested by Thayer and Wigmore. Some presumptions have 
2 References by Wigmore and Morgan cited in· footnote I above. 
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been held to shift the risk of non-persuasion. Moreover, it is 
not always easy to say whether a given rule ought to be classi-
fied as a presumption, or as a rule fixing the risk of non-
persuasion at the outset of the trial. Where the circumstances 
which bring the rule into operation are of a somewhat general 
character, it may be regarded as belonging to either category.3 
Morgan and Bohlen have also examined the functions 
which presumptions are designed to fulfil and found them 
to be quite as diverse as their immediate effects. Some pre-
sumptions are created to serve the convenience of the court 
and the parties by expediting the trial. If experience shows 
that fact A usually supplies a safe basis of inference for fact 
B, time, money, and effort will be saved by acting upon this 
inference, in the absence of countervailing proof. Again, con-
clusive evidence upon certain types of factual issues is very 
difficult to obtain. Here the courts might find themselves 
utterly unable to reach a definite conclusion if they did not 
make use of a presumption in one direction or the other. 
But a presumption is often something more than a device 
to secure procedural convenience. It may represent a judicial 
conception of fairness in deciding which party should assume 
the task of accumulating sufficient relevant evidential data. 
Where one party has the better opportunity to obtain such 
data he ought to be forced to produce it. An unfavourable pre-
sumption will work this result. A presumption may also be 
used to enforce a general social policy. A statute which forces 
railroad companies to disprove their own negligence in ac-
tions brought by their employees obviously has the effect of 
imposing a stricter standard of care upon such companies. 
Statutes which make the doing of certain acts prima facie evi-
dence of negligence would seem to be intended to dissuade 
people in general from doing those acts. 
8 For examples of such dubious rules, see Helton v. Alabama, etc., R. Co., 
(1893) 97 Ala. 275, 12 So. 276; Southern R. Co. v. Robertson, (1909) 7 Ga. 
App. I54, 66 s. E. 535· 
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Rules regulating the burden of proof are, like rules de-
fining the functions of court and jury, ancillary to other legal 
principles. A court decides to give effect to some primary prin-
ciple of law which declares that certain defined operative 
facts shall have certain legal consequences. It then becomes 
necessary to allocate the burden of proving or disproving 
those facts. For instance, it is a general rule of law that a 
plaintiff who has by his own negligence contributed to his 
own injury cannot recover damages. The application of this 
primary principle requires a secondary rule which will tell 
us whether the plaintiff must show that he was not guilty of 
such contributory fault, or the defendant must adduce proof 
that he was. 
The position of such rules in the conflict of laws is some-
what analogous to that of rules assigning issues to court and 
jury. Primary principles requiring the proof of certain facts 
may emanate from either the law of the place of wrong or 
the law of the forum. Where the primary principle in ques-
tion has its source in the law of the forum, most courts and 
lawyers would probably take it for granted that the secondary 
rules of the forum ought to decide who should prove the facts 
necessary to bring the primary principle into play. Where the 
principle in question has its source in the law of the place of 
wrong, the incidental burden of proof problem might be 
solved by a reference to either the law of the place of wrong 
or the law of the forum. 
Reference to the secondary rules of the law of the place 
of wrong requires no explanation. The possibility of a reference 
to the secondary rules of the forum is presented when the 
primary principles of the two systems appear to be similar. 
Often the law of the forum and the law of the place of 
wrong agree in laying down some general principle, such 
as that the defendant shall be liable for harm caused by his 
negligence, the defendant shall not be liable for harm caused 
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by the plaintiff's negligence, etc. Here the court of the forum 
is very likely to say: "We shall recognize and give effect to 
the principle of the foreign law prescribing the investitive 
facts which must be found in order to impose liability. But 
the burden of proving those facts we shall dispose of accord-
ing to our own rules." 
For example: an action is brought in the courts of state 
Y against a railroad company for injuries received in a col-
lision with one of the company's trains at a level crossing 
in state X. The primary principle that a railroad company is 
only responsible, under such circumstances, for damage caused 
by the negligence of its servants is law in both state X and 
state Y. State X has an ancillary burden-of-proof rule that 
the plaintiff must prove the defendant's negligence, while in 
state Y the defendant company is expected to prove its free-
dom from fault in such a case. Following the primary prin-
ciple of the law of X, the court of the forum resolves to in-
vestigate the question of the railroad company's negligence. 
But to whom should the court assign the burden of proof 
upon this issue, the plaintiff or the defendant company? As 
we have suggested, the court might refer the problem to the 
law of the place of wrong, and assign the burden of proof 
to the plaintiff. But since the law of the forum contains a 
similar primary principle, raising the same issue of fact (was 
the defendant company guilty of negligence?), the court 
might decide to follow its own secondary rule requiring the 
company to show affirmatively that it was not guilty of neg-
ligence. 
A slightly different situation would be presented if the 
court of the forum were called upon to enforce a primary 
principle of the law of the place of wrong which could not 
be matched by any. duplicate doctrine of the local law. Here 
the possibility of using a secondary burden-of-proof rule 
derived from the local law would not be so apparent. Perhaps 
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the facts put in issue by the primary principle of the law of 
the place of wrong could be dealt with in the same fashion 
as some analogous factual issue defined by a primary principle 
of the law of the forum. But in the cases where this problem 
has come before the courts, they have taken the alternative 
course of adopting the appropriate secondary rule provided 
by the law of the place of wrong. 
Lemieux v. Boston, etc., R. Co.4 illustrates this situation. 
A workman, injured in Vermont, sued his employer in Massa-
chusetts. By the law of Vermont there could be no recovery 
in such a case if the harm was due to some danger of which 
the plaintiff had knowledge. Upon him rested the burden of 
showing that he did not know of the danger. By the law of 
Massachusetts there could be no recovery if the plaintiff 
voluntarily assumed the risk which produced his injury, a 
fact which the defendant was required to prove. It will be 
seen that the Massachusetts burden-of-proof rule concerned 
an issue of fact which was quite different from that raised 
by the law of Vermont. The law of Massachusetts really did 
not provide any rule for deciding which party should carry 
the burden of proof upon the single issue of plaintiff's knowl-
edge. The court applied the Vermont rule. The plaintiff 
was required to prove that he did not know of the danger 
which caused his injury. 
A somewhat subtler problem of the same kind was pre-
sented in Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co.5 In New York 
where the case was tried, contributory negligence is a complete 
bar to recovery. The onus rests with the plaintiff to prove 
that he was not guilty of such negligence. In Ontario, the 
place of wrong, contributory negligence is not an absolute 
defence; even though it be proved, the plaintiff is entitled 
•Lemieux v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (1914) 219 Mass. 399, 106 N. E. 992. 
"Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co., (1929) 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112. 
A New York federal court followed this decision in Jarrett v. Wabash R. Co., 
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1932) 57 F. (zd) 669. 
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to have a share of his damages paid by the defendant upon a 
comparative negligence basis. And the defendant is expected 
to establish the plaintiff's culpability. Here again it seems clear 
that the rules of law in the two states, defining the crucial 
issues of fact to be determined between the parties, were sub-
stantially different although they both contained the same 
symbol "contributory negligence." The New York rule 
requiring the plaintiff to show his own freedom from fault 
was never intended to be applied in conjunction with a rule 
of comparative negligence such as that prevailing in Ontario. 
Had the Ontario law coincided with the New York law in 
making the existence of contributory fault a complete bar to 
the plaintiff's recovery, the New York court would probably 
have substituted its ancillary doctrine for that of the Ontario 
courts and demanded that the plaintiff satisfy the court of 
his innocence. 6 But in view of the outstanding difference be-
tween the primary principles of law involved, the New York 
court held that the trial judge had properly charged the 
jury upon the burden of proof question in strict accord with 
the Ontario law. 
SECTION 35 
ARGUMENT FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF PLACE OF 
WRONG RESPECTING BURDEN OF PROOF 
In the previous section we observed the fact that it is very 
often possible to apply a rule of the forum in dealing with 
the burden of proving some fact put in issue by the law of 
the place of wrong.1 The law of the forum and the law of 
"See Wright v. Palmison, (1932) 237 App. Div. 22, 260 N.Y. Supp. 812; 
Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., (1893) 3 Misc. 224, 22 N.Y. Supp. 749; Clark 
v. Harnischfeger Sales Corp., (1933) 238 App. Div. 493, 264 N.Y. Supp. 873. 
1 Above at p. 156. 
On the subject of this section, see generally Hamshaw, "Conflict of Laws as 
to Presumptions and Burden of Proof," (1939) 4 Mo. L. REV. 299· 
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the place of wrong may concur in making ultimate liability 
depend upon some question of fact, such as: Was the defend-
ant guilty of negligence? Was the plaintiff guilty of con-
tributory negligence? Did the plaintiff assume the risk? 
If the forum and the state of wrong have different rules for 
dealing with the burden of proof upon the issue in question, 
the court of the forum may feel inclined to follow its own 
rule. Admitting that the law of the place of wrong should 
be allowed to prescribe that liability depends upon a certain 
issue of fact, the court of the forum may allow its own do-
mestic rule to say who should prove or disprove that fact. 
But although it may often be possible to apply a burden-
of-proof rule of the forum in foreign litigation, there are a 
number of reasons for arguing that the foreign burden-of-
proof rules should prevail. Such rules undoubtedly affect, 
in some degree, the strategic balance of power between the 
parties. In collision cases, where conflicting testimony is com-
mon, the burden of proof may become crucial. A rule of the 
law of the place of wrong affixing the burden of proof may, 
on occasion, reflect an important social policy which the forum 
should be concerned to recognize. And the fact that certain 
courts have adopted such principles from another jurisdiction 
suggests that it can easily be done.2 
Against such a course of action an argument of policy may 
be raised in one instance. Where the court of the forum habit-
ually employs a presumption of the type intended to obviate 
delay and uncertainty in settling the facts, it may be reluctant 
to abandon this expedient in the face of a contrary doctrine 
of the law of the place of wrong. Suppose A brings suit in 
state Y for injuries suffered in state X while riding on the B 
railroad. By the law of state X the plaintiff in such a suit must 
allege and prove the railroad company's negligence. But the 
courts of state Yin such cases always assume that the company 
was negligent until the company proves that it exercised due 
• See cases cited below. 
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care. The courts of state Y do this because their experience 
has lead them to believe that personal injuries to passengers 
or employees caused by the operation of railroads are gen-
erally the result of negligence on the part of the company 
or its servants. Hence this inference is made to save the 
time and trouble which the accumulation of full proof would 
entail. But if the courts of state Y apply the rule of state X 
requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant's negligence, 
they will have to abandon their helpful inference and under-
take an investigation of the B company's conduct. This they 
may well be unwilling to do.3 When the tort has been com-
mitted in Y, however, there is no reason why the courts of 
outside states should not act upon the state Y presumption 
in the interests of uniformity. 
Some little show of authority might be mustered to sup-
port the thesis that rules determining the incidence of the 
burden of persuasion are entitled to recognition by an out-
side forum4 whilst less effective rules are not. Rules assigning 
the burden of persuasion are, no doubt, more likely to affect 
the final result of a contest than those of less importance. But 
even the humblest presumption may carry the day for one 
of the parties on a proper state of the evidence. It may be 
doubted whether the slight advantage which might be gained 
by discarding the less significant foreign presumptions would 
be commensurate with the effort expended in applying the 
suggested distinction. 
In considering the various interests involved in a conflict 
• See Southern R. Co. v. Robertson, (1909) 7 Ga. App. 154, 66 S. E. 535, 
where a local presumption of this kind was applied. The point is also discussed 
in Precourt v. Driscoll, (1931) 85 N.H. 28o, 157 Atl. 525. 
4 In some cases where a foreign rule was applied the courts have stressed the 
fact that it fixed the risk of non-persuasion. See Hiatt v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 
(1925) 308 Mo. n, 27! s. W. 8o6; Olson v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., (1936) I3I 
Neb. 94, 267 N. W. 246. 
In a number of cases where the foreign rule was disregarded the courts stressed 
the fact that the local rule did not go so far as to alter the risk of non-persuasion. 
Levy v. Steiger, (1919) 233 Mass. 6oo, 124 N. E. 477; Gould v. Boston & M. 
R. Co., (1931) 276 Mass. 114, 176 N. E. 8o7. 
162 TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
of rules governing the burden of proof we shall have to make 
our customary distinction. The substitution of the forum's 
rule for that of the state of wrong may assist either (a) the 
plaintiff or (b) the defendant. Let us consider the first situa-
tion. The application of the forum's rule assists the plaintiff. 
The very statement of the problem suggests the unfairness 
of allowing the plaintiff to increase his chances of recovery 
by "catching" the defendant in such a forum. Choice-of-law 
policies emphatically require that the rule of the place of 
wrong and not that of the forum be applied. Opposed to 
choice-of-law policies may be the court's conviction that it 
cannot abandon its own rule without undue procedural in-
convemence. 
It has been suggested that a way out of this dilemma might 
be found by resorting to the expedient of the Slater case.5 If 
the court of the forum cannot see its way clear to follow the 
foreign rule, and the application of the local rule would se-
riously prejudice the defendant, the court might simply dis-
miss the action without determining its merits. Such a result 
seems preferable to forcing upon the defendant a burden of 
proof which the proper law would not have put upon him. 
But the suggested solution does not seem to have been adopted 
in any reported case. 
Let us consider some species of local burden-of-proof 
rules, which may jeopardize a defendant's position. At the 
present day it is not uncommon to find statutes, forming 
part of the forum's internal law, which provide that, under 
certain circumstances, a defendant shall be presumed guilty of 
negligence unless he makes the contrary appear. A passenger 
is injured in a railway train. The railway company is pre-
sumed to have been guilty of negligence. An employee is in-
jured by defective machinery. His employer is presumed to 
0 See CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 595, comment a; Precourt 
v. Driscoll, (1931) 85 N.H. 28o, 157 Atl. 525. 
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have been negligent. Such rules raise a presumption which 
the defendant must rebut. They must be carefully distin-
guished from rules which say that certain acts constitute neg-
ligence per se. The defendant cannot overcome the effect of 
a rule of the latter type by adducing evidence to show that he 
was not negligent. A rule of this type is not a burden-of-proof 
rule; it is what we have called a primary rule of law. It directs 
that certain facts, if proved, shall have certain legal conse-
quences. 6 Such rules are sometimes said to raise a conclusive 
or irrebuttable presumption of negligence. This description 
is accurate enough, but by introducing the idea of a presump-
tion it may lead to confusion. 
Our concern here is with the type of rule which raises a 
rebuttable presumption of negligence upon certain basic facts. 
We assume such a rule to be in force at the forum. The law 
of the place of wrong makes the defendant's liability turn 
upon the issue of negligence. If the court of the forum brings 
its domestic presumption into play, it will give the plaintiff 
a special advantage which be ought not to obtain. Neverthe-
less, this has been done in several cases. 7 The courts which 
followed their local presumption gave no explanation for 
doing so beyond the statement that the presumption "re-
lates to the remedy." 
One of the most important species of burden-of-proof 
rules consists of rules concerning the issue of contributory neg-
ligence. It often happens that both the forum and the state 
of wrong concur in making the plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence an absolute bar to his recovery. Yet the law of the 
state of wrong assigns to the plaintiff the duty of clearing 
himself, whilst the law of the forum requires the defendant 
to prove the plaintiff's culpability. Which doctrine should the 
6 See above, sections 2 3, 2 5. 
7 Pennsylvania Co. v. McCann, (1896) 54 Ohio St. to, 42 N. E. 768; Rastede 
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1927) 203 Iowa 430, 212 N. W. 751; Richmond, etc., 
R. Co. v. Mitchell, (r893) 92 Ga. 77> r8 S. E. 290. 
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court adopt? It could scarcely be urged, as a reason for adopt-
ing the doctrine of the forum, that it was a trusted inference 
employed by the courts to eliminate the task of adducing 
more complete proof. Judicial experience never compelled a 
court to conclude either that plaintiffs are usually guilty of 
contributory negligence, or that they are usually innocent. 
Neither rule can be regarded as a rational inference crystal-
lized for convenience into a rule of law.8 
To apply the rule of the forum and so require the de-
fendant to bear a burden which the law of the place of wrong 
would not have put upon him would seem to be unfair to the 
defendant. Nevertheless, this has been done in a good many 
cases.9 The great weight of authority supports the view that 
the ordinary rule of the forum should allocate the burden 
of proof upon the issue of contributory fault. 
In Precourt v. Driscoll 10 the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire took the contrary view which, if we may say so 
with respect, appears to be the more reasonable one. Vermont 
was the state of wrong. Under the New Hampshire practice, 
the defendant was required to prove the plaintiff's contrib-
utory negligence. In Vermont the plaintiff would have been 
expected to prove himself free from fault. The New Hamp-
8 The same point is made in a different way by Allen J., in Precourt v. 
Driscoll, (1931) 85 N.H. 28o, 157 Atl. 525. ' 
"Sapone v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I927) I30 Misc. 755, 225 N.Y. Supp. 
2 II (see semble, where the rule affected risk of non-persuasion, Schrader v. 
New York, etc., R. Co., (1930) 254 N.Y. I48, I72 N. E. 272); Levy v. 
Steiger, (I9I9) 233 Mass. 6oo, I24 N, E. 477; Gould v. Boston & M. R. Co., 
(193I) 276 Mass. I14, I76 N. E. 807; Menard v. Goltra, (I93I) 328 Mo. 
368, 40 S. W. (2d) I053; Holland v. Boston & M. R. Co., (1932) 279 Mass. 
342, I81 N. E. 217; Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co. v. Vandenberg, 
(1905) I64 Ind. 470, 73 N. E. 990; Midland Trail Bus Lines v. Martin, 
(I935) Ioo Ind. App. 206, I94 N. E. 862; Jenkins v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 
(I9I4) I24 Minn. 368, I45 N. W. 40; Jones v. Louisiana, etc., R. Co., (I922 
Tex. Com. App.) 243 S. W. 976; Smith v. Wabash R. Co., (I895) I4I Ind. 92• 
40 N. E. 270 (semble, a special rule for railway crossing accidents). 
10 Precourt v. Driscoll, (193I) 85 N.H. 28o, I57 Atl. 525. See also Olson v. 
Omaha, etc., R. Co., (I936) I3I Neb. 94, 267 N. W. 246. 
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shire court adopted the Vermont rule saying (in the course 
of a lengthy opinion): 
"It appears that the procedural rule in Vermont as to 
the burden of proof of contributory negligence is indispen-
sable to the enforcement of the substantive rule, and is es-
tablished in conformity with it. The procedural rule is inci-
dental to it, effectuates it, and in a real sense is part and 
parcel of it. The substantive rule in an exceptional way em-
braces the procedural rule as an inseparable corollary of it. 
"The usual distinctions are so merged that, if they were 
made, the substantive rule would become invalid in the alter-
ation of its character which the observance of the distinc-
tions would impose. An element of the cause of action would 
be destroyed, and the allowance of the non-existence of the 
element as a defence would not restore it. Whatever technical 
comparisons may be made, the practical result of the enforce-
ment of the local burden of proof rule would be to substitute 
a domestic cause of action for that sought to be enforced." 
In this passage the court is obviously pouring new wine 
into old bottles. In the face of earlier authority, the court 
hesitates to say that the Vermont rule is not procedural. Yet 
it is strongly convinced that the Vermont rule ought to be 
enforced at the forum if the plaintiff's cause of action is to 
be defined in any real, practical sense by the law of Vermont. 
Let us turn now to our second problem situation: the 
substitution of the forum's burden-of-proof rule for that of 
the state of wrong assists the defendant. Here there is not, 
perhaps, such a strong element of unfairness in applying the 
rule of the forum. If the plaintiff's chances of success are di-
minished, he has only himself to blame for choosing this 
forum. However, it is still desirable, from the point of view of 
choice-of-law policies, that the rule of the place of wrong 
should prevail. 
We have already considered rules which create a pre-
sumption of negligence upon certain basic facts. A rule of 
166 TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
this kind forming part of the law of the place of wrong gives 
the plaintiff a certain advantage. It is desirable that he should 
retain that advantage in other jurisdictions. Some courts 
have reached this result by giving rules of this type the same 
treatment which they would receive in their home state.11 
Other courts have excluded such rules from consideration.12 
The law of the place of wrong may allocate the burden 
of proving contributory negligence in such a way as to favour 
the plaintiff. But if the forum's rule requires that the plaintiff 
should affirmatively show his freedom from fault, the de-
fendant will try to have the local rule applied. There does 
not appear to be any good reason for excluding the rule of the 
state of wrong upon this point. But in a number of cases this 
has been done. 13 There is also authority for the position that 
if the law of the place of wrong would make the defendant 
prove contributory fault, the court of the forum should do 
likewise. 14 
n Rule of the law of the place of wrong applied: 
Negligence of defendant railroad company presumed from fact of injury to 
the plaintiff. Hiatt v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1925) 308 Mo. 77, 271 S. W. 
8o6; Ramey v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (1929) 323 Mo. 662, 21 S. W. (2d) 873. 
Negligence of defendant railway company presumed from failure to give re-
quired signals. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan, (1903) 31 Ind. App. 597, 
68 N. E. 923. 
Burden of proving absence of negligence placed upon employer in action 
brought by employee. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves, (C. C. A. 5th, 19 3 7) 
89 F. (2d) 528. 
12 Rule of the law of the place of wrong excluded: 
Negligence of defendant railroad company presumed from fact of injury to 
plaintiff. Helton v. Alabama, etc., R. Co., (1893) 97 Ala. 275, 12 So. 276. 
Defendant's negligence presumed from rate of speed at which he was travel-
ling. Johnson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1894) 91 Iowa 248, 59 N. W. 66; 
Smith v. Wabash R. Co., (1895) 141 Ind. 92, 40 N. E. 270; Davis Cabs v. 
Evans, (1932) 42 Ohio App. 493, 182 N. E. 327; Kingery v. Donnell, (1936) 
222 Iowa 241, 268 N. W. 617; Collins v. McClure, (1939) 63 Ohio App. 
312, 26 N. E. (2d) 780. 
Defendant's negligence presumed from defective machinery. Jones v. Chi-
cago, etc., R. Co., (19oo) 8o Minn. 488, 83 N. W. 446. 
13 Kingery v. Donnell, (1936) 222 Iowa 241, 268 N. W. 617; Wright v. 
Palmison, (1932) 237 App. Div. 22, 260 N. Y. Supp. 812; Geoghegan v. 
Atlas S. S. Co., (1893) 3 Misc. 224,22 N.Y. Supp. 749; Clark v. Harnis-
chfeger Sales Corp., (1933) 238 App. Div. 493, 264 N.Y. Supp. 873. · 
"Reilly v. Pepe, (1928) 108 Conn. 436, 143 Atl. 568; Southern R. Co. v. 
Robertson, (1909) 7 Ga. App. 154, 66 S. E. 535· 
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Something should be said at this point regarding a species 
of rules which, although not classically included in the 
category of presumptions, possess one of the most important 
attributes of presumptions in that they enable one of the 
parties to avoid a directed verdict. In common-law juris-
dictions it is customary for trial and appellate courts to re-
verse any finding of fact, made by a jury, which they do not 
believe to be supported by a reasonable quantum of evidence. 
In the process of supervising and testing the work of juries, 
a court will sometimes build up, by the accumulation of de-
cisions, a general theory that fact B is sufficient evidence 
from which a jury might properly infer fact A. Thus, if a 
proponent charged with the burden of adducing enough 
evidence of fact A to get before the jury, succeeds in produc-
ing the necessary minimum of evidence to prove fact B, he 
will be held to have fulfilled his original duty relative to fact 
A. Unlike a presumption, however, such a theory merely 
enables the proponent to obtain the jury's opinion upon the 
existence of fact A; it casts no obligation upon the opponent 
to adduce some quantity of evidence in rebuttal. 
What should be the status of such rules in conflict of laws 
litigation? No doubt they may materially assist the pro-
ponent of an issue upon which the evidence is scanty and 
ought, when they form part of the law of the place of wrong, 
to be taken into consideration. There is some authority for 
this view.15 By the same token, an habitual inference derived 
from the decisions of the forum ought to be ignored. It may 
be difficult, however, for a court to put out of mind a rational 
conclusion which it has already drawn from similar data in 
its previous opinions.16 
15 Rapers v. Holmes, (1937) 292 Ill. App. II6, 10 N. E. (2d) 707; Jarrett 
v. Wabash R. Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932) 57 F. (2d) 669 (semble). 
Contra: Clodfelter v. Wells, (1938) 212 N.C. 823, 195 S. E. 11. 
"'Usual inference of local law applied: Harrison v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
Co., (1915) 168 N.C. 382, 84 S. E. 519. See also Kingery v. Donnell, (1936) 
222 Iowa 241, 268 N. W. 617 (dictum?). 
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SECTION 36 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF UPON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
The attitude of the federal courts to the burden of proof 
on the contributory negligence issue requires separate con-
sideration. Let us approach the question historically. When 
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 1 was in flower there was no 
difficulty. The burden of proof upon an issue of contributory 
negligence was classified as part of the "general federal com-
mon law." The divergent opinions of state courts were ig-
nored. All federal courts followed the uniform federal rule 
laid down by the Supreme court. 2 And this rule assigned 
the burden of proving contributory negligence to the defend-
ant. But since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 3 (I938) the federal 
courts no longer administer a general common law. They 
must, in compliance with the Judiciary Act of 1789 (sec-
tion 34), follow the common law as well as the statute law 
of "the several States." Hence the federal courts are no 
longer free to adopt a uniform federal rule governing the 
burden of proving contributory negligence on the ground 
that it is part of the federal common law. 
The federal courts have, however, a uniform code of rules 
of procedure, authorized by an act of Congress and promul-
gated in 1938.4 The act which authorized the Supreme Court 
to prescribe these rules stipulates that they "shall neither 
1 Swift v. Tyson, (1842) 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) r. 
2 Hough v. Railway Co., (1879) roo U.S. 213, 2.2.5; Central Vermont R. Co. 
v. White, (1914) 238 U.S. so7, 35 Sup. Ct. 865. 
3 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 81 7· 
• The rules are printed as a supplement to U. S. C. A. following title 2. 8, 
section 723b. 
The constituent statute is 48 Stat. (1934) 1064, 28 U. S.C. (1934) § 72.3b. 
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abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any 
litigant." Rule 8 (c) of the code might be thought to provide 
that the defendant to a suit in a federal court must assume 
the duty of pleading and proving the plaintiff's contributory 
negligence. But in several cases where the applicable state 
law required the plaintiff to prove his freedom from con-
tributory fault, lower federal courts have refused to accept 
the view that rule 8 (c) affects the burden of proof, on the 
ground that the rule would then affect the substantive rights 
of the parties which must be determined by the state law.5 
These federal courts take the view that a state rule which 
makes it necessary for the plaintiff to show his freedom from 
fault transcends the procedural category and affects sub-
stantive rights. Such a state rule therefore comes within the 
scope and policy of section 34 of the Judiciary Act and is 
obligatory upon federal courts. 
If we adopt the position that the federal rules of court do 
not touch the burden of proof in relation to contributory 
negligence and that the federal courts must be guided by state 
laws, a further problem arises. To illustrate, suppose A is 
injured by Bin state X. He brings suit against Bin a federal 
court in state Y. Should the federal court, in dealing with 
the burden of proof on a contributory negligence issue, adopt 
the rule of state Y which is the forum, or the rule of state X 
where the injury was received? From the standpoint of 
choice-of-law policies it is desirable that the law of state X 
(the state of wrong) should prevaiJ.6 But since the Supreme 
Court's decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.7 
"Schopp v. Muller Dairies, (D. C. N.Y., I938) 25 F. Supp. so; Francis v. 
Humphrey, (D. C. Ill., I938) 25 F. Supp. I; Sampson v. Channell, (C. C. A. 
Ist, I94o) IIO F. (2d) 754· 
See Note, (1939) 37 MICH. L. REV. 1249; Note, (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 
1472· 
• See section 35· 
7 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., (1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 1020. 
See section I o, above. 
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the federal court's choice-of-law would appear to be a choice 
in name only. This decision requires federal courts to adhere 
strictly to the conflict of laws rulings of their home states. 
Hence the treatment of the burden of proof by the federal 
court sitting in state Y will depend upon the views entertained 
by the state Y state courts. 8 If the state courts would, in the 
instant case, apply their local burden-of-proof rule, the fed-
eral court will do likewise. If the state courts would, in the 
instant case, apply state X's burden-of-proof rule, the federal 
court will do likewise. 
8 See Sampson v. Channell, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) 110 F. (zd) 754· 
CHAPTER VII 
Multiple Contact Cases: Introductory 
Discussion 
SECTION 37 
APPLICATION OF ONE OR OF SEVERAL CHOICE-OF-LAW 
PRINCIPLES 
HITHERTO in our discussion we have only dealt with cases in which the operative facts occurred within the bounds of a single jurisdiction, the state 
of wrong. The problems with which we were concerned all 
arose from the circumstance that the litigation to determine 
the legal consequences of those facts had been instituted in 
another jurisdiction, the forum. However, conflict of laws 
cas~s are not all as simple as this. Courts are often confronted 
by cases in which the very operative facts themselves are 
spread over two or even more jurisdictions whose internal laws 
are different. For example, A, blasting rock in state X, causes 
a piece of rock to fly over into state Y and injure B who is 
standing there. A has not been guilty of any negligence. U n-
der the internal law of state X, A is liable to B whether he 
has been negligent or not. Under the internallaw of state Y, 
B cannot recover without proving negligence. Can B recover 
damages? Another example, A injures Bin state X. B signs 
a contract in state Y releasing A from all liability. Such con-
tracts are void under the internal law of state Y, valid under 
the internal law of state X. Can B recover damages from A? 
For the sake of convenience we venture to call cases of this 
kind "multiple contact cases" because the facts make signifi-
cant contacts with a number of jurisdictions. But there is an-
other important element in these cases besides their multi-
plicity of contacts which makes them difficult to decide; the 
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internal laws of various jurisdictions concerned are differ-
ent. If, in either of these examples, the laws of state X and 
state Y were identical, there would be no problem. We could 
determine the legal effect of the operative facts according 
to the law of either state and the results would be the same. 
But when the two relevant laws are different, we are forced to 
resolve the "conflict of laws." In other words, there are two 
essential elements in a multiple contact problem: (I) multiple 
contacts and ( 2) different laws. 
In solving multiple contact cases the courts appear to 
have used two formal techniques. One of these techniques 
involves the application of a single choice-of-law principle 
in such a manner as to select the law of one of the various 
jurisdictions and exclude the laws of the others. This tech-
nique would very likely be used in the "rock blasting" ex-
ample above. An American court would probably decide the 
case according to the law of state Y where the injury occurred 
and ignore the law of state X where the defendant acted. The 
single choice-of-law principle applied would be that the law 
of the place of wrong determines liability in tort. This prin-
ciple does not, as stated, carry us very far because "place of 
wrong" means "place where the acts and events of which the 
plaintiff complains occurred." 1 That description would in-
clude either state X or state Y. But, for reasons which we 
shall discuss later, the case would probably be handled as 
if both the blasting and the injury had happened in state Y. 
The law of state X would not have any effect upon the :final 
decision.2 
The second formal technique which the courts adopt in 
1 See above, p. xvii. 
• For discussion, with special reference to torts, of the solution of multiple 
contact cases in terms of a single choice-of-law principle, see: Lorenzen, "Tort 
Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (1931) 47 LAW QuARTERLY REV. 483, 
491; Cook, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (1935) 35 CoL. L. REV. 
202; Magruder and Grout, "Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdic-
tion," (192.6) 35 YALE L. ]. 395; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 165, 
182. 
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multiple contact cases involves the use of two or even more 
choice-of-law principles. Through the operation of these 
choice-of-law principles, each of the relevant laws is per-
mitted to govern a particular aspect of the case in hand. We 
should probably find this technique employed in the "injury 
and release" example above. The injury having been inflicted 
in state X, the law of that state would be allowed to determine 
the nature and extent of A's liability in tort. But since the 
contract of release was signed in state Y, its law would be 
allowed to determine the validity and effect of the release. 
This would be the court's general theoretical approach to the 
problem. Probably the contract of release, being void under 
the internal law of the place where it was made, would be 
treated as having no legal effect in any forum. The theory 
of this second technique, employing two or more choice-of-
law principles, is that no one body of law should regulate the 
entire series of transactions. Questions of tort liability are 
referred to the law of the place of wrong; questions relating 
to the effect of the contractual transaction are referred to the 
law of the place of contracting.3 
The operation of this second technique, involving more 
than one choice-of-law principle, may be illustrated by an-
other example. A buys a railway ticket in state X. During the 
journey he is injured in state Y. He brings suit against the 
railroad company. Upon the facts of the case, A has a good 
cause of action against the railroad company under the in-
ternal law of state X; he has no cause of action under the 
internal law of state Y. By what law should the case be gov-
erned? In favour of the law of state Y it may be urged that 
the law of the place of wrong usually defines the defend-
ant's liability in tort. But since the contract of carriage was 
8 For a general discussion of the solution of multiple contact cases in terms 
of several choice-of-law principles, see: STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS ( 193 7) 
182; Note, (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1233; Rheinstein, "Comparative Law and 
Conflict of Laws in Germany," (1935) 2 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 232, 265. 
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made in state X, its law might be permitted to determine 
how the contract should be performed. Some courts have 
held that in such cases they will apply both choice-of-law 
principles. 4 The law of state Y will determine whether the 
plaintiff has any claim in tort; the law of state X will deter-
mine whether he has any claim for breach of contract. 
The case of Burkett v. Globe Indemn#y Co.5 exemplifies 
a problem to which either of the two formal techniques which 
we have discussed might have been applied with the same 
result. A, an automobile repairman, was commissioned by B 
to repair B's automobile in Louisiana. A left the car in such 
a dangerous condition that while B was driving it in Alabama, 
it ran off the road and injured C. C brought an action against 
A for damages. The court referred the question of A's liabil-
ity to C to the law of Louisiana and awarded damages to C. 
Now we could explain this decision as an illustration of the 
first technique by saying that that court regarded Louisiana, 
where the car was negligently repaired, as the place of wrong. 
It therefore chose Louisiana law, as the proper law to de-
termine A's liability to C in tort. 
However, there is a good deal of authority for the view 
that when a negligent act, done in one state, causes injury 
in another, the law of the state of injury should be applied 
exclusively, i.e., that state is the place of wrong. On this view, 
the law of Louisiana ought not to be chosen, since the injury 
occurred in Alabama. If pressed with this argument, we could 
explain the result reached in Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co. 
as an application of the second technique. This involves the 
use of two choice-of-law principles. One choice-of-law prin-
ciple directs that the law of the place of wrong governs all 
questions of tort liability. The weight of authority supports 
the view that "place of wrong" means "place of injury." 
• See below, p. I 92. 
• Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (I 93 8) I 82 Miss. 423, I 8 I So. 3 I 6. 
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Hence the law of Alabama will decide whether C has any 
cause of action against A for the wrong or tort. But we may 
invoke another choice-of-law theory; the effect of a contract 
is to be determined by the law of the place of contracting. A's 
failure to repair B's car properly was a breach of the contract 
for the repairs, made between A and B in Louisiana. This con-
tract was also breached by A in Louisiana. That breach caused 
injury to C. May not the law of Louisiana be permitted to 
impose a liability upon A in favour of C, arising out of this 
breach of contract? Thus we have two arguable theories, each 
based upon a different choice-of-law principle, to explain the 
court's reference to Louisiana law. 
SECTION 38 
CHOICE-OF-LAW POLICIES IN MULTIPLE CONTACT CASES 
In the subsequent sections of this work we shall examine 
in detail a number of different types of multiple contact cases. 
Before doing so, however, it may be useful to discuss in a 
somewhat general fashion the various social interests which 
are likely to come into play in such cases. Such a discussion will 
facilitate the more detailed treatment of particular problems 
later on. 
As a preliminary point it should be noted that, in a mul-
tiple contact case, the forum may be one of the states with 
which the operative facts are connected. This circumstance 
does not in itself alter the character of the choice-of-law 
problem. But in practice it will be found that the court of 
the forum is likely to give more careful and favourable con-
sideration to the policies of its own local law. For example, 
the legislature of state X exacts a workmen's compensation law 
making employers responsible for the costs of industrial acci-
dents. An employee who does most of his work in state Y is 
injured in state X while performing some temporary service 
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there. He applies for compensation in state X. In dealing 
with this type of multiple contact case, the court will doubt-
less take into account the general choice-of-law principles 
governing wrongs and breaches of contractual relations. But 
the most important factor in determining the issue will prob-
ably be the court's opinion regarding the policies and purposes 
of the local compensation law. 
In section I I, above, we discussed at some length the sig-
nificance of "uniformity" as a juristic ideal in the conflict of 
laws. It is most desirable that when certain transactions give 
rise to a controversy between two parties, one of those parties 
should not be able to gain an advantage by commencing liti-
gation in one jurisdiction rather than another. All courts 
should cooperate, as far as possible, in the application of 
choice-of-law principles, so that wherever the dispute may 
be litigated the result will be approximately the same. This 
ideal is not completely realized in present-day practice, but 
American courts have achieved a considerable degree of suc-
cess in minimizing the improper advantages to be gained 
by suing in particular jurisdictions. 
These considerations apply to multiple contact cases quite 
as much as to others. Hence a court, confronted by a multiple 
contact problem, ought to give most careful consideration 
to the decisions which have been handed down by the courts 
of other jurisdictions in dealing with identical or closely 
analogous problems. This practice is regularly followed by 
courts in the United States with regard to decisions given 
by the courts of other American states. It has enabled them 
to build up a fairly uniform conflict of laws jurisprudence. 
It may be conceded, however, that at least some species 
of multiple contact cases are rather rare. When a case of 
this kind occurs there may be no existing precedent which can 
be said to have established a uniform standard of decision. 
The court will then be free to give full play to other social 
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interests besides that of uniformity. It is impossible to pursue 
uniformity until some pattern has been set up to which we 
may conform. But even if such a pattern has been set up by 
prior decisions it will be no great matter if, in a rare type of 
case, a particular court refuses to follow it. Because where the 
problem presented is an uncommon one, a lack of consistency 
in its solution from state to state will affect only a small class 
of persons. For example, a statute is passed in state X imposing 
very strict liability upon all persons who set out fires. A sets 
out a fire in state X which spreads into state Y and causes con-
siderable damage to B's property in state Y. B sues A in state 
X. Now the prevailing doctrine in such cases is that the law 
of the state where the damage occurred should govern the 
defendant's liability. But if the court of state X decides to 
disregard the prevailing doctrine and apply its own law, the 
law of the place where the defendant acted, no great harm 
will be done. Such a ruling, even if followed in other cases 
will only affect the comparatively small group of persons 
who set out fires in one state and so cause injury in another. 
And even they are not likely to be affected if they can keep 
themselves and their property out of state X. If, on the other 
hand, the court of state X had undertaken to apply its local 
statute to all cases of damage by fire wherever they occurred, 
such a decision would be highly objectionable from the con-
flict of laws point of view. 
In other words, although uniformity is always a matter 
for consideration in multiple contact cases, its significance is 
liable to be diminished by the fact that the solution of unusual 
cases of this type will affect only a small class of persons. 
Uniformity and predictability are not the sole objectives in 
the conflict of laws. Cases may arise in which a court will 
deem it desirable to depart from the established pattern of 
decision in order to protect some other social interest. If, 
however, no other important social interest appears to be at 
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stake, uniformity will remain, as always, our principal ob-
jective in the conflict of laws. 
In the ordinary case where all the operative facts are 
located in a single state, we refer the question of defendant's 
liability in tort to the law of that state because it appears to 
have the greatest social interest in the matter.1 In a multiple 
contact case, where the operative facts are spread over sev-
eral states, one or more of these states may be said to have 
an interest in the outcome of the controversy.2 And in some 
cases these interests may conflict with one another. Thus, 
in our "fire spreading" example, it is clear that the govern-
ment of state Y, where the damage occurred, has an interest 
in the protection of persons or property within its borders. 
At the same time state X, where the acts causing the damage 
occurred, has also an interest in determining the legal conse-
quences of the entire series of acts and events. The govern-
ment of state X may desire to regulate the conduct of persons 
who set out fires there. It may desire to impose a liability upon 
such persons if they carry on their operations in such a manner 
as to produce serious injury to others, even though the injury 
occurs in some other state. 
In this case it would probably be an exaggeration to say 
that the policies of state X and state Y regarding the setting 
out of fires conflict with one another. The law of state X im-
poses a somewhat stricter liability than the law of state Y but 
there is no need to assume that this strict liability is contrary 
to the policy of state Y. However, in some multiple contact 
cases it may be a matter of importance to one state that a lia-
1 See above, p. 6 r. 
•on this point see STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 182; Lorenzen, 
"Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (1931) 47 LAW QuARTERLY REV, 
483, 493; Note, (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1233. 
A similar problem arises in the field of criminal law. Almost any of the states 
connected with an interstate crime are likely to mete out justice to the wrong-
doer according to their own laws. See STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL LAWS 
(1936) 46; BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. r, p. 315. 
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bility should not be imposed. For example, the law of state 
X creates a privilege in favour of certain acts such as shooting 
criminals to prevent their escape or inflicting injury to save 
a human life. The law of state Y does not recognize these de-
fences. If a person, doing one of these acts in state X, produces 
injurious consequences in state Y, the policies of the two 
states will, in a measure, come into conflict with one another. 
The court of the forum will have to choose between them. 3 
Let us consider another example. A injures B in state X. 
B signs a contract in state Y which releases A from all liability 
for the injuries. This contract is quite valid under the law of 
state Y but a statute of state X purports to make such releases 
absolutely void. Now state Y has an interest in prescribing 
the validity and effect of contracts made there. But state X 
has also some interest in extending contract-proof protection 
to persons who have been injured within its borders. Hence 
the policies of the two states are, to some extent, opposed to 
one another. 
It is not suggested, of course, that in all multiple contact 
cases each of the states involved has of necessity a vital inter-
est in the outcome of the litigation. All we desire to indicate 
is that in such cases the interests of the states involved may 
have to be taken into consideration. 
Where the forum is one of the states connected with a case, 
its claim to impose or eliminate liability is likely to receive 
very careful consideration. The same sympathetic treatment 
ought also to be given to the claims of other states. But there 
is no need for the court of the forum to give the laws of 
other states any more ample recognition than that which they 
would receive at home. To illustrate, A, who is shooting in 
state X, accidentally injures Bin state Y. There is no negli-
gence or want of care upon A's part. Under the internal law 
of state X, B can recover; under that of state Y, he cannot. B 
3 See the CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 382. 
18o TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
brings suit against A in state Y. Since A was physically present 
in state X at the time of the shooting, state X has some claim 
to determine the legal effect of A's conduct. The court of state 
Y might feel inclined, in the absence of some clear domestic 
policy to the contrary, to give effect to the law of state X by 
imposing liability upon A. Suppose, however, it was shown 
that, in a case identical with this one, the court of state X would 
not apply its own internal law but would apply that of state Y. 
If the court of state X would not apply its own law to such a 
case, there is no reason why the court of state Y should do so. 
The court of state X is the best judge of that state's interests 
and policies. 4 
In such a case as this, the fact that the court of state X 
would apply the law of state Y is probably a good reason 
for the court of state Y to do the same thing. By following the 
precedent set by the court of state X, the court of state Y is 
helping to achieve the choice-of-law ideal of uniformity in all 
jurisdictions. The parties receive the same treatment in the 
court of state Y as they would have received in the court of 
state X. 
This solution of the problem should not be regarded as a 
general approval of the renvoi doctrine. Under the circum-
stances of the problem supposed, a reference to the total law 
of state X and a renvoi to the internal law of state Y would 
doubtless reach the same result. But the solution which we 
have suggested is not derived from any general theory of "do 
renvoi" or "don't renvoi." It is based upon the idea that if 
a certain state refuses to apply its own internal law to a par-
ticular type of multiple contact cases, it cannot be said that 
other states ought to make such an application out of respect 
for the interest of the state in question. They may safely as-
• See The Vestris, (D. C. N. Y., 193 I) 53 F. (2d) 847 (vessel of British 
registry sinking on the high seas; American court held, following British de-
cisions, that British loading regulations did not govern such cases). 
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sume that the state in question has no real interest in the 
solution of such cases, and proceed to adopt what appears to be 
the uniform practice. 
SECTION 39 
THE THEORY OF CAUSATION APPLIED IN MULTIPLE CONTACT 
CASES 
A theory which is somewhat analogous to that of prox-
imate cause in internal tort law has been invoked in certain 
multiple contact cases to exclude the application of the law 
of a particular state. Perhaps the best-known example is found 
in the "automobile owner's liability" cases. A, an automobile 
owner, lends his car toBin state X. B drives the car into state 
Y and while operating the car there, injures C. C brings an 
action against A. Under the internal law of state Y, A is 
vicariously liable to C for injuries inflicted by the operation 
of his car; under the internal law of state X, A is not liable 
to C. In favour of the application of the law of state Y, it 
may be said that state Y has an interest in prescribing the con-
ditions respecting civil liability which will govern the use 
of automobiles on its highways. But in favour of A it may be 
argued that his liability ought not to depend upon the law 
of state Y because he did not cause the car to be taken there. 
The only reason for making A liable under the law of state 
Y is that his car was involved in an injury there. The causal 
connection between A's act of lending the car to B and the car 
being in state Y is so remote that it seems unfair to make A 
liable under the law of state Y. 
To put the argument in another form; if B while driving 
the car in state X had injured C there, most persons would 
think it rather harsh to subject A to liability for a violation 
of the laws of state Y. From A's point of view, the case is not 
different when C is hurt in state Y because A had nothing 
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to do with the car being in state Y. It was B, not A, who took 
the car into state Y. This argument has made so much im-
pression on the courts which have dealt with the problem that 
they have adopted a via media. Although applying the law 
of state Y, they indicate (some more explicitly than others) 
that the automobile owner (A) must be shown to have given 
an express or implied consent to the use of his car in state Y.1 
It should be observed that the idea of causation as it affects 
this conflict of laws problem is different from the idea of 
causation in ordinary internal tort law. In the latter context 
we are called upon to decide whether a person should be liable 
for certain harmful events. It is customary to require some 
causal connection between that person's act and the harmful 
events in question. In the conflict of laws situation we are 
called upon to decide whether a person should be subjected 
to liability under the law of a particular state. If the person 
has not entered the state in question, it is suggested that 
we should require some degree of causal connection between 
his act and the fact that certain events have occurred in that 
state. In brief, we are concerned for conflicts purposes, not 
with the relation of an act to events, but with the relation of 
an act to the location of events. 
' To make this distinction clearer and further illuminate 
the significance of the causation conception in conflict of laws 
let us consider another example. Suppose A injures B in state 
X. B is removed into state Y and dies there. The question is 
raised whether A's liability to B or to B's dependents should 
be determined by the law of state Y. Now the causal con-
nection between A's act and B's death may be perfectly clear 
and satisfactory. But the connection between A's act and the 
fact that B died in state Y seems very vague and remote. A 
might be in no way responsible for the location of the death 
which might be due to the act of B himself or of some third 
1 See below, p. 237. 
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party. There would be an element of unfairness to A in mak-
ing his liability depend upon these circumstances which have 
so little relation to his original act. Hence the courts which 
have been confronted by this problem have unanimously de-
clined to make any reference to the law of the place of death.2 
SECTION 40 
THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION IN MULTIPLE CONTACT 
CASES 
In introducing the topic of multiple contact cases we sug-
gested that these cases, like all other cases which come be-
fore the courts, involve a pattern of operative facts. But these 
cases are peculiar in that the pattern of facts is spread over 
a number ofjurisdictions whose laws are different, a state of 
affairs which raises the question, "which law or laws is to be 
applied?" 
In dealing with these cases the courts sometimes adopt the 
law of one state to determine the legal effect of the entire 
series of transactions. The other laws are excluded from 
consideration. A second technique, not infrequently em-
ployed, is to make a selection of legal rules from each of the 
relevant laws, by using several choice-of-law principles. No 
one body of law is allowed to determine all the legal conse-
quences of the fact situation. 
When there appears to be a possibility of applying two 
or more choice-of-law principles to a set of operative facts, 
the problem may be stated as a problem of classification (char-
acterization, qualification). To illustrate this point we may 
use an example which we considered in section 3 8. Suppose A 
2 See below, p. 25 5· 
For a discussion of the theory of causation in relation to the selection of a 
proper law for torts cases, see BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. z, 
p. 1296; Cheatham, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws," 
(1936) 21 CoRN. L. Q. 570,580. 
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injures Bin state X. B signs a contract in state Y which re-
leases A from all liability for the injuries. According to 
choice-of-law principles the internal law of state X governs 
matters of tort liability, the internal law of state Y determines 
the legal effect of the contract. We find that the contract of 
release is valid under the internal law of state Y (where it 
was signed) but void under the internal law of state X (where 
the injury occurred). Thus we have a rule of the internal law 
of state X which is contrary to a corresponding rule of the in-
ternal law of state Y. Which rule ought to prevail? The 
formal problem of classification might be stated in any one of 
three ways: does state X's rule avoiding the contract belong to 
the category of tort or to the category of contract? does state 
Y's rule upholding the contract belong to the category of tort 
or to the category of contract? does the subject-matter of these 
rules (contracts releasing tort claims) belong to the category 
of tort or to the category of contract? But the actual problem 
is always the same irrespective of the form in which it is 
stated; the court must decide which of the two conflicting 
rules shall govern the decision. This accounts for the fact that 
writers who employ this terminology sometimes appear to be 
classifying different things. 1 
These three formulae which state the problem in terms 
of a classification do not provide us with a very complete 
picture of the real issues which are at stake. In a sense, they 
oversimplify the problem. They omit all the important social 
factors to which we referred in section 38. In multiple con-
tact cases of this kind, the conflicting rules of the various states 
involved may embody important social policies which the 
court of the forum will want to take into consideration. In 
the example which we have used, state X's rule avoiding 
1 Another explanation for this apparent disparity in the objects of classifica-
tion is found in the treatment of certain writers who divide the classification 
process into two stages. At the first stage they classify the facts, at the second, the 
rules of the appropriate internal law. See below, section 41, 
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releases is probably a rule of this kind. Another matter which 
ought to be taken into account in all conflicts cases is the ideal 
of uniformity. If possible, it is desirable that the court trying 
this case should decide it as other courts have decided similar 
cases, or would be likely to decide this one. 
The classification analysis does not seem to find any place 
for these matters. It suggests that the problem is one of pure 
logic. A legal rule or a legal rule's subject-matter necessarily 
belongs to some category. The court's only task is to discover 
the correct pigeon-hole. The writers who employ this analysis 
usually try to find some general theory which the courts ought 
to follow in making their classification. They debate whether 
the classification ought to be governed by the internal law of 
the forum or by one of the relevant proper laws. They seem 
to lay very slight emphasis upon the relation of the classifica-
tion to conflict of laws policies. 
In favour of this approach to the problem it may be urged 
that many multiple contact cases do not involve any im-
portant policies of the states with which the case is connected. 
In many cases it is a matter of indifference to these states 
whether the case be decided one way or the other. Uniform-
ity is the sole objective. What is wanted, therefore, is a simple 
general principle of classification to which the courts of every 
state may resort and which will enable them to deduce a 
solution for every case. It may be conceded that in many 
multiple contact cases uniformity is the most important ob-
jective. But this is not true of all such cases. Under these cir-
cumstances it would be most dangerous to adopt some formula 
which, by producing satisfactory results in some cases, would 
lull us into a state of complacent indifference to social factors 
which might, in other cases, assume a position of crucial im-
portance. 
This criticism or warning regarding the use of the term 
"classification" is not by any means a purely theoretical ob-
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jection. Courts and writers are very prone, in dealing with 
conflicts problems, to be too much influenced by some sweep-
ing general principle or some over-simplified mechanical 
analysis and to ignore the social factors involved in these 
problems. Whatever may be the reasons for this tendency, 
it is so real that certain American writers have been con-
strained to protest against it quite vigorously.2 If we are to 
employ the term "classification" to describe the application 
of choice-of-law principles, we must use it with caution and 
reservation. We should remember that it does not refer to 
a process of automatic deduction but to a technique for decid-
ing actual controversies and laying down the rules by which 
men live. In making a classification, a court ought to be guided 
by a consideration of the various social factors which are im-
portant in the conflict of laws: the ideal of uniformity, the 
recognition of the interests of different states, etc. 
The term "classification" has also been applied to the 
problem of deciding whether a particular rule of foreign law 
should be regarded as a rule of procedure which the court 
of the forum could not conveniently enforce.3 Although cer-
tain formal analogies can be drawn, this problem is really 
quite different from that involved in a multiple contact case. 
In dealing with the substance-procedure problem the court 
makes a selection of legal rules from the law of the forum and 
from the law of some foreign state or states. The prime objec-
tive is to apply as much of the foreign law as possible. No such 
general policy can be laid down for the multiple contact cases. 
In those cases the arguments of policy in favour of the various 
2 See Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," (1928) 
37 YALE L. J. 468; Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem," (1933) 
47 HARV. L. REv. 173; Heilman, "Judicial Method and Economic Objectives 
in Conflict of Laws," (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1082; Cook, "Logical and 
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; Lorenzen, 
"Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," (1924) 33 YALE 
L.J. 736. I 
See also our discussion of the classification analysis as applied to the substance-
procedure problem in section 14, above. 
8 See above, sections 14 and 15. 
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laws involved will depend upon the tenour of their specific 
provisions and the nature of the contacts. The use of the same 
term "classification" in connection with both problems is 
rather unfortunate and may lead to confusion. 
We are indebted to some of the writers who have dis-
cussed the classification problem for a clarification of certain 
matters incidental to the application of choice-of-law prin-
ciples. One of these matters is the relation between the terms 
of choice-of-law principles and the internal law of the forum. 
Choice-of-law principles normally contain verbal symbols 
which are used in the internal law of the forum, such as con-
tracts, torts, intestate succession, etc. But when these terms 
are used in the conflict of laws they have a significance different 
from that attached to them in internal law contexts. Their 
conflict of laws connotation is broader and more inclusive 
than their internal law connotation.4 They may include rules 
and obligations of foreign law which are not part of the 
forum's internal law. For example, an English court will 
enforce a foreign contractual obligation created under cir-
cumstances in which English internal contract law would not 
create any obligation, as where the parties have made an 
agreement without consideration. 5 The term "contract" as 
used in English conflict of laws is broad enough to include 
such obligations. Similarly the term "quasi-contract" as used 
in English conflict of laws, includes foreign obligations un-
known to English internallaw.6 The term "tort" as used in 
the conflict of laws by the courts of an American state normally 
includes tort obligations which would not be imposed by the 
• This point is particularly emphasized by Cheatham, "Internal Law Distinc-
tions in the Conflict of Laws," (1936) 21 CoRN. L. Q. 570. 
See also Beckett, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private 
International Law," (1934) 15 BRITISH YEAR BooK INT. LAw 46, 58; Unger, 
"The Place of Classification in Private International Law," (1937) 19 BELL 
YARD 3; RoBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (I 940) 8 I. 
"Re Bonacina, [r9~2] 2 Ch. 394· 
"Batthyany v. Walford, (r887) 36 Ch. D. 269. 
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internal law of that particular state. Whether we can say the 
same thing for the term "tort" as a term of English conflict 
of laws is very doubtful. English courts have laid down the 
rule in conflict of laws that "the [foreign] wrong must be 
of such a character that it would have been actionable if com-
mitted in England." 7 
When the forum is one of the jurisdictions with which a 
multiple contact case is connected, its internal law will pre-
sumably be well known to the court. The same cannot be said 
of the laws of other jurisdictions. This is especially true in 
European countries where the laws of nearby states are often 
written in different languages and very different in their con-
tents. The importance of a careful and sympathetic examina-
tion of the provisions of a foreign legal system which is in-
volved in a conflicts case has been emphasized by Falcon-
bridge. 8 Rules of a foreign legal system ought not to be torn 
from their native jurisprudence and casually classified as 
tort or contract according to their most obvious characteristics. 
They should be considered in their proper context, which is 
the legal system from which they are derived. Most important 
of all, a serious attempt should be made to understand their 
purpose, to discover what social interests they have been de-
signed to uphold. 9 
1 See above, sections 3 and r 9. 
8 Falconbridge, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," (1937) 53 LAw 
QuARTERLY REV. 235, 254· See also Unger, "The Place of Classification in 
Private International Law," (1937) 19 BELL YARD 3, rs. 
9 For discussion of the classification analysis, see, in addition to the works al-
ready cited: Falconbridge, "Conflict of Laws; Examples of Characterization," 
(1937) 15 CAN. BAR REV. 215; Lorenzen, "Theory of Qualifications and the 
Conflict of Laws," (1920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 247; Rheinstein, "Comparative 
Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany," (1935) 2 UNiv. OF CHI. L. REV. 
232, 261; Robertson, "A Survey of the Characterization Problem in the Conflict 
of Laws," (1939) 5Z HARV. L. REV. 747; CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, Ed. 2 (1938) 24. The problem of classification in all its aspects is very 
thoroughly examined and the views of other writers are discussed in the mono-
graph by ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (I 940). 
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SECTION 4I 
THE THESIS OF A PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION 
In our discussion of multiple contact cases we have as-
sumed that a multiple contact case would normally present 
itself to a court for decision as a pattern of operative facts 
spread over a number of states whose internal laws were 
different. We have also assumed that the court would know 
the relevant provisions of the internal laws of these states 
and would take them into account in working out its solution 
for the case. It may be inferred from the works of certain 
writers that they would object to this point of departure. 
These writers divide the classification problem into two 
stages which they call primary and secondary classification. 
They argue that in the first stage, i.e., that of primary classi-
fication, it is illogical to give any consideration whatsoever 
to foreign law. "We cannot consider foreign law," they argue, 
"before we have decided which foreign law is to govern the 
case." In their view, the court starts with a pattern of operative 
facts spread over several states. It knows no law save that of 
the forum, i.e., the forum's internal law and also its choice-
of-law principles. With these legal elements in mind the court 
must first classify the legal issue or question presented by the 
facts. It must determine what legal problem or problems are 
raised by the facts. Contemplation of a set of facts will not in 
itself suggest any legal problems; hence the court must 
consider the facts in the light of the forum's internal law and 
its choice-of-law principles. Having classified the problem, 
e. g., as one of tort liability, or as one of contractual liability, 
the court then applies one or more of its choice-of-law prin-
ciples and for the first time is brought to consider the content of 
the foreign law in detail. A second stage is thus reached at 
which further issues may arise with regard to the classification 
of particular rules of the foreign law. This stage is called 
by these writers "secondary classification" or "delimitation 
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of the foreign law." At this stage the court may, according 
to these writers, take into consideration rules of the foreign 
law and their classification within the foreign legal system.1 
Even as a purely theoretical introduction to the classifi-
cation problem, this primary classification without reference 
to foreign law is an entirely artificial and unnecessary inven-
tion. Courts and counsel need not, in practice, attack a conflict-
of-laws problem like a game of blind man's buff, shutting 
their eyes to all legal rules save those of the forum until 
they have reached a particular stage.2 In a conflict of laws case 
counsel for both sides will very probably scrutinize the pro-
visions of all the relevant legal systems to see whether their 
side can gain any advantage thereby. If they think there is a 
possibility of this they will plead and, if necessary, prove the 
foreign law or laws in question. The court may have a detailed 
knowledge of all the relevant foreign laws at the time when 
it decides whether to adopt them or ignore them. When an 
appellate court decides to apply a foreign law it is almost 
certain that it will have the rules of that law before it. In 
actual practice, the point of departure is not a pattern of facts 
plus a knowledge of the law of the forum but a pattern of 
facts plus a knowledge of the internal law of every state with 
which they make a connection of any possible significance. 
The idea of a primary classification without reference to 
foreign law is also theoretically unsound because, if rigidly 
followed, it would exclude from the court's consideration any 
distinct legal conception of foreign law which had no counter-
part in the law of the forum. Suppose an English court starts 
with the fact that two people have been married in France. 
1 This theory of a primary classification is put forward by Unger, "The Place 
of Classification in Private International Law," (1937) 19 BELL YARD 3; 
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2. (1938) 30; ROBERTSON, 
CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940) zo, 59· 
2 This point is made by Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem," 
(1933) 47 HARV. L. REV. 173. Falconbridge, who has written extensively on 
the classification problem, apparently does not accept the idea of dividing the 
classification process into two different stages. See his "Renvoi, Characterization 
and Acquired Rights," (1939) 17 CAN. BAR REV. 369, 373· 
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How can this fact, in the light of English law, suggest to the 
court that a question of an implied marriage contract for 
community of goods3 might be raised? 
"The solution," says Unger, "depends on the recognition 
that at this stage the lex fori is not applied to decide the issue 
but merely to give a legal characterization of the circum-
stances. It follows that only the analytical framework of that 
legal system without its body of detailed provisions need be 
considered." 4 This is all very well for such cases as Unger 
cites: a foreign contract without consideration, a foreign mar-
riage without English formalities. But if the foreign legal 
conception was absolutely unlike anything known at the 
forum, it would never occur to a court which closed its eyes 
to everything except the "analytical framework" of the 
forum's internal law. 
Robertson contends even more pointedly than Unger that 
in its initial attack upon a conflicts case the court must classify 
the bare facts as they have been proved. He further insists 
that at this stage of the game the court cannot logically take 
into consideration the provisions of foreign law. But he does 
not explain how the court can effectively classify a set of facts 
which would have no legal consequences whatever under the 
internal law of the forum without some knowledge of the 
foreign law which would endow these facts with legal sig-
nificance. He admits, however, that the "analytical frame-
work" of the forum's internal law will not meet the exigencies 
of the problem suggested. 5 As described by these writers the 
task of making a primary classification in the proper manner 
becomes very difficult indeed. It goes beyond mere blind 
man's buff and involves pulling oneself up by the bootstraps. 
3 As in De Nicols v. Curlier, [1900] A. C. 21. 
'Unger, "The Place of Classification in Private International Law," (1937) 
19 BELL YARD 3· 
5 See RoBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940) 
59-63, 68, 83. 
CHAPTER VIII 
Specific Problems in Multiple Contact Cases 
SECTION 42 
LIABILITIES OF CARRIERS AND TELEGRAPH COMPANIES: 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
1\. THE present day the liabilities of interstate carriers and telegraph companies in the United States are regulated to a great extent by federal legislation. 
But before the federal government entered the field, actions 
against these bodies were decided by the application of state 
laws selected according to ordinary conflict of laws principles. 
Many interesting problems in the applications of these prin-
ciples were raised and decided. Most of these are now of 
diminished practical significance. But they illustrate admi-
rably the technique of handling choice-of-law principles and 
may still provide suggestive analogies for the solution of 
more modern problems. 
A buys a ticket in state X for a railway journey into state Y. 
He receives some injury while the train is in state Y. It 
seems to have been well settled that he could recover com-
pensation from the railway company in an action of tort gov-
erned by the law of state Y.1 Could he, by framing his ac-
tion as one for breach of contract, obtain the benefit of a 
reference to the law of state X? In Pittsburgh etc., R. Co. v. 
Gram 2 a Kentucky court ruled that the carrier's liability to 
passengers could not be classified as contractual so as to permit 
1 Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Grom, (1911) 142 Ky. 51, 133 S. W. 977; 
Hines v. Rice, (1920) 142 Ark. 159, 218 S. W. 851; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
v. Teeters, (19o6) 166 Ind. 335, 77 N. E. 599; Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Master-
son, (1896) 16 Ind. App. 323, 44 N. E. 1004; Smith v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 
(1912) 114 C. C. A. (8th) 157, 194 Fed. 79· 
2 Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Grom, (1911) 142 Ky. 51,133 S. W. 977· 
SPECIFIC MULTIPLE CONTACT PROBLEMS 193 
such a reference. But this theory is opposed to the decision of 
the New York Court of Appeals in Dyke v. Erie Railroad Co.3 
The plaintiff, who had obtained a verdict for thirty-five 
thousand dollars, had been injured in Pennsylvania after buy-
ing his ticket in New York. Since the damages recoverable in 
such cases were limited to three thousand dollars by Penn-
sylvania law, the defendants sought to make the plaintiff's 
claim depend upon Pennsylvania law alone. But the court 
decided that he might maintain a suit in contract which would 
be governed by the laws of New York. In Sawyer v. El Paso, 
etc., R. Co.4 the plaintiff, an injured railway passenger, was 
met with the defence that notice of her claim had not been 
delivered to the defendants as required by a statute of New 
Mexico, the place of wrong. The court held that this was a 
good defence to a count in tort. But since the plaintiff had 
bought her ticket in Pennsylvania she was allowed to recover 
under a second count for breach of contract governed by the 
laws of that state and unaffected by the New Mexico statute. 
Suits against railroad companies for personal injuries some-
times produced another interesting multiple contact problem. 
Suppose that one of the railroad company's employees is 
charged with the task of inspecting trains and their equip-
ment in state X. Due to his failure to perform this duty prop-
erly a train becomes involved in an accident in state Y, and 
A who is riding on the train is injured. Should the question 
of the company's liability be referred to the law of state X 
or to the law of state Y? A considerable body of case-law 
supports the view that under such circumstances state Y, 
where the injury occurred, should be regarded as the place 
8 Dyke v. Erie R. Co., (I87I) 45 N.Y. II3. 
• Sawyer v. El Paso, etc., R. Co., (I9o8) 49 Tex. Civ. App. Io6, Io8 S. W. 
7I8. See also New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, (I874) so Miss. 244; 
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Bishop, (I896) 13 Ohio C. C. 38o; Fryklund v. 
Great Northern R. Co., (I907) IOI Minn. 37, III N. W. 727; Forrester v. 
Southern Pac. Co., (I9I3) 36 Nev. 247, I34 Pac. 753; The Constantinople, 
(D. C. N.Y., I926) IS F. (2d) 97· 
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of wrong and the case should be decided according to its rules 
of law.5 
The failure of a telegraph company to deliver a message 
promptly and accurately entailed consequences which varied 
considerably in different states.6 In some, the telegraph com-
pany was forced to pay a fixed penalty for errors or might 
find itself at the mercy of a jury empowered to award dam-
ages for mental anguish. The possibility of numerous multiple 
contact cases in this field is obvious. Very frequently a contract 
for the carriage of a message was made in one state, the mes-
sage to be delivered in another. If the message was delayed 
or altered in the transmission and an action brought against 
the telegraph company it would become necessary to decide 
which law ought to control. 
Before we come to grips with this problem it should be 
noticed that there are two parties who might bring action 
against the telegraph company, the sender and the addressee. 
Let us consider the rights of the sender first. The sender of 
the message could always frame his claim as one for breach 
of contract. As such, it was held in some courts to be governed 
by the law of the place of contracting/ in others by the law 
5 El Paso, etc., R. Co. v. McComas, (r903 Tex. Civ. App.) 72 S. W. 629; 
Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McMullen, (r889) 117 Ind. 439, 20 N. E. 287; 
Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Becker, (r899) 67 Ark. r, 53 S. W. 406; Chicago, 
etc., R. Co. v. Doyle, (r883) 6o Miss. 977; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, 
(I892) 97 Ala. I26, II So. 8o3; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Foster, (I88z) 78 
Tenn. 351. 
See also Hoodmacher v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (I9o7) 218 Pa. zi, 66 Atl. 
97 5 (law of state where negligence and death, but not actual injury, occurred 
applied). 
6 The application of state statutes to impose liability upon telegraph com-
panies in respect of interstate transactions was held, under certain circumstances, 
to be an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. See Western 
Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, (I887) I22 U.S. 347, 7 Sup. Ct. IIz6; Western 
Union Tel. Co. v. James, (I896) 162 U.S. 6so, 16 Sup. Ct. 934; Western Union 
Tel. Co. v. Brown, (I9I4) 234 U. S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955· 
'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pratt, (I907) 18 Okla. 274, 89 Pac. 237; Hall 
v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1905) I39 N.C. 369, 52 S. E. so; Western Union 
Tel. Co. v. Smith, (19I6 Tex. Civ. App.) I88 S. W. 702. 
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of the place where the message ought to have been delivered. 8 
In Gray v. Telegraph Co./ a Tennessee court allowed the 
sender to claim the advantages of the law of the place of de-
livery on the theory that it gave him a right of action in 
tort, alternative to any claim arising out of the contract. 
Let us now consider the case of the addressee. Most of 
the suits against telegraph companies seem to have been 
brought by the addressees of delayed or garbled messages. 
Although the addressee was rarely a party to the contract for 
delivery of the message, he was treated in some jurisdictions 
as a third party beneficiary with an enforceable interest in 
its performance.10 By many courts, however, his right to re-
cover was held to sound in tort for a breach of a duty im-
posed upon the company in the interest of the general public. 
Both these ideas influenced the courts when they came to de-
cide what law sh~uld govern the addressee's claim in a mul-
tiple contact case. In some cases he was permitted to rely 
upon the provisions of the law of the place of contracting.11 In 
others he was allowed the benefit of the law in force where the 
message ought to have been delivered on the theory that the 
contract was to have been performed there.12 
Some of those courts which had invoked the law of the 
place of contracting to permit a recovery by the addressee 
went further and declined to classify his claim as other than 
"Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fuel, (r9ro) 165 Ala. 391, 51 So. 571. 
9 Gray v. Telegraph Co., (r9or) ro8 Tenn. 39, 64 S. W. 1063. 
10 See WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, Rev. Ed. ( 1936) vol. 2, 1095; }OYCE, ELEC-
TRIC LAWS, Ed. 2 (1907) vol. 2, 1499; }ONES, TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE 
CoMPANIES, Ed. 2 (r9r6) 6o2. 
uWestern Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, (r9o2) 29 Tex. Civ. App. 591, 69 
S. W. 427; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Waller, (r9o3) 96 Tex. 589, 74 S. W. 
751; Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r896) 135 Mo. 66r, 37 S. W. 904; 
Markley v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9rr) 151 Iowa 612, 132 N. W. 37; 
Walker v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9o6) 75 S.C. 512, 56 S. E. 38; Fail v. 
Western Union Tel. Co., (r9o8) 8oS. C. 207, 6oS. E. 697, 6r S. E. 258; 
Brown v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9ro) 85 S.C. 495, 67 S. E. 146. 
12 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lacer, (r9o6) 122 Ky. 839, 93 S. W. 34; Bailey 
v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1916) 97 Kan. 6r9, 156 Pac. 716. 
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contractual. He must succeed under the law of the place of 
contracting or fail entirely.1s In other states, however, the 
tortious nature of his suit was recognized to the extent that 
he was permitted an alternative reference to the law of the 
place of wrong.14 In Schmitt v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co.15 
the court said: 
"Counsel for appellant argue that inasmuch as the telegram 
was delivered for transmission in Illinois, the measure of re-
covery would be governed by the laws of that state, and, as 
thereunder damages are not allowed for mental anguish dis-
connected from physical injury, the verdict should have been 
for defendant. Were this an action ex contractu, little diffi-
culty would be experienced in determining the point, but, as 
the action is one sounding in tort, it would seem that the law 
where the breach of duty occurred would determine the 
measure of damages; though authorities are not wanting 
which hold that, as the wrong grew out of and is based on a 
breach of contract, the lex loci contractus should prevail. This, 
however, is too narrow a view for it overlooks the fact that 
the breach is of a public duty owing by the telegraph company 
as a common carrier of intelligence .... This court is com-
mitted to the doctrine that either an action ex delictu or ex 
contractu may be maintained for a breach of the company's 
duty to transmit promptly." 
Among those courts which adopted this tort doctrine there 
arose a difference of opinion as to whether the place where the 
"'Johnson v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9o7) 144 N.C. 410, 57 S. E. 122; 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, (r9o4) 35 Tex. Civ. App. 437, 8o 
s. w. 561. 
14 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Favish, (r9r6) 196 Ark. 4, 71 So. r83; 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ford, (I 906) 77 Ark. 53 r, 92 s. w. 528; Western 
Union Tel. Co. v. Armstrong, (r9r8 Tex. Civ. App.) 207 S. W. 592; Schmitt 
v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., (r9r4) I64 Iowa 654, I46 N. W. 467; 
Balderston v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I 908) 79 S. C. I 6o, 6o S. E. 43 5; 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Burris, (r9ro) I02 C. C. A. (8th) 386, I79 Fed. 92; 
Hornthal v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1914) 166 N.C. 6o2, 82 S. E. 851. See 
CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 414; Note, (1912) 6r UNIV. OF 
PA. L. REV. 42. 
15 Schmitt v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., (r9r4) 164 Iowa 654, 656, 146 
N. W. 467. 
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blunder in transmission occurred or the place where the mes-
sage ought to have been delivered should be considered the 
locus of the tort. Suppose A makes a contract with a telegraph 
company in state X for the delivery of a message to B in state 
Z. The message is to be sent from point to point, starting in 
state X, passing through state Y, and reaching B in state Z. 
At some point in state Y a mistake is made by the telegraph 
company's employees; the message is lost, delayed or al-
tered. B, the addressee, sues the telegraph company. If we 
assume that he can frame a claim in tort, based upon the law 
of the place of wrong, which state should we regard as the 
"place of wrong?" We might choose state Y, where the negli-
gent acts of the telegraph company's servants were done, or 
state Z, where the ultimate failure of delivery occurred. 
In Balderston v. Western Union Tel. Co.16 the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina was confronted by a problem of 
this type. The court adopted the law of the state where the 
message ought to have been delivered promptly and correctly 
(state Z in our illustration), saying: 
"The plaintiff cannot be expected to determine the point on 
defendant's line where the failure of duty occurred, nor do 
we think it consonant with public policy to permit the de-
fendant to show that the message was delayed or failed at 
some specific point on its line and thus make plaintiff's right 
to recovery to depend upon the laws of that place. Such a 
holding would, in nearly every case, lead to much uncertainty, 
to say nothing of the broad field that would thus be opened to 
fraud." 
If we may say so with respect, these remarks suggest a sound 
and practical basis of decision. 
Other courts appear, however, to have proceeded upon the 
16Balderston v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1908) 79 S.C. 16o, 163, 6oS. E. 
435· In other cases it seems to have been assumed rather than decided that the 
place where the failure of delivery occurred should be regarded as the place of 
wrong. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Favish, (1916) 196 Ala. 4, 71 So. 183; 
Gray v. Telegraph Co., (1901) 108 Tenn. 39, 64 S. W. 1063. 
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theory that the place where the negligent acts were done 
should be regarded as the "place of wrong." 17 An Arkansas 
statute which imposed liability upon telegraph companies 
for "mental anguish caused by negligence in receiving, trans-
mitting, or delivering messages" was applied by the Arkansas 
courts to all cases in which the actual negligent acts occurred 
there, irrespective of the place of delivery.18 If, on the other 
hand, the message should have been delivered in Arkansas 
but no negligence in that state was proved, the plaintiff did 
not get the benefit of the statute.19 
In the Texas case, Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co./0 
an ingenious attempt was made to capitalize on one contact 
of the fact pattern. A telegram was sent from one point to 
another, both of them within the state of Arkansas. Because 
of delay in delivering it, the addressee was unable to see his 
daughter before she died or to attend her funeral. His counsel 
argued that because he suffered much mental anguish on this 
account while physically present in Texas, the liberal rule of 
that state should be applied in estimating damages. They also 
pointed out that he was a citizen of Texas. But the court did 
not consider these connections sufficiently significant and ap-
plied Arkansas law. The decision seems very sound. It is quite 
true that the plaintiff suffered the injury of mental pain in 
Texas. And that mental pain was doubtless a direct conse-
quence of the telegraph company's neglect of duty. But there 
17 Hornthal v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9r4) r66 N.C. 6o2, 82 S. E. 85r. 
The court relied upon this theory as an alternative ground of decision in Fail v. 
Western Union Tel. Co., (r9o8) 8oS. C. 207, 6oS. E. 697, 6r S. E. 258; 
Brown v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9ro) 85 S.C. 495, 67 S. E. 146. 
"'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ford, (r9o6) 77 Ark. 531, 92 S. W. 528; 
Arkansas, etc., R. Co. v. Lee, (r9o6) 79 Ark. 448, 96 S. W. 148; Western 
Union Tel. Co. v. Chilton, (r9rr) roo Ark. 296, 140 S. W. 26. 
lJ) Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crenshaw, (r9ro) 93 Ark. 4I5, 125 s. w. 420j 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. See, (r9ro) 94 Ark. 86, 126 S. W. 78; Western 
Union Tel. Co. v. Burris, (r9ro) ro2 C. C. A. (8th) 386, 179 Fed. 92 . 
.. Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9or) 25 Tex. Civ. App. 398, 6r 
S. W. 5or. 
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is very little causal connection between the negligent acts of 
the telegraph company's operators and the fact that the plain-
tiff suffered his mental pain in the state of Texas. There would 
be an element of unfairness in making the telegraph com-
pany's liability depend upon the plaintiff's presence in Texas 
when the company was not responsible in any way for his 
presence there. The telegraph company's liability ought not 
to be increased because the plaintiff carried his grief into a 
particular state. 
Can we draw any general conclusions from this maze of 
cases and theories dealing with the choice-of-law problem 
in suits against telegraph companies? It is, of course, impos-
sible to reconcile all the decisions. We can say that, in one 
case or another, almost every state with which it is possible 
for a telegram case to make a significant contact has been 
permitted to create a cause of action against a telegraph com-
pany or to increase the amount of damages. In producing this 
result the courts have applied several choice-of-law principles: 
choose the law of the place of contracting, choose the law of 
the place of performance of the contract, choose the law of 
the place of wrong, etc. In applying the principle, "choose the 
law of the place of wrong," they have selected different states 
as the place of wrong, i.e., sometimes they have selected the 
state of injury, sometimes they have selected the state where 
the telegraph company's negligent acts were done. On the 
other hand, we find numerous cases in which a court has re-
fused to allow the law of a particular state, which was con-
nected with the pattern of facts, to impose liability. Perhaps 
we may venture the conclusion that, taken as a whole, the 
cases evince a general tendency of the courts (often checked 
and qualified in particular instances) to recognize the fact that 
every state with which a telegraph case makes a significant 
connection has an interest in the imposition of a liability upon 
the telegraph company. 
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Contracts for the carriage of goods or passengers often con-
tain a stipulation limiting the carrier's liability for injuries 
to the goods or passengers during transit. In the conflict of 
laws, such stipulations have received a variety of treatments. 
Their validity has been referred to the law of the place where 
the contract of carriage was made, to the law of the place where 
some actual injury was received, and to the law of the 
destination. 21 
Even when they were admittedly valid under the law 
which the court considered to be the proper law of the con-
tract, contracts limiting a carrier's liability have been refused 
recognition on the ground that they were contrary to the pub-
lic policy of the forum. In these cases the doctrine of public 
policy was applied affirmatively to strike down a defence and 
to give the plaintiff a cause of action which, apart from this 
special rule of the forum, he would not have had. But these 
decisions are not quite as unjust or as contrary to basic choice-
of-law principles as they might at first sight appear to be. 
On closer examination it will be found that, in almost all of 
them, the contract of carriage had been made at the forum or 
else some part of it was to be performed there. Quite apart 
from the fact that the action was brought in the forum, the 
forum had a certain interest in the transaction.22 
An exceptional case is Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co.23 
decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The plaintiff 
claimed damages for the late delivery of a telegram which 
was to have been sent from New York to Chicago. The de-
21 See BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (I 93 5) vol. z, p. r I 8 7; Annotation, (I 9 3 I) 
72 A. L. R. 250. 
For the application of these theories to telegram cases see }oNES, TELEGRAPH 
AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES, Ed. 2 (I9I6) 501. 
00 See Annotations, (I928) 57 A. L. R. I75; (I9JI) 72 A. L. R. 250 for an 
exhaustive analysis and classification of cases applying these theories to contracts 
limiting carrier's liability. See also ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (I939) 545, 558. 
The problem goes beyond the scope of the present work. 
28 Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., (I9o9) I38 Wis. 648, I2o N. W. 399· 
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fendant company set up as a defence a stipulation printed upon 
the back of the telegram blank relieving it from all liability. 
According to the law of Illinois and the law of New York 
this stipulation would have been a valid defence. But in Wis-
consin such stipulations were not recognized in the courts on 
the ground that they were contrary to public policy. Although 
the facts of the instant case had no apparent connection with 
Wisconsin, the court refused to recognize the contractual de-
fence and gave judgment for the plaintiff. This decision might 
be attacked on constitutional grounds. Although Wisconsin 
had no apparent interest in the decision of the case, the court 
applied Wisconsin law to strike down a contractual defence, 
valid under the laws of the states with which the case was con-
nected. There is authority for the view that such a course of 
procedure constitutes a denial of due process.24 
Suppose a contract of carriage containing a limitation pro-
vision is made in state X. Damage to the goods or passenger 
occurs in state Y. By the law of state X the limitation pro-
vision would be valid. The law of state Y expressly forbids 
such contracts. This clash of legal policies might be resolved 
by regarding state Y, where the injury occurred, as the place 
of performance whose law was therefore entitled to govern 
the contract. On this view, the limitation provision would not 
be recognized. Apart from this theory, however, there is some 
authority for the view that a limitation of liability which is 
repugnant to the law of the place of wrong, should not be 
available as a defence. 25 
In Canadian Pacific R. Co. v. Parent 26 a carrier's contract 
excluding liability produced a nice problem of concurrent 
24 See above, section 9· 
25 See Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Teeters, ( 1906) r 66 Ind. 335, 77 N. E. 599; 
Smith v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1912) 114 C. C. A. (8th) 157, 194 Fed. 79; 
Weir v. Rountree, (1909) 97 C. C. A. (8th) soo, 173 Fed, 776; Kansas City, 
etc., R. Co. v. Becker, (r 899) 67 Ark. r, 53 S. W. 406; Clark v. Southern R. Co., 
(r9r8) 69 Ind. App. 697 (very vague). 
26 Canadian Pacific R. Co. v. Parent, (r9r4) 24 Qw~b. K. B. 193; (r915 
Sup. Ct.) 51 Can. L. R. 234, [1917] A. C. 195. 
\ 
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reference through two choice-of-law principles. The railway 
company agreed to carry Joseph Chalifour, a stockman in 
charge of cattle, from Winnipeg to Montreal at a reduced 
fare. At the beginning of the journey Chalifour signed a con-
tract absolving the company for any "damage, injury or loss 
to himself." Owing to the negligence of the company's em-
ployees, Chalifour was killed at Chapleau, Ontario. An action 
was begun in Quebec on behalf of his dependents under the 
Ontario death statute which permits recovery only where 
the deceased himself, had he survived, could have maintained 
suit. Counsel for the railroad contended that such a suit by 
Chalifour would have failed because he had renounced his 
rights. Hence, according to the law of the place of wrong, the 
present plaintiffs ought not to succeed. The court arrived at a 
contrary result. They held that the effect of the contract should 
be determined by the law of Manitoba, where it was signed. 
Since that law had not been proved, they presumed it to be 
the same as the law of Quebec. It was well established in Que-
bec law that a deceased person's contract could not affect the 
right of his dependents to recover damages for his death. 
Hence the present contract, governed by Quebec law, could 
not possibly prevent the plaintiffs from recovering damages. 
This reasoning was not impugned in any way by the Supreme 
Court of Canada or the Privy Council. But since these bodies 
take judicial notice of the laws of every Canadian province, the 
presumption which had enabled the Quebec courts to apply 
their own peculiar rules to the contract ceased to operate. 
The contract, governed by either Ontario or Manitoba law, 
was quite effective to bar the deceased's and hence the plain-
tiffs' recovery. 
SECTION 43 
ASSIGNMENT OR RELEASE OF A TORT CAUSE OF ACTION 
A injures Bin state X. The law of state X gives B a cause 
of action in tort. B assigns this cause of action to C in state Y. 
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To what extent should the validity and effect of this trans-
action depend upon the laws of state X and state Y respec-
tively? Authority upon this point is scanty. The Conflict of 
Laws Restatement, which devotes an entire "topic" to the 
theme "transfer of contractual rights," has nothing to say 
about the transfer of tort claims. Let us suppose that in the 
problem stated the assignment is void by the law of state X 
and valid by that of state Y. Generally speaking, an assign-
able obligation to pay damages is more onerous than one 
which cannot be transferred. To uphold the assignment would 
be to impose a greater burden upon B than that sanctioned 
by the law of the place of wrong. The only justification for 
this course is the fact that the assignment was made in state 
Y. But B is not responsible for that event nor for its occurrence 
there. He has done nothing to subject himself to the law of 
state Y. His position ought not to be altered by the fact that 
A and C have gone into state Y and carried out some trans-
action there. It is submitted therefore that an assignment of a 
tort cause of action which is invalid by the law of the place 
of wrong ought not to be recognized. 
The conven~e situation arose in Vimont v. Chicago, etc., 
R. Co.1 A claim for injuries suffered in Iowa was transferred 
in Illinois under whose law it would not be assignable. An 
Iowa court allowed the assignees to maintain an action upon it 
because Iowa law upheld the validity of the transfer. 
"It seems to us," said the court, "that the mere carrying of 
this claim into another state could not have the effect to change 
its character or take from it any of its qualities, but that it 
would retain its properties notwithstanding the removal of the 
person in whose favour it arose to another state or country; 
and that, as it had properties which rendered it assignable 
imparted to it by the laws under which it arose, it would re-
tain those properties when taken beyond the jurisdiction of 
those laws, and would be assignable anywhere." 
1 Vimont v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1886) 69 Iowa 296, 299, zz N. W. 906, 
z8 N. W. 6IZ; see also Sanders' Adm'x v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1901) 49 
c. c. A. (6th) s6 s, I I I Fed. 708. 
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However mechanical this reasoning may sound, the result 
seems just and reasonable. Although the contract was made in 
Illinois, that state had a very slight interest in the transaction. 
And there is a good deal to be said for the view that, when two 
people make a bargain, it should be enforced if one of the 
relevant legal systems upholds its validity.2 
A release of a claim sounding in tort stands upon a different 
footing from an assignment. Suppose B, having been injured 
by A in state X, signs an agreement in state Y absolving B 
from liability. The contract is void by the law of state X but 
valid by that of state Y. B cannot argue that he was not re-
sponsible for the case's connection with state Y. State X has, 
however, an obvious interest in extending contract-proof pro-
tection to persons injured there. Leach v. Mason Valley 
Mines 3 raised this problem. Emphasizing the fact that the 
plaintiff resided in the state of contracting, the court sus-
tained the contract as a defence. 
In Snashell v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co.4 an action was 
brought in the District of Columbia by a husband and wife 
to recover for injuries received there by the wife. The defend-
ants pleaded a sealed discharge of all claims executed by the 
wife alone. They urged that effect ought to be given to this 
instrument, because under the law of the plaintiffs' matri-
monial domicile the wife was entitled to contract away her 
claim like a feme sole. But the court took the view that the 
law of the place of wrong having conferred a cause of action 
• See Lorenzen, "Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 
(1921) 30 YALE L. J. s6s, (1921) 31 YALE L. J. 53; Heilman, "Judicial 
Method and Economic .Objectives in Conflict of Laws," (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 
1082; CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2 (1938) 244· 
3 Leach v. Mason Valley Mines, (1916) 40 Nev. 143, 161 Pac. 513· As 
emphasizing the place of contracting, see also Page v. United Fruit Co., (C. C. A. 
1st, 1925) 3 F. (2d) 747 where, however, both tort and contract had the same 
locus. 
4 Snashall v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., (189o) 8 Mackey (19 D. C.) 399· 
See also Cowen v. Ray, (1901) 47 C. C. A. 352, 108 Fed. po where it was 
held that the law of the place of wrong should determine whether a release by 
the plaintiff could bar her from maintaining suit in a purely representative 
capacity. 
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upon the husband and wife jointly, no other law could author-
ize one of them to dispose of it alone. 
Many death acts provide for the compensation of all the 
beneficiaries in a single suit to be instituted by the decedent's 
personal representative. This has usually been interpreted as 
referring to a duly accredited administrator appointed in any 
state. W auld a release of all claims given by one administrator 
be a good defence to an action by another? Several cases have 
held that it would.5 Such a release might, however, be given 
without the consent of the beneficiaries, the real parties in in-
terest. It has been held that the effect of this circumstance 
upon the legal validity of the release ought to be decided by 
the law of the place of wrong. 6 
SECTION .44 
EMPLOYERS' COMMON-LAW LIABILITY FOR INJURIES 
TO EMPLOYEES 
In this section we are concerned with the conflict of laws 
aspects of employers' liability for injuries to their employees, 
prior to the enactment of modern workmen's compensation 
legislation. At this time it was well established that an injured 
employee might bring an action in tort against his employer 
which would be governed by the law of the place of 
wrong. Between master and servant there usually exists a 
contract of employment. Considerable authority could be 
mustered to support the view that an injured employee should 
be permitted an alternative reference to the law of the place 
5 Compton's Adm'rs v. Borderland Coal Co., (I9I8) I79 Ky. 695, 2oi S. W. 
20; McCarron v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I92I) 239 Mass. 64, I3I N. E. 478. 
6 Pisano v. B. M. & J. F. Shanley Co., (I9oi) 66 N.J. L. r, 48 Atl. 6I8. See 
also McCarron v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I92r) 239 Mass. 64, I3I N. E. 478. 
In Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Evans, (I 91 I) I IO C. C. A. (3d) I5 8, I 88 Fed. 6, 8, 
it was held that only the domiciliary administrator had power to compromise the 
beneficiaries' claim. 
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where the employment contract had been made.1 If that law 
were different from the law of the place of wrong, the em-
ployee could take his choice. The law of the place of wrong 
might give him a right of action in tort; the law of the place 
of contracting might give him one for breach of contract. But 
if the employee was killed in the course of his work, his de-
pendents could not make out a cause of action under the death 
statute of the state in which he was hired. The coverage of 
such statutes was limited to cases where the fatal injury was 
received within the bounds of the enacting state.2 In other 
words, the state in which the employment contract was made 
was not regarded as having a sufficient interest in the trans-
action to confer a cause of action upon the deceased employee's 
dependents if he was killed in another state. But in a few cases 
the state of hiring was allowed to confer a cause of action upon 
the employee himself if he were injured in another state. 
Some "nice points" were taken in connection with the no-
torious fellow-servant doctrine, which flourished in some 
states but had been cut down or abolished in others. Suppose 
a workman had been hired in a state where the doctrine pre-
vailed and injured in a state where it had been abolished. 
The doctrine was often explained in domestic law by saying 
that every contract of employment contained an implied term 
by which the servant accepted the risk of injury by his fellow-
servants. In several cases of the type suggested the employer-
defendant argued that the fellow-servant rule prevailing at 
the place of contracting was incorporated into the workman's 
1 See Williams v. Southern R. Co., (r9or) 128 N.C. 286, 38 S. E. 893; The 
Lamington, (D. C. N. Y., r 89 8) · 87 Fed. 7 52; Marra v. Hamburg-
Amerikanische, etc., (1917) r8o App. Div. 75, r67 N.Y. Supp. 74; Grand 
Trunk R. Co. v. Wright, (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) zr F. (zd) 814. 
For dicta, see Logan v. Missouri Valley, etc., Co., (r923) 157 Ark. 528, 249 
S. W. zr; Schweitzer v. Hamburg-Amerikanische, etc., (r9r2) 78 Misc. 448, 
138 N.Y. Supp. 944; Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co., (r89r) 48 Ohio St. 623, 
30 N. E. 69. 
• Crowley v. Panama R. Co., (1859) 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 99; Ott v. Lake 
Shore, etc., R. Co., (1899) 18 Ohio C. C. 395· 
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contract. Like a limitation of liability, it should prevent him 
from recovering for an injury by a fellow-servant wherever 
that injury had been received. This plausible argument was 
not received with favour by the courts. They held that a 
fellow-servant rule prevailing in a particular state could not 
affect the position of workmen who were hired in that state 
but injured or killed in other states.3 Whatever formal anal-
ogies may be drawn from the domestic law explanations of 
the fellow-servant doctrine, the law of the state of injury has 
a paramount interest in extending what protection it pleases to 
persons injured within its boundaries. This interest the courts 
recognized. 
The converse situation arose in Dupont v. Quebec Steam-
ship Co./ where an employee of the defendant company, 
hired in Quebec, was killed by a falling derrick on board a 
British ship. The court treated the ship as the place of wrong. 
The relatives of the deceased brought an action based upon the 
British death statute which provided that any defence which 
would have prevented a recovery by the deceased (had he 
lived) should bar a recovery by his beneficiaries. The defend-
ant argued that the present action must fail because the death 
was due to the negligence of deceased's fellow-employees. 
The Quebec court, trained in civil law doctrines, pointed out 
that this bete nair of English common law, the fellow-servant 
rule, was based, according to leading English texts and de-
cisions, upon an implied undertaking of the deceased to ac-
cept the risks of his employment; they therefore classified 
it as a contractual rule and irrelevant to the tort aspect of the 
"See Dormidy v. Sharon Boiler Works, (C. C. Pa., I904) I27 Fed. 485; 
Smith v. Southern R. Co., (I9Io) 87 S.C. 136, 69 S. E. I8 [But see contra the 
former decision of the same court in Caldwell v. Seaboard, etc., R., (1906) 73 
S.C. 443,53 S. E. 746]; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Becker, (1899) 67 Ark. I, 
53 S. W. 406 (here the court relied upon a statute of the state of injury avoiding 
all contracts limiting employers' liability) ; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. McDuffey, 
(1897) 25 C. C. A. (2d) 247, 79 Fed. 934· 
• Dupont v. Quebec Steamship Co., (I 896) I I Queb. S. C. I 88. See also Logan 
v. Lee, (I9o6) 3I Queb. S.C. 469, (I907) 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3II. 
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case. The deceased having been hired in Quebec, his contract 
of employment was governed by Quebec law which imposed 
no such unfavourable restrictions. In other words, the Quebec 
court's reference to English law, as the law of the place of 
wrong, completely excluded the fellow-servant rule on the 
ground that it concerned, not tort liability, but the effect of 
contracts. By this ingenious chain of reasoning the court was 
able to avoid the application of the fellow-servant rule, which, 
as civil lawyers, they probably considered unduly harsh. The 
chain of reasoning adopted by the Quebec court does not seem 
to have been suggested in common-law jurisdictions. 
SECTION 45 
WORKMEN's COMPENSATION ACTS: COVERAGE OF THE 
STATUTE OF THE FORUM 
Workmen's compensation acts, like the death and survival 
statutes of an earlier generation, have raised many interesting 
conflict of laws questions.1 Although the number of variations 
from state to state makes generalization difficult, the common 
denominator of all these laws seems to be a new and special 
remedy for injured industrial employees or their dependents, 
in case of death. The monetary award, usually adjusted by a 
quasi-judicial administrative board, may be paid by the em-
ployer concerned or his insurer or by a special fund to which 
all employers contribute. Acceptance of the provisions of the 
act may or may not be optional with the parties. 
Courts have frequently been called upon to decide whether 
or not their own local statute should be construed as extend-
ing the new remedy to an employee in some fact situation 
1 See generally, Angell, "Recovery Under Workmen's Compensation Acts 
for Injury Abroad," (1918) 31 HARV. L. REv. 619; Dunlap, "The Conflict 
of Laws and Workmen's Compensation," (1935) 23 CAL. L. REV. 38I; Dwan, 
"Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws," (1927) II MINN. L. 
REV. 329, (1935) 20 MINN. L. REv. I9; Annotation, (1934) 90 A. L. R. 119. 
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where an important incident, such as the formation of the con-
tract of employment or the injury to the employee, occurred 
in the forum. Primarily this question is one of statutory con-
struction and interpretation depending upon the wording of 
the statute, the general implications of its terms, and the 
purposes which it was meant to fulfil. Decisions of the courts 
defining the coverage of their local compensation statutes, 
which are very numerous, depend so intimately upon the 
form of the particular statute in question that no attempt is 
made in this study to analyze and classify all of them. But the 
process of construction and interpretation has been influenced 
to a considerable extent by pre-existing rules and analogies of 
the conflict of laws. In many cases the courts have attempted 
to reconcile their decision to apply or not to apply the forum's 
statute with established choice-of-law principles. It may be 
of interest to observe briefly the applications of these principles 
to the coverage problem. 
Let us consider first the possibility of applying the law of 
the state where tlie employee is injured. That state has an 
obvious interest in the protection of persons injured there 
and there is an established choice-of-law theory referring 
questions of tort liability to the law of the place of wrong. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising to find that 
many states apply their local acts to cases in which an em-
ployee has been injured at the forum although he was hired in 
some other state. 2 Sometimes a contract theory is introduced 
in these cases. The employee has been hired in an outside state 
and injured at the forum. The court of the forum justifies 
the application of the statute of the forum on the ground that 
the forum is the place of performance of the employment 
contract. Hence its law ought to determine the legal rights of 
2 Ocean, etc., Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, ( 1 9 2 7) 3 2 Ariz. 
275, 257 Pac. 644; Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., (1921) 119 Me. 552, 
II2 Atl. 5I6; Farr v. Babcock Lumber & Land Co., (1921) 182 N.c. 725, 
109 S. E. 833. 
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the employee arising out of the injury in the course of per-
formance.3 
However, the fact of injury at the forum has not always 
been deemed a sufficiently significant contact with that state 
to justify the application of its compensation laws. The course 
of an employee's employment at the forum might be of a 
very transitory character, such as soliciting orders, or merely 
travelling through on his employer's business. A few courts 
have held that an employee, injured at the forum under some 
such circumstances, should not be granted an award under the 
forum's compensation law. 4 
In discussing the common-law rules of master and servant, 
we considered the possibility of referring the master's liability 
for the servant's injuries to the law of the place where the 
employment contract was made. There was some authority 
for the view that that law might impose a contractual liability 
upon the master for injuries to the servant in the course of his 
work.5 This theory has had great influence in the workmen's 
compensation field. Many American courts have interpreted 
their local compensation statutes as applicable to all contracts 
of employment made at the forum. The practical result is 
that the employee gets compensation under the statute of the 
state in which he was hired for injuries received in another 
state. This interpretation of the compensation statutes in their 
conflict of laws aspect has often been explained or justified on 
the theory that the liability to pay compensation is contractual 
or quasi-contractual in its nature. The statutory provisions 
8 Johns-Manville v. Thrane, (1923) So Ind. App. 432, 141 N. E. 229; 
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. McCaffrey, (C. C. A. sth, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 
87o; Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., (1921) 119 Me. 552, 112 Atl. sx6; 
Bannister v. Shepherd, (1939) 191 S. C. 165, 4 S. E. (2d) 7· 
• Norman v. Hartman Furniture, etc., Co., ( 1 926) 84 Ind. App. 173, 1 so 
N. E. 416; Hall v. Industrial Commission, (1925) 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. 
1073; Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co., (1923) 99 Conn. 457, 121 
Atl. 828. 
• See above, section 44· 
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are said to be directed to the regulation of employment con-
tracts made within the governed area and the determination 
of their legal consequences. 6 The use of the somewhat ambig-
uous term "quasi-contractual," even in connection with the 
so-called elective acts, has been sharply criticized.7 As Judge 
Cardozo has pointed out, it really means nothing more than 
that "the contract creates the relationship to which the law 
attaches the duty and the same law which imposes the duty de-
fines its orbit and its measure." 8 
The law of the place of contracting has not been invariably 
applied in workmen's compensation cases. The decisions re-
jecting its application are of two classes. The first class con-
sists of decisions which were handed down at an early period 
while the courts were strongly influenced by the analogy be-
tween compensation claims and a common-law recovery for 
tort. These decisions proceed upon the theory that a claim for 
compensation is merely a novel form of tort liability. Hence 
the compensation statute of the state of hiring could have no 
application to injuries received in another state.9 This limita-
tion upon the scope of the compensation statutes was found 
unsatisfactory. Courts and legislatures of states which had 
adopted compensation laws wanted to extend their protection 
to employees, who, though regularly employed in such a 
state, suffered an injury while performing some incidental 
work in another state. This aspiration brought into play the 
"state of hiring" theory. The second class of decisions reject-
• Cases adopting this theory are legion. See, e.g., Matter of Post v. Burger, 
(I9I6) 2I6 N. Y. 544, III N. E. 35I· 
For a long list of citations, see Annotation, (I929) 59 A. L. R. 735; BEALE, 
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (I 9 3 5) vol. 2, p. I 3 I 8. 
1 See Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws," (I927) 
II MINN. L. REv. 329, 34I; GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, Ed. 2, (I938) 
240. 
8 Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., (I9I 8) 224 N.Y. 9, 12, I I9 N. E. 878. 
"Gould's Case, (I9I3) 2I5 Mass. 48o, I02 N. E. 693; Union Bridge, etc., 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, (I919) 287 Ill. 396, I22 N. E. 6o9; North 
Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, (1916) 174 Cal. 1, I62 Pac. 93· 
212 TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
ing the state of hiring theory proceed upon a less sweeping 
principle. They are simply cases in which the fact of hiring 
provided the sole significant contact with the state in question. 
The employment contract was made there but the actual work 
was performed elsewhere and the injury occurred elsewhere. 
Under these conditions some courts have refused to apply 
their local compensation acts.10 
So far we have merely discussed various solutions of the 
coverage problem in terms of long-established choice-of-law 
theories. The coverage problem has, however, evoked a new 
choice-of-law theory based upon the idea of the "place of 
employment." In various states the courts have held that the 
scope of their local statute extends to all employment within 
the state.11 The employee must, in the course of his employ-
ment, perform some service there. If he does so, the place 
of hiring and place of injury are not important. The position 
is thus explained by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin: 
"Under the express provisions of the act, an employee is 
one who renders services for another in the state of Wisconsin 
under a contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written. 
Where the employer under the act engages a person to per-
form services in this state under a contract of hire, express or 
implied, no matter where or when such contract may have been 
engendered, such employee is under our act and is entitled to 
its benefits, and this is so even though he is injured while out-
side of this state, rendering services incidental to his employ-
ment within this state. The place where the contract is made is 
not controlling. Whether the employee be a resident of this 
10 Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lumber Co., (1932) 19 La. App. 494, 136 So. 
II2, 140 So. 867; Platt v. Reynolds, (1929) 86 Colo. 397, 282 Pac. 264; 
Salkind v. Pennsylvania, etc., Ins. Co., (1939) 335 Pa. 326, 6 Atl. (2d) 301; 
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. James, (1938) 131 Tex. 6os, II8 S. W. (2d) 
293; Wandersee v. Moskewitz, (1929) 198 Wis. 345, 223 N. W. 837. 
11 See State ex rel. Chambers v. District Court, (1918) 139 Minn. 205, 166 
N. W. 185; Penwell v. Anderson, (1933) 125 Neb. 449, 250 N. W. 665; 
Bagdalik v. Flexlume Corp., (1939) 257 App. Div. 583, 14 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 
35; Traders etc. Ins. Co. v. Stakes, (1939 Tex. Civ. App.) 131 S. W. (2d) 
270; Baldwin v. Byrne, (1939) 53 Wyo. 519,86 P. (2d) 1095. 
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state is not material. The controlling and decisive factor is 
whether he had a status as an employee within this state." 12 
Surveying the coverage problem in retrospect we may say 
that the courts, in determining the ambit of their local com-
pensation statutes, have employed several different theories. 
As a result, a good deal of overlapping is possible. In certain 
situations an injured workman may find that the statutes of 
two or even more states each offer him a right to compensation. 
He may be able to get relief in the state where he was in-
jured. He may be able to get relief in the state where he was 
hired. He may be able to get relief in any state where he ac-
tually worked for his employer. 
SECTION 46 
WORKMEN's COMPENSATION ACTS: A CLAIM AUTHORIZED BY 
THE LAW OF ONE STATE CAN RARELY BE ENFORCED 
IN THE COURTS OF ANOTHER STATE 
An employee whose injuries are compensable under the 
statute of a certain state may desire to collect his claim by 
proceedings in the ordinary courts of another state. Usually 
he cannot do so. In many cases the special remedies conferred 
by compensation laws have been held to be unsuitable for 
extraterritorial enforcement through the common-law process. 
Their administration in the state of origin is generally con-
fided to a special tribunal invested with unusual powers, 
great latitude of discretion, and a system of procedure quite 
different to that employed by courts of law. Awards often 
take the form of periodical payments to the injured party. 
Litigation of the rights conferred by those statutes through an 
ordinary civil action would really defeat their principle pur-
pose, a cheap and speedy settlement of industrial accident 
12 McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Commission, ( 1933) 212. 
Wis. 507, 512, 250 N. W. 396. 
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cases. In declining to implement the acts of other states, the 
courts have not placed any noticeable emphasis upon the 
danger of oppressing the defendant, although this factor 
would probably have to be reckoned with. They have taken 
the broad ground that the effect of such laws in practice de-
pends too intimately upon the powers and personnel of the 
executing authority. An outside court, lacking such powers 
and following its own traditional technique, could not hope 
to produce even a colourable imitation of that authority's 
normal administration. 
Mosley v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co.1 is the most articulate 
decision. An action was brought in the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri for damages to be recovered under the Kansas W ark-
men's Compensation Law. The Missouri court carefully 
reviewed its many detailed provisions and the somewhat ex-
traordinary powers conferred upon the local boards and courts 
authorized to enforce it. In particular, they noted that the 
Kansas court might, in its own discretion, decree the payment 
of either a lump sum or a series of sums subject to modification 
by the court on the application of either party. 
"Courts in Missouri," said the Supreme Court of that 
state, "can render only such judgments or so modify them 
after they are rendered as they might be authorized to do by 
the laws of Missouri. The jurisdiction of the court is de-
termined by the law of its creation. A statute of Kansas cannot 
confer upon a Missouri court in a suit for money, a jurisdiction 
and a power wholly unknown to the Missouri code of pro-
cedure. . . . By that statute the right and remedy are so 
united, and the provision for liability is so coupled with a 
provision for a special remedy to be administered by a desig-
nated tribunal with certain specific powers given, that the 
remedy must be sought in the designated tribunal." 
Other state courts have replied in a similar vein to sugges-
tions that they should set in motion the rights conferred by 
1 Mosley v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., (1926) 313 Mo. 2251 2451 281 S. W. 
762. 
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foreign compensation statutes.2 But more often they simply 
assume that such a course is out of the question or justify that 
assumption with the laconic remark that the sister state "fur-
nishes an exclusive remedy." 3 Federal courts, too, have de-
clined to take jurisdiction in such cases when the parties have 
become subject to a state compensation law.4 
In some of the states the compensation statutes are ad-
ministered, not by any specially organized commission but by 
the ordinary state courts. Such acts have received exceptional 
treatment in a few cases. One of the earliest is Texas Pipe Line 
Co. v. W are 5 in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered the various sections of Louisiana's act in some de-
tail and decided that effect could, with propriety, be given to 
it through the medium of federal procedure. "There may be," 
the court admitted, "some few provisions of the act which per-
haps could be more easily carried out in the courts of Louisiana. 
Such provisions can properly be held to apply where a suit 
is brought in the state court. We see no insuperable difficulties, 
however, to the federal courts enforcing the provisions of this 
Compensation Law." Earlier in the opinion it was remarked 
that the district court appeared to have encountered no serious 
clashes between the statute in question and the ordinary trial 
procedure. Statutes operated by administrative tribunals were 
emphatically distinguished. "The remedy provided to enforce 
the provisions of the act is a proceeding in a court of justice, 
viz., a suit." Other federal and state courts have also under-
"Logan v. Missouri Valley, etc., Co., (I923) I57 Ark. 528, 249 s. W. 2I; 
Douthwright v. Champlin, (I9I7) 9I Conn. 524, Ioo Atl. 97· 
In Harbis v. Cudahy Packing Co., (I 92 I) 2 I I Mo. App. I 8 8, 24I S. W. 
96o, the court declined to enforce another state's statute because its express 
terms prohibited such a course of action. See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. In-
dustrial Accident Commission, (I934) I Cal. (2d) 250, 34 P. (2d) 7I6. 
8 See, e.g., Resigno v. Jarka Co., (1927) 22I App. Div. 2I4, 223 N.Y. Supp. 
5; Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Peck, (I9I8) I66 c. c. A. 43I, 255 Fed. 261. 
•Delaware, etc., R. Co. v.Peck, (r9r8) r66 C. C. A. (2d) 431,255 Fed. 261; 
Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co. (D. C. Mo., 1930) 38 F. (2d) 303. 
"Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 171. 
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taken the administration of Louisiana's Workmen's Com-
pensation Law.6 In Johnson v. Employers Liability Corpora-
tion 7 a Texas court declared itself incapable of properly 
administering that act "with full justice to the parties." This 
decision also rested upon the ground that the statute's dis-
similarity to corresponding Texas law rendered its enforce-
ment incompatible with Texas public policy. These views do 
not seem to be shared by the federal courts in Texas. 8 
In Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co.9 and McMillan 
v. Canadian Northern R. Co.10 the Privy Council was called 
upon to determine what effect should be attributed in one 
Canadian province to the compensation statutes of another. 
In the final result, their lordships reached the same result as 
the majority of American courts by giving an additional twist 
to the meaning of that pliable symbol "justifiable."11 The 
Anglo-Dominion choice-of-law theory is that an action cannot 
be brought upon a foreign tort if the acts complained of are 
"justifiable" under the law of the place of wrong. The Privy 
Council decided that the compensation act of one province 
could not be enforced in the ordinary courts of another prov-
"United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) 18 F. (2d) 453, 
aff'g Lindberg v. Southern Casualty Co., (D. C. Texas, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 
54; Blount v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., (D. C. La., 1925) 5 F. (2d) 967; 
Ford, Bacon & Davis v. Volentine, (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 8oo; Floyd 
v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., (1930) 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395; Louisville, 
etc., R. Co. v. Dixon, (1933) 168 Miss. 14, 150 So. 8II; Dunn Const. Co. v. 
Bourne, (1935) 172 Miss. 62o, 159 So. 841; Orleans Dredging Co. v. Frazie, 
(1935) 173 Miss. 882, 161 So. 399, (1937) 179 Miss. 188, 173 So. 431. 
For the enforcement of other state compensation laws by ordinary courts, 
see: Zurich, etc., Ins. Co. v. Brunson, (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 906; 
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. McCaffrey, (C. C. A. 5th, 193o) 37 F. (2d) 
87o; Esteves v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) 74 F. (2d) 364; 
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Warren, (1938) 172 Tenn. 403, 112 
S. W. (2d) 837. 
7 Johnson v. Employers Liability Co., (1936 Tex. Civ. App.) 99 S. W. (2d) 
979· 
8 United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, (C. c. A. 5th, 1927) 18 F. (2d) 453· 
"Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co., [1923] A. C. 113. 
10 McMillan v. Canadian Northern R. Co., [1923] A. C. 120. 
11 See above, section 2. 
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ince because acts which, under the law of the place where they 
were done, merely gave rise to a claim for compensation, were, 
in a highly technical sense, "justifiable." In rationalizing their 
inclusion in that category of acts giving rise to a claim for 
compensation, their lordships laid some stress upon two char-
acteristics of the factual situations there presented: (a) that 
the acts were not shown to form a possible basis for a criminal 
action against the defendants; (b) that, in McMillan's case, 
the defendant would not have been subject to a civil action 
prior to the enactment of the compensation statute. Hence 
the question is patently left open whether or not the absence 
of these somewhat fortuitous circumstances would really pro-
duce a different result, a matter not left in any doubt at all 
by the more simple and comprehensive solution of the Ameri-
can courts. It is interesting to note that that solution was 
adopted in Walpole's case by the Saskatchewan Court of Ap-
peal notwithstanding the lack of any suggestive discussion 
in either the English precedents or textbooks.12 
SECTION 47 
WORKMEN's COMPENSATION ACTS: STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
BARRING ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS OR REMEDIES 
Workmen's compensation laws are characteristically ex-
clusive. The power to obtain compensation is usually given in 
lieu of the employee's common-law power to sue for damages, 
which is expressly abolished. In some compensation acts the 
clauses barring alternative remedies are phrased in language 
broad enough to include not merely common-law rights but 
also such claims as might be available under the compensation 
12 See Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co., [1921] 15 Sask. 75· 
See also the opinions of Bigelow, J., in the McMillan case [1921] r W. W. R. 
51; Walpole case [1921] r W. W. R. 1232.. 
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statutes of other states. Such a provision contained in the 
statute of the state of injury or in that of the state of hiring 
may be pleaded by an employer as a defence to either (a) 
a common-law suit or (b) compensation proceedings, at the 
forum. Should the court of the forum obey the command of 
the foreign statute and dismiss the suit for damages or the 
claim for compensation? As might be expected, the answer to 
this question will depend upon the nature of the contacts 
which the facts make with the states involved and upon con-
siderations of policy. Let us consider in order the various 
problems of this kind which may arise. 
Suppose A, a workman, is hired and injured in state X. 
The statute of that state would allow him compensation but 
no common-law remedy. He cannot bring a common-law ac-
tion in state X. If he attempts to do so in some outside juris-
diction, a reference to the law of the plac~ of wrong will 
show that it denies him a right of action in common-law 
courts. That law gives him only a special claim which the 
foreign court could not conveniently assist him to enforce.1 
An alternative reference to the law of the place of contracting 
would reach the same result. 2 
Johnson v. Carolina, etc., R. Co.3 is a peculiar decision. 
Plaintiff employee was hired and injured in Tennessee. He 
brought a common-law action for damages against his em-
1 At least, this is the normal situation. See above, section 46. 
2 Pendar v. H. & B. American Mach. Co., (I9I3) 35 R.I. 32I, 87 Atl. I; 
Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., (I9I4) 87 Misc. I56, I49 N. Y. 
Supp. I035; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner, (I933) I88 Ark. I77> 65 
S. W. (2d) I (semble). 
It has been expressly decided that the mere fact of the forum having adopted 
workmen's compensation legislation does not render obnoxious to its policy a 
common-law suit by an employee based on injuries received in another state 
and not compensable at the forum. Reynolds v. Day, (I9I4) 79 Wash. 499, 140 
Pac. 68I, 
8 Johnson v. Carolina, etc., R. Co., (1926) 191 N.C. 75, 131 S. E. 390. 
A similar decision was given by a Quebec court in Johansdotter v. Canadian 
Pac. R. Co., (r9I4) 47 Queb. S. Ct. 76. 
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ployer in North Carolina. The employer argued that this 
common-law action was forbidden by the Tennessee Work-
men's Compensation Act. The court refused to recognize 
the Tennessee law and dealt with the case according to 
the common law of North Carolina. The decision would ap-
pear to be open to attack upon constitutional grounds. 4 
More difficult problems arise when the contract of em-
ployment is made in one state and the injury occurs in another. 
Suppose A is hired in state X and injured in state Y. The 
law of state Y would allow him compensation but purports 
to exclude all other remedies. State X has no workmen's 
compensation statute; the common law is in force there. As 
we have seen, there is some authority for the view that the 
employee could bring an action for breach of contract based 
upon the common law of state X, which would be alternative 
to any claim he might have under the law of state Y.5 An at-
tempt to enforce this common-law contractual right of action 
would bring the laws of the two states into conflict with one 
another. If the suit were brought in state Y, it would probably 
be dismissed. If brought in state X, its fate would be more 
dubious. There is some authority supporting the view that 
the courts of the state of hiring (state X) ought to waive its 
interest in favour of the state of injury's aspiration to provide 
an exclusive remedy of a more modern character. 6 
The situation would be different if the state of hiring had 
established a compensation law under which the employee 
was entitled to an award. It is very unlikely that the courts 
of the state of hiring would stay compensation proceedings 
there in deference to the law of the state of injury. And the 
Supreme Court has indicated that the Constitution does not 
compel them to do so. In Alaska Packers Association v. In-
• See the ensuing discussion regarding the effect of the "full faith and credit" 
clause, 
• See section 44, above. 
6 Johnson v. Nelson, (1915) 128 Minn. 158, 150 N, W. 6zo. 
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dustrial Accident Commission of California7 the claimant 
employee was hired in California for services wholly to be 
performed in Alaska. His contract stipulated that the parties 
should be subject to, and bound by, the Alaska compensa-
tion statute. Having suffered injuries in Alaska, he filed a 
claim for compensation under the California act. Both statutes 
purported to exclude all other remedies. But the California 
courts granted an award and the Supreme Court upheld them 
in doing so: 
"Prima facie," said the court, "every state is entitled to 
enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted. 
One who challenges that right, because of the force given 
to a conflicting statute of another state by the full faith and 
credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some 
rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those 
of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. It fol-
lows that not every statute of another state will override a 
conflicting statute of the forum by virtue of the full faith and 
credit clause; that the statute of a state may sometimes over-
ride the conflicting statute of another, both at home and 
abroad; and, again, that the two conflicting statutes may each 
prevail over the other at home, although given no extrater-
ritorial effect in the state of the other." 
Having reviewed the facts, the court decided that the in-
terest of Alaska was not superior to that of California. In 
reaching this conclusion they laid stress upon two circum-
stances: ( r) the form~tion of the contract in California, ( z) 
the possibility of the injured workman's becoming a public 
charge to the state of California. 
To produce another variation on our original problem, 
let us suppose that state X (the state of hiring) has en-
acted compensation legislation which covers A's injury in 
7 Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 
(1934) 1 Cal. (2d) 250, 34 Pac. (2d) 716, aff'd (1935) 294 U.S. 532, 547, 55 
Sup. Ct. 518. See also Daggett v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., (1933) 334 
Mo. 207, 65 S. W. (2d) 1036; Sims v. Truscon Steel Co., (1939) 343 Mo. 
1216, 126 S. W. (2d) 204. 
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state Y and denies him any alternative form of relief. 
State Y (the state of injury) has no compensation act; the 
common law is in force there. Here again the policies of 
the two states may clash. Although the law of the state of 
injury gives the workman a common-law right to damages, 
the law of the state of contracting forbids its enforcement. 
Some compensation acts govern the parties' relations only 
in the absence of an express disaffirmance. If the state of 
hiring has one of these acts, its provisions may be compared to 
an ordinary contract limiting the employer's liability. But this 
analogy is at best a thin one and, in the case of a compulsory 
act, it vanishes entirely. The real issue is between the desires of 
the two states to protect the workman .and his family 8 in what-
ever manner they may see fit. If he were to bring an ordinary 
suit in state X, the courts there would probably prefer their 
own law and dismiss the action. 9 And there are cases in 
which courts other than that of the state of hiring have 
recognized the law of that state as an effective bar to a 
common-law action based upon the law of the place of 
wrong.10 
8 Where the employee is killed and an action brought for his death under 
the death statute of the state of injury, it might be argued that the compensation 
act of the place of contracting should not be allowed to affect the rights of the 
beneficiaries. They are not partie.s to the employment contract; why should 
they be subjected to the law of the place where it was made? But if the death 
statute of the law of the place of wrong gives a right of action to the benefi-
ciaries only in the event that the deceased, had he lived, would have had one, a 
compensation statute of the place of contracting which would bar him, will 
bar them also. See Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., (1920) 227 N.Y. 
531, 125 N. E. 675. 
9 Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1919) 169 Wis. 1o6, 170 N. W. 275, 
171 N. W. 935; Hockmuth v. Perkins, (1937) 55 Ga. App. 649, 191 S. E. 
156. 
10 An elective act in force at the place of hiring was held to bar suit else-
where in Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., (1920) 227 N. Y. 531, 
125 N. E. 675; Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., (1914) 87 Misc. 
156, 149 N.Y. Supp. 1035; Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Refining Co. (D. C. 
Kan., 1930) 47 F. (zd) 615; Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 
286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571. 
For the effect of a compulsory act, see Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co. 
[1923] A. C. 113; Schweitzer v. Hamburg-Amerikanische, etc., (1912) 78 
Misc. 448, 138 N.Y. Supp. 944· 
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The Supreme Court has discussed the bearing of the 
"full faith and credit" clause upon the solution of this prob-
lem. In Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper11 the facts 
were as follows: Leon Clapper was engaged by the defendant 
company in Vermont to serve as a linesman in Vermont and 
New Hampshire. His duties required him to go into New 
Hampshire only for temporary and specific purposes. Both 
parties resided in Vermont, where the company had its prin-
cipal place of business. They elected to be bound by the Ver-
mont vVorkmen's Compensation Act. While replacing some 
fuses in Vermont, Clapper was killed. To an action by his 
administrator in a federal court, the company pleaded the 
exclusionary sections of the Vermont act. The court held that 
this section was opposed to the public policy of New Hamp-
shire and gave judgment for the plaintiff. This decision was 
reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that there was 
no basis for the assumption that a New Hampshire state 
court would not give effect to the Vermont statute. The Su-
preme Court also held that, irrespective of New Hampshire 
policy, full faith and credit to the Vermont act would re-
quire the action to be dismissed. In the subsequent case of 
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
s-ion of California 12 the court appears to have withdrawn from 
this position. The opinion in the latter case clearly suggests 
that a New Hampshire court would have been free to dis-
regard the Vermont statute if it were deemed obnoxious to 
New Hampshire policy. 
We have still to consider the situation where an exclu-
sionary section in the compensation law of the state of hiring 
is pleaded as a defence to compensation proceedings in the 
11 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (193z) z86 U. S. 145, sz Sup. 
Ct. 571. See also Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., (1933) z89 U. S. 
439, 53 Sup. Ct. 663. 
12 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 
(1939) 306 U.S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 6z9, aff'g (1938) 10 Cal. (zd) 567, 75 
Pac. (zd) 1058. 
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state of injury. If the courts of the state of injury felt that 
their statute was designed to cover the case in hand, they 
would be most reluctant to allow this defence. But prior to 
the decision in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ac-
cident Commission of California 13 it was necessary to con-
sider the effect of the Clapper case. The crucial facts in the 
Clapper case were: (I) the contract of hiring was made in 
Vermont; (2) both parties resided in Vermont; (3) the em-
ployee was required to make only occasional and temporary 
excursions out of Vermont. The Supreme Court held that, 
in view of these facts, the Vermont statute barring alternative 
remedies was entitled to absolute recognition everywhere. In 
other cases where the same factors connected the circum-
stantial pattern to a single state, the courts of the state of in-
jury enjoined their local boards from proceeding.14 Where 
one of the parties did not reside in the state of hiring, the 
Clapper case has been distinguished. 15 
In Pacific Employers Ins. Company v. Industrial Accident 
Commission of California 16 both employer and employee re-
sided in Massachusetts, the state of hiring. The employee was 
injured while working temporarily in California. The Su-
preme Court of California upheld an award of compensation 
made by the California Industrial Commission. Taking their 
keynote from the Alaska Packers' case, the court argued 
that California had a sufficient interest in the affair to justify 
13 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 
(1939) 306 U.S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, a:ff'g (1938) 10 Cal. (2d) 567, 75 
Pac. (2d) 1058. 
14 Weiderho:ff v. Neal, (D. C. Mo., 1934) 6 F. Supp. 798; Cole v. Industrial 
Commission, (1933) 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. E. 520. 
15 Esau v. Smith Bros., (1933) 124 Neb. 217, 246 N. W. 230; State ex rei. 
Weaver v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, (1936) 339 Mo. 
150, 95 S. W. (2d) 641; United States Casualty Co. v. Hoage, (1935) 64 App. 
D. C. 284, 77 F. (2d) 542. 
lll Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 
(1938) 10 Cal. (2d) 567, 75 Pac. (2d) 1058, a:ff'd (1939) 306 U.S. 493, 
59 Sup. Ct. 629. 
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the application of California law because an injured employee 
might easily become a public charge there.17 They also pointed 
out that if the local commission could not dispose of the case, 
the hospitals and doctors who had supplied the employee with 
medical services might have to go to Massachusetts to col-
lect their claim. The decision of the California court was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. As a 
decision upon the obligatory effect of the full faith and credit 
clause, the Clapper case would appear to have been over-
ruled. 
We have considered the situation in which the statutory 
provision barring all claims (other than a claim for com-
pensation at the forum) forms part of the law of the state 
in which the employee was injured. We have also considered 
the problems which arise when the statutory provision barring 
all claims (other than a claim for compensation at the forum) 
forms a part of the law of the state of hiring. A third situation 
(unusual but possible) suggests itself. A statutory provision 
of the type under consideration forms a part of the law of a 
state in which the employee has been employed. Part, at least, 
of his work has been performed there; that state (we may 
call it state Z) is a "state of employment." Yet neither the 
contract of hiring nor the actual injury to the employee have 
occurred in that state. The employee has been hired in state 
X, injured in state Y. But under the coverage theory enter-
tained by the court of state Z (the state of employment) his 
injuries are compensable there. 
The problem presents itself in the usual variant forms. 
We first assume that state X (the state of hiring) and state 
Y (the state of injury) each give the employee a common-law 
claim for damages. If he brings an action in state Z (the state 
of employment) to enforce either of these claims, he is not 
17 Stress was laid upon this fact in United States Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 
(1935) 64 App. D. C. 284, 77 F. (2d) 542. 
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very likely to succeed. The courts there will tell him that his 
remedy is before the state Z compensation tribunal; his 
common-law action is barred by the local statute.18 If he brings 
his action in state X or state Y, his chances of success are 
dubious. As we have seen, there are several cases in which 
courts have dismissed a common-law suit on the ground that 
the law of a foreign state (which was the state of hiring or 
the state of injury) barred the action. The same recognition 
might be given to a statutory prohibition contained in the law 
of a state of employment. 
The problem would be different if state X or state Y gave 
the employee a claim for compensation and proceedings were 
taken in either state to secure an award. The statutory bar of 
state Z would probably be disregarded. The covrt of the 
forum (state X or state Y) would probably carry on with the 
compensation proceedings. Would the full faith and credit 
clause permit it to do so? According to the excerpt quoted 
above from the Supreme Court's opinion in Alaska Packers 
Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,19 
the answer would depend upon the extent of the forum's in-
terest in the problem. If state X (the state of hiring) was the 
forum, this case would lend considerable support to the argu-
ment that the forum had a sufficient interest to justify the ap-
plication of its law. If state Y (the state of hiring) was the 
forum, Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Commission of California 20 would go a long way to justify the 
application of state Y's law. 
Let us attempt to summarize the principal trends in the 
18 Severson v. Hanford Tri-state Airlines, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 
622. 
10 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 
(1935) 294 U.S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518, aff'g (1934) I Cal. (2d) 250, 34 Pac. 
(2d) 716. 
00 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 
(1939) 306 U.S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, aff'g (1938) ro Cal. (2d) 567, 75 
Pac. (2d) 1058. 
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judicial treatment of our problem. We start with the fact that 
most workmen's compensation statutes purport to give an 
exclusive remedy and to bar alternative proceedings. So far 
as such a prohibition affects common-law suits, it will prob-
ably be recognized and enforced by the courts of other juris-
dictions. But so far as it attempts to stop compensation 
proceedings in other states it will probably be disregarded. 
Pronouncements of the Supreme Court indicate that the court 
of a state which has a sufficient interest in the protection of 
an injured employee may award compensation to him 
although the laws of another state purport to prohibit such 
an award. But the Clapper case, though overruled, still 
signifies the power of the Supreme Court to prevent a state 
from extending its law to cases in which it has not a sufficient 
interest. 
SECTION 48 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS: CONTRACTS LIMITING THE 
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY, RELEASES, AND PRIOR JUDGMENTS 
Bargains between employer and employee limiting the em-
ployer's liability for injuries are deprived of legal validity 
by most compensation acts. Such a contract might be made 
in a state whose laws upheld it and then pleaded as a defence 
to compensation proceedings in a forum whose laws avoided 
it. If the court of the forum believed that the forum had a 
sufficient interest in the case to entertain compensation pro-
ceedings, it would probably reject the contractual defence as 
contrary to local public policy.1 A similar problem has fre-
quently arisen in suits against carriers who have attempted 
to limit their liability. In such cases some courts declined to 
1 See Carl Hagenbeck, etc., Show Co. v. Ball, (1920) 75 Ind. App. 454, 126 
N. E. 504. 
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recognize the limitation if the factual pattern was significantly 
connected to the forum. 2 
Contracts made after the event releasing the employer 
from liability for injuries are also invalid under most com-
pensation acts. In a few states they are permitted to take 
effect when their terms comply with certain statutory re-
quirements. Cases have arisen in which employers tried to 
defend themselves against compensation proceedings at the 
forum by pleading a release signed in some outside state, 
valid under its laws but void under the statute of the forum. 
The courts have given scanty consideration to the parties' de-
sire to arrange a binding settlement of their dispute. Stressing 
instead the policy of the forum which disapproved such re-
leases, the courts have uniformly treated such foreign re-
leases as void.3 But if the employer or his insurer has paid 
sums of money to the employee under the terms of the release, 
these sums are usually credited to them in the compensation 
proceedings at the forum.4 
Questions are sometimes raised in the course of com-
pensation proceedings regarding the effect of a prior judg-
ment rendered in some other state. The "double recovery" 
problem has been the subject of several judicial decisions. 
Suppose that an employee's injuries are compensable under 
the statute of state X. He takes appropriate proceedings in 
state X and receives an award. Then he discovers that the 
same injuries are compensable under the statute of state Y. 
Being dissatisfied with the award obtained in state X, he 
~ See above, p. 2oo. 
3 Jenkins v. Hogan & Sons, (1917) 177 App. Div. 36, 163 N.Y. Supp. 707; 
Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Wilson, (1929 Tex. Civ. App.) 17 S. W. (2d) 
68; McLaughlin's Case, (1931) 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338; Anderson v. 
Jarrett Chambers Co., (1924) 210 App. Div. 543, 206 N. Y. Supp. 458 
(semble); Migues' Case, (1933) 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847. 
'See Jenkins v. Hogan & Sons, (1917) 177 App. Div. 36, 163 N.Y. Supp. 
707; McLaughlin's Case, (1931) 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338; Migues' Case, 
(1933) 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847. 
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initiates proceedings in state Y to obtain an award under its 
statute. In these latter proceedings the employer pleads that 
the matter has already been conclusively settled by the com-
pensation tribunal of state X. That body has investigated the 
merits of the employee's claim and made an award. Its dis-
position of the case ought to be regarded as final. 
The court of state Y is now called upon to decide whether 
or not it will make a second award in respect of the same in-
juries. It is very desirable, of course, that the litigation in 
respect of these injuries should be brought to an end, once 
and for all, and not protracted unnecessarily. The prime 
object of all workmen's compensation is to provide a cheap, 
speedy, and effective means of handling industrial accident 
cases. Consecutive proceedings in two different states re-
specting the same accident are scarcely consistent with this 
objective. In many states the compensation statutes provide 
that an award shall be given in lieu of all other alternative 
claims or remedies. We may assume that state X has the same 
rule; thus the employee may be said to have received his 
award there on condition that he accept it as complete satis-
faction and that he refrain from taking further proceedings. 
These various factors in the problem have led some courts to 
forbid compensation proceedings based upon injuries for 
which compensation has already been awarded in another 
state.5 
6 Minto v. Hitchings & Co., (1923) 204 App. Div. 661, 198 N.Y. Supp. 
61o; De Gray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., (1934) 106 Vt. 259, 173 Atl. 556; 
Di Carvallo v. DiNapoli, (1935 N.J. Dept. of Labor) 180 Atl. 488; Hughey 
v. Ware, (1929) 34 N. M. 29, 276 Pac. 27; Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler 
& Tank Co., (1931) r63 Tenn. 420, 43 S. W. (2d) 221, rehearing denied 163 
Tenn. 648, 45 S. W. (2d) 528. This last decision proceeds upon the theory that 
the acceptance of compensation in Ohio constituted a breach of the statutory 
terms of the contract imposed by the law of Tennessee where the contract of 
employment was made. This breach excused the employer from his duty to 
pay compensation under the Tennessee statute. 
In Texas an employee who has collected compensation in another state is 
barred by statute from making a claim in the local tribunals. See Vernon's Ann. 
Civ. St. (1925) 1940 Supp., art. 83o6, § 19c. 
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On the other hand, it is always possible to argue that, not-
withstanding the previous award in another state, the policy 
of the forum requires that the case be disposed of according 
to its laws. The statute of the forum might allow greater 
compensation to the injured employee. Taking this view of 
the matter, several courts have held that the court of the 
forum ought to make a second award according to its own 
laws.6 
In those states where a foreign award does not prevent 
the employee from making a further claim, the courts usually 
credit the employer or his insurer with all sums paid under 
the prior judgment.7 But the employee still retains the ad-
vantage of being able to try for a larger sum in the second 
proceeding. 
It has been suggested that the full faith and credit clause 
may have some bearing upon the solution of the double-
recovery problem. If the court of a sister state has obtained 
proper jurisdiction of the parties, and has given a judgment 
in favour of the plaintiff, that judgment will be recognized 
in other states as a conclusive adjudication upon all issues of 
law or fact which it purports to dispose of. Should a question 
be raised in another state as to whether a particular issue of 
law or fact has been dealt with by such a judgment, it will 
be referred to the law of the state in which the judgment was 
rendered. This general choice-of-law rule is supposed to be re-
inforced by the constitutional obligation of the full faith and 
credit clause. 8 But it does not dispose of our problem concern-
• Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, (1931) 203 
Wis. 466, 234 N. W. 889; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Price, (1927 Tex. 
Civ. App.) 300 S. W. 667 (semble); Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission, 
(1935) 219 Wis. 343, 263 N. W. 349; Gilbert v. DesLauriers Column Mold 
Co., (1917) 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N.Y. Supp. 274. 
7 Gilbert v. DesLauriers Column Mold Co., (1917) 180 App. Div. 59, 167 
N. Y. Supp. 274; Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission, (1935) 219 
Wis. 343, 263 N. W. 349; see also American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. 
McCaffrey, (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 87o. 
8 See FREEMAN, JuDGMENTS, Ed. 5 (1925) Vol. 3, § 1394; CONFLICT OF 
LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 450 and comment f. 
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ing two awards in the workmen's compensation field. The first 
judgment, given by the compensation tribunal in state X, may 
be said to have conclusively determined the rights of the em-
ployee under the statute of state X. But it does not touch the 
question of what rights are conferred upon him under the 
statute of state Y. In the normal case it could not do so be-
cause, as we have seen, the rights conferred by compensation 
statutes can rarely be enforced except in their state of origin.9 
If the court of state Y where the second claim is put forward 
orders a second award, that award will be based upon an ap-
plication of legal rules which the first court could not have 
made. In other words, the employee, when injured, had two 
causes of action, one created by the law of state X, the other 
created by the law of state Y. Either state could render an 
award according to its own rules of law. This state of affairs 
is quite compatible with the obligation of the full faith and 
credit clause. When the court of state X gives the first judg-
ment, it finally disposes of the cause of action created by the 
law of state X. The cause of action, the claim to compensation, 
is merged in the judgment. But the cause of action created 
by the law of state Y remains unaffected by that judgment. 
Hence the cause of action created by the law of state Y may 
properly form the subject of a second adjudication by the 
court of that state. 10 
The double award problem arose in Interstate Power Co. 
v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin.11 The first award was 
made under the Iowa statute by an Iowa court; proceedings 
were then taken in Wisconsin to obtain a second award under 
the Wisconsin statute. The court approved a second award 
saymg: 
celt is contended by the appellant [employer] that the dis-
position of this case in Iowa has the force and effect of a 
9 See section 46, above. 
10 See FREEMAN, JuDGMENTS, Ed. 5 (1925) Vol. 3, § 1395. 
11 Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, (I 9 3 I) 203 
Wis. 466, 478, 234 N. W. 889. 
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judgment, to which this court must give full faith and credit. 
This might be a valid argument provided the Iowa court had 
any jurisdiction to effect proceedings under the Wisconsin 
act. We think it has not such jurisdiction. We concede the 
jurisdiction of the Iowa Commission to determine the rights 
of the parties under the Iowa act, and we claim the jurisdiction 
of the Wisconsin Commission to determine their rights under 
the Wisconsin act." 
Like other species of adjudications, a judgment which 
terminates workmen's compensation proceedings may be in-
troduced in the course of subsequent litigation to show that, 
as between the parties, a particular issue of fact or law has 
been conclusively determined by a competent tribunal. In 
Chicago etc., R. Co. v. Schendel 12 an action was brought in 
Minnesota under the Federal Employer's Liability Act to 
recover damages for the death of an employee. Such a suit 
necessarily proceeded upon the theory that the employee was 
engaged in interstate commerce. The employer defendant set 
up the prior judgment of an Iowa court affirming an award 
of compensation under the Iowa compensation statute upon 
the ground that the deceased was engaged in intrastate com-
merce only. The parties to the Minnesota suit had all been 
parties to the prior proceedings in Iowa. The employer con-
tended that as between himself and the plaintiff beneficiaries 
the question of the character of the deceased employee's em-
ployment had been conclusively determined. This contention 
was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. That 
court held that by virtue of the full faith and credit clause, the 
decision of the Iowa court that the deceased employee was en-
gaged in intrastate commerce must be recognized in Minne-
sota. Hence the proceedings there, which were based upon a 
12 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schendel, ( r 926) 270 U. S. 6r r, 46 Sup. Ct. 420, 
In the Schendel case the Iowa compensation proceedings had terminated in a 
final judgment by an ordinary court. But it has also been held that a finding 
of fact by an administrative board, which is not open to review, is res judicata. 
Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., (r92r) 54 Cal. App. 571, 202 Pac. 356. 
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contrary theory, could not be maintained. The Supreme 
Court's opinion clearly indicated that, in the converse situa-
tion, a determination by a court that the deceased was engaged 
in interstate commerce would preclude further proceedings 
under a state compensation act. 
SECTION 49 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS: A STATUTORY ASSIGNMENT 
OF THE EMPLOYEE's RIGHTS AGAINST A THIRD 
PARTY TORTFEASOR TO THE EMPLOYER 
So broad is the scope of some workmen's compensation 
statutes that an employer may find himself compelled to com-
pensate an employee in respect of injuries caused by the negli-
gence of some third party but received by the employee in the 
course of his employment. Some statutes provide that where 
an award is made under these circumstances the employer 
shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee against the 
third party tortfeasor. The acceptance of compensation is made 
to constitute an assignment by the employee to the employer 
of his claim against the tortfeasor. Usually the statutory as-
signment is limited to the amount of the compensation award 
which the employer has paid to the employee. The employee 
is then entitled to any damages in excess of that sum for which 
the tortfeasor is liable. 
Provisions of this kind give rise to an interesting modern 
instance of concurrent reference to two legal systems. Any 
tort cause of action which an injured employee may have 
against someone other than his employer will be defined and 
governed by the law of the place of wrong. If the employee 
accepts compensation in some other state whose laws in that 
event assign his cause of action to his employer, the effect of 
those laws upon the employee's original cause of action will 
have to be determined. We have seen that where a claim for 
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damages in tort accrues in one state and is assigned in another 
state the spheres of influence appropriate to the respective laws 
of these two states are by no means clearly defined.1 In deal-
ing with these statutory assignments by acceptance of compen-
sation, the courts have generally given very full play to the 
law of the state where the award was accepted. Several opin-
ions indicate, however, that the modification of the employee's 
right of action by that law must not run counter to any settled 
rule or policy of the state where the tort was committed. 2 
Thus the law of the state where the employee had accepted 
an award has been permitted to determine the following 
points: 
(I) That the employee might, notwithstanding his ac-
ceptance of an award, maintain an action against the third 
party tortfeasor to recover his interest in the partially assigned 
cause of action. 3 
( 2) That the employer might intervene in a suit brought 
by the employee or his dependents in order to recover his 
interest in the partially assigned cause of action.4 
(3) That an employee who had already collected damages 
at the forum from the third party should be forced to share 
them with his employer.5 
1 See section 4 3, above. 
"Betts v. Southern R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787; Rorvik v. 
North Pacific Lumber Co., (1920) 99 Ore. 58, 190 Pac. 331, 195 Pac. 163; 
Saloshin v. Houle, (1931) 85 N.H. 126, 155 Atl. 47· 
8 Personius v. Asbury Transp. Co., (1936) 152 Ore. 286, 53 Pac. (2d) 
1065; Smith v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., (1935) 191 Ark. 389, 86 S. W. 
(2d) 41 r (here the employer's insurer had waived its interest in favour of 
the employee); Solomon v. Call, (1932) 159 Va. 625, 166 S. E. 467; Scott v. 
Missouri P. R. Co., (1933) 333 Mo. 374, 62 S. W. (2d) 834. 
•Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., (1924) 132 Wash. 108, 231 Pac. 773; 
Betts v. Southern R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787; Saloshin v. 
Houle, (1931) 85 N.H. 126, 155 Atl. 47; Sloan v. Appalachian Electric Power 
Co., (D. C. W.Va., 1939) 27 F. Supp. 108. 
• Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Chartrand, (1924) 239 N.Y. 36, 145 
N. E. 274; General Accident, etc., Co. v. Zerbe Const. Co., (1935) 269 N. Y. 
227, 199 N. E. 89; Re Hertell's Estate, (1929) 135 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y. Supp. 
6 55 (here the employee's administrator had collected a sum of money as 
damages in another state but it had come under tire control of the court in 
administration proceedings.) 
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Where the injury to the employee has resulted in death, 
the award of compensation to persons who would be entitled 
to damages under the law of the place of wrong has been 
recognized as efFecting an assignment of their rights to the 
employer.6 But it has been held that the acceptance of an 
award by one beneficiary should not be permitted to afFect 
the rights of others who have not received compensation. 7 
The law of the place of wrong gives them a common-law cause 
of action for damages against the third party tortfeasor. This 
common-law cause of action they are entitled to enforce unless 
and until they accept compensation on terms which require 
them to assign their cause of action. The acceptance of com-
pensation upon these terms by one of the beneficiaries should 
not afFect the position of the others. 
In Foster v. Denny Motor Transfer Co.8 the court had to 
deal with a rather peculiar statutory assignment provision 
contained in the Illinois compensation act. The provision in 
question was directed to a situation in which both the employer 
and the third party tortfeasor were operating under the Illi-
nois compensation act and the employee's injuries were com-
pensable under that act. It purported, in these circumstances, 
to assign the employee's entire claim against the third party 
tortfeasor to the employer, whether the employee obtained 
an award under the act or not. In Foster v. Denny Motor 
Transfer Co. the plaintifF employee was injured in Indiana. 
He apparently made no attempt to obtain compensation in 
Illinois but brought a common-law action against the defend-
ant third party tortfeasor in an Illinois federal court. The 
defendant third party tortfeasor argued that since both it and 
"Re Hertell's Estate, (1929) 135 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y. Supp. 655; Reutenik 
v.GibsonPackingCo., (1924) 132 Wash. 108,231 Pac. 773; Bettsv. Southern 
R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787; Saloshin v. Houle, (1931) 85 
N. H. 126, 155 Atl. 47· 
7 Betts v. Southern R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787; Anderson 
v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1922) 176 Wis. 521,182 N. W. 852, 187 N. W. 746. 
8 Foster v. Penny Motor Transfer Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) xoo F. (2d) 
65s. 
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the plaintiff's employer were operating under the Illinois 
compensation act, and the plaintiff's injuries were compensable 
under that act, the plaintiff's claim had been assigned to his 
employer. Hence the plaintiff could not maintain the present 
action. The court rejected this argument and allowed the 
action to proceed. Although the reasoning of the opinion is 
somewhat obscure, the decision seems sound. The law of the 
place of wrong, Indiana, gave the plaintiff a cause of action 
against the defendant third party tortfeasor. Illinois law gave 
him a claim for compensation against his employer. Since he 
made no attempt to collect this latter claim, it is difficult to see 
why Illinois law should be allowed to interfere with his 
Indiana cause of action. 
SECTION 50 
ACTIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES 
The ancient common-law rule that a husband and wife may 
not bring suit against one another has come up for classifica-
tion in several recent cases. In Buckeye v. Buckeye 1 the plain-
tiff was injured in Illinois while riding as a passenger in de-
fendant's automobile. After the commencement of proceedings 
the parties were married, Wisconsin, the forum, becoming 
their matrimonial domicile. Under its internal law such an 
action was maintainable, under that of Illinois it was not. The 
Wisconsin court admitted the general proposition that "with 
respect to the legal consequences of marriage both as to the 
status of the parties and as to all their property interests, except 
interests in land, the law of the matrimonial domicile gov-" 
erns." But they refused to accede to the plaintiff's contention 
that the question whether the marriage extinguished her 
power to sue her husband should be determined by Wisconsin 
law. Instead, they permitted the law of Illinois to supply a 
1 Buckeye v. Buckeye, (1931) 203 Wis. 248,234 N. W. 342. 
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conclusion upon this issue, thereby barring the plaintiff's 
action. 
It is submitted that such an all-inclusive reference to Illi-
nois law was unnecessary. The Illinois theory of legal identity 
to spouses might well have been classified as a rule relating 
to the marital status or property rights of the parties. The 
purposes of the common-law incapacity are no doubt obscure 
and antiquated, but if it can be regarded as a means to the 
preservation of domestic harmony, that is clearly a matter of 
little concern to Illinois when the spouses reside in Wis-
consin. 2 The same result has been reached in several other 
cases where the facts were similar except that the marriage 
preceded the injury.3 Thus there may now be said to exist 
an established jurisprudence upon the point, which, although 
not immune to criticism, probably ought to be followed for the 
sake of consistency and predictability. 
In l'vf.ertz v; Mertz 4 the New York Court of Appeals ap-
pears to have taken the view that the common-law prohibition 
of actions between spouses in force in that state should be 
assigned to the department of procedure. They refused to 
permit a wife to sue her husband in New York for injuries 
received in Connecticut. Such a holding is quite inconsistent 
with the modern view that the category of procedure ought 
to be restricted as much as possible. 5 The court also main-
tained that the New York rule in question embodies the pub-
lic policy of that state. 6 
2 See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (I937) 186. 
• Dawson v. Dawson, (193I) 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 4I4; Howard v. Howard, 
(193I) 200 N.C. 574, 158 S. E. IOI; Gray v. Gray, (1934) 87 N.H. 82, 
I 74 Atl. 508. 
• (1936) 27I N.Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597· Some slight stress is laid upon 
the fact of the plaintiff wife's residence in New York. 
• See section I 3, above. 
6 To the same effect, see Poling v. Poling, (I935) II6 W.Va. I87, 179 S. E. 
6o4; Kircher v. Kircher, (I939) 288 Mich. 669, 286 N. W. 120. 
Actions between spouses upon foreign judgments were dismissed as contrary 
to the law of the forum in Metzler v. Metzler, (I93o) 8 N.J. Misc. 8:1.1, 151 
Atl. 847; Weidman v. Weidman, (193I) :1.74 Mass. II8, 174 N. E. :1.06. 
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SECTION 5I 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE OWNERS 
At the present day there are important variations between 
the laws of different states governing the liability of auto-
mobile owners for damage occasioned by the use of their auto-
mobiles. This state of affairs has produced some interesting 
conflict of laws problems. For example; A entrusts his car to 
B in state X. B drives the car into state Y and, while driving 
it there, injures C. The law of state Y makes an automobile 
owner responsible for all injuries caused by persons using his 
car with his consent. The law of state X where the car was 
lent is not so strict. Which law should govern A's liability to 
C? State Y ought to have the right to regulate the use of 
automobiles within its boundaries. But A did not bring his 
car to state Y. A may not have authorized B to take the car 
to state Y. Under these circumstances there might seem to 
be some hardship to A in charging him with liability under the 
law of state Y. The decided cases appear to indicate that be-
fore A can be so charged, it must be shown that he gave an 
express or tacit consent to the use of his car in state Y.1 
In Young v. Masci 2 the Supreme Court of the United 
States considered the constitutional aspects of this problem. 
In New Jersey Young gave possession of his car to a friend 
who injured Masci while driving the car in New York. New 
York imposes the strict liability upon automobile owners. A 
New Jersey court applied New York law. Young appealed to 
the Supreme Court on the ground that a reference to New 
York law under these circumstances was so unfair to him as to 
'Masci v. Young, (1932) 109 N.J. L. 453, 455; 162 Atl. 623; Kernan v. 
Webb, (1929) so R.I. 394, 148 Atl. 186, 188; Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 942. 
See also O'Connor v. Wray, [1930] Can. L. R. 231, [1930] 2 Dom. L. R. 
899· 
2 Young v. Masci, (1933) 289 U.S. 253, 53 Sup. Ct. 599, aff'g Masci v. 
Young, (1932) 109 N. J. L. 453, 162 Atl. 623. 
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amount to a denial of due process of law. Emphasizing the 
fact that Young permitted his car to be used in New York, the 
Supreme Court held that the New Jersey court's choice of law 
was perfectly proper. 
To vary the problem, let us suppose that state X, in which 
the car is lent, imposes strict liability upon the owner. The 
law of state Y, where the injury occurs, is more lenient. An 
alternative reference to the law of state X has been suggested. 
The government of state X may desire to make owners who 
lend their cars there responsible for harm caused by the 
operation of those cars in other states. The application of the 
law of state X might be explained in terms of the tort choice-
of-law theory. This would mean that state X was regarded 
as the "place of wrong." But a state, in order to qualify as a 
"place of wrong," is usually expected to be the scene of actual 
harm to the defendant. No harm has occurred in state X. 
Hence a second theory has been brought forward. The bail-
ment of the car has taken place in state X. The law of state 
X might be regarded as imposing a semi-contractual, rela-
tional duty upon A to insure the public against injury by B. 
It would be adopted as the law of the place where the contract 
or relationship of bailment was entered into. 
This theory was adopted by the court in Levy v. Daniels' 
U-Drive Auto Renting Co.3 The defendant company rented 
a car in Connecticut to Sack, whose negligent driving in Massa-
chusetts occasioned the plaintiff's injury. A Connecticut stat-
ute provided that "any person renting or leasing to another 
any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any dam-
age to any person or property caused by the operation of such 
motor vehicle while so rented or leased." The action was 
brought in Connecticut and the court there applied the statute 
in question. "The statute," said the court, "made the liability 
"Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., (1928) 1o8 Conn. 333, 143 
Atl. 163. 
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of the person renting motor vehicles a part of every contract 
of hiring of a motor vehicle in Connecticut. The statute did 
not create the liability, it imposed it in case the defendant 
voluntarily rented the automobile. Whether the defendant 
entered into this contract of hiring was its own voluntary act; 
if it did, it must accept the condition upon which the law per-
mitted the making of the contract." Following out the con-
tract analogy, the court described the plaintiff as a third-party 
beneficiary for whose benefit the contract was made. 4 
The question has been raised whether the choice-of-law 
principle of Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Co. might be ex-
tended to cases in which the automobile owner did not rent his 
car for hire but merely lent it to the bailee. In Cherwien v. 
Geiter 5 the defendant owner lent his car to a friend in New 
York who drove it into New Jersey and injured the plaintiff. 
A New York court declined to refer the owner's liability to 
New York law.6 
SECTION 52 
LIABILITY OF TORTFEASOR'S INSURER TO INJURED PARTY 
A number of American states have passed legislation giving 
an injured person direct recourse against the wrongdoer's 
insurer. Under an ordinary contract of public liability auto-
• If analogies be wanted, the owner's liability to the injured third party is 
not unlike that of a telegraph company to an addressee who has suffered a loss 
by reason of the company's failure to deliver a telegram. See section 42, above. 
5 Cherwien v. Geiter, (1935) 244 App. Div. 814, 279 N.Y. Supp. 553· See 
also Note, (1936) 21 CoRN. L. Q. 303. 
"The case of Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (1938) 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 
316, raises a problem similar to that canvassed in this section. A, an automobile 
repairman, was commissioned by B to repair his automobile in New Orleans. A 
left the car in such a dangerous condition that it ran off the road in Alabama 
and injured C. The court appears to have referred the question whether C could 
recover from A to the law of Louisiana. The case might be explained by saying 
that the effect of the contract for repairs made between A and B was governed 
by Louisiana law. That law imposed a contractual liability upon the repairman 
in favour of third parties who suffered injury by reason of his neglect to per-
form the contract properly. 
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mobile insurance, the insurer undertakes to discharge any lia-
bility incurred by the insured in the use of his automobile. 
Legislation of the type in question provides that, under certain 
circumstances, a person damaged by the insured may bring an 
action directly against the insurer, who shall be liable to him 
for any loss within the coverage of the policy. The statute 
gives the injured person an enforceable third-party interest 
in the performance of the insurance contract. 
Such statutes have important conflict of laws aspects. Sup-
pose B makes a contract of insurance with the A company in 
state X. The company undertakes to discharge any liability 
incurred by B in using his automobile. B, driving his auto-
mobile in state Y, injures C. There is a statute in force in 
state X (where the insurance contract was made) making in-
surers directly responsible to injured third parties. Can C, 
who has been injured in state Y, bring action directly against 
the A company relying upon the terms of this statute? Since 
the statute is primarily designed to protect injured persons 
by enabling them to recoup themselves more effectually, it 
might be thought that state X should have little or no interest 
in the application of its statute to cases of injury in state Y. 
The statute can be regarded, however, as imposing a semi-
contractual liability in respect of all insurance contracts made 
in state X. It governs the contract between Band the A com-
pany which was concluded in state X and gives C an enforce-
able interest in the performance of that contract. Taking this 
view of the matter, some courts have under such circumstances 
allowed the injured party to bring action directly against the 
insurer.1 
When a court deals with insurance legislation in this way, 
it may have to make concurrent references to two bodies of 
1 Cormier v. Hudson, (1933) 284 Mass. 231, 187 N. E. 625 (dealing with 
statute of forum); Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., (C. C. A. 4th, 
1938) 99 F. (zd) 485; Farrell v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., (1933) 
54 R.I. 18, 168 Atl. 911. 
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law. The law of the state where the insurance contract was 
made will determine whether the injured party can bring 
suit directly against the insurer. If such a suit is permitted, the 
injured party is entitled to recovery against the insurer only 
in the event that he could have recovered against the insured 
tortfeasor. To ascertain the liability of the tortfeasor, the 
court must refer to the law of the place of wrong. 
To produce a different problem, let us suppose that no 
special legislation has been enacted in state X where B and the 
A company have made their contract. State Y, the scene of 
the injury to C, has the special legislation. Can C bring suit 
against the company, relying on the law of state Y? No doubt 
state Y has an interest in extending the protection of its law 
to C. But such an extension might be unjust to the A company. 
They have done nothing in state X and are not responsible 
for the occurrence of the accident there. On the other hand, it 
might be argued that, by promising to indemnify B against 
liability, the company has encouraged him to use his car in 
state Y and elsewhere. They have given him a confidence and 
assurance which he might not otherwise have had. Perhaps the 
analogy of the owner who lends his car for use in another state 
is not too remote. However, there is some authority for the 
proposition that, in the situation stated, to subject the company 
to the law of state Y would be wrong.2 On the other hand we 
have the case of Kertson v. J ohnson.3 Here the injury oc-
curred in Wisconsin, whose law authorized direct recourse 
against insurers. A Minnesota court allowed the injured per-
son to bring suit directly against the tortfeasor's insurer, say-
"Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (1927) 48 R.I. 433, 138 Atl. 186; Martin 
v. Zurich General Accident, etc., Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 6; 
Lowery v. Zorn, (C. A. La. 2d., 1934) 157 So. 826. 
In Coderre v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (1927) 48 R.I. 152, 136 Atl. 305, the 
court refused to apply the statute of the forum when neither the contract of 
insurance nor the injury were located in the forum. 
3 Kertson v. Johnson, (1932) 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329. See also 
Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (1938) 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316. 
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ing that the Wisconsin law ought to be enforced "as part of 
every contract in force in that state." The court emphasized 
the fact of injury in Wisconsin exclusively; the opinion does 
not even mention the place of contracting. It therefore affords 
a basis for suggesting that the law of the state of injury should 
be allowed to fix an obligation upon a tortfeasor's insurer in 
favour of injured third parties. 
In McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co.4 a Mississippi court 
offered a peculiarly undesirable solution for the instant choice-
of-law problem. The injury occurred in Louisiana, which has 
a statute imposing direct liability upon insurers. The injured 
person brought an action against the tortfeasor's insurer in 
Mississippi. The Mississippi court refused to enforce the 
Louisiana statute upon the ground that it was a law of a 
remedial character, affecting only a matter of procedure. The 
court did not say where the insurance contract was made. 
If it was not made in Louisiana, the propriety of apply-
ing the Louisiana statute to the case in hand might be con-
sidered debatable as a question of choice-of-law policy. 
But it is impossible to see how the Louisiana statute could be 
classified as a rule of procedure for conflict of laws purposes. 
Such a classification should only be made where the rule in 
question cannot be conveniently implemented by the court of 
the forum. 5 If this element of inconvenience is not present, 
there is no sufficient justification for disregarding the choice-
of-law policies which require that rights vested under a proper . 
law should be enforced, so far as is possible, in all other juris-
dictions. The Mississippi court did not suggest that the Louisi-
ana law would be hard to enforce; it had already been en-
forced in a previous Mississippi decision.6 The Mississippi 
court argued that the Louisiana statute was remedial because 
4 McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., (1939) 184 Miss. 663, r86 So. 305. 
• See above, section I 3. 
8 In Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (1938) 182 Miss. 423 181 So. 316. 
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the Louisiana courts had held it to be remedial for constitu-
tional law purposes. The connection between the constitutional 
law problem and the conflict of laws problem is not explained. 
Obviously there is none; the word "remedial," like many 
other words, has different meanings in different contexts. By 
a process of mechanical reasoning, the Mississippi court 
reached a speedy solution of the case before it which cannot 
be commended. 
Statutes giving direct recourse against insurers sometimes 
provide that the injured party must obtain a judgment against 
the tortfeasor and attempt to execute it before seeking his 
remedy against the insurer. To a student of conflict of laws, 
such a provision will suggest the possibility of obtaining a 
judgment against the tortfeasor in one state and bringing suit 
against the insurer in another. In Continental Auto Insurance 
Underwriters v. Menuskin 7 the plaintiff who had been in-
jured obtained a judgment against the tortfeasor in Tennessee. 
Being unable to obtain satisfaction of it, he brought suit against 
the tortfeasor's insurer in Alabama, relying upon an Alabama 
statute which authorized direct recourse against insurers upon 
the conditions which we have outlined. The contract of in-
surance had been made in Alabama. The Alabama court held 
that in order to comply with the statutory requirement of a 
prior unsatisfied judgment against the tortfeasor, the injured 
party must obtain such a judgment in the courts of Alabama. 
A Tennessee judgment against the tortfeasor would not be 
sufficient. Nevertheless the Alabama court was able to allow 
the injured party to recover against the tortfeasor by virtue 
of the express terms of the insurance contract. A further ques-
tion suggests itself: Would the result be different if the suit 
against the insurer were brought in some other state? Since 
the cause of action against the insurer would be based upon 
• Continental Auto Insurance Underwriters v. Menuskin, (1931) 222 Ala. 
370, 132 So. 883. 
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Alabama law, the courts of other states ought to adopt the 
conditions laid down by the Alabama courts. To do otherwise 
would be to impose a burden upon the insurer which the proper 
law of his obligation did not authorize. 
SECTION 53 
LEGAL EFFECT OF A PARTY'S DEATH 
Vestiges of the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona, 
still survive in many common-law jurisdictions. What law 
should determine the extent to which the rights and duties 
of the parties are affected by the death of (I) the plaintiff and 
( 2) the defendant? 
Let us consider the problem of the defendant's death first. 
Employing a purely theoretical technique we might work out 
four possible solutions. (I) Survivability could be regarded 
as an attribute of the obligations created by the law of the 
place of wrong. If that law did not give the plaintiff a surviv-
ing cause of action, no suit would be permitted after defend-
ant's death. ( 2) We might say that the question to be decided 
is whether or not the plaintiff's claim survived as a liability 
of the defendant's estate. Such a matter ought to be referred to 
the law of the defendant's domicile. (3) We could also say 
that, since one result of our deliberations might be to order the 
deceased's personal representative to pay damages over to 
the plaintiff, the question was one of administration, to be gov-
erned by the law of the forum. ( 4) Rules denying or allowing 
recovery against a decedent's estate might be classified as pro-
cedural. In that case they would likewise be adopted only from 
the law of the forum. 1 
Both the third and fourth theories lead us to the internal 
1 See per Redfield, J., in Burgess v. Gates, (1848) 20 Vt. 326 at 330: "I 
think the demise of the action with the person may be treated as of the remedy 
perhaps, and so not affect a mere transitory cause of action." 
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law of the forum. If either of them is followed, the plaintiff's 
success will depend upon the law of the place where he is 
able to bring his action. Each of the first two theories indi-
cates a single proper law which will produce a uniform result 
no matter where the action is brought. They would appear to 
be preferable for this reason. If, for this reason, we eliminate 
the last two theories from consideration we are left with the 
first two theories from which to make a selection. We can 
choose either the law of the place of wrong or the law of the 
defendant's domicile. There is, however, a serious objection 
to making the validity of the plaintiff's claim depend upon the 
law of the defendant's domicile. The plaintiff has no control 
over the defendant's conduct in selecting a domicile. There 
would be an element of unfairness in allowing the defendant's 
selection of a domicile, after the harm had been inflicted, to 
alter the plaintiff's rights. It would be strange if the defendant 
could protect his estate from liability in this way. Hence it is 
submitted that the most satisfactory rule would be to refer the 
effect of the defendant's death to the law of the place of 
wrong. 
The first theory, applying the law of the place of wrong, 
has been most generally adopted by the courts. In Ormsby v. 
Chase 2 the plaintiff, who had been injured on an elevator in a 
New York office building owned by the defendant, sued his 
estate in a Pennsylvania federal court. Since New York re-
tained the common-law rule that a right of action for personal 
injuries abates upon the death of the wrongdoer, the Supreme 
Court on appeal gave judgment for the estate. "Assuming 
Ormsby's negligence as alleged," said the court, "the New 
York law upon the happening of the accident gave plaintiff 
a right of action. But the same law limited the right and made 
it to end upon the death of the tortfeasor." Other courts have 
reached the same result when the law of the place of wrong 
•ormsbyv. Chase, (1933) 290 U.S. 387,54 Sup. Ct. 211. 
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made no provision for survival of liability.3 Conversely it has 
been held that, when the law of the place of wrong has abro-
gated the common-law rule and created a surviving claim, 
the defendant cannot rely upon a contrary rule prevailing at 
the forum.4 
The third theory, referring to the law of the defendant's 
domicile, has not gone entirely unrecognized. In Whitten v. 
Bennett 5 the defendant executor's deceased was charged with 
malicious prosecution and false imprisonment in Massachu-
setts where such claims survived. But the plaintiff's suit was 
dismissed by a Connecticut federal court on the ground that 
the law of Connecticut, where deceased died domiciled, caused 
his liability to terminate with his death. 
Herzog v. Stern/ a decision of the New York Court of 
Appeals, appears to favour a reference to the law of the forum 
where the deceased wrongdoer's estate is being administered. 
The action arose out of an automobile accident in Virginia. 
By the laws of that state the defendant's liability survived his 
death; the Decedent Estate Law of New York restates the 
common-law rule. The Court of Appeals, by a majority, gave 
judgment in the defendant's favour, saying: 
"This State has undoubted power to determine the devolu-
tion of the property of a deceased resident and how such prop-
• Orr v. Ahern, (I 92 8) I 07 Conn. I 7 4-, 13 9 Atl. 69 I; Stratton's Inde-
pendence v. Dines, (C. C. Colo. I904-) I26 Fed. 968; Potter v. First National 
Bank, (1930) 107 N.J. Eq. 72, 151 Atl. 54-6; Friedman v. Greenberg, (1933) 
noN. J. L. 4-62, r66 Atl. 119; Sumner v. Brown, (1933) 312 Pa. 124, 167 
Atl. 315; Rathgeber v. Sommerhalder, (1934) 112 N.J. L. 54-6, 171 Atl. 835. 
• Chubbuck v. Holloway, (1931) 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314, 868; Burg 
v. Knox, (1933) 334 Mo. 329, 67 S. W. (2d) 96; Kertson v. Johnson, (1932) 
185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329· 
5 Whitten v. Bennett, (C. C. Conn., r896) 77 Fed. 271. See STUMBERG, 
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 186. 
"Herzog v. Stern, (1934) 264 N.Y. 379, 382, I91 N. E. 23. Previous New 
York decisions on the point were in conflict. See Re Killough, (1933) 148 
Misc. 73, 265 N.Y. Supp. 301; Domres v. Storms, (1932) 236 App. Div. 63o, 
z6o N.Y. Supp. 335· 
See also Gray v. Blight, (C. C. A. roth, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 696; Woolen v. 
Lorenz, (1938) 68 App. D. C. 389, 98 F. (zd) 261. 
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erty shall be administered. It determines upon what claims 
a suit may be brought against the representatives of the de-
cedent, and payment be enforced out of the assets of the 
estate. . . . The rights and obligations of executors and 
administrators appointed by our courts are defined by our law 
and our courts are without jurisdiction to grant a judgment 
binding on the executors or administrators appointed here 
unless our law makes provision for such actions against ex-
ecutors and administrators." 
The judgment does not dispute the propriety of a reference 
to the law of the place of wrong but insists that the law of 
the state of administration should also be consulted. In effect, 
it imposes upon the plaintiff the burden of concurrent reference 
to both laws. As an alternative ground, the court also held that 
a recovery by the plaintiff would offend New York's public 
policy. 
Let us now consider what law determines whether the claim 
of the party wronged continues after his death. To find an 
answer for this question we might apply, mutatis mutandis, 
each of the four theories outlined above for the problem of a 
deceased defendant. 7 But for the same reasons, the theory 
which refers the question of survivability to the law of the 
place of wrong is the most satisfactory. Generally speaking, 
the courts have leaned toward the law of the place of wrong 
as the best source for a controlling principle. Where that law 
decrees that the plaintiff's claim is extinguished at his death, 
a series of cases supports the principle that it cannot be col-
lected anywhere.8 The converse proposition, that a claim sur-
7 Where the deceased party is the one on whose behalf the action is brought, 
the state of administration will not always coincide with the forum. The action 
might be brought by an administrator appointed in some other state. 
8 Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (r 865) 38 Vt. 294; Hyde v. Wabash, 
etc., R. Co., (r 883) 61 Iowa 441, 16 N. W. 351; Davis v. New York, etc., R. 
Co., (r887) 143 Mass. 301, 9 N. E. 815; Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Goodman, 
(1898) 20 Tex. Civ. App. rog, 48 S. W. 778; O'Reilly v. New York, etc., 
R. Co., (r889) r6 R. I. 388, 17 Atl. 171, 17 Atl. go6, 19 Atl. 244; 
Sanders' Adm'x v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (rgor) 49 c. c. A. (6th) s6s, III 
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viving by the law of the place of wrong can be enforced 
anywhere, has been accepted, apparently without dispute, in a 
number of decisions. 9 
The idea that the law of the dead plaintiff's domicile should 
in some respects control the transmission of a tort chose in 
action to his personal representative has found expression in 
two decisions of a federal judge.10 He did not deny that the 
law of the place of wrong should be recognized as authorita-
tive to settle the issue of survivability. But where that law 
failed to specify the administrator to which the claim should 
go, he argued that it could only pass to the domiciliary ad-
ministrator. Decisions upon the question of the proper ad-
ministrator to enforce death statutes were distinguished be-
cause they did not purport to transmit an accrued right but 
conferred a new one. There do not appear to be any other de-
cisions discussing the incidence of surviving delictual rights 
of action as among a number of administrators. This state of 
affairs contrasts strangely with the mass of case-law which has 
clustered about the question of the proper administrator to en-
force death statutes. 11 
One of the most important types of surviving claims in tort 
is that which arises out of the wrongful death of the deceased. 
Such claims differ from those based upon ordinary death 
statutes with respect to the basic theory employed in estimat-
ing damages. ·A death statute aims to compensate the de-
ceased's dependents for their loss; survival statutes simply 
transmit the same cause of action which the deceased would 
Fed. 708 (here the law of the place of wrong was applied to determine whether 
the claim of a beneficiary under a death statute would, upon his death, pass 
to his estate). 
"Petrusha v. Korinek, (I927) 237 Mich. 583, 2I3 N. W. 188; Davis v. 
Gant, (I923 Tex. Civ. App.) 247 S. W. 576; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron 
Co., (1921) I76 Wis. 52I, 182 N. W. 852, 187 N. W. 746; Larue v. Kershaw 
Contracting Co., (I9I2) I77 Ala. 441, 59 So. ISS· 
10 Stockwell v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (C. C. Vt., I 904) I 3 I Fed. 153; Lyons v. 
Boston, etc., R. Co., (C. C. Vt., 190I) I07 Fed. 386. 
11 See above, p. 126. 
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have had, had he lived to enforce it. Where it is transmitted 
by the terms of the law of the place of wrong to designated 
individuals, they are, of course, entitled to share the proceeds 
of the action.12 Where it passes to the deceased person's estate, 
the proceeds are divided, like other personalty, according to 
the terms of his will or the intestacy laws of his domicile.13 
The foregoing principles for deciding the effect, in con-
flicts cases, of the death of either party have been held, in a 
series of decisions inspired by the Supreme Court, to have no 
application to the situation where the action was commenced 
before death occurred. These decisions hold that the law of the 
forum, rather than the law of the place of wrong, should de-
termine the effect of the party's death upon the continuation 
of a lawsuit. In the case of Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore & 0. 
R. Co.14 the Supreme Court had to deal with an action brought 
in a West Virginia federal court for personal injuries received 
in Maryland. During the prosecution of the suit the plaintiff 
died. It was held that the action could not be continued by 
his administrator because, by the law of West Virginia, his 
action died with him. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice 
Gray said: 
"The question whether a particular cause of action is of 
a kind that survives for or against the personal representative 
of a deceased person is a question not of procedure but of right. 
. . . But in the case at bar, the question whether the ad-
ministrator has a right of action depends upon the law of 
West Virginia, where the action was brought and the ad-
ministrator appointed." 
Despite the directness of this language, it may be doubted 
whether the learned judge meant to decide the conflict of 
laws question. Now here does it appear from the report that 
12 As in Davis v. Gant, (1923 Tex. Civ. App.) 247 S. W. 576. 
18 Hartley v. Hartley, (1905) 71 Kan. 691, 81 Pac. 505. 
'"'Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1894) 151 U.S. 673, 692, 14 
Sup. Ct. 533· 
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anyone argued or even suggested the relevance of Maryland 
law as that of the place of wrong. Moreover, at a later point in 
the opinion, decisions of the Maryland Court of Appeals are 
quoted to show that there too, as in West Virginia, a right to 
compensation for personal injuries died with its owner. Hence 
even assuming that the conflict of laws problem was present 
to the learned judge's mind, his opinion was, on his own show-
ing, clearly unnecessary to the decision of the case. 
A $Omewhat brief but much more articulate decision upon 
the point was given by the same court in Baltimore & 0. R. 
Co. v. J oy/5 where, however, the effect of the law of the 
forum (Ohio) was to preserve the plaintiff's cause of action, 
that of the law of the place of wrong (Indiana) to extinguish 
it. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the court, resolved the 
conflict in the following words: 
"It is scarcely necessary to say that the determination of the 
question of the right to revive this action in the name of Her-
vey's personal representative is not affected in any degree by 
the fact that the deceased received his injuries in the State of 
Indiana. The action for such injuries was transitory in its 
nature, and the jurisdiction of the Ohio court to take cogni-
zance of it upon personal service or on the appearance of the 
defendant to the action cannot be doubted. Still less can it be 
doubted that the question of the revivor of actions brought in 
the courts of Ohio for personal injuries is governed by the 
laws of that State, rather than by the law of the State in which 
the injuries occurred." 
Hence the plaintiff's administrator was permitted to revive the 
action begun by his deceased, contrary to the law in force at the 
place of wrong. Upon similar facts, the same conclusion has 
been reached by other tribunals.16 
15 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Joy, (I 899) I 73 U. S. 226, 23 r, I9 Sup. Ct. 387. 
16 Martin v. Wabash R. Co., (I9o5) 73 C. C. A. (7th) 646, I42 Fed. 65o; 
Page v. United Fruit Co. (C. C. A. rst, I925) 3 F. (2d) 747; Gordon v. Chi-
cago, etc., R. Co., (I9I2) I54 Iowa 449, I34 N. W. 1057; Austin's Adm'r v. 
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., (r9o6) I22Ky. 304, 9I S. W. 742. 
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The theory that revivor of actions is governed by the law 
of the forum has also been invoked in the case of the defend-
ant's death. In Clough v. Gardiner 17 the defendant died while 
the suit was pending. The law of the place of wrong would 
have allowed it to be continued against his estate; the law of 
the forum would not. The court followed the rule of the 
forum. 
The Joy case seems to sound a note of discord in modern 
conflicts doctrine. Where the law of the forum, in contrast 
with the law of the place of wrong, favours a survival the 
plaintiff gains an advantage over the defendant due solely to 
his selection of a forum. Where the law of the forum, in con-
trast with the law of the place of wrong, extinguishes the cause 
of action, a most peculiar result ensues. The mere fact that the 
action was begun before the death of one of the parties puts the 
plaintiff in a worse position than he would have occupied if the 
action had been commenced later. The doctrine has been ex-
plained as a particular instance illustrating the general prin-
ciple that matters of procedure are governed by the law of 
the forum.18 It may be doubted, however, whether the appli-
cation of an outside law in this connection would entail suf-
ficient inconvenience to justify such a classification. With 
reference to the question of convenience, there does not appear 
to be any sound reason for distinguishing between the revival 
of an existing action and the prosecution of a new one. 
SECTION 54 
MISCELLANEOUS MULTIPLE CONTACT PROBLEMS 
In this section are collected together a number of miscel-
laneous multiple contact problems, none of which are suf-
17Clough v. Gardiner, (I920) III Misc. 244, I82 N.Y. Supp. 803. See also 
Orr v. Ahern, (1928) 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691. 
18 See Annotation, (1933) 87 A. L. R. 86o; Austin's Adm'r v. Pittsburgh, etc., 
R. Co., (I9o6) 122 Ky. 304, 91 S. W. 742; Orr v. Ahern, (1928) 107 Conn. 
174, 139 Atl. 69r. 
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ficiently important to deserve a separate section. Most of them 
have been solved in terms of a single choice-of-law theory. 
Suppose A in state X sets in motion some physical force 
which injures B in state Y. The law of state Y is usually 
adopted.1 In Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. 
R. Co.2 an employee of the defendant company, operating 
one of its engines in Quebec, set fire to a bridge owned by the 
plaintiffs. The bridge, which extended into New Hampshire, 
was completely burned. The plaintiffs brought action in New 
Hampshire. The court held that the defendant's liability 
should be governed by New Hampshire law with respect to 
the part of the bridge burned in that state, and by Quebec law 
with respect to the part burned there. A New Hampshire 
statute imposed strict liability upon railroad companies for 
damage by fire. But the court decided that this statute of the 
forum was not intended to cover damage caused by the oper-
ation of trains in another jurisdiction. 
The general problem of interstate libel or slander has re-
ceived very little judicial discussion. A few cases have been 
litigated in which the defendant wrote a libel in one state and 
sent it into another where it was read. These cases support the 
view that the law of the state where the libel was read ought 
to controP 
In Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co.4 
the court carried the place of injury theory so far as to hold 
1 Otey v. Midland Valley R. Co., (I9ZI) I08 Kan. 755, I97 Pac. zo3; Dallas 
v. Whitney, (I936) rr8 W.Va. Io6, I88 S. E. 766; Cameron v. Vandegriff, 
(I89o) 53 Ark. 38I, I3 S. W. Io9z; Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine 
Cent. R. Co., (I9I8) 78 N.H. 553, Io3 Atl. 263. 
"Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., (I9I8) 78 N.H. 
553, I03 Atl. Z63. 
3 See Haskell v. Bailey, (I 894) 25 U. S. App. 99, 63 Fed. 873; Evans & Sons 
v. Stein & Co., (I904) 42 Scottish L. R. Io3. There are two English cases in 
which the materiality of the law of the place of publication seems to be assumed 
though not explicitly affirmed. See Isaacs & Sons v. Cook, [I9Z5] z K. B. 39I; 
Thoene v. Lockwood, (I 9 I I) Times, April r r. 
•connecticut Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., (I9r8) 78 N.H. 553, 
ro3 Atl. 263. 
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that when injury occurs in two states, each state's law should 
govern with respect to the harm done there. Suppose A, in 
state X, broadcasts slanderous remarks by radio which are 
heard in states X, Y, and Z. It might be very difficult to de-
termine how much harm to A's reputation was inflicted in each 
state and to apply the law of each state with respect to the 
harm done there. For the sake of convenience it might be 
better to apply the law of state X to the entire transaction. 
In Le Forest v. Tolman 5 a dog, kept by the defendant in 
Massachusetts, wandered into New Hampshire and bit the 
plaintiff there. Under the common law in force in New 
Hampshire the plaintiff had to prove scienter; he therefore 
argued for a reference to a Massachusetts statute which ap-
parently abolished this defence. The court did not reject his 
plea upon any general principle but considered the aims and 
effect of the Massachusetts statute in question. 
"It does not declare the owning or keeping of a dog to be 
unlawful, but that if the dog injures another person, the owner 
or keeper shall be liable, without regard to the question 
whether he had or had not a license to keep the dog. The 
wrong done to the person injured consists not in the act of the 
master in owning or keeping, or neglecting to restrain, the dog, 
but in the act of the dog for which the master is responsible." 
Since the "act of the dog" was executed in New Hampshire, 
the statute was held to be inapplicable; but it seems to be 
clearly implied in the opinion that, had the statute by its terms 
been directed against the negligent control of animals, the 
plaintiff might well have succeeded. 
The line of the A railroad company runs from state X into 
state Y. At a point in state X, one of the company's trains is 
negligently inspected by the company's employees so that B, 
who is riding on the train, is injured in state Y. By a number 
5 Le Forest v. Tolman, (r875) 117 Mass. 109, no. See also Fischl v. Chubb, 
(1937) 30 Pa. D. & C. 40. See Note, (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 738. 
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of courts the company's liability has been referred to the law 
of Y.6 In 1-.iike v. Lian7 an automobile accident in Ohio re-
sulted from failure properly to inspect the tires at the com-
mencement of the trip in Pennsylvania. Only the law of Ohio 
was applied. 
In Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co.8 an automobile repair-
man in New Orleans left a car in such a dangerous condition 
that it ran off the road in Alabama and injured the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff was a guest of the owner riding in the car at the 
time of the accident. He brought suit against the repairman. 
The court appears to have determined the liability of the re-
pairman according to the laws of Louisiana. This case might be 
explained upon the theory that Louisiana was the "place of 
wrong." It could also be explained upon the theory that 
Louisiana law governed the contract for repairing, and was 
therefore allowed to impose a contractual liability upon the 
repairman in favour of third parties who suffered injury by 
reason of his neglect. 9 
In Reed & Barton v. Maas,10 a coffee urn, which had been 
defectively constructed in Massachusetts by the defendant was 
sold by him to a caterer in Wisconsin. The urn, while in use 
by the caterer, spilled hot coffee upon the plaintiff in Wiscon-
sin. Wisconsin law was allowed to define the legal position of 
the manufacturer-defendant. 
6 E1 Paso, etc., R. Co. v. McComas, (I 903 Tex. Civ. App.) 72 S. W. 629; 
Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McMullen, (I889) II7 Ind. 439, 20 N. E. 287; Kan-
sas City, etc., R. Co. v. Becker, (1899) 67 Ark. 1, 53 S. W. 406; Chicago, etc., 
R. Co. v. Doyle, ( 1883) 6o Miss. 977; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, (1892) 
97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Foster, (1882) 78 Tenn. 351. 
See also Hoodmacher v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., ( 1 9 o 7) 2 I 8 Pa. 2 1, 6 6 Atl. 9 7 5 
(law of state where negligence and death but not actual injury occurred, 
applied). 
7 Mike v. Lian, (1936) 322 Pa. 353, 185 At1. 775· 
8 Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (I 9 3 8) 1 8 2 Miss. 42 3, 1 81 So. 3 1 6. 
9 See section 51, above. 
10 Reed v. Maas, (C. C. A. tst, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 359· See also Hunter v. 
Derby Foods, (C. C. A. 2d, I940) Ito F. (2d) 970. 
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A injures Bin state X so that he dies in state Y. An action 
is brought against B on behalf of A's estate or A's dependents. 
State X's interest in the affair is obvious; it has been held that 
the law of the place of injury may confer a cause of action 
notwithstanding the circumstance of death having occurred 
elsewhere.11 State Y's interest, on the other hand appears 
rather small. Since A was not responsible for B's presence in 
state Y at the time he died, it might not be fair to judge A's 
conduct by the laws in force there. Under such circumstances a 
number of courts have refused to make any reference to the 
law of the place of death.12 
A curious case, apparently sui generis, is Buckles v. Ellers/3 
an action for seduction in which the defendant was proved to 
have had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, first in Illinois 
and then in Indiana. An Indiana court held that his liability 
should be governed by Illinois law, saying: "The illicit inter-
course testified to as having occurred in this state did not 
constitute a new and independent case of seduction as con-
tended for by the appellee, but was merely consequential to 
the alleged seduction which had previously taken place." 
A multiple contact problem involving a husband's vicarious 
liability for his wife's torts arose in Siegmann v. Meyer.14 
The defendant's wife assaulted the plaintiff in Florida. The 
plaintiff argued that under Florida law the defendant was 
liable for his wife's torts. It might be questioned whether a 
rule of this kind ought to be adopted from the law of the place 
11 Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (r899) 35 C. C. A. (3d) 282,93 Fed. 
26o; Crane v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (r9o8) 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 222; Cento-
fanti v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (r9r4) 244 Pa. 255, 90 Atl. 558. 
12 De Ham v. Mexican National R. Co., (r893) 86 Tex. 68, 23 S. W. 381; 
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, (r897) 113 Ala. 402,21 So. 938; Derr v. 
Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1893) 158 Pa. 365, 27 Atl. roo2; Melton's Adm'r 
v. Soutlrern R. Co., (1930) 236 Ky. 629, 33 S. W. (2d) 690. But see Hood-
macher v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (r9o7) 218 Pa. 21, 66 Atl. 975 (law of state 
where negligence and death but not actual injury occurred, applied). 
lll Buckles v. Ellers, ( r 8 8o) 72 Ind. 220. 
"Siegmann v. Meyer, (C. C. A. :md, 1938) roo F. (2d) 367. 
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of wrong. Perhaps the vicarious liability of a husband for his 
wife's torts ought to be regarded as an incident of the marital 
relationship and referred to his domiciliary law. But the court 
did not take up this point. It ruled out the law of Florida 
upon another ground. The husband was not in Florida and 
was not responsible in any way for his wife's presence there. 
There was no causal relation between any act of his and the 
fact that the assault occurred in Florida. Hence the court held 
that it would be unfair to subject the husband to liability under 
Florida law. 
Legal rules governing marital property and delictual lia-
bility were distinguished for conflicts purposes in Williams v. 
Pope h1anufacturing Co.15 The plaintiff, a married woman, 
being domiciled and resident in Mississippi, was wrongfully 
imprisoned by the defendant's agents in Louisiana. She in-
stituted an action in her own name in the Louisiana courts. It 
was contended for the defendant that any claim which the 
plaintiff might have must be litigated by her husband, because 
under Louisiana law a husband and wife held their property 
rights in common, under the control of the husband. The Su-
preme Court of Louisiana held that the provisions of Louisiana 
law referred to did not affect a right of action for tort belong-
ing to a married woman domiciled outside Louisiana. Al-
though the cause of action for the tort arose under Louisiana 
law, the wife was allowed to sue upon it alone. 
:Ill Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co., (19oo) 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 
851. 
See also Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Humble, (1901) 181 U.S. 57, 21 Sup. Ct. 526; 




INTRODUCTION: THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW CONCEPT 
T HE next five sections of this study are devoted to a discussion of maritime torts in the conflict of laws. We are not concerned (except incidentally) with the 
internal law of any state or nation relating to maritime torts. 
Our interest lies only in the application of choice-of-law prin-
ciples by the courts of the United States and the British Em-
pire. Hitherto we have been accustomed to thinking of the 
various states of the United States as individual units in the 
conflict of laws, each having its own internal law. But in deal-
ing with maritime torts we shall find it necessary, at times, to 
abandon this approach and to think of the entire United States 
as a single unit having a uniform internal law. Since maritime 
torts fall within the admiralty jurisdiction, the national gov-
ernment has, under the Federal Constitution, almost com-
plete power to prescribe their legal consequences.1 In recent 
years Congress has, in the exercise of this power, introduced 
soine important modifications in the American law of mari-
time torts. 
It is still possible, however, for an individual state to make 
a very limited contribution to this body of law. In the view 
of the Supreme Court there is a class of matters which are 
"maritime but local" in nature. If Congress has not dealt with 
a maritime but local matter, a state legislature may legislate 
effectively with regard to that matter. A state statute can only 
1 For further discussion of the power granted to Congress by the Federal Con-
stitution to deal with maritime torts, see RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939) 8, 27. 
:1.57 
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operate in cases appropriately connected with the state in 
question. State legislation is applied to such cases upon ordi-
nary choice-of-law principles. Subsequent congressional legis-
lation will, of course, supersede all state laws. Of matters 
maritime but local the outstanding example is wrongful death 
upon state territorial waters. Though such a tort is obviously 
maritime, the deceased man's dependents may base an action 
for his death upon the death statute of the state in which the 
fatal injury was inflicted.2 
Another factor which complicates the approach to a study 
of mitritime torts is the concurrence of admiralty jurisdiction 
with that of the ordinary common-law courts. In a non-federal 
state, such as England, an action for a non-maritime tort could 
be brought only in the ordinary common-law courts. But a 
dispute arising out of a maritime tort might be litigated in 
either the common-law courts or the court of admiralty. 
Within a very broad field, and especially in matters of pro-
cedure, each court would apply different rules. The differences 
between these rules might, in some cases, be of considerable 
practical significance. In the United States, the jurisdictional 
situation is even more intricate. A maritime tort, like any other 
tort, may be litigated in ( r) a state common-law court or ( 2) 
a federal common-law court, if there is diversity of citizenship. 
Because of its maritime character it could also be litigated in 
(3) a federal court of admiralty. Any one of these courts 
would, of course, be bound to follow the general maritime law 
of the United States or, in an appropriate case, the law of a 
state of the United States or of a foreign country, applied ac-
cording to choice-of-law principles. But upon points of "pro-
cedure" each court would adopt its own rules and these might 
diverge considerably. Difficult questions are not infrequently 
raised as to whether a particular dispute is within the jurisdic-
• See below, p. 263. 
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tion of the admiralty tribunals. But the demarcation of ad-
miralty jurisdiction is a topic outside the scope of the present 
work. 
Maritime law has a tradition of international uniformity. 
Like the law merchant, it is supposed to have its roots in 
ancient rules and customs common to all nations. As the law 
merchant epitomized the custom of merchants of every na-
tionality, so the general maritime law represented the usages 
of mariners in all parts of the world. The survival of admiralty 
courts has helped to preserve this tradition in the United 
States and the British Empire. At the present day the uni-
formity of maritime law as it is administered in the various 
countries of the world is not impressive. Even between Eng-
land and the United States there have been serious divergen-
cies on certain doctrinal issues. Much of the maritime law ad-
ministered in these countries is laid down by local statutes. 
There is no uniform world-wide law of the sea.3 
It is still possible, however, to secure a reasonable degree of 
uniformity in the maritime field, as in other branches of law, 
by adherence to uniform choice-of-law principles. Differences 
between English and American marine law do not matter, 
if English and American courts can agree upon the demarca-
tion of the spheres of authority within which these two bodies 
of law shall operate~ There is a certain theoretical antipathy 
between the ancient conception of a uniform sea law for the 
whole world and the application of choice-of-law principles. 
The application of choice-of-law principles presupposes the 
existence of differences between the maritime laws of the 
"See The Milford, (r858) Swabey 362, r66 Eng. Rep. II67, in which Dr. 
Lushington, a great admiralty lawyer of his time, seems to admit that the 
so-called general maritime law is really nothing more than internal law of the 
forum. See also Lloyd v. Guibert, (r865) r Q. B. II5, 123-125. 
The classic criticism of the general maritime law theory as fictitious and mis-
leading is that of Westlake. See his PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 7 
(1925) 290· 
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various nations. The ancient tradition of uniformity may move 
an admiralty judge to say, "I will not apply some particular 
foreign law to this case; I will apply the general maritime law, 
as I understand it." Admiralty courts have, generally speak-
ing, accepted the idea that the law of the place of wrong should 
govern in matters occurring there. But a thoroughgoing ap-
plication of this principle has sometimes been impeded by the 
ancient tradition. 
Most of the problems with which we shall be concerned in 
the next four sections of this book are multiple contact prob-
lems. They arise because a ship is more than a mere chattel; 
it is, in some respects, like a floating island. As it moves about, 
from one country to another, it carries on board a community 
of persons. For their convenience, it is desirable that the ship 
be governed by some system of legal rules. Moreover, most 
ships are associated, by registration, with the nation of which 
their owners are citizens. They are part of its merchant 
marine; they fly its national flag. The government of that 
country has usually a certain interest in the ship, in the conduct 
of those on board her, and in the legal consequences of acts 
and events in which she may become involved. For these 
reasons, it is sometimes advisable, in cases whose facts are 
connected with a ship, to apply the law of the ship's flag. But 
one ship may collide with a ship which belongs to another 
country whose law is different and then we have to take two 
laws into consideration. Or one ship may sail into the terri-
torial waters of another state. Here a collision or an injury on 
board will produce fresh multiple contact problems. 
In the next four sections we shall have occasion to discuss 
the tort aspects of certain relations: passenger and carrier, 
employer and employees (seamen, stevedores, etc.). No at-
tempt will here be made to deal with the contractual or quasi-
contractual aspects of such relationships which might involve 
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additional choice-of-law principles. These have already been 
discussed in earlier sections; 4 to introduce them here would 
only intensify the complexity of problems already compli-
cated. 
To say precisely to what country a ship belongs is not always 
easy. The flag, as we have suggested, is a prima facie symbol. 
But it does not always indicate who really controls the ship. 
In some instances the citizenship of the shipowner is more 
significant. The latter test has been adopted by the United 
States Seaman's Act of 1920.5 An American court will apply 
that act to actions brought against their employers by seamen 
employed on vessels owned by American citizens, even though 
the vessel has been registered under a foreign flag. There may 
be other cases in which a vessel ought to be regarded as belong-
ing to one nation although she flies another's flag. 6 
SECTION 56 
MARITIME TORTS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS 
INVOLVING A SINGLE SHIP 
In this section we are concerned with the multiple contact 
problems which arise from an injury occurring in territorial 
waters in which only a single ship is involved. For instance, 
one of the ship's officers assaults a member of the crew, or the 
ship itself sinks, resulting in the death or injury of persons on 
board. Collision cases are reserved for another section. To 
make a multiple contact problem, we suppose that the law 
• Above, section 42, 44· 
5 41 Stat. 1007, c. 250, § 33 (192o), 46 U. S. Code (1934) § 688. See 
Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932) 6o F. (2d) 927, (1932) 
287 U.S. 642,53 Sup. Ct. 92; Torgersen v. Hutton, (1934) 243 App. Div. 31, 
276 N.Y. Supp. 348, aff'd (1935) 267 N.Y. 535, 196 N. E. 566. 
6 See the judgment of Lord Justice Brett in Chartered Mercantile Bank of 
India v. Netherlands, etc., Co., (1883) 10 Q. B. D. 521. See also Grand Trunk 
R. Co. v. Wright, (C. C. A. 6th 1927) 21 F. (2d) 814, in which a vessel of 
American registry, owned by an American corporation, was held to be governed 
by Canadian law with respect to an injury to an employee on board. The vessel 
was under charter to a Canadian corporation at the time of the injury. 
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of the ship and the law of the territorial waters are different. 
The possibility of applying either one or both is thus pre-
sented. The state of the territorial waters will no doubt be 
concerned with the legal consequences of any acts or events 
occurring within its boundaries. But the state of the ship's flag 
may also have a similar interest in whatever occurs on board 
the vessel and the application of its law may in some instances 
be more convenient for all persons concerned. It is not sur-
prising therefore to find that American courts have sometimes 
adopted the law of the waters, and, at other times, the law of 
the ship. The general theory appears to be that the law of the 
waters should control unless the dispute concerns only the in-
ternal economy of the ship. 
Let us consider first the situation of a foreign vessel within 
the territorial waters of the United States. Uravic v. Jarka 
Co./ a Supreme Court decision, affords a good point of de-
parture. Uravic, a stevedore, was killed while working on 
board a German vessel in New York harbour. Overruling a 
previous decision of the New York Court of Appeals,2 the 
Supreme Court ruled that his dependents could maintain an 
action based upon the law of the United States. "There is 
strong reason," said Mr. Justice Holmes, "for giving the same 
protection to the person of those who work in our harbours 
when they are working upon a German ship that they would 
receive when working upon an American ship in the next dock, 
as is especially obvious in the case of stevedores who may be 
employed in unloading vessels of half a dozen different flags 
in turn." The litigation was disposed of in accordance with 
the terms of an appropriate federal statute. 3 
In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia 4 the factual pattern was 
1 Uravic v. Jarka, ( 193 r) 282 U.S. 234, 51 Sup. Ct. r r r. 
2 Resigno v. Jarka Co., (1928) 248 N.Y. 225, r62 N. E. 13. 
3 In this case, the court applied the Seaman's Act (r92o) or Jones Act (1920) 
41 Stat. roo7, c. 250, § 33,46 U.S. Code (1934) § 688. 
At the present day the appropriate American statute would be the Harbor 
Workers Act (1927) 44 Stat. 1424, c. 509, 33 U.S. Code (1934) §§ 901-950· 
•western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, (1921) 257 U.S. 233,42 Sup. Ct. 89. 
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identical with that of Uravic v. Jarka. Manuel Souza, a steve-
dore, was killed at work on board the "T ancred," a Norwegian 
ship anchored in San Francisco Bay. It does not seem to have 
been doubted that the case should be governed by United 
States law. But at the time when it arose, the federal statute 
applied in Uravic v. Jarka had not been enacted. The Supreme 
Court held that, in default of federal legislation, the deceased 
man's dependents might base their action upon the death 
statute of the state of California. The case illustrates the point, 
which we have already mentioned, that while the maritime 
law of the United States is controlled and prescribed by the 
federal government, it is possible for the several states to 
make a limited contribution to that body of law in the absence 
of federal action. The legal consequences of a wrongful death 
occurring in American territorial waters are frequently re-
ferred to the law of the state of wrong.5 The federal govern-
ment has, however, enacted special statutes dealing with the 
death or injury of seamen and harbour workers.6 To this ex-
tent the state laws have been superseded. 
So much for the situation in which the law of the territorial 
waters controls. Let us now turn to the cases in which the law 
of the ship's flag has been adopted. These decisions do not an-
nounce any clear and definite theory. But they are all con-
cerned with injuries received on board a foreign ship in Amer-
ican waters by a member of the crew. It will be remembered 
that in Uravic v. J arka, the leading case in which the law of 
the waters was adopted, the injured man was not a seaman 
but a stevedore, temporarily present on the ship. When a 
member of the crew or some person more permanently at-
" See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, (1921) 257 U.S. 233, 240, 42 Sup. Ct. 89. 
In the absence of a state or federal statute the maritime law of the United States 
does not allow any action for wrongful death. The Harrisburg, (1886) 119 
U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140. 
"The Seaman's Act (1920) 41 Stat. 1007, c. 250, § 33,46 U.S. Code (1934) 
§ 688; The Harbor Workers Act (1927) 44 Stat. 1424, c. 509, 33 U.S. Code 
§§ 901-950. 
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tached to the ship is injured, American courts usually con-
cede the application of the :flag law.7 But the United States 
has an undeniable interest in the conduct of persons on board 
foreign ships in American waters. If the foreign law were 
shown to be peculiarly harsh or unjust, the case would be an 
apt one for the application of American law, even to the ex-
tent of conferring a cause of action where the law of the :flag 
gave none. No doubt it is desirable, so far as possible, to 
follow a uniform choice-of-law principle which will select a 
single law. But there are other conflict of laws situations in 
which the courts permit an alternative reference to the laws of 
either one of two states, because the factual pattern is con-
nected with both of them. 
We have still to consider the cases involving a conflict b~­
tween the law of a single ship and the territorial waters law of 
some state other than the United States. There is some au-
thority for the view that the law of the territorial waters 
ought to prevail. 8 But in a number of cases the law of the ship 
has been enforced on the ground that the dispute merely 
7 The Hanna Nielsen, (D. C. Wash., I928) 25 F. (2d) 984 (here, however, 
the law of the ship was presumed, in the absence of contrary proof, to be the same 
as that of the forum); Heredia v. Davies, (C. C. A. 4th, I926) I2 F. (2d) 500 
(here the law of the ship was presumed to be the same as that of the forum; the 
effect of the decision is obvious); Clark v. Montezuma Transp. Co., (I926) 2I 7 
App. Div. IJ2, 2I6 N.Y. Supp. 295; The Magdapur, (D. C. N.Y., I933) 
3 F. Supp. 97I; The Seirstad, (D. C. N.Y., I928) 27 F. (2d) 982; The Pinar 
Del Rio, (C. C. A. 2nd, I927) I6 F. (2d) 984; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. 
Wright, (C. C. A. 6th, I927) 2I F. (2d) 8I4 (injury resulting in death suf-
fered by employee on board train ferry in American territorial waters; the ferry 
was of American registry but had been chartered to defendant railroad, a 
Canadian corporation; court held case governed by Canadian law). 
Contra: Shorter v. Bermuda, etc., Co., (D. C. N.Y., I932) 57 F. (2d) 313; 
The Apurimac, (D. C. Va., I925) 7 F. (2d) 74I; The Navarino (D. C. N.Y., 
I925) 7 F. (2d) 743· 
The Supreme Court left the point open in Plamals v. Pinar Del Rio, (I928) 
277 U.S. I5I, 48 Sup. Ct. 457; Uravic v. Jarka Co., (I93I) 282 U.S. 234, 
5 I Sup. Ct. I I r. 
8 Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., (I893) 3 Misc. 224, 22 N.Y. Supp. 749 
(death of a member of the crew) ; The Cuzco, (D. C. Wash., I 9 I 5) 225 Fed. I 69 
(injury to a stevedore); Wingert v. Carpenter, (I894) I or Mich. 395, 59 
N. W. 662. 
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affected the internal economy of the vessel. Thompson Tow-
ing and Wrecking Ass'n v. Mcgregor 9 is the classic authority 
for this theory. In that case a member of the crew of an 
American ship was killed by a boiler explosion while the 
vessel was in Canadian waters. Applying American law, the 
court allowed a recovery by his dependents. With reference 
to the choice-of-law problem the court said: 
"So far as this question is concerned, the ultimate basis of 
the decree was that the explosion of this boiler was a matter 
which did not directly involve the peace, dignity, or tran-
quility of the Canadian government but rather involved the 
internal discipline and management of the ship." 
This principle has been adopted in subsequent cases where 
a seaman on board an American ship has been injured or killed 
in foreign territorial waters.10 There seems to be no reason 
why it should not also be applied in cases where both the ship 
law and the water law are foreign. 11 
In Carrington v. Panama Mail Co.12 a stevedore was in-
• Thompson Towing & Wrecking Ass'n v. McGregor, (I 913) I 24 C. C. A. 
(6th) 479, 207 Fed. 209. 
10 Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co., (D. C. Wash., I92I) 277 Fed. 8I2; 
Bennett v. Connelly (I923) I22 Misc. I49, 202 N.Y. Supp. 568; Cain v. Alpha 
S. S. Corp., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 717. 
The Supreme Court applied United States law to a seaman's injury received 
on board an American ship in a Venezuelan harbour in Alpha S. S. Corp. v. 
Cain, (I93o) 281 U.S. 642, so Sup. Ct. 443· 
American courts apply American law relating to seamen's injuries to all 
cases of such injuries occurring on a ship owned by an American citizen, 
whether or not it is a ship of American registry. See the Seamen's Act, I 7 Stat. 
277, c. 322, § 65 (I 872 ), 46 U.S. Code ( 1934) § 713; Gerradin v. United Fruit 
Co., (D. C. N.Y., 193I) 51 F. (2d) 417. 
11 But the cases are somewhat inconclusive. See The Hanna Nielsen, (C. C. A. 
2nd, 192I) 273 Fed. 17I; Bonsalem v. Byron S. S. Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931) 
so F. (2d) II4; Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., (I893) 3 Misc. 224, 22 N.Y. 
Supp. 749; Rainey v. New York, etc., Co. (I914) IJ2 C. C. A. (9th) 509, 2I6 
Fed. 449· 
See Dupont v. Quebec S. S. Co., (I 896) I I Queb. S.C. I 88, a case of death on 
board a British ship in Trinidad harbour. The Quebec court applied English, not 
Trinidad, law. 
12 Carrington v. Panama Mail Co., (I929) 136 Misc. &so, 241 N.Y. Supp. 
347· 
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jured while working on board an American ship in a port of 
the Panama Canal Zone. The court applied United States law 
rather than the law of the Canal Zone. The decision has been 
criticized by Robinson 13 because the court did not apply the 
law of the Canal Zone. He argues that since the injured man 
was not a member of the crew but a stevedore, temporarily 
engaged on the vessel, the dispute was something more than 
a mere matter of the ship's internal economy and the water 
law ought to have governed the litigation. In support of the 
decision it may be said that the United States has a certain 
interest in the treatment of stev~dores upon American ships, 
even in foreign harbours. But the application of American law 
under such circumstances would seem to be justified only if 
the law of the territorial waters appeared to be extremely 
harsh or inequitable. 
' 
SECTION 57 
COLLISION IN TERRITORIAL WATERS 
In discussing the proper law to govern collisions in ter-
ritorial waters it seems desirable to set apart rules of navi-
gation from other types of legal rules. We shall first address 
ourselves to the rules affecting legal liability which are in 
no sense rules of navigation. Within this limited field, the 
general tendency of both English and American courts is to 
accept the guidance of the rules of the territorial law, irrespec-
tive of the law or laws of the ships involved. It might be 
thought that the laws of the ships concerned would be en-
titled to some consideration. But there is little evidence of such 
an idea in the reported decisions. In one case, the ship's law 
was expressly rejected by an English court.1 However, there 
is no great plethora of precedents. It cannot be said that a ref-
18 ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (I939) I48. 
'TheM. Moxham, (I875) I P. D. 43; (I876) I P. D. Io7. 
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erence to the law of one ship (or both, if they had a common 
law) is beyond the range of possibility. 
Smith v. Condry,2 decided by the Supreme Court in 1843, 
is the leading American case. It arose out of a collision be-
tween two American vessels in the port of Liverpool. Speak-
ing for the court, Chief Justice Taney said: 
"The collision having taken place in the port of Liver-
pool, the rights of the parties depend upon the provisions of 
the British statutes, then in force; and if doubts exist as to 
their true construction, we must of course adopt that which is 
sanctioned by their own courts." , 
The defendant argued that at the time when it struck the 
plaintiff's vessel, his vessel, the Tasso, was under the control 
of a compulsory pilot. British law compelled the defendant to 
allow this pilot to take charge of his vessel. But according to 
the decisions of the British courts, the owner of a ship was 
not liable for damages which were inflicted by it while it was 
under the control of a compulsory pilot. Applying this prin-
ciple of British law to the case in hand, the Supreme Court 
exonerated the defendant. 
In Robinson v. Detroit & C. Steam Nav. Co.3 a federal 
circuit court of appeals adopted the law of foreign territorial 
waters upon several points. The case, which was litigated in 
admiralty, arose out of a collision in the Canadian waters of 
the Detroit river between the steamer City of Mackinaw and 
the tug Washburn. Two men on board the Washburn were 
2 Smith v. Condry, (I843) I How. (42 U.S.) 28, 33· 
See also Standard Oil Co. v. Tampico Nav. Co., (D. C. N.Y., I92I) 2I F. 
(zd) 795; Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegaco Lloyd Bras-
ileiro, (D. C. N.Y., I928) 3I F. (zd) 757; The Eagle Point, (I9o6) 73 
C. C. A. 569, I42 Fed. 453; The Mandu, (D. C. N.Y., I936) IS F. Supp. 627. 
8 Robinson v. Detroit & C. Steam Nav. Co., (I 896) 43 U. S. App. I 90, 20 
C. C. A. (6th) 86, 73 Fed. 883. 
Wrongful death in a collision on American territorial waters is governed by 
the law of the littoral state. The federal death statute [4I Stat. 538, c. I u, § 7 
(I92o), 46 U.S. Code (I934) § 767] does not apply to deaths in American 
territorial waters. See RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY (I939) I44, rsz. 
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drowned. Their dependents filed libels in rem against the 
City of Mackinaw. The court dismissed these libels because 
the Canadian law (in this instance, the law of Ontario) did 
not authorize proceedings against the ship. Then the owners 
of the steamship alleged that, under Ontario law, the neg-
ligence of those persons in charge of the tug would be im-
puted to all persons on board her, and so prevent them from 
recovering damages against the owners of the steamship. 
The court considered the Ontario law on this point carefully. 
It was finally decided that the Ontario authorities did not 
support any such rule of "imputed negligence." An in per-
sonam decree was accordingly rendered against the owners of 
the steamship. 
As Robinson points out, 4 there is one situation in which an 
American court would be very likely to apply a ship's law 
with respect to a collision in territorial waters. Suppose a 
seaman is injured as a result of a collision in foreign territorial 
waters. He brings suit in an American court against his em-
ployers. The court would probably hold that the relation of 
the seaman to his employers was a problem of the ship's in-
ternal economy and apply the ship's law to the seaman's ac-
tion. But to determine whether the ship was properly navi-
gated or not, the court might have to refer to the navigation 
rules of the territorial waters. A reference to the law of the 
ship with respect to the seaman's claim against his employers 
would be especially probable if the ship were owned by Amer-
ican citizens. 
English decisions show the same tendency to apply the 
law of the territorial waters. In The Arum 5 a collision oc-
4
ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939) 147· 
5 The Arum, [1921] P. 12. 
In Owners of S. S. Reresby v. Owners of S. S. Cobetas, (1923) Scots L. T. 719 
a Scottish court refused to apply the law of foreign territorial waters to a 
collision which occurred there. The foreign law excused the defendant from 
liability, but the court rendered a judgment against him on the ground that 
the case ought to be decided by the general maritime law as administered at the 
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curred in the harbour of Gibraltar. Action was brought in an 
English court which found that the collision was due to the 
negligence of a pilot whom the port authorities had placed in 
charge of the offending vessel. Under the English Pilotage 
Act of I 9 I 3 the owners of the offending vessel would have 
been responsible, under such circumstances, for the resulting 
damage. But the court held that its decision must be governed 
by the common law of Gibraltar, which exonerated the own-
ers from any liability for the acts of a compulsory pilot. The 
action was therefore dismissed. 
Where, however, the foreign law creates a liability which 
English internal law would not recognize under the same 
circumstances, the first rule of Phillips v. Eyre6 will prevent 
an English court from enforcing the foreign law. The famous 
case of The Halley/ upon which this rule was based, arose 
out of a collision in Belgian waters. The Privy Council refused 
to enforce the Belgian law because, contrary to English com-
mon law, it made the owners of the offending ship liable for 
the acts of a compulsory pilot. 
In the case of TheM. Moxham 8 an unsuccessful attempt 
was made to induce an English court to apply the law of a 
ship in a collision case. The ship in question was of British 
registry; it had demolished a pier in Spanish waters. The 
shipowners alleged in their pleading that they were not liable 
for this injury, under Spanish law, because it was due to the 
negligence of the ship's crew. The owners of the pier argued 
that, under these circumstances, British law should be allowed 
to impose liability upon the owners, no matter what the rule 
of Spanish law might be. They cited cases in which British 
forum. The decision is, from a conflict of laws point of view, highly objection-
able, and has been criticized in DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS, Ed. 5 (1932) 987. 
See generally JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME 
JURISDICTION (1927) 135· 
6 Phillips v, Eyre, (r 87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. 1. 
'The Halley, (r868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193. 
"TheM. Moxham, (r875) r P. D. 43, (r876) r P. D. 107. 
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criminal law had been applied to conduct on board British 
ships in foreign waters. Sir Robert Phillimore accepted this 
choice-of-law theory, but he was reversed by the Court of Ap-
peal. That court held that the shipowners must be liable under 
Spanish law or not at all. 
Several cases have come before the English courts in which 
the defendant had seized the plaintiff's goods in foreign ter-
ritorial waters. If the seizures were justified under the law 
of the place of wrong, the actions were dismissed. 9 
Let us consider now the position of legal rules governing 
navigation in territorial waters. These rules must be obeyed 
by all ships entering the territory, regardless of what law they 
carry with them. It would be most unfair not to decide all 
questions of responsibility for collisions in the territory by ref-
erence to those rules. Hence English courts in dealing with 
collisions in foreign waters usually apply the foreign rules of 
navigation.10 Doubtless American courts would follow the 
same practice.11 
Moreover, foreign navigation rules are exempt from the 
exclusionary effect of the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre. An 
English court will impose liability in respect of an act done in 
foreign waters which would have been perfectly innocent if 
it had been done in English waters. All that is necessary is to 
show that the act constituted a breach of a foreign rule of 
navigation. This exception to the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre 
stems from the Privy Council's opinion in The Halley 12 upon 
which the first rule in Phillip v. Eyre was based. The passage 
is as follows: 
"Dobree v. Napier, (I836) 2 Bing. N.C. 78I, I32 Eng. Rep. 301; Carr v. 
Fracis Times & Co. [I902] A. C. I76. 
10 See the RussianS. S. Yourri, (I88s) L. R. IO App. Cas. 276; The Talabot, 
(I89o) IS P. D. 194; The Diana, [1894] A. C. 625. 
11 See The New York, (I 899) I 7 5 U.S. I 87, 20 Sup. Ct. 67; The Lansdowne, 
(D. C. Mich., I9oo) Ios Fed. 436. 
"'The Halley, (x868) L. R. 2 P. C. I93> 203. 
MARITIME TORTS 271 
"It is true that in many cases the Courts of England inquire 
into and act upon the law of Foreign countries, as in the case 
of a contract entered into in a Foreign country, where, by 
express reference, or necessary implication, the Foreign law 
is incorporated with the contract, and proof and consideration 
of the Foreign law therefore become necessary to the con-
struction of the contract itself. And as in the case of a collision 
on an ordinary road in a Foreign country, where the rule of 
the road in force at the place of collision may be a necessary 
ingredient in the determination of the question by whose fault 
or negligence the alleged tort was committed." 
SECTION 58 
MARITIME TORTS ON THE HIGH SEAS INVOLVING A SINGLE SHIP 
Selecting a proper law for an alleged wrong on board a 
ship on the high seas is not a difficult matter. The law of 
the ship appears to be the obvious choice. The leading author-
ity is the Supreme Court's decision in The T itanic.1 The Ti-
tanic, a British ship on her maiden voyage, struck an iceberg 
on the high seas and sank with great loss of life. The Supreme 
Court held that her owners might limit the amount of their lia-
bility under American law. But in delivering the court's opin-
ion Mr. Justice Holmes clearly indicated that the liability 
of the owners for the many wrongful deaths in the catastrophe 
would be governed by British law. 
In a few cases the somewhat whimsical theory has been 
advanced that if a man on board a vessel on the high seas is 
thrown into the water and drowned, the place of wrong is not 
the vessel but the sea. 2 Therefore the law of the vessel cannot 
be applied. Excluding the law of the vessel, two alternative 
1 The Titanic, (I 9 I 4) 2 3 3 U. S. 7 I 8, 34 Sup. Ct. 7 54· See also The Laming-
ton, (D. C. N.Y., 1898) 87 Fed. 752. 
"Lindstrom v. International Nav. Co. (C. C. N.Y., 1902) II7 Fed. 170; 
Davidsson v. Hill [I901] 2 K. B. 6o6, 6I7; Rundell v. La Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, (19oo) 40 C. C. A. (7th) 625, 1oo Fed. 655. 
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theories remain. (I) There is no law in force on the high seas 
and so the man's dependents recover nothing. ( 2) The high 
seas are governed by the general maritime law. The first of 
these alternatives is obviously objectionable. The second is 
plausible but it rests upon a doctrine which, however hoary 
and respectable, frustrates all choice-of-law policies. In Lind-
strom v. International Nav. Co.3 the law-of-the-waters theory 
was expressly rejected. It cannot be reconciled with The Ti-
tanic nor with the Supreme Court's decision in LaB our go gne, 4 
a collision case. 
In 1920 Congress passed a statute to give a uniform remedy 
for wrongful death on American ships on the high seas.5 Prior 
to that date, the question of liability for wrongful death on an 
American ship had been referred to the law of the American 
state with which the ship was appropriately connected. 6 The 
new statute, usually called the Federal Death Act of 1920, 
changes the internal American law in this respect and also 
epitomizes the choice-of-law principle. Section 4 provides 
"that whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any 
foreign state on account of death by wrongful act, neglect or 
default occurring upon the high seas, such right may be 
maintained in an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts 
of the United States." In The V estris 7 this section was dis-
cussed and applied to a single ship disaster involving a British 
ship. Since the British law gave a right of action for wrongful 
death, the American court enforced it. 
The law of the ship has also been applied to seamen's deaths 
and injuries. As we have pointed out, the American Sea-
"Lindstrom v. International Nav. Co. (C. C. N.Y., 1902) rr7 Fed. 170. 
'La Bourgogne, (r9o8) 210 U.S. 95, 140, 28 Sup. Ct. 664. 
5 41 Stat. 537, c. rrr, § r (r92o), 46 U.S. Code (1934) § 76r. This statute 
was applied to wrongful death as an American ship on the high seas in Salla v. 
Hellman, (D. C. Calif., 1925) 7 F. (2d) 953· 
6 See Lindstrom v. International Nav. Co., (C. C. N.Y., 1902) rr7 Fed. 170; 
The Hamilton, (r9o7) 207 U.S. 398, 28 Sup. Ct. 133. 
'The Vestris, (D. C. N.Y., 1932) 53 F. (2d) 847. 
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man's Act 8 governs seamen's claims against their employers 
with respect to injuries on all American-owned vessels.9 But 
this statute has been held to have no application to American 
seamen who are injured on board a vessel of foreign owner-
ship.10 
English authority upon the precise problem of this section 
is scanty, being confined to a few stray dicta in criminal cases.11 
The case of Madrazo v. Willes 12 (I 820) would appear to 
be relevant although its incidents belong to a bygone era. 
The defendant, a captain in the royal navy, had seized a ship 
loaded with slaves, the property of the plaintiff, on the high 
seas. The plaintiff, a Spaniard, brought an action for damages 
in England. The English court appears to have referred the 
legality of the seizure to Spanish law, as the law of the ship. 
Since Spanish law permitted traffic in slaves, the seizure was 
held to be improper and judgment given in the plaintiff's 
favour. 
SECTION 59 
COLLISION ON THE HIGH SEAS 
In discussing collisions upon the high seas we must dis-
tinguish rules of navigation from other types of legal rules 
affecting liability. In navigation upon the high seas, the ships 
of all nations are governed by the International Rules. A 
British or American court would look to these rules for guid-
ance in any collision case, irrespective of the nationality of the 
8 4I Stat. Ioo7, c. 250, § 33 (I92o), 46 U.S. Code (I934) § 688. 
9 Above, pp. 26I, 265. 
See Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, I93I) 50 F. (2d) 866. 
111 Hogan v. Hamburg American Line, (I934) I 52 Misc. 405, 272 N. Y. 
Supp. 690. 
usee also Canadian Nat. Steamships Co. v. Watson, [I939] Can. L. R. I, 
I Dom. L. R. 273, holding that an injury to a seaman on board a Canadian ship on 
the high seas should be governed by the law of the port of registry. 
12 Madrazo v. Willes, (I82o) 3 Barn. & Ald. 353, Io6 Eng. Rep. 692. 
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ships concerned. Since these rules are part of the law of every 
sea-going nation, no conflict-of-laws question can arise 1 within 
the field which they cover. 
But outside the field of navigation rules there is no such 
uniformity. These rules give us a criterion for deciding which 
ship is at fault. But they do not determine the legal conse-
quences of fault. Upon questions of this kind the laws of other 
sea-going nations often differ from those of England or the 
United States. Different laws regarding the effect of wrong-
ful death are common in the American cases. There may also 
be important differences regarding the measure of damages 
and vicarious liability. 
When a ship becomes involved in a collision, the claims 
which may be brought against her or her owners fall into two 
distinct categories. The first of these categories consists of what 
may be called internal or carrying claims, claims with respect 
to cargo on board the ship which has been lost or injured and 
claims with respect to persons on board her who have been 
injured or killed. The second category includes what may be 
called external or non-carrying claims, which originate with 
the other ship involved in the collision. These may be claims 
for damage to the other ship, claims for loss or injury of 
cargo on board the other ship, or claims in respect of persons 
who were on the other ship and have suffered in the collision. 
Let us deal first with the internal claims. The country to 
which the carrying ship belongs has a certain interest in these 
claims and its law is a convenient one for the parties. There 
is little connection, however, between these claims against 
the carrying ship and the non-carrying ship. The country to 
1 American courts apparently apply the International Rules to the ships of 
foreign nations which have adopted them upon choice-of-law principles. See 
The Scotia, (1871) 14 Wall. (81 U.S.) 17o; The Belgenland, (1885) 114 
U. S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. 86o. 
Courts of tlxe British Empire apply the International Rules to foreign ships 
in obedience to statutes and orders-in-council. See MARSDEN, CoLLISIONS AT 
SEA (1934) 288. 
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which the non-carrying ship belongs can have little concern 
with the relations of the carrying ship to its passengers, crew, 
and cargo owners. So far as these relations are concerned the 
situation is not unlike a single ship disaster. In dealing with 
internal or carrying claims it should be possible to exclude 
altogether the law of the non-carrying ship. This appears 
to have been the course taken by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of La Bourgogne.2 
So much for internal or carrying claims. Let us consider 
now the choice-of-law problem raised by the external claims 
brought in respect of the other vessel, its cargo, or the persons 
on board it. In this connection it is well to take a diversity 
between two possible situations: ( r) where the ships involved 
belong to the same country and ( 2) where the ships involved 
belong to different countries. 
Where both ships involved in the collision belong to the 
same nation, the choice-of-law problem need not, as Robinson 
points out, be any more difficult than that of a wrong involving 
a single vessel. The nation to which the two ships belong has 
the greatest interest in ruling upon the controversy, and the 
owners of the vessels should not complain of being judged by 
their own law. There can be little doubt that in case of a col-
lision between two ships of the same nation, an American 
court would apply the law of that nation. But actual prece-
dents for this practice are scanty.8 
"La Bourgogne, (r9o8) 210 U.S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664. This decision ap-
parently overrules Rundell v. La,Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, (19oo) 
40 C. C. A. (7th) 625, roo Fed. 655, holding that death claims against the carry-
ing ship arising out of a collision ought to be governed by the general maritime 
law. 
8 For dicta, see The Scotland, ( r 8 8 r) r o 5 U. S. 24, 3 r ; The Belgenland, 
(r885) 114 U.S. 3551 369,5 Sup. Ct. 86o. 
See also The Hamilton, (r9o7) 207 U.S. 3981 28 Sup. Ct. 133 where, how-
ever, the two ships were connected with the state of Delaware. The Hamilton 
struck and sank the Saginaw; both vessels were at fault. Claims were filed against 
the Hamilton in respect of several persons who, being on board the Saginaw, 
had been drowned. At this time there was no federal statute dealing with wrong-
ful death on the high seas. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of 
federal legislation, the claimants might rely upon the Delaware death act. 
Under the maritime common law, they would have had no cause of action. The 
Harrisburg, (r886) 119 U.S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140. 
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In The Eagle Point 4 British law was applied in a case of 
collision between two British vessels, the Eagle Point and 
the Biela. Both vessels were to blame for the accident. The 
owners of cargo aboard the Biela claimed damages against the 
Eagle Point for the full value of their cargo, to which they 
would have been entitled under American law. But the court 
decided that the case ought to be governed by British law in-
stead. The British rule in such a case limited the Eagle Point's 
liability to half the value of the cargo and it was so ordered. 
English courts incline to a different view of the matter. 
They cling steadfastly to the principle that all collisions upon 
the high seas ought to be adjudicated according to the law 
maritime, as understood and applied by English courts. No 
exception to this general doctrine is recognized even though 
the ships involved share a common law and nationality. The 
problem was squarely raised and resolved in Chartered Mer-
cantile Bank of India v. Netherlands SteamNav. Co.5 where 
the facts were similar to those in The Eagle Point. The ves-
sels involved, the Crown Prince and the Atjeh, were both 
Dutch. Each was partly at fault. The action was brought by 
the owners of cargo on the Crown Prince against the owners 
of the Atjeh. What their position under Dutch law would 
have been is not clear, but the court refused to consider Dutch 
law. It held that the cargo owner's claim should be determined 
by the general maritime law. This meant, of course that t~e 
cargo owner's claim was controlled by the ordinary English 
rule which the American court followed in The Eagle Point. 
Since the Atjeh was partly to blame, her owners were liable 
to the Crown Prince cargo owners for half damages. 
A much more difficult problem is presented when non-
carrying claims are brought against one of two ships which be-
long to different countries, governed by different laws. Among 
•rhe Eagle Point, (r9o6) 73 C. C. A. 569, 142 Fed. 453· 
"Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands, etc., Co., (r883) ro 
Q. B. D. 521. See also The Johann Friederich, (r839) r W. Rob. 35, r66 Eng. 
Rep. 487. 
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the English and American materials of dogmatic authority 
support may be found for the application of no less than three 
different laws, viz: (I) the law of the ship against which the 
claim is made, the non-carrying ship; ( 2) the law of the carry-
ing ship; (3) the general maritime law as interpreted by the 
forum. Let us consider the propriety of a reference to each of 
these laws, in order. 
The law of the non-carrying ship against which claim is 
made is obviously connected to the factual pattern. It is in the 
interest of the government of the country to which that ship 
belongs to regulate the conduct of those who own and control 
her and to prescribe their liability for mismanaging her. If, for 
example, the laws of that country make shipowners liable for 
wrongful death caused by negligent navigation, those laws 
may properly be applied in a case where the death is suffered 
by persons on a foreign vessel. Effect was given to this view of 
the matter by Judge Learned Hand in The James McGee,6 
where a vessel owned by a New Jersey corporation sank a 
vessel owned by the United States. Both ships were at fault. 
The facts occurred before Congress passed the Federal Death 
Act of I 920. Judge Learned Hand allowed the dependents 
of men drowned on the government ship to base their claims 
against the New Jersey ship upon New Jersey law. This de-
cision has been followed in two cases of international conflict 
of laws.7 
The second law whose relation to an international collision 
on the high seas has been judicially discussed is the law of the 
carrying ship, the ship on which the injury has been sustained. 
The nation to which this ship belongs has also a certain inter-
est in the controversy. It may quite properly desire to estab-
lish the rules of compensation for injury to its vessels or to 
"The James McGee, (D. C. N. Y., 1924) 300 Fed. 93· See, apparently, 
contra, The Middlesex, (D. C. Mass., 1916) 253 Fed. 142. 
• The Aquitania, (1924) Am. Mar. Cas. 1440; Powers v. Cunard S. S. Co., 
(D. C. N.Y., 1925) 3Z F. (2d) 72.0. 
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those on board them. The interest of a state in determining 
the legal significance of acts which, though done in another 
state, take effect upon persons or things within its borders has 
always been recognized in conflict of laws. If a state may 
properly impose criminal or civil liability in respect of extra-
territorial acts which take effect inside its boundaries, why 
should it not do so with respect to those which take effect on 
board its ships? 
The relevancy of the carrying ship's law was recognized 
in The Windrush,S although the decision proceeds upon the 
theory that the court applied the general maritime law. The 
carrying vessel was the American Windrush, the defending 
vessel, the Spanish Buenos Aires. Apparently the Buenos 
Aires was entirely to blame for the disaster. With regard to 
claims against the Buenos Aires for men drowned off the 
Windrush it was argued that the liability of the Buenos Aires 
and her owners must be defined by Spanish law. According to 
Spanish law the owners were personally liable for the deaths 
but no maritime liens were created against the Buenos Aires. 
The court rejected this argument, however, and applied 
American law, to wit, the Federal Death Act of 1920, which 
was interpreted as giving a lien. American law was not invoked 
as the law of the carrying ship, but as the general maritime 
law, seen through the eyes of the forum. 
There remains the third of the three choice-of-law theories 
which we set out to investigate: the reference to the general 
maritime law. For all its unreality, this doctrine goes undis-
puted in British courts. As we have seen, its scope extends to 
collisions between two ships which belong to the same coun-
try.9 Its application to collisions between ships with different 
"The Windrush, (D. C. N.Y., 1922) 286 Fed. 251, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1924) 
5 F. (2d) 425. See contra, The Sagamore, (r9r7) 159 C. C. A. (rst) 6or, 247 
Fed. 743· 
• Above, p. 276. 
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laws is illustrated by The Leon.10 This action was brought by 
the owners of the British Harelda to recover damages from 
the owners of the Spanish Leon which had sunk the Harelda 
on the high seas. The owners of the Leon contended that 
their personal liability depended on Spanish law, and that 
according to Spanish law they were not vicariously liable for 
the negligent navigation of their servants, the master and 
crew. Sir Robert Phillimore declined to be controlled by 
Spanish law and held that "the law which is applicable here 
and governs the liability of the defendants in this case is the 
general maritime law as administered in this country." 
In the United States the general maritime law of the forum 
theory is supported by various dicta of the Supreme Court.11 
Moreover, as we have seen, it was expressly adopted in The 
Windrush. 12 There the court applied American law to claims 
respecting persons drowned off an American ship sunk by a 
Spanish ship. In speaking of the Federal Death Act of I 920 
as embodying the general maritime law the court was a little 
embarrassed by the implication that Congress had apparently 
altered the maritime law of the world.13 So the court em-
phasized the fact that numerous other maritime nations had 
recognized a cause of action for wrongful death too. 
Notwithstanding the language used by the court in The 
Windrush and other opinions, there are substantial reasons for 
thinking that the general maritime law theory will not prove 
acceptable to American courts. This theory, as we have indi-
cated, is based upon a fiction. There may be interesting simi-
larities between the maritime laws of various nations. But 
there is no uniform maritime law. There is no reason why a 
10 The Leon, (1881) 6 P. D. 148. 
11 See The Scotland, (1 881) 105 U. S. 24, 31; The Belgenland, (1885) 
114 U. S. 355, 369, 5 Sup. Ct. 86o. 
See also CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 410. 
12 The Windrush, (D. C. N.Y., 1922) 286 Fed. 251, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1924) 
5 F. (2d) 425. 
18 The same problem came before a British court in Davidsson v. Hill [1901] 
z K. B. 6o6. 
28o TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
collision between a French and a British ship ought to be ad-
judicated according to American law upon the pretext that 
it is "general maritime law." In the maritime field, as else-
where, uniformity in all courts and other choice-of-law ideals 
can best be achieved by the thorough-going application of 
choice-of-law principles. It is true that the general maritime 
law theory has been adopted in England. But English courts 
are notoriously indifferent to choice-of-law policies. American 
lawyers and judges understand these policies better because 
the diversity of internal jurisdictions in the United States has 
forced the courts to consider them. Some American writers 
disapprove of the general maritime law theory.14 A solution 
of the problem upon a choice-of-law basis would be much 
more in keeping with the American conflict of laws tradition. 
The problem created by a collision of two ships governed 
by different laws is not unique in the conflict of laws. It is 
simply another example of a factual situation significantly 
connected with two states which have different internal laws. 
Similar problems have arisen in connection with railway car-
riage, telegrams, workmen's compensation, etc. Sometimes the 
courts have struggled to establish a uniform rule selecting 
one system of law to the exclusion of the other. But usually 
they have recognized the interests of both jurisdictions by per-
mitting an alternative reference to the internal law of either 
one. The collision problem might well be treated in the same 
fashion. If we consider all the American cases together we 
may say that it has been so treated. Of course it is possible 
that a case may arise in which the policies of the two laws con-
cerned conflict with one another. Then the court of the forum 
will have to choose between them.15 
,.. For discussion of the dispute between conflict-of-laws writers and admiralty 
lawyers on this point, see RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939) 836. See also BEALE, 
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. z, § 410.1; Magruder and Grout, "Wrongful 
Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction," (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 395, 413, 
note 79· 
15 See above, section 3 8. 
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